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I. Introduction 
 
1.1. National Tasks in Global Terms: Between Opportunities and Constraints 
 
While international division of labor and internationalization was deepening across the globe 
and  thereby  mutual dependencies among national economies through the institutionalization 
of international trade, movements of capital and labor migration were strengthened, quite the 
contrary was the case in the former socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s. As a result of centrifugal trends, the Soviet republics which previously made up the 
one common country, found themselves on their way to independence. Being an integral part 
of the given process, Uzbekistan had also to face a choice of new development. The country 
started searching for a new model which would reinforce its national sovereignty and identity, 
but within the new rules of global economic and political order. 
The new national development model suggested by the government was supposed to carry 
through the set of transition reforms in the political, economical, social and other areas of 
public life and reach the final strategic goal, i.e. a secular democratic state with a developed 
socially-oriented market economy and an open foreign policy. Domestic macroeconomic 
reforms, nation-building processes and integration within the world community were 
considered as simultaneous and indivisible elements in the new development conception. The 
president of Uzbekistan particularly emphasized that "integration into the world community is 
only possible provided its conformity to the modern perceptions of a democratic state with a 
developed market economic system. Equally, the country could be modernized on the 
indispensable condition of its integration into the world community, i.e. through  finding a 
deserved place in the international division of labor and active participation in creation of 
regional and global security systems".1 
By the declaration of its openness, the republic, thus, officially admits the integrity of its 
national development with sweeping global trends promoting interdependence and 
complementarities in the world economy. Therefore, one of the most important pre-conditions 
for the creation of efficient development mechanisms in Uzbekistan after independence is to 
set up an open economic system which could not only be characterized by traditional high 
ratio of import and export transactions in GDP, but also conceptually a model of national 
development whose instruments of domestic and foreign policies are closely correlated with 
and influenced by internationalization of world's economic life. 
                                                 
1 Translated by the author from Karimov I. Uzbekistan na Poroge XXI Veka: Ugrozy Bezopasnosti, Usloviya 
Stabilnosti I Garantii Progressa. Tashkent, 1997, p.290. 
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As experience of world economic development shows, the epoch of the secluded development 
with the exclusive emphasis on internal sources is more and more outdated. Such an 
orientation is basically related to the irrational use of national resources and therefore 
becomes soon an impediment to economic and social progress on the way to a market 
economy. After almost 70 years of isolationist development, the factor of openness is going to 
play a positive economic and even more political role in pursuing domestic reforms. The 
benefits of a more open strategy in foreign economic relations in particular, are mainly 
connected to the following positive effects: 
1. With the higher share of GDP involved into international turnover, the country may obtain 
qualitatively new, additional opportunities for acceleration and increase in growth of national 
income. Consequently, in such a case, foreign relations in general become a crucial factor of 
intensive economic growth.  
2. Through the establishment of relations with the world economy, a country may enhance 
development of those market mechanisms and institutions which are either weak or absent at 
all. These issues may include, for example, competition policy, privatization processes, stock 
exchange, credit and insurance mechanisms which all together would promote the 
establishment of a multistructural economy with diversified property forms. 
3. Development of trade relations on the commonly admitted international commercial basis 
allow to strengthen the price factor which is important in reducing serious trade distortions 
widely developed in the former system of resource distribution. 
4. Given national priorities, the country may improve the commodities structure in its export 
by pursuing new structural policy. The share of products with high value added is steadily 
increasing against the background of diversification of export and expansion of geography of 
trade relations. 
5. And finally, the most crucial thing is that the country takes the opportunity to develop bi- 
and multilateral cooperations with any country concerned; it defines its policy within 
international and regional organizations in accordance with its national priorities. 
At the same time the process of globalization takes sometimes complex and controversial 
forms. It is not realistic to expect that it bears positive changes only and therefore, is able to 
solve all the existing problems. On the contrary, as further interdependence occurs between 
countries and regions, the young countries have to confront with a number of new appeals 
threatening their emerging economic and political systems. Economically, for instance, 
Uzbekistan has to face with the consequences of world economic cycles which have had little 
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effects on domestic processes before. Domestic economic sectors are still fragile so that to 
react adequately to foreign shocks, immediate inflow or outflow of capital, etc. From the point 
of view of the pursuance of domestic policies, one may even observe a certain loss of 
autonomy in administering domestic processes which in turn may seriously affect socio-
political and economic stability in the country. In political sense, the republic, like all the 
other states of the region, is already resisting to the pressure of international terrorism, 
extremism, drugs traffic, trade in weapons and even people.  
Hence, the achievement of higher economic growth and national living standards via adequate 
policy measures is going to be an integral part of a clear strategy on conflict prevention in its 
modern perception. This policy agenda includes first and foremost domestic reforms which 
are called upon to promote the realization of underused domestic economic potential. This 
potential, among other factors, is largely determined by the endowment with natural 
resources. During the rise in oil prices, there was a substantial shift of income from energy-
importing countries, primarily industrial western countries and the third world countries of 
Asia, to energy-producing states of the Persian Gulf states. For example, the total GDP of the 
Persian Gulf’s states in 1981 (about $210 bln.) was 19 times that of a decade earlier, which 
was explained by the increase in prices rather than in volumes of oil produced and exported.2 
The question is whether industrialization in energy-rich Central Asian countries3 may have 
much to do with the similar “windfalls” from production and export of energy products. In 
addition, one of the most frequently expressed academic views remains that energy 
interdependence between the regional states is believed to contain still unrealized potential to 
enhance the so far faint patterns of much-needed regional cooperation in Central Asia.  
The oil shocks of the 1970s triggered off some new approaches to analize and discuss the 
problem of highly interdependent policy issues on national security in the context of 
economic and energy security. Moreover, the thesis that the countries with rich mineral 
resources would face faster economic growth, did not have support in real practice. On the 
contrary, the energy dependent countries did much better with the problem of high imported 
oil and could reach sustainable economic development with higher efficiency. At the same 
time, for most of the exporting countries unprecedented windfalls in the short-run became a 
source of huge domestic inefficiencies which on the contrary hampered economic growth in 
the middle- and long-run perspective. 
                                                 
2 Kubursi A.A. (1984) Oil, Industrialization and Development in the Arab Gulf States. Sydney-New Hampshire 
3 In the given context, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Further references to Central Asia comprise 
also Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan. 
 4
In addition, the new role of natural resources in the world development has much to do with 
the growing importance of NGOs and other movements (like the “Greenpeace”, etc.) at 
international level. Such movements demand  not only a cautious attitude towards the gifts of 
nature, but support also the use of environment-friendly technologies in production processes, 
and the reduction of wasteful consumption of primary resources in favor of a more efficient 
manufacturing of the available resources. These movements became largely popular in 
industrially developed countries as a reflection of fully democratic societies. In line with 
commercial purposes, they might be partly seen also as the reason of the trends that forced 
many industrial producers to transfer some of their production, especially the dirty production 
requiring low-skilled labour, from their home countries to the developing countries. In such 
cases, it might have inadequate effects on  the public opinion in recipient countries, who do 
not feel direct social benefits, but only the ambitions of multinationals to exploit domestic 
natural resources as well as cheap labor force. In Central Asia the aforementioned problems 
are exacerbated not only by its remoteness due to immediate problems of the underdeveloped 
and at best obsolete infrastructure to boost its exports, but also by hidden rivalry between the 
great powers keeping to its own national and geopolitical imperatives over the region’s 
perspectives. After more than a decade of independent development only a handful of energy 
projects have been realized to diversify the traditional energy outlets, as well as to overcome 
deficiency and then secure efficiency in both, production and consumption of energy within 
the region.  
The key to long-term success, however, is hidden in the policy measures directed towards 
institutional and structural reforms to build up a new economy with the diversity of property 
forms and competition on an equal footing, which did not exist in the former planned 
economy. The government is obliged to coordinate these activities by creating a sound 
domestic atmosphere that encourages those spheres in which Uzbekistan and other states may 
have potentially comparative advantages and positive social effects. It needs to strive for the 
improvements in export structure moving toward the articles with higher value added which 
may provide more sustainability in foreign  exchange inflows. Energy and other raw materials 
are not only influenced by the ups and downs of international prices, but are also exposed to 
the risk of the speeded-up development of alternative substitutes.  
To become competitive in global terms and succeed in domestic reforms would be to some 
degree an easier task if cross-border cooperation had already been well established in the 
region. It is worth noting that political science points at three main reasons for the 
establishment of regional unions. The first one is that countries may have common interests in 
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regional cooperation because  of geographical proximity and common economical, social and 
cultural interests. Secondly, there seems to be some ideological considerations and 
motivations to set up and be unified within a common constitutional union. Finally, it must be 
a rational choice that favorites economic aspects, i.e. when political actors conduct detailed 
analysis of losses and benefits from membership and, subsequently uphold regional 
cooperation if losses from membership are exceeded by potential benefits.4 
The latter, in particular, could be figured out by the following: 
• regional trade may expand through a wider access of producers and consumers of one 
country to the bigger markets of goods and services in other member states; 
• better opportunities for the use of united, i.e. more significant, resources and markets 
in defining and development of new industries reflecting competitive advantages of the 
regional countries; expansion of intra-industry specialization in the framework of large-scale 
industries allowing to benefit from the economies of scale, 
• enhancement of intra-regional competition which promote further competitiveness of 
goods and services initially on the regional level,  and then on  the global level too; 
• intensification of scientific and technological exchange allowing better coordination of 
technological policies and concentration of programs and funds to stimulate further progress 
of science and technologies across the region; 
• upbuilding and maintenance of all kind of adequate infrastructure, especially transport, 
communications, financial; 
• better opportunities to defend their national and regional interests in bi- and 
multilateral economic talks with the more developed countries and regions, as well as on the 
level of international institutions. 
There are several definitions of “economic integration” in academic literature.5 The variety of 
scientific schools studying the phenomenon of integration agree nevertheless on defining it as 
a complex, structural and multifaceted process. This kind of complexity requires to look at it 
in some structural way in order to highlight the features and realize its internal logic. Hence, 
its main substance could be qualified as strengthening of interdependence among the 
economies of countries, as a result of either purposeful activities of the governments in these 
                                                 
4 Jakobeit K. Teoriya Regionalnoy Integratsii. In Diter H. Regionalnaya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii. 
Zentralstelle fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialentwicklung, Berlin, 1995. p.5  
5 For this see Micic M. The Theory of Economic Integration, in International Trade, St.Martin’s Press, New 
York, 1998, pp.441-443. 
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countries, or the initiatives backed by the private sector, often by multinational corporations, 
to draw their economies together. The first one is so called policy-led integration which 
focuses upon reducing trade barriers between members in order to create a free trade area or 
customs union. It may also go even further to institutionalisation of integrative efforts and 
harmonisation of various policies (fiscal, monetary, industrial, etc.). The second type is 
something different driven by investors-led activities, when the latter perceive the advantages 
from intra-regional integration compared to inter-regional integration. The first type may 
encourage the second one to reinforce the regional activities, however investors-led trends 
may also occur in the absence of specific policy measures. Moreover, in accordance with the 
aforementioned types of integration, regionalization may take place in trade and/or production 
level. The former touches upon trade issues with the subsequent removal of barriers to cross-
border trade in goods and services, while the latter implies the liberalisation of barriers to 
cross-border flows of production factors (labor, capital) and technology. Representing deeper 
form, integration on the production level may thus require more comprehensive policy 
measures than those directed on the support of free flow of goods and services only.6  
Also, integration is divided into a negative and a positive one if we look at the given process 
through the prism of some policy measures. Negative integration implies to take some steps 
called upon to eliminate protectionist barriers in order to stimulate the development of better 
economic relations between the countries covered by the integration union. Positive 
integration suggests a set of measures of coordination of industrial potential of country-
members to the regional union, including the methods of industrial, fiscal and monetary 
policies.7 
Equally, by the character of its activities, regionalism may be open-typed, as well as closed-
typed. Open-type regionalism considers economic development and regional cooperation in 
the context of the whole world economic development, serving as some kind of an interim 
stage, a pre-condition to globalization in the entire world economy. In such a particular case, 
regional integration is considered to promote the viability of political and economic 
formations covered by the given regional space. Stronger interdependence and common 
                                                 
6 Micic M. The Extent of Regionalisation in World Economy, in International Trade, St.Martin’s Press, New 
York, 1998, pp.512-514. Some others use the categories “market integration” and “industrial integration” to 
qualify the same trends. Market integration  means the availability of specific guarantees for the free sale of 
goods on the markets, as well as the free movement of factors of production between the countries intending to 
set up an integration union. Industrial integration is based on the development of industries going beyond 
national boundaries in order to maximize benefits from the economies of scale in the framework of the whole 
regional union. 
7 Bulat V. Doctriny Nadnatsionalnogo Regulirovaniya Ekonomicheskih Otnosheniy. Moskva, 1984, pp.6-38; 
Faminskiy I. (ed.) Mejdunarodnye Ekonomicheskiye Otnosheniya. Moskva, 2001, pp.739-747. 
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interests of the member-states trigger regional competition and steps towards more openness 
in global terms. Contrary to that, closed regionalism could be defined as the orientation on 
both, national and regional efforts, with less commitments on full-scale liberalization in the 
course of global trends. A regional bloc is thus initially set up for the protection of regional 
interests in competition with other countries and regions and finally may lead to alienation of 
the region.8 
Rich international experience of regional efforts since the first regional wave in the 1960s 
suggests that the political set of features is going to be more characteristic for the regional 
initiatives between the developed countries. Only the latter, as a rule, may afford the desired 
level of foreign economic liberalization which is necessary for integration, while certain 
aspects of relations in the integration process between emerging economies or states in 
transition may be either poorly developed or even absent at all. Therefore, relatively to the 
developed economies on the one hand, and - to the developing countries on the other hand, we 
may talk about the differences both in motivations and models, as well as the speed of 
integration process. 
In particular, developed economies are obviously used to move towards integration with the 
perception of wider opportunities to realize their comparative advantages in global terms. 
Emerging economies may be generally driven by poor economic development and the 
perceived exigency of joining efforts in order to be more efficient in bringing forward their 
common interests in negotiations with relatively stronger partners. In addition, small 
economies may unite their forces to realize some concrete joint projects within the common 
strategy of industrialization. Also, integration unions may be set up by developing economies 
in addition to existing military and political blocs. Therefore, in all aforementioned cases the 
level of real economic interdependence may be not that high. It is an even more complex task 
to succeed in arranging integration processes between the countries with differences in the 
structure and the scale of economies, as well as between those being on various stages of 
economic development. This process is going to be smoother if the economies of countries 
forming a union are on more or less the same level of development. 
A number of studies on regionalization across the globe have revealed the following pre-
requisites for these processes to be successful: 
                                                 
8 Kasymova N. Osobennosti Vzaimodeystviya Globalizma I Regionalizma. Ekonomicheskiy Vestnik 
Uzbekistana, 2001, N6; Simoniya N. Globalizatsiya i Neravnomernost Mirovogo Razvitiya. MEMO, 2001, N3. 
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1. Similar economic structures and the start-up of industrialization process. With 
economic structures and the level of industrial development being significantly different, 
there is high probability for a situation in which some countries will face direct losses as a 
result of dynamic effects. It finally may lead the integration process to a failure or stagnation, 
though it may be also of a short-run character, or somehow be offset. Until compensation 
mechanisms are created, the countries will seem to have little concerns in the realization of 
regional initiatives. 
2. Similarities in socio-economic and political conceptions. Common socio-economic 
and political experience and goals, as well as the readiness to concessions may be crucial in 
reaching mutual understanding in multilateral negotiations. Political stability is an important 
pre-condition to a constructive approach and is necessary to cushion resistance and opposing 
views during integration process. 
3. Step-by-step strategy. Ambitions should correlate with real opportunities. Gradual and 
pragmatic orientation on the development of new forms of mutual consultations and 
cooperation may be much more efficient than momentous propaganda of vain and ambitious 
goals. Successful integration requires both, time and patience; its entire purposes are 
unattainable through a big bang jump. 
What are the implications of regionalization across the world in the past for Uzbekistan and 
whole Central Asia? In terms of common history, similar cultural traditions, the way of life 
and mentality of the regional peoples, as well as common economic, political and security 
challenges the young states are to confront with, the region is induced to look for the creation 
of common economic, political and spiritual environment. Central Asia has the territory of 
more than 4 mln.km2 (18% of the CIS) which is rich in natural and labor resources. The latter 
make up more than 55 mln. people (19% of the total CIS population), with more than 40% 
living in Uzbekistan. It seems to be true that the countries have hardly found themselves in an 
ideal position to realize its political and economic strategy after the 1990s. Yet there is 
definitely some potential for accelerated growth and development in the regional perspective. 
One point to be stressed here is, that the expansion and strengthening of cross-border 
economic cooperation among the regional states would increase the possibility of these 
countries playing an important role as connectors in the various routes linking Asia and 
Europe. At the same time, it would induce economics of the region, which are too small 
individually, to form a stable and medium-sized market which could be much more attractive 
to desperately needed inflows of foreign capital. In addition, because of their different 
 9
endowment with natural resources and geographical characteristics, it would be a long way 
ahead for the countries to individually complete the transition to a market economy on their 
own efforts, and it would be inefficient. Only by forming a common market will they be able 
to deal with the movements of international economy and other economic regions. 
Yet, the previous efforts of the Central Asian states to cooperate and coordinate their policies 
on the regional level and to promote common goals in various issue areas, have proceeded 
only slowly overall, reflecting difficulties between the states. This process took a 
controversial form in the past due to a number of specific reasons. Firstly, the countries were  
confronted with a complex process of socio-economic and political transformation, 
accompanied by a number of challenges of both, domestic and foreign character. As a rule, 
these problems were addressed by unilateral actions from the states which did not promote 
regional initiatives and even strained the interstate relations. Secondly, regional structures set 
up in the region, have mostly tended to be consultative in nature rather than consisting of 
bodies making and implementing decisions. If on the one hand, it might have been related to 
the peculiarities of the Asian business culture which might prefer informal relations without 
appropriate institutionalization and obligations, especially among the elites who had already 
good personal relations from the Soviet era; then, on the other hand, it might reflect an 
emphasis on the consolidation of new-found sovereignty of the states having little interests in 
pooling their sovereignty. Thirdly, throughout the past decade the countries remained largely 
the economies with primarily commodities orientation in their export which made the states 
compete in searching for the trading partners outside the region. At the same time, intra-
regional trade experienced a faint pattern and even tended to decrease. Fourthly, regional 
policies have been basically associated with state-level activities. There has been less 
evidence of so called “soft regionalism” reflecting sub- and suprastate regional processes 
which was integral part of regionalism in other parts of the world. But some functional 
linkages in industry, for example in the energy sector, have been also formed. Finally, 
initiatives for active cooperation have to take the form of top down efforts which seemed to 
be explained by the peculiarities of political system in the regional states. 
In this regard, the following questions may be put up: what are the further steps for 
Uzbekistan and the whole region in XXI century to be undertaken in the light of the necessary 
domestic reforms, strengthening sovereignty, and sustainability of a nation-building process 
on the one hand; and the perceived exigency for regional cooperation to resist the global 
threats on the other hand? May the new priorities in Uzbekistan’s development strategy on 
comprehensive liberalization of domestic political, economic and social life serve as a turning 
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point influencing the whole spectre of intra-regional relations given the country’s economic 
and military potential in Central Asia? Are there sufficient objective opportunities for the 
regional states to rely on closer cooperative links with each other? Or will the countries 
continue with independent, multivectoral integration with the world community, while 
preferring regional relations to be on bilateral basis? Finally, what are the perspectives of 
regionalization in Central Asia in the light of policy strategies of major powers, such as the 
USA, Russia, China, Iran and the EU, towards each other and with regard to the region? 
The Central Asian patterns seem to be further influenced by the degree of engagement from 
powerful external states. Obviously, much will depend on their direct involvement or non-
involvement in a number of initiatives undertaken by the regional states. Stability and 
sustainable regional development in Central Asia are apparently also pre-determined by the 
construction of the new and diversified system of transport and pipeline network, both intra-
regional and inter-regional, which are called upon to address the strategic tasks of securing a 
wider access to regional and global markets of goods and services. This is a great bottleneck 
on the way to the realization of integration potential of the region, since the structure, 
technical state and conditions of maintenance of the old system outpace international 
standards, while the new ones have not been built yet. In particular, the region falls short of 
the common system of transport corridors, international ports and airports, while the regional 
oil, gas and electricity pipelines are getting out of order which substantially affects the 
effectiveness of transportation of goods and services, including energy resources, both inside 
and outside the region.  
 
1.2. The Goals, Tasks and Methodological Approach 
In the light of the aforementioned, there are several issues which should be taken into 
consideration in the debates on Central Asian transition societies. The main goal of this work 
is to analise and find out possibilities of the sustainable development of Uzbekistan through 
the prism of its energy policy and effective regional cooperation. 
For this purpose, a number of tasks should be realized. In particular, we need, firstly, to 
analize the strategy of socio-economic development in Uzbekistan in the light of political 
transformation and  the nation-building process. Secondly, to reveal the substance of energy 
policy of Uzbekistan in the past decade and to discover its potential to contribute to the 
process of industrialization in the future. Thirdly, to debate general models of prospective 
national development. Fourthly, to scrutinize the role and contribution of the foreign sector to 
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the comprehensive integration of Uzbekistan into the world community in the sense of 
business climate improvement and the enhancement of financial and technological capital 
inflows to keep up domestic transformation process. Fifthly, to conduct a detailed analysis of 
regional efforts in Central Asia in the light of regionalization trends in the world; to highlight 
peculiarities and challenges of these processes in the region; and to shape possible prospects 
given local opportunities and foreign assistance.  
In the given context, a two-pronged approach could be useful embracing systemic and 
modelling dimensions. The systemic one suggests to give a look at the development of 
Uzbekistan and the whole Central Asian region in XXI century through the prism of “national 
interests”. Such an approach may consist of the three intertwined aspects: stability and 
security, sustainable economic growth, and persistent integration process. All of the aspects 
are closely interdependent and strengthen each other. A more comprehensive approach to 
security suggests that poverty and underdevelopment are among the fundamental causes 
which create a fertile ground for the proliferation of various destructive forces, including 
international terrorism and extremism. Among the possible methods of counteraction in this 
case is the necessity to overcome the economic roots of proliferation of these evils by 
loosening pressing poverty problems. It supposes to have not only direct measures allowing 
people minimum social rights to meet their needs in education, medicine and other areas, but 
also the steps on creation jobs to have the sources of sustainable income which in turn could 
be reached through a complex of socio-economic reforms securing stable economic growth. 
Equally, economic and social reforms are impossible without making people feel safe in the 
streets, on markets, at  work, or even at home. Hence, with domestic security and stable 
economic development in place, one may depend upon better opportunities in the world 
competition for foreign direct investments and benefit from international division of labor.  
The second dimension is based on the development of different models with certain situations 
in a place in which losses and benefits are streamlined, both through a geoeconomic and a 
geopolitical view. The Central Asian states are to confront with the simultaneous tasks of 
political and economic transformation under the influence of various domestic and external 
political, socio-economic, cultural, technical, legal challenges. It encourages discourses on 
multiple choices and consequences of their strategies on both, the national and regional level, 
as well as in the light of single policy spheres. For example, the realization of pipeline and 
transport projects in Central Asia affect political and financial interests, as well as suggests 
the use of infrastructure facilities of the neighboring countries. It means that the regional 
states are forced to permanently search for a balanced approach, in order to coordinate first 
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their actions with each other, and then look at intra-regional interests through the prism of 
relations with the outsiders. 
1.3. The Structure of the Research and the Sources of Information 
The given research is an attempt to amplify all the aforementioned aspects through the prism 
of Uzbekistan’s socio-economic policy agenda, with the emphasis on its political effects, 
both, domestically and across the region. Chapter II sets the scene with a broad socio-
economic analysis of the Uzbek development, both, as part of the former Soviet system and as 
independent state after the 1990s. The government of sovereign Uzbekistan encountered the 
necessity to develop its economic strategy in the context of domestic socio-political 
developments. Thus the transformation process and the outcome of the reforms undertaken in 
the past decade, as well as the main contemporary challenges in different areas, are 
scrutinized here. Chapter III  puts a particular emphasis on the developments in the energy 
sector which have played one of the strategic socio-political roles within the development 
agenda after independence. In terms of future economic growth, the importance of the energy 
is expected to remain, both, for domestic needs and exports. There is also an attempt to debate 
about possible models of development of Uzbekistan in the years to come given both, the 
domestic opportunities and a set of external factors. In Chapter IV a glance has been taken 
on the energy issue in regional terms. This issue acquires strategic meaning for the whole 
Central Asian intra-regional relations. The regional states remain strongly interdependent in 
energy, although a number of steps have been taken towards energy self-sufficiency by each 
country. The question here is to not only  push forward  regional cooperation, but also to solve 
existing energy problems through joining forces. On the other hand, the development of  a 
energy resource base in the region does not confine to its local production only. The biggest 
challenge for foreign investors is still how to transport these resources to foreign markets. In 
terms of Central Asia’s land-lockedness, the determination of pipeline routes acquires a 
particular geopolitical meaning. In this regard, these projects should be obviously scrutinized 
through the prism of higher interests to the region from main regional and non-regional 
outsiders, such as the USA, Russia, China, Iran, the EU; through national factors of the past 
developments in those states; intensification of bi- and multilateral relations of the Central 
Asian states with these powers; and the level of cooperation or rivalry between these main 
players. Chapter V suggests that the reforms in the foreign economic sector are crucial to the 
extent to which they contribute to the relations between domestic sectors and the outside 
world. Also the significance of foreign investment strategy, forms and methods of attraction 
of foreign capital are discussed here. While higher involvement in the development of 
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resource base is supported, the enhancement of processing industries is of crucial importance 
in the long-run. Chapter VI emphasizes the necessity of regional cooperation for Uzbekistan 
and the other states through a broad comparative and historical analysis of political and 
economic features of regional developments in Central Asia. It is also pointed out that 
regionalism in Central Asia remains a work still in progress the outlines of which are still 
being sketched and its structure not being fixed yet. In the given context, a few scenarios of 
possible regional patterns are also a theme of debate, based on the various theories of 
regionalism. The main features and outcomes of the work are summarized in the Conclusion. 
The information on the developments in Central Asia are huge and diversified. While 
choosing and analyzing its sources, the main emphasis was put on some kind of neutrality 
between the views of  regional academic circles and those outside of the region. The problem 
is that perceptions and definitions  may sometimes be completely different when covering the 
same trends: Central Asian officials and scholars are used to refer to regional trends as 
"integration", while outside analytical reports operate more with "regional cooperation", 
pointing at the absence of even initial stages of integration, such as a common trade area and 
common economic space, which is the substance that reflects much closer coordination of 
both horizontal and vertical connections throughout the region. Nevertheless, the contribution 
of local literature is crucial, especially in form of offical statements, speeches, reports; both, 
on daily public life and on academic events. For example, the book of the president of 
Uzbekistan I.Karimov "Buyuk Kelajak Sari" (Towards the Great Future) is only one of the 
series on domestic economic and political events in the republic, as well as security threats in 
XXI century in regional terms throughout the past decade.  
Among very helpful academic discourses about Central Asia are also the "Materials of the 
Conference “Stability in Central Asia in Post-Conflict Period”, basically in Russian, with 
some English articles, published in Tashkent in 2002; "Alimov R. and others (eds). 
Tsentralnaya Aziya: Geoekonomika, Geopolitika, Bezopasnost" in Russian dealing with 
geopolitical and security issues in the region, publ. in Tashkent in 2002; a book named 
“Interesy ES, KNR, Rossii i SshA v Tsentralnoy Azii”, round Table Materials debating the 
geopolitical involvement of the main powers in the regional trends, publ. in Bishkek, 2004; 
Diter H. Regionalnaya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii. Zentralstelle fuer Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialentwicklung, Berlin, 1995 on regional cooperation in Central Asia; and a book 
published within the Project on "Conflict Management, Security and Economic Cooperation 
in Central Asia" in the Institute of Political Science, University of Giessen and edited by 
Professors Drs. Seidelman R. and Giese E. on “Cooperation and Conflict Management in 
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Central Asia, Zentrum fuer Internationale and Umweltforschungspolitik. Justug Liebig 
Universitaet, Frankfurt-am-Main, Peter Lang Verlag, Band 10, 2004". Based on the materials 
of the similar international conference in Germany May 2003, the book contains interesting 
contributions both, from local experts in Central Asia as well as from those outside the region. 
This kind of editions are valuable first and foremost for exchange of views between local and 
foreign scholars, which leads to better understanding of features and the substance of 
challenges in Central Asia, and helps develop adequate policy strategies for their resolution. 
In addition, they may also be of wider public interest to those feeling a shortage of knowledge 
about  the  so far untapped region. 
A  number of articles published in foreign literature are also of particular significance. For 
instance, "International Affairs" Magazine, 2004, Vol.80., issue 3 contains a set of analytical 
articles on regionalism in Central Asia, as well as on an Interstate Cooperation between the 
regional states within the CIS and the Shanghai Forum. 
Reports and data from international institutions, such as the United Nations Organization, 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Bank on Reconstruction and 
Development, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Asian 
Development Bank, World Energy Organization and some others have been of particular 
assistance in maintaining the research with empirical and statistical data. For instance, being 
one of the largest multilateral investors in Central Asia, ADB in addition launched and is 
currently coordinating a special programme "CAREC" (http://adb.org/CAREC/default.asp) 
for the support and expansion of regional projects in trade, energy and transport and 
infrastructure, to enhance better cooperation throughout the region. 
Finally, daily developments throughout the region have been monitored. Such information 
could be available through a number of information web sites for each of the countries and for 
the region as a whole. For Uzbekistan,  it is the National Information Agency UzA 
(www.uza.uz), for Kazakhstan - www.kazakhstantoday.kz, for Tadjikistan - National 
Information Agency (www.asiaplus.tj) and for Kyrgyzstan- the National Information Agency 
Kabar (www.kabar.kg). Regional reports and analytical articles are also available on the 
Times of Central Asia on-line newspaper (www.times.kg) and on the NGO info forum 
EurasiaNet operated by the Central Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute 
(www.eurasianet.org). 
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Chapter II. THE ESSENCE AND PRIORITIES OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IN UZBEKISTAN IN THE 
YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 
2.1. Uzbekistan under the Plan System: Process and Consequences  
Historically the inhabitants of Central Asia were divided into the nomadic (Kazakhs and 
Kyrgyz) and sedentary (Uzbeks, Tadjiks and Turkmens) societies. While Europe faced 
industrial revolution, in Central Asia people were engaged into the labor-intensive agrarian 
sector, pre-dominantly in land cultivation and cattle-farming. When the Russian empire came 
to the region in the 19th century, it sought additional sources for keeping up its manufacturing 
and industrial boost. Following this logic the new lands were thus exposed to extensive 
military and economic conquest by the Tsarism which culminated in the establishment of the 
Russian protectorate in the region.9  
After the overthrow of the Russian monarch family by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, the 
new Soviet government went even further trying to bring Central Asian economic, social and 
spiritual values in compliance with the other parts of a new Soviet state. The idea of transition 
from “feudalism” directly to “socialism” in Central Asia presented by communists aimed, 
among others, at overcoming tribal and feudal relations.10 But there was a strong conviction 
that this was not just a "break-through” from feudalism to socialism, but the enhancement of 
the acceleration-based development to embrace gradual industrial transformation and 
equalization of the development level with other parts of the Union. The given process of 
integration of the new territories into the common Soviet economic system did not occur 
smoothly, both due to the shortcomings to be intrinsic to the plan system and subsequent 
socio-political and economic developments in Uzbekistan. 
By substance, the Soviet methods of management in the plan system was to provide a strong 
control over political and economic processes on the macro- and microlevels through the 
tough directives on consumption, distribution, and production of material wealth. And what’s 
more, the economic power of the Center was based on the monopolist power of state property 
on land, mineral base, the means of production. The main point was that public property 
meant state property which was controlled by a narrow number of people related to the power 
(nomenklatura, partocratia, socio-oligarkhia). Market mechanisms were absent. The 
production process was separated from financial flows. Money did not carry all its functions 
as in a market economy. They just played the role of a unit of accounting transfers from one 
                                                 
9 See more in Inomjonov Kh. “Aussen und Sicherheitspolitik der Republik Usbekistan in den ersten Jahren der 
staatlichen Unabhaengigkeit“ within the Central Asian project. 
10 Tukhliyev N., Taksanov A. Natsionalnaya ekonomicheskaya model Uzbekistana. Tashkent. 2000, p.28 
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branch or enterprise to others according to the decisions made at the center, with only a minor 
influence by production units. This drove factory managers to circumvent plans or seek 
devious ways of fulfilling them in order to accommodate the special problems thay faced in 
their production units. Among the most common have been falsifications of production 
statistics, illegal transfer of funds from one use to another, and the concealment of full 
production capacity from the superiors. Another frequent practice was to take advantage of 
the way in which plan targets were stated to fulfil the plans in the easiest manner possible, 
regardless of the needs of the economy. And what is more interesting is that the Soviet 
political leadership not only realized the substance of the problem even in the early 1960s, a 
quarter of a decade before the cordial changes in the domestic political and economic life, 
supposed by perestroika, but also undertook reform efforts in 1965 to give the enterprises 
more autonomy in exchange for increased efficiency.11 
The particularity of the plan system was a strong fusion of economic and political power 
where the latter prevailed and therefore, controlled everything and everywhere. Its “brain” 
was the Communist Party which managed the state and the economy, and whose tentacles 
reached every corner of organised social life in each republic. Production, supply and 
redistribution of raw materials as well as budget transfers and resource allocation were 
fulfilled exclusively by Moscow. To become a manager of an enterprise, one was strongly 
required to go through the Communist Party’s system and earn the confidence of the 
partocratia. To make any settlements at the local (regional) level, for instance, between 
Ferghana and Tashkent, enterprises should have got permissions from the Union ministries 
and state organs which were located in Moscow. It required much time and complicated paper 
procedures, although this also could not be enough to eventually obtain needed decision. “The 
political side of the question is that any attempts of the republics to find new, more acceptable ways 
and forms of development had been considered as “nationalism” and therefore, been strictly 
restricted”.12 
The industrial development in Uzbekistan after joining the USSR could bring forward a 
number of questions the main of which are: how and why was “industrialization” pursued; 
                                                 
11 For instance, some authors refer to the production of various manufacturing products to demonstrate low efficiency in the 
Soviet economy. For example, the producers of furniture, for example had plans stated in roubles. Hence they found it best to 
make massive furniture since the heavier the products the more expensive they were. Then the plan was formally met as the 
furniture makers added various details to the products in order to make them more expensive rather than more suitable and 
competitive. As a result, the production represented highly cost consuming  process leading to the depletion of funds and 
over-consumption of resources. And this was evoking significant problems across the general sectors of economy and 
particular industries, such as agriculture, energy complex, etc. For more information on the deficiencies in the Soviet 
economy see: Barry. D.D., Barner-Barry C. Contemporary Soviet Politics. An Introduction. New Jersey, Fourth Edition, 
1991.pp.174-192. 
12 Translated by the author from Karimov I. (1993) O’zbekiston – bozor iqtisodiyotiga o’tishning o’ziga hos yoli. 
The collection of works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 1998, p.81. 
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and to what extent did Uzbekistan benefit from such “industrialization”, i.e. to what 
consequences did it lead?  
During the Soviet rule Tashkent, an Uzbek capital, in fact became the fourth largest city in the 
Union and also served as the center of gravitation to many other Central Asian industries. 
Equally, however, the policy encouraged further interdependence of the regional republics 
with the European parts, paying less attention to the reinforcement of intra-regional relations. 
Consequently the Soviet republics were strongly connected to each other via interrelated links 
in production and distribution of material wealth, especially on the basis of material balances 
consisting of a number of strategic commodities and inputs such as coal, gas, oil, means of 
production and etc. which subsequently had an impact on the volume and structure of 
production.  
In this respect, Uzbekistan had specialised in production of raw cotton. The country was the 
4th largest country in the world by production of cotton and the 2nd one – by its export. By 
1990, Uzbekistan produced 62,4% of cotton-fiber of the whole USSR and cotton ginning was 
a fifth of its total industrial growth. During the development of the republic the volumes of 
production were increased primarily through the expansion of cultivated areas, but not 
through better agricultural productivity (which was the lowest in the economy – 1% per 
worker in 1970). If during the years of five-year-plans (1961-1965) the republic harvested 
about 3,484 mln. tons of raw cotton, then in 1966-1970’s period the state order forced to yield 
4,100 mln.tons per year.13 Subsequently, in the 1980’s the plan targets were further tightened 
demanding about 6 mln.tons, the yet ever highest figure (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1. Average Annual Cotton Production in Central Asia 
 
 Thousand tonnes Yield per hectare (centners) 
 1976-80 1981-85 1976-80 1981-85 
Uzbekistan 5704 5724 31.3 29.7 
Kazakhstan 317 302 27 23.3 
Kirgizstan 208 87 28.3 19.1 
Tadjikistan 906 917 30.7 29.8 
Turkmenistan 1143 1210 22.7 22.7 
Source: McCauley M. Agriculture in Central Asia. p.95 
 
Under such conditions the system of economic relations was driven with the administrative 
methods of control and orders with accordingly little attention to its socio-economic 
consequences. In particular, the labor of school-goers and students was also widely used. 
                                                 
13 Uzbekistan za Godi Vosmoy Pyatiletki (1966-1970). Central Committee of the CP UzSSR. Tashkent. 1971 
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They were sent to the rural regions of the republic each autumn and had been staying there for 
at least two months in rather severe living and climatic conditions. In Uzbekistan, in 1978, the 
number of adults and schoolchildren sent to bring in the cotton crop reached 2 mln, and only 
28% of the total crop was mechanically picked in 1985. Although the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of Uzbekistan condemned such practices during the bringing in of the 
1986 crop, local government organs continued violations of the established time limits for 
schoolchildren and students to spend on agricultural work and did not create normal 
conditions for their work and living.14 
 It is difficult to estimate whether net social and economic losses were exceeded by benefits 
calculated in physical volumes of the picked cotton. Yet such losses were also characterized 
by the involvement of high skilled labor from other non-agrarian spheres which therefore did 
not produce good and services they ought to do. There was also no estimates on social effects 
from emergency situations caused by the deterioration of health among population, especially 
among school-goers and students. There were regular reports on the year-on-year growth of 
the harvest and low production costs, but which had consciously hidden or ignored the facts 
of using cheap and abundantly available child labor. Moreover, the question is still open to 
debate whether those figures (6 mln.tons of cotton per year) would have been ever attainable 
even with full economic capacities having been involved into operation. The more evident 
fact is that for the fear of tough punishment, local production entities and statistical organs 
started counterfeiting the figures with an even more distortive and damaging impact on not 
only the plan economy as a whole, but on the local spheres of production too. Such distortions 
could be then barely overcome by the administrative methods of the Center. 
As was evident from the words of the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov too: “Due to 
the conservative administrative system, party management over the economy and extremely 
ideologization of the latter, all further efforts on economic reforms (the 1979 Planning system 
reform, the 1987 reform of an economic mechanism) had brought little results”.15 
Moreover, environmental conditions were not taken into consideration at all and resulted in 
dramatic consequences. The area under irrigation increased up to 5-5.5 mln.hectares in the 
1980s, which amounted roughly a half of irrigated lands in the whole region. As a result, 
                                                 
14 There is an opinion that in order to offset the declining size and quality of the crop throughout the 1980s, 
farms resorted more and more to manual labor, while economic viability of using either labor force or cotton-
picking machines remained opened and differed across the republic and even the farms. See: McCauley M. 
Agriculture in Central Asia. In Akiner Sh. (ed.) Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia, British 
Academic Press, London-New York, 1994, pp.96-97. 
15 Translated by the author from Karimov I. (1993) O’zbekiston – bozor iqtisodiyotiga o’tishning o’ziga hos yoli. 
Collection of works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 1998, p.76. 
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according to some sources, of the two rivers’ (Amudarya and Syrdarya) total average annual 
runoff of 115 km3, about half reached the Aral sea in the years before 1960, which kept the 
lake size stable, but between 1981 and 1985 an average of only 5,2 km3 reached the Sea and 
practically no water reached the lake in 1986.16 Without appropriate recovery of lands 
between harvests, they (lands) faced a huge number of injections of chemical fertilizers. The 
ensuing problems of salinization, toxic dust storms and climatic change were causing serious 
deterioration of health standards by the 1980s. Since then on, Uzbekistan is still reaping the 
results of distortion in environment conditions (shrinking of the Aral sea) directly reflected in 
worsening state of health and the standard of living of population in a number of regions of 
the republic. 
Since the 1930s Uzbekistan had been experiencing quite rapid economic growth maintained 
by industrial expansion, especially high on the initial stages and then resuming in the 
aftermath of the Second World War (Table 2.2). For the Soviet Union the political 
significance of this process followed the two main goals. On the one hand, it could be an 
attempt of some kind of illustration on the international arena of what could be achieved by 
following the socialist path of development. Yet its domestic impact was much more 
important. Reflecting the policy of nationalities declared by J.Stalin in the 1930s, it aimed at 
economic and cultural parity among the nations of the Soviet Union and which was eventually 
believed to be accomplished with success by 1980s.17 
 
Table 2.2 Uzbekistan’s Annual Average Industrial Growth Rate, % 
 
1929-32 11.7 1946-50 11.3 1966-70 6.3 
1933-37 19.4 1951-55 10.1 1971-75 8.6 
1938-40 9.5 1956-60 7.4 1976-80 5 
1941-45 1.3 1961-65 8.4 1981-85 3 
Source: Thompstone S. Uzbekistan’s economic Prospects, p.103. 
 
However, the industrial sector was distorted and production process was technically 
inefficient. Most of the output consisted either raw materials or intermediate goods supplied 
to the USSR’s market. The production of agricultural machines and equipment, for example, 
primarily had to meet the domestic and regional needs, while aircraft plant, fuel and energy 
complex and mining were linked to a number of respective industries in non-regional 
republics. The efficiency of factories in Uzbekistan’s smaller population centres was in 
                                                 
16 Pomfret R. (1996) Asian Economies in Transition: Reforming Centrally Planned Economies. Cheltenham, 
UK. p.101 
17 Thompstone S. Uzbekistan’s economic Prospects, in Akiner Sh. (ed.) Political and Economic Trends in 
Central Asia, British Academic Press, London-New York, pp.104-105. 
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general significantly below that of industrial enterprises in the larger cities. In 1985 it was 
reported that the returns on assets and labor productivity in the domestic industrial sector were 
continuing to fall. At the beginning of 1986 the 21st Congress of the CPU heard that the return 
on investment in the republic had declined by a third over the past ten years. As a result, 
average annual growth rate of Net Material Product, i.e. GDP had been on a downward trend, 
decreasing from 6.5% in the period of 1960-65 to only 4.4% and less after 1980. In so far as 
NMP per capita reflects living standards too, in terms of high population growth rates, this 
indicator also experienced decline from 3% per capita in 1960s, 2.2% in 1970 to virtual 
stagnation (0.3%) in the 1980s.18 
The Soviet industrial policies in Uzbekistan could be intrinsically highlighted with the 
following features: 
1. Through its monopolist power in the whole economy, the state increased its influence 
in industry. There were 3 types of enterprises in Uzbekistan: those submitted to the Center 
(the all-Union submission); those submitted to the local authorities; and their combination. 
The proportion of enterprises regulated by the Center, and the mixed administration was 
increasing and amounted to 74,6% and 92%, respectively. By having such a lever, 
Moscow eventually could determine the main indicators, such as the volume and 
assortment of products produced, dislocation of labor, structural policy, labor relations 
(staff training, labor migration), etc. 
2. The Center used such mechanisms which integrated the republic into the Union’s 
division of labor with the narrow specialization, and the uneven and irregular structure of 
industries. For instance, at the end of the 1980s, the proportion of machine-building in 
Uzbekistan in total industrial output was equal to 16%, while manufacturing – 13,8%, 
light industry – 37%. Production of consumer goods per capita did not exceed 40% of the 
union’s average level. On the whole, more than 60% of total industrial production was at 
the expense of non-labor-intensive production which produced raw materials and 
intermediate products.19 
3. Industrial policy reinforced differences in industrial development between the regions 
within the republic. For example, such an approach resulted in situation when 5% of the 
                                                 
18 Thompstone S. Uzbekistan’s economic Prospects, in Akiner Sh. (ed.) Political and Economic Trends in 
Central Asia, British Academic Press, London-New York, 1994, pp.103-104. 
19 Tukhliyev N., Taksanov A. Natsionalnaya ekonomicheskaya model Uzbekistana. Tashkent. 2000, p.30 
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republican territory had covered 65% of total industrial potential (enterprises) of 
Uzbekistan. Tashkent and the Tashkent region hosted half of those enterprises.20 
4. The development of traditional branches of the economy, such as the cooperatives and 
cottage and handicraft workshops, was restrained. According to the data of 1989, 
cooperatives included 24,8 thousand of workers, cottage workshops – 15 thousand which 
accounted for only 0,52% of all population engaged in the economy.21 
5. The policy of the Center was intended to keep up an agricultural structure in the 
economy due to the availability of natural and production factors (geographic conditions, 
labor force), while industrial base was confined to extracting and initial manufacturing. 
By the early 1990s, the image of the Uzbek economy had been formed to associate basically 
with the minerals and agricultural products. During the Soviet time it was the 2nd largest 
producer of gold by total production (following Russia) and 1st one – by per capita 
production. Besides, Uzbekistan produced (as a ratio of the Union production) in agriculture: 
65% of cocoons, 40% karakul, 15% food oil, 2% meat, vegetables and fruits; in industry: 
6,9% silk and 6 cotton fabrics, 5,6% chemical fibre, 5,6% fertilizers, 5,2% knitted wear; 4,7% 
construction bricks, 4,7% cement; 3,7% chemical equipment, 3,6% agro machinery, 2,4% 
excavators, 1,16% engines; 3,1% refrigerators, 2,7% furniture; 3,3% electricity.22 Since many 
of finished goods were by and large in shortage in local countries’ markets, in terms of inter-
republican trade all the republics recorded sustainable trade deficit (See Annex 2.1, Table (a)).23  
Although agriculture contributed much to domestic national income, it also was the largest 
sector by the number of unemployed among all countries of the region.24 The Soviet policy 
with respect to the Central Asian states proceeded from the priority to produce a variable 
number of raw materials and to supply them to industrial plants in the European parts of the 
Union, representing the continued colonial nature of Uzbekistan’s relationship with other 
                                                 
20 The same. 
21 Natsionalnaya Ekonomika Uzbekskoy SSR. 1990. Tashkent, 1991 
22 Tukhliyev N., Taksanov A. Natsionalnaya ekonomicheskaya model Uzbekistana. Tashkent. 2000, p.31.  
23 General analysis of Central Asia’s place in total Soviet output shows that contribution to Soviet agriculture was equal to 
more than 17%, ranging from minimum 10% (milk production) to maximum over 20% (fruits and vegetables, half of which 
came from Uzbekistan). Extractive industries produced about 17% of all Soviet natural gas, about 20% of total coal, as well 
as 8% of furniture, 15% of knitted wear, about 14% of shoes in 1990. At the meantime, durable goods, such as home 
appliances, transport means, were extensively imported from other republics. The absolute values of inter-republican trade, 
however, should be seen cautiously, since in terms of distorted prices on different goods and inadequate exchange rates in the 
USSR, it is difficult to reveal true figures on the values of trade between the republics. For all this see the Tables in Mangott 
G. (Hrsg.) Buerden Auferlegter Unabhaengigkeit. Neue-Staaten im post-sowjetischen Zentralasien, Oesterreichisches Institut 
fuer Internationale Politik, Laxenburger Internationale Studien, LIS 10, Wien, 1996., pp.151-158. 
24 According to the estimates, in 1979 state and collective farms in the republic had a manpower surplus of nearly 240000, 
while unemployment had already reached 2 mln.in the first half of the 1980s. See: Thompstone S. Uzbekistan’s economic 
Prospects, in Akiner Sh. (ed.) Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia, p.108. 
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republics. For example, in 1980 only 7% of cotton was manufactured in the republic while the 
rest part was exported to other republics, primarily to Russia, Belorussia, and Ukraine.25 
The Soviets were understandably loath to allow the control of the spheres which could 
potentially provide the economic sovereignty of the republic. Hence, the most developed 
industrial branches were controlled by the all-Union Ministries in Moscow. The preliminary 
processing of raw materials produced was carried out in the republic, while more complex 
manufacturing and production of goods took place in other republics of the Union.26 These 
raw materials were as a rule underpriced in the USSR, which led national industry to 
contribute little to local national income.27 For instance, for the years, the specialization of 
Uzbekistan with respect to agriculture became more evident. If in 1970s the Uzbek industrial 
output was about 68% of local national income, agriculture – 22%, transport and 
communications – 3,2%, the rest – trade and others28, in 1990 industry – 25,7%, agriculture – 
44,2%, construction – 14,1%, transport and communications – 4,7%, others – 11,1%. While 
the average Union indicators at that time were amount to 40,4%, 24,8%, 12%, 6,5% and 
16,1% of national income of the USSR.29 
“Neither transport costs, nor other relative costs were taken into consideration that was 
negatively influencing on regional development of any republic. On the other hand, the goal 
was to make the republics closely interdependent on each other which, in our opinion, may 
reflect immediate development and consequence of imperialistic policy”.30 
Another peculiarity is that all Central Asian states were the closed economies, with trade 
primarily inside the USSR (See Annex 2.1, Table (b)). It means that much of Uzbekistan’s 
needs in inputs and consumer goods was related to the centralized decisions taken in Moscow 
on all trade flows to and out the republic. In addition, geographical disadvantages of the 
country were exacerbated by a transport system oriented towards the north (Russia and the 
European parts of the USSR) and with little or even no links to the south. It is difficult to say, 
                                                 
25 Thompstone S. Uzbekistan’s economic Prospects, in Akiner Sh. (ed.) Political and Economic Trends in 
Central Asia, British Academic Press, London-New York, 1994, p.111. 
26 For example, raw cotton was supplied to textile works in Russia and the Baltic to produce clothing and other 
textile products which were subsequently sold to other republics, including Uzbekistan itself.   
27 For lack of data, it was practically impossible to calculate acute economic figures reflecting benfits and losses 
of such policy. Some authors believe that many Central Asian states were subsidized, mainly either financially or 
through import supplies of goods and services. For example, one seventh of GDP in Kyrgyzstan was provided by 
import supplies from other republics. Yet local scholars stand by the view that underpicing of locally extracted 
resources, mainly minerals and energy was exceeding the aforementioned benefits. See: Pomfret R. Central Asia 
since 1991 ; the Experience of the NIS. OECD Development Centre Technical Paper 212, Paris, July 2003. 
28 Uzbekistan za Godi Vosmoy Pyatiletki (1966-1970). Central Committee of the CP UzSSR. Tashkent. 1971 
29 Natsionalnaya Ekonomika Uzbekskoy SSR. 1990. Tashkent, 1991 
30 Our translation from Karimov I. (1993) O’zbekiston – bozor iqtisodiyotiga o’tishning o’ziga hos yoli. 
Collection of works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 1998, p.81. 
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whether infrastructure development would have taken place, if no Soviet military intervention 
in Afghanistan in 1979 had been decided. Central Asia strengthened its position in the Soviet 
system, because during this war the region was politically considered as a strategic hinterland. 
This policy brought to Uzbekistan electrification and the establishment of good road network 
along the Afghan border, and also subsidies in energy and money. 
The developments in the social sphere are also of specific attention. With significant transfers 
from Moscow (in the 1970s about 47% of all expenditures of Uzbekistan on social and 
cultural events in the economy were from the USSR’s budget), the republic yet plunged into a 
number of social problems. The population was not provided enough with housing, healthcare 
services, and so on.31 Basic social security here had long been inferior to the rest of the USSR. 
The entire region was at the bottom on a number of indicators, such as the number of 
inhabitants per doctor, dispensary and sanatorium.  
Due to the backward development, within the region Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan were the 
most dependent on the Central Union budgetary transfers. If during the 1960s Uzbekistan 
obtained about 15% of its revenues from Moscow, in 1970 – 20%, then in the 1990s the figure 
amounted to 42,9% of all revenues of the republican budget.32 Later on, there was an abrupt 
drop in the whole Central Asia’s investments coming from the Centre: per capita investments 
were two thirds less than in the rest of the USSR.33 
Despite the fact that approximately half (47%) of the republican expenditures were directed 
into the social sphere of the economy, they lagged behind corresponding all-union indicators 
(Table 2.3). 
The aforementioned was corroborated by the pressure of complex demographic situation in 
the republic. For example, in the 1979 census almost all the Central Asian nationalities had 
large families - the average Uzbek family consisted of 6.2 children under eighteen while the 
Russians had only 3.16 and the Latvian 3.0 under the average Union number was equal to 
                                                 
31 Shortage of housing was critical in the republic, compounding urbanization and job creation. If employment 
opportunities could have been created in the urban areas to absorb the growing manpower surpluses of the 
countryside, the urban housing stock surely could not. Only to keep pace with the anticipated population growth 
in the 1980s, it would have needed 2.5 times more housing in the next 15 years than in the previous three five 
year plans. The pressure of urbanization would have then increased this figure markedly. Thompstone S. 
Uzbekistan’s economic Prospects, in Akiner Sh. (ed.) Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia, British 
Academic Press, London-New York, 1994, p.111. 
32 Uzbekistan za Godi Vosmoy Pyatiletki (1966-1970). Central Committee of the CP UzSSR. Tashkent. 1971, 
p.14; World Bank (1992). Statistical Handbook: States of the Former USSR. (Washington. D.C.) 
33 Olivier R. (2000) The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations. New York University Press, New York. 
p.127 
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3,5.34 By the early 1990s the natural growth of population had reached 27,6 which was 4 
times higher than on average in the USSR.35  
 
Table 2.3 Comparative data on volume of services per capita, 1990  
(in Soviet roubles) 
 
 Social 
services 
 
Transport Commun-
ications  
Housing Culture Tourist Sport Recreation
USSR  56,9 
 
68 15,2 42,4 8,9 13 0,9 7,8 
Uzbekistan 40,2 
 
39,8 5,6 21,3 4,2 6,4 0,4 2,2 
Source: The National Economy of the Uzbek SSR. 1990. Tashkent, 1991 
 
The population growth in the republic could be explained by both internal and external 
reasons. As an internal one, they were Uzbek traditional values and Islam both of which were 
encouraging long families. Partly because of it, in rural areas where the majority of population 
were of local nationalities, the population growth was always higher than in regions with non-
indigenous population, like in the capital Tashkent, for example. Being an external factor, the 
Soviet demographic policy saw population growth as the main labor source for its military 
and production needs. The essence of the policy was to encourage high population growth 
rates in Central Asia to offset relatively poor growth rates of population in the European parts 
of the USSR, as well as maintain labor-intensive needs in the local agricultural sector.36 
The level of urbanization as a sign of the Soviet efforts on industrialization and elimination 
intra-union regional differences showed that these differences were remaining. The European 
and Baltic republics were all over two-thirds urban, whereas the Central Asian republics were 
largely rural and agricultural.37 For example, during the period 1970-1987, urban population 
                                                 
34 Lane D. Soviet Society Under Perestroyka, London and New York, Revised Edition, 1992, p. 194 
35 Tukhliyev N., Taksanov A. Natsionalnaya ekonomicheskaya model Uzbekistana. Tashkent. 2000.  
36 In addition, the rapid growth of population in all Central Asian republics observed since the end of 1950s was 
explained by a favorable correlation between the indicators of birth and mortality, while the influx of population 
from outside had been relatively small. Mortality rates were mainly reduced due to successful measures in public 
health care and the less consequences of the World War II for local peoples than for other republics. For more 
information on demographic trends in the region see Kozlov V. Ethnographic Problems of Central Asia and 
Measures for Their Solution, In Akiner Sh. (ed.) Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia, British 
Academic Press, London-New York, 1994, pp.143-152. 
37 The Soviet Union’s rural population declined by some 10 mln. Between 1959 and 1989, while the population 
in Central Asia increased by 78 mln. Yet in Central Asia (including Kazakhstan) between 1959 and 1978 the 
rural population rose from 14 mln. to 25 mln. representing a 75% growth, mainly due to higher birth rate of the 
indigenous population in rural areas. See: Lane D. Soviet Society Under Perestroyka, London and New York, 
Revised Edition, 1992, p.193 
 25
increased in Uzbekistan from 37% to 42%, while in Russia – from 62% to 74%, Belorussia 
from 43% to 64%, Armenia – from 59% to 68%, Lithuania from 50% to 67%.38  
High demographic growth in terms of non-adequate increase in national income and 
incapability to create jobs further contributed to the deterioration of socio-economic life in 
Uzbekistan. There were two possible solutions to cushion the situation: either to develop local 
industry and agriculture, or to make the extra workforce more mobile outside the region at all. 
Inasmuch it was practically absurd idea to suggest Central Asian people jobs in severe 
Siberian climatic conditions, the republic was doomed to be under the pressure of imbalance 
on the domestic labor market, especially among rural population. Moreover, along with the 
whole republican deterioration, a sharp intra-regional disproportions like expanding 
differences between urban and rural areas were also observed. Most part of national 
communities lived in rural areas and engaged in agriculture.39 In terms of huge labor force 
and low productive efficiency in agriculture, the local population had relatively low income.  
As regard the standard of life, one needs to be cautious, since it was always hardly exposed to 
quantitative estimates. In addition, in the USSR the Soviet methodology was strongly 
distorted for political reasons to hide poverty and low standards of living. This may explain 
the variance of figures found in literature. For instance, according to existing estimates, the 
UNO evaluated that about 40% of all population of Uzbekistan lived below the poverty line 
(i.e. below the minimum wage level) in last years of the USSR. However, the figure did not 
reflect access to free education, public healthcare, a number of privileges for people with low-
income that certainly could make the poverty size lower than it might actually be.40 Other 
estimates say that in 1991 about 75% of population had per capita income lower the value of 
consumer basket (of main vital foodstuff and consumer goods) in comparison with the 
European part of the USSR (Russia and Ukraine) where the figure was equal to 30%.41  
Hence, some important conclusions could be set out. Before October Revolution in 1917 in 
Russia industrial development had hardly begun in Soviet Central Asia in its true way. 
Bolsheviks managed to some extent to equalize standards between the regions due to 
industrial growth especially strong in Kazakhstan (8.5 times) and Kyrgyzstan (8.3) during 
1913-1936. Some scholars even noted that being on par with (or below) countries like India, 
                                                 
38 Source is the same. See Table 6.3 on p. 194. 
39 More than 80% of rural population were Uzbeks, while constituting only 36% and 25.3% of labor force in 
industry and construction complex respectively. Thompstone S. Uzbekistan’s economic Prospects, in Akiner Sh. 
(ed.) Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia, British Academic Press, London-New York,1994, p.106.  
40 UNO (2001). Uzbekistan: Obshaya Otsenka Strany. p.15 
41 UNDP (1999). Uzbekistan. Human Development Report. p.32 
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Iran and Pakistan in 1926, by the early 1960s the Central Asian republics were similar to 
countries like Italy so far as economic development and cultural and welfare facilities were 
concerned, as the region has been transformed from a stagnant, illiterate, disease-ridden, 
semi-feudal society into a modern progress-oriented society.42 Yet such industrial growth was 
not difficult due to a low level of the domestic industrial level. Moreover, due to inadequate 
prices which were disintegrated from the real costs of inputs, environmental externalities, low 
labor costs, etc. the consequences of this process in terms of its positive impact may with little 
doubt look much more moderate.  
Thus by 1988, the local economy had faced relatively high growth of GDP (5,2-5,3%), 
remarkable growth of industrial output (5-5,8%), sustainable growth of agricultural 
production. During this period a number of fundamental industries were both founded and got 
a strong push to develop (machine-building, chemical industry, metallurgy, and oil and energy 
complex). 43  
In the years of perestroika domestic economic life was deteriorating as a result of the turn in 
Soviet policy priorities. Relatively to Central Asia, it envisaged primarily the decrease of 
subsidies, prosecution in the economic field, etc., which then led to the deterioration of 
political credibility of local elite before the Center. Socio-political crisis was exacerbated by 
natural economic stagnation through the gradual depletion of opportunities and capacities of 
the plan system. Economic growth was decreasing from year to year (1,6% in GDP and 2,8% 
in industrial output in 1989-1991). Moreover, in terms of relatively high population and labor 
force growth it resulted in decline of productive efficiency in the economy as a whole.  
“For a few decades, Uzbekistan has transformed into integral part of common economic 
complex managed by the Center. Hence, like in the years of the Tsar Empire, the republic 
represented both a supplier of cheap and strategic mineral resources, and a favourable 
market which was absorbing (imported) ready products. The decisions taken by the Center 
were not in compliance with the interests of Uzbekistan”.44 
Eventually by 1990s Uzbekistan had come to have a one-sided distorted economy with 
prevailing cotton output in agriculture and low-level industrialization; with primarily 
extensive methods of production; with tough direct control over the economy, and 
bureaucracy; with a high level of hidden unemployment (according to some estimates, about 
                                                 
42 Lane D. Soviet Society Under Perestroyka, London and New York, Revised Edition, 1992. Quoted from 
Charles K. Wilber (1969). p. 197 
43 Chepel S. (1996) Makroekonomicheskiye problemy perehodnogo perioda. Tashkent 
44 Our translation from Karimov I. (1993) O’zbekiston – bozor iqtisodiyotiga o’tishning o’ziga hos yoli. 
Collection of works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 1998, p.79. 
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20%45), and therefore, with the high level of misery. In other words, the bottom of the 
problems in Uzbekistan in the early 1990s went back to the past, calling for the necessity of 
urgent macroeconomic reforms. The implementation of this task, however, was due to take 
place already in new time and under new conditions caused by the collapse of the USSR. 
 
2.2. The Transformation Process and its Outcome in the Last Decade 
2.2.1. The Choice of Further Development Strategy: Possibilities and Contradictions.  
The Essence of the “Uzbek Economic Model” 
 
“Without a comprehensive analysis of the existing situation, [and of] the reasons for deep 
economic, social and political crisis, without determination of the negative elements in the 
economic system which have to be eliminated before the reforms are launched, it is 
impossible to transform the society into its qualitatively new form”.46 
After the general crisis of the socialist system the former Soviet republics entered the new 
phase of its historical development. Under particular circumstances, each country definitely 
declared to build up a market economy and democratic society. Since that, there have been a 
wide range of discussions on economic reform strategies and on the choices of the most 
optimal model of transition to market. However, the final aims have proved to be much more 
complicated to achieve than it was expected. Today, even more than a decade later, it is clear 
that it may take a few decades to reach that level of the majority of industrially developed 
countries. Moreover, each country in transition succeeded to a different degree in the socio-
political and economic reforms. Some of them managed to be relatively more successful, 
while others are still facing various setbacks. Most part of these differences was initially 
explained by the speed and coverage of reforms at the very beginning. To some extent, initial 
conditions could be important to explain these trends. Comparatively advanced position of the 
Eastern European states in the early 1990s was seen as a pre-requisite for making successful 
transition to a market economy. This point is related to a number of  factors. Firstly, Eastern 
European countries had a huge industrial potential which could develop as soon as it would be 
given necessary stimulus by the government. Secondly, a degree of centralization was lower 
than in the USSR, and, therefore, enterprises had more freedom to make business. Thirdly, 
private sector was relatively independent and had more opportunities for the development 
than economic units in the Soviet regime. Finally, East Europe was closer to the West 
                                                 
45 Tukhliyev N., Taksanov A. Natsionalnaya ekonomicheskaya model Uzbekistana. Tashkent. 2000, p.68 
46 Our translation from Karimov I. (1993) O’zbekiston – bozor iqtisodiyotiga o’tishning o’ziga hos yoli. 
Collection of works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 1998, p.75. 
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geographically, that allowed for the development of social-political and cultural relations 
under the indirect influence of the Western democracies.47 
“In terms of the collapse of the totalitarian system and the emergence of new independent 
states on the basis of former Soviet republics, it becomes very important to develop and justify 
new approaches on economic construction and further transformation. Declaration of 
independence for each of these republics implies their intentions to pursue domestic and 
foreign policies in accordance with their national interests”.48 
The post-Soviet states were in worse conditions to start with economic reforms. The crisis in 
the USSR was exacerbated in the early 1970s and became more evident by the 1990s. It 
manifested widely through chronic stagnation, state budget imbalances, hidden inflation, low 
investment activities in the economy, and deteriorating socio-economic situation. 
In this respect, the backwardness and dependency of the Central Asian region on the Center 
undoubtedly ought to influence the development of market reforms there. In comparison with 
other countries of the region, Uzbekistan found itself in situation which had significantly 
determined the strategy of further development. The positive and negative aspect of the 
republic’s conditions are summarized in Annex 2.2. 
Social situation in the country was especially fragile with: 
• a substantial decline in the standard of living of local population because of an abrupt 
decrease in real wages, social insurance and pensions; 
• growing income differentials and unemployment rate; 
• the risks of social destabilisation due to the growth of criminality, drugs business, 
terrorism, extremism, bribery among government officials. 
For the official economic policy those were among the key arguments to deny big bag 
changes in the economy in favor of the step-by-step reforms. Firstly, there was a perception 
that such reforms might result in increasing social instability if radical price liberalisation and 
structural changes would be implemented. It might in turn provoke further growth of 
unemployment and income differentiation in the society most part of which consisted of 
“vulnerable groups” (old-age people, both long and poor families, and the young population 
under age 15). The government thus refused such changes in the economy in the early 1990s 
in favor of retaining stability in the society. 
                                                 
47 Smith A. Eastern Eropean Economies, in Eastern Europe and the CIS, Paris, OECD, 1999. p.62-73. 
48 Translated by the author from Karimov I. (1993) O’zbekiston – bozor iqtisodiyotiga o’tishning o’ziga hos yoli. 
Collection of works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 1998, p.71. 
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The second explanation of the strategy of Uzbekistan lied in the simple absence of necessary 
government institutions in the republic right after the independence through which one could 
be possible to carry out the aforementioned changes. A number of the existing institutions had 
to comply with the conditions set up by the previous plan system, through mainly 
prioritization of vertical relations, but without not the less important inter-institutional 
collaboration. In addition, these institutions felt a huge lack of knowledge and expertise on a 
market economics to keep pace with the substance of the reforms pursued.49  
The domestic situation was also exacerbated by a number of ideological factors. As a result of 
the collapse of the former communist ideology, an ideological vacuum was increasing. On the 
other hand, the socio-phycological way of thinking of the past was strongly entrenched in 
society. In particular, the firm Soviet ideology on "equality" and "social justice" in public 
minds was tantamount to the enhancement of negative attitude to private property, and 
therefore, weakening private initiatives. On the contrary, the monopoly dominance of state 
were strongly required. The strong dependence of Uzbekistan on the Center budget transfers 
only even strengthened further dependence of the republic on Moscow, and that of local 
population - on social benefits. In such situation, a number of destructive ideologies under the 
cover of religious values started to spread across the country. It was evident that the necessity 
of urgent domestic stabilisation, retention of the existed institutional network to deal with 
economic and social problems as well as countermeasures to the prolifiration of destructive 
ideologies should make up the core of the multi-edged top national priorities in the early 
1990s. As a next step, the idea of democratic society with steady industrialization and market 
reforms towards better living standards was regarded.50 
                                                 
49 For example, only a handful of people worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Soviet Uzbekistan, while 
the existing Uzintorg (the responsible institution for foreign trade) was forced to act completely within the 
directives of the monopolist Moscow-based foreign economic agency. Thus both time and specific reforms 
would be required for local elite and institutions to learn and adequately perform their functions in new 
conditions of open international relations. 
50 International experience suggested a few possible choices. The Turkish model with a pro-western secular state 
was favored by Turkey which was one of the first states to recognize the independence of Uzbekistan. It had 
very ambitious goals with respect to the region that was partly explained by their historical and cultural relations. 
Turkish investors were one of the largest ones in the early 1990s. The Iranian model of Islamic fundamentalism 
and theocratic state with huge influence of the religion on state affairs was hardly acceptable due to the 
dominating ideas of a secular state and sociaety. The Pakistani model was more secular, but Islamic religion had 
strong roots in the society, with a particular emphasis on fundamentalist religious values. The Chinese model 
with authoritarian and socialist mixture in the control over the economy was lucrative due to similarities of the 
past and the precedent of the successful moves towards market reforms even in terms of the administartively led 
policies. Finally, the New Industrial Countries (NIC) model of small East Asian economies with an open-type 
economic sector and very often a leading state role was attractive because of impressive economic growth 
performance in the recent decades. Although the models were different by substance and nature of socio-political 
and economic development of the countries, they also had some similarities. The geographical location in Asia 
(even partly for Turkey); the Oriental societies with sustainable traditions in which collective values are 
prevailing over private; the superiority of the power and government could be of much interest for Uzbekistan on 
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Further steps were undertaken to minimize a negative impact of the socio-political and 
economic processes which were taking place in other republics on local development, and to 
reduce in such a way the potential for a sharp production decline, inflation and its impact on 
the domestic socio-political situation. But, in terms of geographical proximity and transparent 
boundaries between the republics, the reforms in Uzbekistan could hardly be confined to the 
national borders. On the contrary, they needed to follow, both in time and strategic tasks, 
those in other republics. Thus, macroeconomic stabilisation, institutional and production 
modernisation of the economy, comprehensive development towards a market economy, and 
the smooth integration into the world economy were common to all of the new independent 
states. 
In line with the determined strategic tasks and real conditions of the early 1990s, the 
government of Uzbekistan suggested a few key principles on which the economic reforms 
were due to be fulfilled. They were: 
1. de-ideologization of the economy, the latter dominates over the political ambitions 
2. state is the main reformer 
3. superiority of law, all have to be equal before the law 
4. strong social security policy with respect to the most vulnerable stratums of the society 
which made up more than half of the population 
5. gradual approach to all the reforms 
Uzbekistan was one of the countries which mainly remained reluctant to follow the classical 
remedies (of international financial institutions) to reach economic stabilisation via decisive 
and tough measures.51 The official policy discourse repeatedly underlined that each of the 
aforementioned principles which are closely intertwined had to take into account local 
conditions. For instance, the bone of the Uzbek strategy – gradualism is widely explained as 
having a less painful effect on the population during the economic reforms. On the other hand, 
in the short run it is simply impossible to change the way of thinking among people with 
respect to the social and production processes. It will take a long time to fully overcome old 
ideas in the contemporary production process.  
                                                                                                                                                        
the initial stage of its development. Nevertheless, soon the national discources ultimately emphasized that the 
country’s specific domestic conditions would necessiate the development of its own model of reforms.  
51 The Washington Consensus proposed by the IMF in Latin America in the 1980s was also urged as to transition 
economies through a number of parallel sweep measures on macroeconomic stabilisation and trade liberalisation. 
See: Smith A. Eastern Eropean Economies, in Eastern Europe and the CIS, Paris, OECD, 1999. p.62-73. 
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In this regard, the peculiarity of the gradualism in Uzbekistan is in that no time limit is 
established for any stage of reforms. This approach proposes to use a qualitative rather than 
quantitative evaluation of reforms which implies that the next step will be made only if the 
previous aims have been achieved and necessary pre-conditions are in place to move further. 
The “gradualism” correlates strongly to social policy objectives. The latter aimed to reach, to 
a certain degree, social justice and equality in society. The concepts of “justice and equality” 
in conditions of Uzbekistan’s reforms, comparing to those of socialist society which were 
utopian, mean to prevent or mitigate as much as possible a wide differentiation in the society 
between “rich” and “poor” during the transition. Against the background of social problems in 
the early 1990s in Uzbekistan, there was a high degree of caution not to cause any further 
destabilization in the country as a result of socially unpopular reforms. 
The next important aspect of the development strategy in Uzbekistan lies in the superiority of 
law. It is strongly required that all economic units and population have to be equal before the 
law, and have equal initial conditions to participate in economic activities. In this respect, 
private property among other forms of ownership is a priority and strongly protected by 
Constitution.52 
Finally, the state is an initiator and the main reformer. The official logic believes that in terms 
of transition it is important not to allow a spontaneous development of events and therefore, 
tries to keep the leverages of influence in different fields. In the economic sphere, this is seen 
as a necessary step unless appropriate conditions in the form of true entrepreneurship spirit, 
strong institutions encouraging market relations, as well as the credibility of market relations 
among population, are developed. Thus, the state needs to coordinate the whole transition 
process. Later on, the role of state has to be decreased gradually. As a result of the 
decentralisation process, its main functions may be transferred to the local authorities, while 
the economic processes will start to be regulated by the market itself. 
 
2.2.2. The Key Spheres of Reforms during the First Phase (1991-1996) 
Determination of Priorities 
“To eliminate the one-sided commodity-based orientation of the Uzbekistan’s economy is the 
most important strategy of domestic policy of the republic. The countries which produce and 
trade in  commodities only are doomed to a chronic backwardness”.53 
                                                 
52 A special article on the protection of private property was introduced in the Constitution. 
53 Translated by the author from Karimov I. (1992) O’zbekiston – o’z istiqlol va tarraqiyot yoli. Collection of 
works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 1998, p.53. 
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Taking into account the way and content of market transformation in Uzbekistan, the reforms 
could be divided into a few important stages. The stage in the given context may imply a set 
of goals and tasks of a high priority to be solved before pushing through with further reforms. 
The first phase of market transformation implied macroeconomic stabilisation and 
institutional changes as well as the creation of the necessary pre-requisites for the next step. 
The main directions at that time were to create the foundation of legal regulation of the 
economy; to pursue anti-crisis policy with the focus on the support of basic industrial 
(primarily mining and manufacturing) industries; to meet the requirements of domestic 
demand for foodstuff; to reform the system of the government regulation over the economy; 
to set up necessary conditions for market relations as well as the development of private 
entrepreneurship. 
To achieve macroeconomic stabilization was a lynchpin of those changes. Although some 
authors point at low degree of integration of domestic economy into the Soviet system as a 
reason of more or less stable situation in the economy54, the low level of production efficiency 
in agriculture and huge transfers from Union budget made the economic terms sharply fragile 
with respect to external factors. Moreover, though agriculture was producing about 1/3 of 
total GDP, it could not meet fully the domestic demand for foodstuff. As a result, the republic 
was forced to import many consumer products such as grain, milk and meat products, 
potatoes, sugar. Therefore, the government was set to undertake to deal with these problems 
as fast as possible choosing between socio-political issues and economic deterioration.. 
In the first years of independence (1991-1993) the government sought to control everything, 
so that to make the process to develop in due course. Within the given period the relations 
between Moscow and the former Soviet republics continued to deteriorate. Russia still went 
on playing the role of the Center for some time as a successor to the USSR. For example, in 
the monetary sphere, the banknotes of Russian Central Bank were in the circulation in all the 
republics. Political processes dominated over the economic development. Under the motions 
of long-awaited independence and democracy all economic processes for some period became 
of secondary importance. The mythical attempt of the Russian government led by Yegor 
Gaydar (Prime-Minister of Russia at that time) to build up a market economy for “500 days”55 
not only brought the Russian Federation into the sharp and long-lasting crisis, but also 
                                                 
54 Primarily the question concerns the lower degree of industrial contribution in the whole Union economy, only 
14% of GDP in comparison with 36% for agriculture and services each. See Zettelmeyer J. (1999) “The Uzbek 
Growth Puzzle”. IMF Working Staff paper. Vol.46. No.3 
55 That was the name of socio-economic program suggested by the Russian government on fast and 
comprehensive transformation of the socialist system to a market economy for 500 working days.  
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contributed to worsening of the socio-economic situation in other republics in view of the fact 
that the latter were still strongly related to Moscow. Such situation resulted in deteriorating 
economic ties between all the republics. The economic exchange of commodities (barter) 
replaced civilian payments with money. The worsening life standards which was reinforced 
by the deterioration of domestic macroeconomic conditions in all the republics, was 
prompting prudent macroeconomic stabilisation programs (See Annex 2.3, Table (a)).  
Under such circumstances, the government of Uzbekistan chose industrial branches as the 
main target of its support seeing them as a potential drive for development in the post-
stabilisation era. Moreover, by doing so, the government sought not only to offset the overall 
production decline in the economy, but to create independent local industries as well which 
would explore national mineral base. The latter was also critical for the state in terms of stable 
revenues for the republican budget to compensate, to a certain degree, the abolished budgetary 
transfers from Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union.   
As was mentioned, the former system left Uzbekistan the industries which were producing 
low value-added. The majority of such industries were located in big cities. At the meantime 
they were closely connected to other similar plants and factories in other Soviet republics 
making up so called the Soviet type of regional specialization in production. Exporting 
primary commodities, Uzbek enterprises in turn were provided with raw materials too, such as 
oil and gas, metal, tumber. After the break-up of traditional economic relations with suppliers 
from Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and others, caused by the deterioration of economic and 
political processes in the Soviet republics, it was the government which had committed to 
keep up domestic investment and production activities of local producers. It started an import-
substitution policy within a few key industries, especially in the energy and oil sphere by 
investing into the exploration and development of the new mining areas. This policy aimed at 
providing a continuous production process of domestic industries. The government was 
reluctant to give a wide access for foreign investors to explore the main components of its 
mineral base. The government succeeded in obtaining needed resources through intensive 
export of raw cotton and precious metals such as gold, copper, zinc, to the world markets, so 
that to carry out such wide-range state-financed investment programs and projects. And what 
is more, in view of increasing poor solvency of the traditional partners among the former 
Soviet republics, Uzbekistan began seeking new consumers for its products, primarily aiming 
at entering new western markets where the commodities might be sold at much higher prices 
than in the traditional markets. On the other hand, the government sticked to former methods 
of control and regulation over the economy at the expense of explicit support of state 
 34
enterprises through the centralized credits, redistribution of income and funds provided by the 
Ministry of Finance and Central Bank. In such a way, the government sought to relieve 
business atmosphere in real sector by resisting widespread external shocks of that period. 
“In order to carry out structural changes and to solve urgent social issues, and whereas the 
needs of the republic for foreign exchange resources, it is cotton, fibre, lint, cocoons, non-
ferrous metals, kaprolaktam, carbamid and other products that will remain as the main 
exports”.56  
Such an approach resulted in the following policy measures. Taking into consideration the 
great dependency of the republic on the imported foodstuffs, the government eliminated all 
import customs for any products until July 1, 1995. The goal was to address the problem of 
imbalances in the domestic consumer market. Stagnation of the agrarian sector began in the 
Soviet time and required decisive structural reforms. For this reason it was simply unable to 
produce the amount of products which was claimed by domestic demand. For example, in 
1994, the republic proceeded import a large portion of wheat (66%), meat (30%), milk (25%), 
potatoes (50%).57 
The government also approached gradually to the issues of price liberalisation. Starting with 
January 10, 1992, the prices and tariffs on a wide range of production goods, on some 
categories of consumer goods and services were basically liberalised. However, some 
consumer items such as food, utilities, housing, transport, and energy were heavily subsidized 
until the mid of 1994. The World Bank estimated that consumer subsidies and enterprise 
credits amounted to at least 21% of GDP in 1999.58 At that period the goods of social 
significance (medicine, bread, soap, oil and oth.) remained under the control of the 
government. The distribution of such goods through coupon system was introduced.  
The year 1994 marked a significant stage in the process of price liberalisation. That year the 
prices on main consumer products (including bread and flour) as well as tariffs on transport 
and housing services were largely liberalized. And starting with 1995, prices on almost all 
consumer goods were freed, though those on oil and oil products were still lower the world 
level. 
 
 
                                                 
56 Translated by the author from Karimov I. (1992) O’zbekiston – o’z istiqlol va tarraqiyot yoli. Collection of 
works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 1998, p.33. 
57 Investment Guide for Uzbekistan (1996). Center for Cooperation with the Economies in Transition. Paris. p.29 
58 The same. p.32 
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Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
The stage-by-stage liberalisation of prices was expected to limit price increases on the 
consumer goods and on production inputs decreasing their negative social impact. However, 
as a rule, such policy is usually related to additional costs for the state budget. In terms of 
Uzbekistan this problem proved even more complex. On the one hand, after the removal of 
budget transfers from Moscow, the republic needed to stabilize a huge domestic fiscal 
imbalance which sometimes reached double digits during the first years of independence. On 
the other hand, the state embarked on the way of active government assistance to support real 
sector and social security policy. To some degree, the two purposes were rather controversial 
and, therefore, hardly attainable. Macroeconomic stabilisation (i.e. lower inflation and budget 
deficit) could be achieved usually through restrictive budget and monetary policies as well as 
via a strict financial discipline in the economy. It was reasonable to expect that the consumer 
and producer subsidies could only encourage financial instability in the economy. As a result, 
Uzbekistan had a fiscal deficit of 11 % of GDP in 1992, 9% in 1993, about 6-7% in 1994 and 
about 4% in 1995.59 However, they do not included off-budget expenditures such as credits to 
enterprises extended by the Ministry of Finance. If they were included, the World Bank would 
estimate much higher figures (for example, 16% in 1993). It is obvious that at that period the 
government financed its budget deficit mainly through gold and cotton sales, and via 
introduction some new taxes (for instance, value-added tax (VAT)). 
Simultaneously, some reforms in the monetary area related to the creation of a two-tier 
banking system and the introduction of new national currency could be also considered 
among the main targets of the given period. Before autumn, 1993, it was hardly to speak 
about monetary policy of independent Uzbekistan, because at that time all the former Soviet 
republics were still within the common national currency area used Russian rouble. The 
consequences could be two-pronged. On the one hand, such a situation allowed for the states 
to settle accounts in common currency, that undoubtedly eased up and encouraged the 
development of trade and economic relations between the republics. On the other hand, all the 
republics were not independent in pursuing their monetary policy, because it was the Bank of 
Russia that had an exclusive right for any cash emission.60 The republics had just to accept for 
the granted the monetary parameters and indicators set by the Bank of Russia. In terms of the 
                                                 
59 Investment Guide for Uzbekistan (1996). Center for Cooperation with the Economies in Transition. Paris p.31 
60 Equally, however, in terms of cash shortages, the republics could also expand money supply by conducting 
non-cash payments, both in domestic and inter-republican transactions, fuelling hyperinflationary trends across 
the whole common currency space. It soon became one of the main issues in debates in the monetary sector 
between Russia and other republics which used Russian roubles. 
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critical situation in the economy, the latter sought, but was barely able to maintain the 
efficient (i.e. restrictive) control over the bank emission that very often gave a push for 
hyperinflation both in Russia and other Soviet republics which used the Russian currency.61 
Moreover, inflation was fuelled, in a number of ways, by domestic policy such as lifting 
subsidies, increases in administered prices and easy credit to enterprises. As long as 
Uzbekistan remained in the rouble zone, the options for controlling inflation, like in other 
republics, were limited since it had no control over the emission of the Central Bank of 
Russia. Moreover, soon Kyrgyzstan had been first among the Central Asian states to introduce 
its own national currency in May, 1993. According to some estimates, Kyrgyzstan had about 
55 bln.roubles in circulation, of which only 6 bln. were exchanged for a new national 
currency.62 Taking into consideration the fact that Kyrgyzstan introduced its currency without 
any notice of its neighbors, the unchanged amount of money (or 49 bln.roubles) posed a real 
threat to the entire region in the form of huge cash overhang and heavy inflationary pressure. 
In such conditions Uzbekistan left the rouble zone in November, 1993. The state issued an 
interim currency, the sum-coupon. Lack of familiarity with a new means of exchange and 
general uncertainty resulted in a round of price increases. Hyperinflation continued for the 
first six months of 1994. 
But, the second phase of the transition to the national currency went smoothly. In July, 1994 
the sum-coupons were withdrawn, and new currency, sum, took its place. By introducing a 
new currency unit in proportion of 1 new sum for 1000 old som-coupons, the government 
succeeded in reducing extra money supply. The rest of som-coupons in circulation were put 
into deposits, which were frozen for 1 month. Restrictions on the emission of the new 
currency in form of cash resulted in a temporary cash shortage, and some enterprises even 
were unable to pay wages. It is estimated that the value of hard cash in circulation in July and 
August, 1994, was only 30% of those in June. Abolition of consumer subsidies also depressed 
income and consumer demand. In August the economy even faced deflation. But in October 
and November it run again to 20% (after all wages were made for the first time in many 
months). 
Nevertheless, the reform in banking was fulfilled simultaneously. The Soviet system was 
replaced by a two-tier banking system with the Central Bank (CBU) at the head and about 30 
commercial banks. But the functions of monetary authorities were performed by several 
                                                 
61 For instance, in Uzbekistan inflation of wholesale prices was at 2700% in 1992 , 1100% in 1993, 1248% in 
1994. EBRD. Uzbekistan – Macroeconomic Indicators. 2001 
62 Mandelbaum M. (ed.) (1994) Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan. Council on Foreign Relations Press. New York. p.40 
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institutions. The CBU had an exclusive rights to issue banknotes and coins, and regulate the 
use of currency within the republic. The CBU provided cash, deposit, and transfer services to 
the government. It also provided credits to the government at the end of each year to balance 
its budget deficit. The CBU was supervisor and coordinator of the activities of commercial 
banks. But the problem was, as mentioned earlier, that credit policy of the CBU within the 
other priorities of the economic policy, was based on expansionist monetary actions. In 
addition to this, the CBU provided credit to the Ministry of Finance to meet the working 
capital of enterprises within the overall support of real sector by the government. And only 
small amount was available by private sector. Such situation was not only one of the major 
cause of inflation, but through financing enterprises it inhibited the process restructuring of 
inefficient economic units. 
The activities of commercial banks were strictly limited at that period because of a number of 
factors. They were: the high level of refinancing rate (250% in 1994); negative interest rates 
on credits provided by commercial banks; the dependency of the banking sector on the 
government which implied that banks had to play a role of intermediaries in the allocation of 
resources from the government to real sector of the economy; high reserve requirements for 
banks. The creation of a number of specialized banks to support the whole branches of the 
economy such as Uzagroprombank (agriculture), Uzpromstroybank (industry), a few banks to 
finance trade and construction brought about a situation where 90% of total credits were 
provided only by a few banks. In 1993, it provided refinanced credit to agriculture and 
industry, and via auctions to commercial banks as well. Uzagroprombank (agricultural bank) 
and Uzpromstroybank (industrial bank) received about 993 mln.roubles in 1993. In contrast 
only 100 mln.roubles were allocated to commercial banks through auctions. The average 
interest rate for auctioned credit was 50% which showed that under existing inflationary 
levels, it faced negative. As a result, most of the loans were converted into grants. The 
National Bank of Uzbekistan, 100% state commercial bank, was authorized to administer 
foreign exchange reserves of the government as well as to monopolize foreign exchange 
market (90% of all forex operations in Uzbekistan at that time).63  
On the whole, it might be concluded that the development of the financial sector was put in 
line with general national macroeconomic strategy. The government considered the banking 
sector as a key tools of its investment policy to support production process in the real sector. 
On the other hand, government cautios view was partly explained by avoiding pyramid scams 
                                                 
63 Investment Guide for Uzbekistan (1996). Center for Cooperation with the Economies in Transition. Paris. 
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and financial abuses such as occurred in Russia and other republics. Thus, the process of 
liberalisation in the banking sector was postponed. 
Another particularity of the Uzbek macroeconomic policy in that period was that the 
government was strictly restricting any official borrowings from abroad. And taking into 
account that Uzbekistan did not inherit any of debts of the former Soviet Union, its total 
external debt remained quite modest. Merchandise exports was about US $2,940 bln. in 1994, 
US $3,475 bln. in 1995, while imports was US $2,727 bln. and US $3,238 bln., repectively, 
that provided trade account surplus. But total current account was in deficit in 1995, due to 
increase of transport costs of cotton to the world markets as well as to the slump in cotton 
prices.64 At the meantime, gross domestic reserves were estimated US $1,3 bln. at the end of 
1994.65 
 
Institutional and Structural Reforms 
“Our goal is that, emanating from all domestic resources, to create such a structure which 
would allow to secure economic and political independence of Uzbekistan”.66 
In line with the tasks of macroeconomic stabilization, the state held active policies on creation 
of the legal base of the transformation process. In December 1992, the new constitution of 
sovereign Uzbekistan was adopted to lay a foundation of market reforms in the country. In 
particular, the constitution secured various types of ownership and overall equality for 
entrepreneurship activities in new conditions.  
On the basis of a new constitution a number of laws and other legislative documents were 
developed. However, actually it was even earlier when different documents regulating 
economic activities in Uzbekistan were put into force. Among them, the Law “On property in 
the Republic of Uzbekistan” dated 31 October, 1990 and amended on 7 May, 1993, which 
admitted various forms of property in the republic, including private, state, or mixed. Property 
rights were extended to all tangible and intangible assets, giving any person or an economic 
unit, to resident or non-resident, the right to own and be the owners of property income. The 
following remained the property of state: 
¾ land, waters, flora and fauna, other natural resources, cultural and historical cities; 
                                                 
64 EBRD. Uzbekistan – Macroeconomic Indicators. 2001 
65 Investment Guide for Uzbekistan (1996). Center for Cooperation with the Economies in Transition. Paris. 
66 Translated by the author from Karimov I. (1992) O’zbekiston – o’z istiqlol va tarraqiyot yoli. Collection of 
works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 1998, p.53. 
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¾ public places (squares, streets, roads, parks, water reservoirs, beaches and oth.; 
¾ land belonging to natural reserves, botanical gardens; 
¾ land for agricultural cultivation; 
¾ contaminated lands; 
¾ land adjoining the national borders; 
¾ lands allocated for transmission lines, utility routes and communications lines. 
The next important Law which is “On Entrepreneurship in the Republic of Uzbekistan” dated 
15 February, 1991, guaranteed economic and legal rights, and the responsibilities of 
entrepreneurs. It mainly declared the freedom of property use, as well as sovereignty to 
conduct economic activities. 
In accordance with the Law “On Exchanges and Exchange activities” dated 2 July, 1992, the 
legal framework for operation of exchanges with transactions in securities, currency, real 
estate, intellectual property rights might be undertaken through obtaining special licences of 
membership and participant of exchanges. 
At the same time, the executive bodies, in their turn, were due to work out additional legal 
acts to put constitutional laws into effect as well as to contribute to the deepening of economic 
reforms, protection of private property, and the development of entrepreneurship.  
These steps were undertaken to induce the process of institutional transformation as well 
which was implemented in two principal ways. On one hand, most part of government 
institutions were retained.67 The state sought to justify that in new conditions during a period 
of transition, when true market institutions were absent, even the old plan system could 
prevent a full collapse of the domestic economy. On the other hand, some institutions were 
partly or fully reorganised, while a number of absolutely new ones were founded at the same 
time. In this sense, for example, the external sector faced considerable changes. To replace the 
existing Republican Committee for Foreign Trade strictly submitted in its actions to the 
Center in the Soviet time, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Activity was created. The 
Customs and Tax Committees, the National Bank for Foreign Economic Activity were also 
founded. The activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (existed in Soviet Uzbekistan) was 
                                                 
67 This expression was very popular with the state policies in the first years of reforms (1992-1994), and stood 
out all institutional changes of that period. The principle was first suggested by the President of Uzbekistan 
I.Karimov in one of his early books named “Yangi Uyni Qurmay Turib Eskisini Buzmang (Do Not Dismantle 
Your Old House Until You Build Up a New One” (1992). Therefore, it reflected one of the main ideas of initial 
institutional reforms in Uzbekistan.  
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largely and cordially changed. On the whole, new economic units in face of concerns and 
associations were created instead of strictly specialized industrial branches. 
It is worth underlining that one of the important elements of reforms was structural 
transformation in the economy. In comparison with the former socialist economy, where state 
property occupied monopolist positions, a market supposes diversity of property. That‘s why, 
privatisation and nationalisation were considered to be integral part of macroeconomic 
reforms in all transition economies. 
In Uzbekistan the situation with a ratio of property in the economy was as follows (Table 2.4). 
In terms of state monopoly, other forms of ownership were simply suppressed. It is evident 
that the republic ought to provide equal conditions for the development and competition 
among all - private, state, or mixed forms of properties.  
 
Table 2.4 Fixed Capital Data by Forms of Ownership in Uzbekistan and the whole USSR,  
in bln. Soviet roubles 
 
USSR Uzbekistan  
1980 1985 1990 1980 1985 1990 
Total Fixed 
Capital, 
includinig 
1742 2333 2958 56,1 77,8 100,9 
State 
Property 1514 2049 2624 48,5 68,2 87,3 
Cooperative 
Property 27 37 56 1,1 1,8 2,9 
Collective 
Farms 128 173 192 3,7 4,7 5,2 
Private 
Property 73 74 86 2,8 3,1 5,5 
Source: Tukhliyev N., Taksanov A. Natsionalnaya economicheskaya model Uzbekistana. Tashkent. 2000  
             The National Economy of the USSR in 1990. Annual Statistics (in Russian). Moscow. 1991 
             The National Economy of Uzbek SSR. 1990. (in Russian). Tashkent, 1991 
 
The non-governmental sector development was given some impetus in the Soviet time in the 
mid-1980s, beginning from the declaration of perestroyka. At that period the all-Union 
legislative acts, such as “On cooperatives”, “On individual work activities”, were adopted. 
They gave a push for the development of those production structures which had been in a 
shadow sector before. However, even then these newly created forms of property were limited 
to develop because of both political (restricted by prevailing communist dogmas) and 
economic factors (with economically non-viable regional and union specialization).  
Thus, the process of privatisation was preceded by the adoption of the special Law “On 
Denationalisation and Privatisation” passed in November 1991 to maintain the transformation 
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of state enterprises into individually and collectively owned firms, limited liability companies 
and joint ventures. State enterprises were allowed for the acquisition by the Uzbek citizens, as 
well as by non-state legal entities created by citizens, foreigners, and foreign legal entities. 
To support the privatisation process, a special state body – the Committee for the 
Management of State Property and Support of Entrepreneurship, was established by 
Presidential decree in February 1992. It reported directly to the government, and was 
supposed to formulate the policy and strategy for privatisation; develop the appropriate 
programs of privatisation; and finally, to coordinate and implement the whole process. 
Uzbekistan launched the process of privatisation and denationalization on a step-by-step 
basis. The experience of other transition economies (Russia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic) was scrutinized too.68 Yet the country generally refused the way which had been 
widely used by the aforementioned countries. The Uzbek President himself tries to give his 
own explanation of these issues.69 He argued that distribution of property on the free of 
charge basis could lead to undervalue its real price. Secondly, most part of population had no 
sufficient investment resources to participate in massive privatisation. Therefore, the property 
could find itself in the hands of only a limited part of people who might be financially more 
sustainable and, thus, have possibilities to buy up this property. Thirdly, decisive privatisation 
seems to be a very complicated process which is usually characterised by a sharp decline in 
production and in the standard of living. In sum, in terms of Uzbekistan everything which 
could threaten social stability was sorted out and subsequently denied. 
In this context, the process of privatisation through the encouragement of the new forms of 
ownership in agriculture, industry, the trading sector, services, housing, construction and 
transport, was integral part to reach one of the strategic tasks to create a multistructural 
economy. Therefore, Uzbekistan preferred to follow some kind of consistency in 
                                                 
68 On one hand, Russia and Eastern Europe had much in common in using the way of drastic privatisation which 
implied that the state property had to be sold or distributed among new owners within relatively short period of 
time. On the other hand, there were some features for each country. Russia issued a huge number of vautchers 
(shares) whose total nominal value was supposed to be equal to all state property across the country. Every 
citizen of Russia had right to own equal number of vautchers which confirmed his individual portion in all state 
property. These shares were then dispensed in a massive way to all population without any charges. In Poland 
and Romania, there were also similar shares, but they were distributed not to all people, but only to those over 18 
years old. 
69 President of Uzbekistan I.Karimov personally paid the priority attention to the given issue. He widely gave a 
critical evaluation of the privatisation process in a “shock” or decisive way which usually accompanied with 
inefficient distribution of property among new owners as well as with rather negative social consequences at the 
initial stage as the result of bankruptcies of many enterprises, and increases in number of jobless. By doing this, 
he justifies individual approach to privatisation in Uzbekistan alluding to the necessity of a gradual attitude 
which has to be the more reasonable in terms of the republic. See more in Karimov I. (1995) Uzbekistan on the 
Way of Deepening Economic Reforms. Tashkent 
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privatisation. The first part of privatisation began with the formation of small and medium-
sized enterprises in the different spheres of the economy, and was subsequently called “small 
privatisation”. As a result of these reforms, approximately 96% of housing became private, or 
about 1 mln. families got privatised apartments. Most of small enterprises in trading and 
service sectors were privatised. According to statistics, by 1998 about 91,4 thousand of 
farming enterprises which owned 413,3 thousand hectares of land, functioned in the economy. 
More quantities of agricultural products were produced by people themselves. For instance, 
these numbers were 87,3% for meat, milk – 90,9%, eggs – 69% out of total volume produced 
in the republic.70  
The second stage of privatisation covered the years of 1994-1995, and was named “mass 
privatisation”. It focused on the privatisation of enterprises in light, food, pharmaceuticals 
industries, procurement network, construction, transport, communication.71 Enterprises-
monopolists were broken up, initially converted in the closed-type joint stock companies and, 
subsequently into the open-type ones. 
In sum, despite uncontested success achieved in some areas of privatisation (the “small-scale” 
privatisation was remarked as a substantial step towards a market economy), changes in 
specific areas of the economy were either unfinished or of poor quality in substance. 
Nevertheless, the process of institutional reforms in the first half of the 1990s looked 
relatively successful comparing to some other ex-Soviet republics (Annex 2.3, Table (b)).72 
Against this background, the next steps were expected to continue with the reforms in a much 
more comprehensive manner, although this still was far from embarking on the way of radical 
reforms. 
 
2.2.3. Tasks for the Second Phase (1997-2002) 
At the given stage of the research, it is necessary to stress that division of the economic 
reforms in Uzbekistan into a few stages is conditional and based on the principle that shows 
which factors and to what degree were influencing economic processes, as well as to show 
how the government policy were responding to such factors. While foreign estimates of the 
process of economic changes were quite different sometimes, we tried to take into account the 
                                                 
70 Tukhliyev N., Taksanov A. Natsionalnaya economicheskaya model Uzbekistana. Tashkent. 2000 
71 Tchjen V. (1996) Osnovy privatizatsii. Tashkent. p.7 
72 One needs to emphasize that currently there are a lot of debates on the methodologies of calculation and the 
subsequent application of aggregate numbers (first column) in different countries which may lead to the 
inadequate estimation of transformation process. For details see: Pomphret R. Central Asia since 1991: the 
Experience of the NIS. OECD Development Centre Technical Paper 212, Paris, July 2003. 
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arguments of the both sides to make up a more or less objective picture of the happening in 
the national economy. From this point of view, we did not proceed from the concrete terms or 
time limits. Time as to macroeconomic policy within the whole economy and within its 
sectors and branches may be naturally different by the period during which it was pursued. 
That is true, for instance, with respect to privatisation and structural transformation issues, 
foreign exchange and trade regimes. What is important, as we believe, is the necessity to 
determine the contents and features of transition to market in terms of Uzbekistan. 
 
Deepening Structural Transformation 
Due to an emphasis placed on prevention of the slump of production by virtue of intensive 
investment and trade policies, Uzbekistan managed not only to avoid gloomy predictions in 
real sector, but was first among all transition economies to see positive economic growth of 
1,6% in 1996. Even international financial institutions which had been rather sceptical about 
the reforms in Uzbekistan, stressed the period 1993-1996 as “the period of reform 
acceleration”. In particular, it was remarked that “considerable progress was made in almost 
all reform areas. Prices and trade were liberalized, the rationing system for basic food staffs 
was virtually completed... Limited private ownership of land was introduced. The state orders 
on all agricultural products, except cotton fiber and grain, were eliminated... The system of 
social protection was significantly reformed and became much simpler and better targeted”. 73 
Budget deficit was kept at 6,1% in 1994 and 4,1% in 1995. Inflation after surging to 23,2% 
per month in 1994 in response to price liberalisation and adjustments, fell to an average 
monthly rate of 6,3% in 1995. The external current account recorded a surplus equivalent to 
2,1% of GDP in 1994 and deficit equivalent to 0,2% of GDP in 1995. Official international 
reserves increased from as $1,330 mln.USD (5,9 moths of imports) in the end of 1994 to 
$1,867 mln.USD (6,9 months of imports) in 1995. 
In such conditions, the government program of structural reforms received support from the 
World Bank under the rehabilitation loan which was approved in 1995, and under the 
Systemic Transformation Program financed by the IMF a little bit earlier. 
After some initial achievements, the government of Uzbekistan determined a number of the 
main priorities of the further transformation process in the economy. Among them were: 
deepening of the process of privatisation and denationalisation which had been started 
                                                 
73 World Bank (1999) Uzbekistan: Social and Structural Policy Review, Report No 19626. 
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before74; the necessity of economic recovery, creating conditions for long-run economic 
growth; stable national currency as one of the important indicators of sustainable production 
process; expansion of national programs of structural changes in the economy to provide 
needed diversification of the production process75; to continue with social security policy in 
order to avoid sharp social inequality and maintain the general level of income. 
The main task which had been put forward by the President of Uzbekistan during the process 
of privatisation and denationalisation was the development of competitive environment. 
According to him, this goal could be reached through the formation of a multistructural 
economic system. “... It is necessary to eliminate the state monopoly (in the economy), and 
needs to aspire to create lots of enterprises which are engaged in the activities similar with 
those of state ones, but only on the basis of various forms of ownership – state, collective, 
stock, private and other”.76 
The second stage of privatisation, which has been considered in the previous chapter, was the 
period of mass privatisation of small and medium size enterprises in the light and food 
industries, machine-building, construction and transport, to transform them into open-stock 
economic units. In September 1996, some special programs were developed in line with 
recommendations of international financial institutions, on the establishment of Privatisation 
and Investment Funds (PIF) to accelerate the process of wider participation of population in 
the processes of privatisation. The PIF were piling up the share packages from different 
economic units to reinvest them in private sector, both among invited private investors and 
population. 
The program of privatisation of state enterprises did not aim at increasing revenues in the 
whole national budget. On the contrary, all the funds coming from privatisation were 
allocated to the post-privatisation support of enterprises and for the development of 
enterprises through the off-budget funds. And up to 1998, dividends from state investments 
into the privatised enterprises were directed to further technological modernisation and re-
equipment. 
                                                 
74 The President of Uzbekistan himself was a strong proponent of this idea and as the Chairman of the Cabinet of 
Ministers had the legal power to pursue government policy in this area. In the given case, it primarily implied the 
necessity to find such an owner who would be able to benefit himself, but in course with government and the 
whole society’s strategic goals and interests. 
75 That meant to develop traditional sectors of the economy like agriculture, light and food industries formerly 
developed during the Soviet times, and to give a strong push for the development of non-traditional production 
such as more finished goods with high value added (electronics, machine and equipment). 
76 Translated by the author from Karimov I. (1998) Buyuk Kelajak Sari. Tashkent. p. 339 
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With the support of the World Bank, in 1998 the government started a program of individual 
privatisation of the largest and strategically important enterprises in oil and energy, 
metallurgy, transport, communications, etc. The main meaning of the reforms is to decrease 
government influence in national economy, especially in the sphere of natural monopolies.77 
A special focus has been made on foreign investments to encourage their participation in 
domestic privatisation. According to the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers No 119 dated 2 
March, 2001 “On Further Measures on Privatisation and Denationalisation in 2001-2002 with 
the Attraction of Foreign Investors” about 38 enterprises and banks were expected to be 
privatized, with 30-75% stock to be sold to foreign investors. Among such enterprises are the 
Uzbek oil and gas company, the Uzbek Energy Company, enterprises engaged in chemical 
and cabel industries, the Uzbek Telecommunications, a number of cement producing plant. 
Another 49 enterprises were listed to be sold to investors at full. 
Thus, the long list of enterprises to be sold to investors through auctions, concessions and 
other sale schemes has been endorsed. In 2002, there were about 535 enterprises representing 
almost all the spheres of the economy, with 50-100% assets for sale.78 
  
The Priorities of Investment Policy 
In both the agricultural and industrial sectors, the reforms favored import-substitution policy 
priorities. If on the first-stage reforms focused mainly on the satisfaction of domestic demand 
for consumer goods, including essential imports, through active public investments into the 
domestic mining sector to provide continuous industrial production, then during the second 
stage the state tried to prioritize certain industries to stimulate economic development. 
“During transition, when the government develops and pursues its economic policy, it 
(government) should keep in mind that one must seek to encourage the prospective industries, 
those of most priority, i.e. it is important to determine key bars (like oi and oil independence, 
energy and energy independence, grain and grain independence and so on) which might 
promote structural reconstruction of the entire economy... Without singling out such leading 
branches clearly, without rendering necessary assistance to them, one may then loose the 
economic strategy as a whole...”.79 
                                                 
77 In the energy field, special foreign investment bank was invited to take part in the evaluation of the property, 
make up restructuring plan and promote financial sustainability strategy for the sector. See the next chapter for 
details. 
78 Magazine Ekonomicheskoye obozreniye. Tashkent. 2001. No 8-9. p.10 
79 Translated by the author from Karimov I. (1998) Buyuk Kelajak Sari. Tashkent. p. 355 
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Being strongly dependent on imported grain, the state kept up intentions to develop domestic 
production of grain via shrinking in cultivated areas for cotton (from 1,7 in 1993 to 1,5 
mln.hectares in further years). Respectively, the areas for grain production were increased 
from 1,3 mln. hectares in 1993 to 1,7 mln. hectares in further years, including the lands for 
production of wheat – from 0,7 mln. hectares in 1993, up to 1,4 mln. hectares in 1998. All this 
resulted in substantial increase in domestic production of grain from 0,9 mln. tons in 1993 up 
to 3,6 mln. tons in 1998 and 4,1 mln. tons later on.80 
At the same time the achievement of macroeconomic stability and economic growth in 1996 
made the government to espouse greater ambitions in pursuing investment and industrial 
policies, as well as further structural changes. The government started developing more 
capital-intensive investment programs, particularly trying to make them more attractive for 
foreign capital. The government relied on foreign investors efforts to carry out technological 
modernisation of a number of existing production as well as creation of absolutely new ones. 
One of the ever largest joint industrial projects with foreign capital was the construction of 
auto plant “UZDAEWOO” in Asaka (the Andijan region in the Ferghana Valley) with general 
capacities to produce up to 200 thousand middle class cars per year. 
In line with the priorities to meet domestic needs in energy products through the development 
and exploration of the domestic energy base, huge investments were attracted, mainly foreign 
borrowings, to create and upgrade production and infrastructure facilities in the energy sector. 
During 1996-1997 a new Bukhara Oil Refinery Plant and the reconstructed Ferghana Oil 
Refinery Plants were put into operation. As a result, in 1997-1998 it provided the increase in 
domestic oil production and refinery by 3,3 times comparing to 1990 which gave the 
opportunity not only to satisfy domestic demand, but to become net regional exporter of 
energy products.81 
Usually by the determination of the key priorities for each year, the government tried to be 
more consequent. In this respect, since 1995 and up to 1998 the government enhanced the 
activities to operate not only in the domestic market, but to seek the opportunities for export. 
The state tried to attract investors both in specific sectors of the economy and the 
development of certain territories and regions of the republic by granting various fiscal and 
legal privileges. For instance, by developing these traditional sectors of the economy like light 
and food industry (tomato pasta and sauce, cotton oil refinery, wines, fruits and vegetables) 
                                                 
80 IMF (2000) Republic of Uzbekistan: Recent Economic Developments. IMF Staff Country Report. No 00/36. 
p.42 
81 These issues are analised in detail in the following chapter. 
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the government strongly counted on solving its strategical tasks: to diversify exports through 
development of finished products with high value-added. And foreign investors included in 
the government investment program of a high priority gained a number of substantial 
privileges, primarily through an exemption from paying different taxes on profits, income, on 
assets and so on, up to 5 years. 
The sector distribution of investments confirms the emphasis placed on the technological 
modernization and development of industrial output, while priorities in agriculture are 
confined to structural reforms and the changes in forms of ownership. For instance, while 
investments in the agricultural sector were kept up at 6-7% during the period 1995-1998, the 
size of investments in industry formed 29% in 1998, even though this indicator was by 20 
percentage points lower comparing to 1995.82 
Overview of Changes in the External Sector 
In terms of international economics, Uzbekistan might be characterized as a small, open 
economy. As a rule, such economy takes active part in international economic relations and 
thus, is strongly dependent on global economic processes. The share of the external sector in 
total GDP is rather high that could be one of the key factors to influence domestic economic 
policy. Therefore, this specific interrelationship is important to analyse economic strategy as a 
whole. 
It has been stressed before that during the period 1991-1994, the government encouraged 
imports of consumer and a number of industrial products through elimination of all import 
tariffs. The government monopoly in foreign trade was ceased, and legal and institutional 
changes were made to stimulate enterprises’ export activities. 
On the next stage (1995-1998) the focus of state policy was placed on the development of 
industries using local raw materials (not imported) and seeking for export opportunities. The 
state decreased number of goods which were subject to quota and licensing process from 71 to 
only 4 articles (cotton, grain, energy products, precious metals). Maximum export custom rate 
was established at as much as 40%, while one third of total export was eliminated at all. 
Export-oriented industries gained substantial privileges in forms of sliding tax rates and an 
access to financial resources. 
The share of export and import in GDP in 1996 amounted to 34,2% and 34,5%, respectively. 
Economic growth at 1,6% in 1996 was to some extent achieved by virtue of the highest levels 
                                                 
82 IMF (2000) Republic of Uzbekistan: Recent Economic Developments. IMF Staff Country Report. No 00/36. 
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of foreign trade turnover ($9 bln.USD) for all years of independence83, or by 18% increase 
relatively to 1995.84  
Mainly this situation could be explained by favorable conditions in the world markets for 
basic export commodities of Uzbekistan (cotton and gold). Cotton export was equal to 40,7, 
51,3, 45,6 and 43,5% of total export in 1993-1996, respectively. Cotton and gold together 
provided about 70% of total export revenues. Undoubtedly, these sources of export revenues 
helped maintain domestic production levels and budget revenues on more or less stable levels 
in comparison with other transition economies. However, such exports could be hardly 
regarded as stable in the middle- or long-run perspective due to high dependency on the 
volatility of world commodity prices.85 
In this regard, the changes in terms of trade against Uzbekistan probably were among the 
most important factors which had influenced on further domestic economic processes. In 
1996-1999 time period Uzbekistan faced a number of economic shocks which could be 
divided into internal and external. As an internal shock it was a supply shock because of the 
poorer than expected cotton and grain harvests. Agricultural production suffered a severe 
contraction by about 7%, which was mainly affected by bad weather conditions, as well as by 
poor irrigation systems and shortages of fuel, spare parts, and pesticides. Because of the 
contraction in the sector, the share of agriculture in GDP declined up to 23% in 1996. 
Production of cotton, the country’s principal agricultural crop and export commodity, fell by 
about 15% from an average of 4 mln. tonnes during 1993-1995 to 3,4 mln. tonnes in 1996. 
Horticulture was also affected by poor weather conditions in 1996 as production of fruits and 
vegetables fell by 9% and 3%, respectively. In contrast, the grain production grew from 3,2 
mln. tonnes in 1995 to 3,5 mln. tonnes in 1996 largely because of an increase in the total area 
under grain from 1,6 mln. tonnes hectares in 1995 to 1,9 mln. hectares in 1996. However, the 
total grain production was still below the government’s target of 4,5 mln. tonnes. At the same 
time, grain production became inefficient as the average grain yield fell from 2,1 tonnes per 
hectare in 1995 to 1,9 tonnes per hectare in 1996.86 
Similarly, the republic recorded external shock in 1997 which was mainly characterized by a 
sharp slump in world prices on cotton and precious metals. Thus, average world prices on 
                                                 
83 UNDP (1999). Uzbekistan. Human Development Report 
84 IMF (2000) Republic of Uzbekistan: Recent Economic Developments. IMF Staff Country Report. No 00/36. 
85 The same. 
86 IMF (1999) Republic of Uzbekistan: Recent Economic Developments in 1998-1999. IMF Staff Country 
Report. 
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cotton decreased by 16% in 1996, by more than 14% in 1997, even more by 8,5% in 1998. 
Gold devalued by 40% for the years 1997-1998.87 
As a result, the balance of payments position worsened significantly. Total export earnings in 
1998 were 22% lower than in 1997. The value of cotton exports from the 1998 harvest was 
about 44,5% lower than from the 1997 harvest. Because of price decline, the value of gold 
exports was 11% lower in 1998 than in 1997.88 Accordingly, under some estimates, only in 
1998, because of the decline in world prices on oil, cotton and copper, the republic lost about 
$ 170-180 mln. USD. 
At that period, earnings from the export of manufactured goods also declined because of 
reduced demand from CIS (Commonwealth of Independence States) countries and the erosion 
of price competitiveness. The official real effective exchange rate, one of the main indicators 
of competitiveness of the country’s exports, vis-a-vis CIS countries appreciated by 42% from 
June 1998 to September 1999. Consequently, the competitiveness of manufacturing exports 
such as automobiles produced by domestic “UZDAEWOO” plant and sold basically in 
Russia, was seriously eroded, because of Russian financial crisis in August, 1999. At that time 
Russia engaged in more than a half of foreign trade of Uzbekistan with CIS countries and 
remained important partner for the republic. In general, total exports to CIS countries declined 
by about 50% in 1998 and further decline had been recorded in 1999. 
Responding to the aforementioned shocks, the government imposed restrictions on foreign 
trade and exchange operations to protect international reserves. Import tariffs were raised, 
pre-import registration of contracts, and excise taxes on imports were introduced, and the 
coverage of centralised exports89 increased. Foreign exchange surrender for exports90 at the 
level 30% of exports earnings was also introduced. The official foreign exchange market was 
split into two parts: the currency exchange and the commercial market.91 As a result of such a 
policy, multiple exchange rates emerged while foreign exchange restrictions led to the 
development of curb market. 
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89 By the centralized export in Uzbekistan export of strategic commodities, primarily cotton and gold was 
considered 
90 In terms of foreign economic restrictions the government, trying to keep up its own foreign exchage revenues, 
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had preliminarily gained an appropriate permission from the authorities. Commercial market was organised by 
commercial banks for forex operations between themselves and to service population. The foreign exchange 
market structure is more completely covered further. 
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At the macro-level, both fiscal and monetary policies, were significantly relaxed, especially in 
1996, due to the large budgetary lending to the agricultural sector (to some extent, to offset 
harvest decline) and the pension system. Consolidated budget deficit reached to 15% of GDP 
in the end of 1996 and 7,3% for the whole year. And about 6,9% of this deficit was financed 
by banking system. Reserve money grew by 84% over the last three moths of 1996 that 
caused a 57% increase in broad money.  
These actions, however, also brought about a breach of the program targets under the Stand-
by Arrangement (SBA) provided by IMF in December, 1995. The IMF suspended 
disbursements under the SBA in December, 1996. But, starting with 1997, due to the 
government’s tightening financial policies so that to increase budget revenues and curtail on-
lending activities, one was managed to reduce budget deficit up to 2,3% of GDP. Central 
Bank managed to contain the annual growth rate of reserve money to 18% and broad money 
to 36%. As a result, monthly inflation fell to 2,1 % (in comparison with 10,5% in 1996). 
In terms of contemporary international economics it is foreign exchange regime which could 
be used as an efficient instrument of macroeconomic policy to determine the redistribution of 
resources among various economic sectors through prolific manipulation of exchange rates. 
The economic reforms in Uzbekistan during 1996-2000 allow to demonstrate how a 
comprehensive effect such policies may have on domestic trends.  
Uzbekistan is one of the transition economies which have operated segmented forex market 
and multiple exchange rate a component of the whole macroeconomic strategy. This system 
was first created as an emergency response to growing balance of payments pressures 
following an expected deterioration of country’s terms-of-trade position. The government 
justified the use of current account restrictions with a need to direct resources from traditional 
exports (cotton, gold, minerals) to the development of capital-intensive, import-substitution 
industrial base (automobile, energy, chemical industries) as well to subsidize socially 
important consumer goods imports. Therefore, some international experts come to conclusion 
that “foreign exchange regime has thus become the cornerstone of “Uzbek economic model of 
development”.92 
Since 1997, the foreign exchange regime consisted of a few segments: two official and one 
unofficial. The first official segment was the Uzbek Republican Currency Exchange where 
access was restricted by the government, and supply of currency was enforced, because 
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demand always exceeded supply of foreign exchange. A special Republican Monetary 
commission decided who could buy forex and how much. Access to the auction market was 
granted to certain importers of capital goods, raw materials, grain, and some priority 
consumer goods as well as to enterprises servicing foreign loans guaranteed by the 
government. The latter also could buy forex to service its own external debt. 
The second official segment of Uzbekistan foreign exchange market was a commercial bank 
market, where commercial banks and exchange offices trade foreign currency with other 
banks, enterprises and individuals. The government also regulated this segment by controlling 
demand and supply. The primary uses of forex sold in this segment were approved imports of 
capital and intermediary goods as well as imports of consumer goods by owners of the Central 
Bank’s license within the Central Bank determined quotas. The main sources of foreign 
exchange supply in this segment were surrender requirement for decentralised exports (all, 
except cotton, gold, energy), which was first 30%, then 50% from January 1, 1999. 
As far as there was strongly unsatisfied domestic demand for foreign exchange, unofficial 
curb foreign exchange market started developing on which national currency was traded at 
lower exchange rates than in official segments.93 Such foreign exchange regime was 
preserved until 2000 with a little change. The consequences of the regime manifested in some 
inter-sector distortions which we will consider in the next chapters. 
New Opportunities for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
The period from 1999 may represent a new phase of economic reforms in Uzbekistan. The 
following issues are quite the relevance to illuminate the most important priorities for the 
given period: the development of small- and medium-sized business, the encouragement of 
export-oriented industries, and overall liberalisation of the economy. 
Taking into consideration the necessity to give a more strong impetus for the development of 
export-oriented industries, the government worked out a Program on the Development of 
Export Potential which aimed at creating favorable conditions for exports increase and its 
structural improvements. This program served as a basis to the elaboration of a number of 
small-scale and detailed regional programs dealing with concrete branches and sectors of the 
economy in more practical way. This program resulted in creating joint ventures with foreign 
capital, especially in the textile and food industries allowing to increase the number of 
diversified finished goods for export produced from cotton fibre and agricultural products. 
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Uzbekistan also started exports of automobiles, buses and agricultural combines, as well as a 
number of home appliances and electrical equipment, benzin, diesel, wire and others. In 
addition, a number of services (tourist, transport) are provided recording wider export 
potential of the domestic economy. 
At the meantime, one of the key priorities of the state policy during the recent years was 
comprehensive development of small- and medium-sized business (SMB). Delivering a 
speech at one of the government meetings, President I.Karimov noticed that “small- and 
medium-sized business is a key element of any developed economy which influence 
successfully not only on large-scale industries, but on the economy as a whole, providing a 
huge number of consumer products and services to a domestic market, developing export 
potential of the economy, addressing problems of unemployment and raising the standards of 
living of population”.94 
For Uzbekistan that was particularly important for a number of reasons. Firstly, relatively fast 
growth of population and labor, especially in rural areas required to create adequate number 
of jobs. Small business was invited to ease up this problem. Secondly, in terms of transition, 
SMB is considered to be more flexible, quickly adapting to any changes in the economy. This 
meant that small enterprises could survive in a more efficient way during transition comparing 
to large ones which suffered from structural adjeustment costs.  
Therefore, the government started with a campaign on the comprehensive support to SMB. It 
created new institutional structures such as the Fund on support and development of private 
entrepreneurship (Business Fund), the fund of assistance to the development of small and 
medium entrepreneurship, Tadbirkorbank, the Consulting Agency (Konsauditinform), the 
Chamber of Commerce, Producers and Entrepreneurs. All of them were non-governmental 
institutions which were responsible for providing financial and consulting support directly to 
entrepreneurs. Besides, the state provided a number of tax privileges, simplified taxation95 and 
registration of entrepreneurs in government bodies.  
On the other hand, this policy was supported by international financial and non-governmental 
organizations. Among them were the European Bank on Reconstruction and Development, 
Asian Development Bank, OECF (Japan), International Financial Corporation, Credit 
Development Agency of Germany, the Central Amerian Fund on Entrepreneurship 
                                                 
94 The speech was made by the President I.Karimov at the meeting dedicated to the evaluation and discussions 
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95 One of the great achievements was that SMB might pay only one common tax instead of a number of taxes on 
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all previous taxes which were paid by enterprises in a separate way. 
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Development. They expressed their readiness to provide financial assistance to private sector. 
According to official statistics, in 2000, the volume of credits to SMB exceeded 92 bln. sums 
which was 2,5 times higher that in 1999. Off-budget funds financed some projects with total 
value of 4,4 bln. sums (1,7 times higher than in 1999).96 
As a result of government policy, the number of small and medium enterprises fast reached 
the number 186 thousand as of 1 April, 2001 (in comparison 9343 in 1991). The share of 
SMB in total GDP was equal to 21,6%, including in total industrial output - 11,3%, in 
agricultural output – 72,4%, 37% - in construction industry, 45,9% - retail trade.97 The 
government repeatedly pledged itself on firm commitments to provide further comprehensive 
support to small and medium enterprises both in middle- and long-run prospective. 
With strong committments to liberalisation and further market-oriented reforms declared by 
the government in 1999, liberalisation of foreign exchange regime and the elimination of 
multiple exchange rate system were of significant attention. Since 1998 Uzbekistan has been 
gradually moving to the unification of multiple exchange rates. During the year 2000 the 
Central Bank devalued official exchange rate by 57%. In the mid of 2000, it was introduced 
commercial exchange rate two times higher than official exchange rate. Starting with July, 
2001, one was introduced so called “over-the-counter”98 rate which ought to reflect real 
demand and supply within the forex market in the republic.  
In sum, the process of transition turned out to be equally controversial in all former Soviet 
republics which had to face a large number of similar problems. However, the peculiarities of 
economic strategy in each single country resulted in a various extent of economic progress.99 
As for Uzbekistan, it was also primarily influenced by inherited social and economic 
problems of the former socialist system. Therefore, the government policy recorded 
uncontested success on the one hand, while facing huge, more complicated than expected 
problems, on the other. Consequently, this required more sweeping economic measures from 
the state to accelerate the period of transition and give a stronger push to sustainable 
economic boost. Some of these discourses are overviewed in the next chapter. 
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2.3. Against the Challenges of Transition 
2.3.1. Discourses on the Overall Strategy of Reforms 
The process of transition from a socialist to market economy in Uzbekistan seems to be a 
complex task from the very outset. The range of factors to influence domestic processes has 
been quite different. The socio-economic development has to be seen in the context of 
economic policy in form of fast or step-by-step strategy of transformation, the role of state, 
success in attracting foreign investments, etc, and political processes right after the break-up 
of the USSR, as well as socio-cultural components of Uzbek market reforms.  
Such interrelationship is not new in the world history. It is well-known that after the second 
World war, the international community saw the establishment of new, post-colonial, 
sovereign states. The process made the scientific society expand its views relatively political, 
social and economic processes in different societies. According to some researchers, “it was 
obvious that political systems, as well as society and economy in these newly independent 
countries did not function according to those rules that organised social and economic life in 
the metropolitan countries of the West, which in their majority were capitalist, liberal 
democracies”.100 
Geographical proximity of East Europe to Western countries, that literally speaking, allowed 
to observe capitalism and democracies development over their national borders, promoted the 
initial market relations in Yugoslavia, Hungary, as early as in 1960-70s when along with the 
state enterprises non-state sector development was also encouraged. Thereto, these countries 
were less influenced by the Communist Party’s interventions in economic life which was a 
general practice in the Soviet system at that time. Existing domestic pre-requisites combined 
with the external political, economic and social consolidation with Western Europe urged 
some Eastern European ruling governments to induce drastic structural measures in the early 
1990s and launch the adaptation process to comply with new EU’s standards and rules.101 
The former Soviet republics faced not only more acute socio-political processes, which 
subsequently expressed in ethnic and social conflicts, but also much deeper economic crisis 
                                                 
100 Wöhrmann F. (2000) Economic Discourse in Uzbekistan. The Perception of Economic Change between 
Market Principles and Social Traditions. Veilag für Entwicklungspolitik, Saarbrücken. Bochum.  p.45. 
101 While EU-25 had formally occured in May 2004, the implications of full “Europeanization” are not monotonic, 
both for recent members and for second-wave countries. In addition to economic problems, new members and other 
nominees have also to deal with painstaking and timeconsuming political transformation to integrate their patterns, 
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See more on these issues in Seidelmann R. (ed.) (2002) EU, NATO and the Relationship Between Transformation and 
External Behavior in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe. The Cases of the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Ukraine, Nomos Verlagsgeselschaft, Baden-Baden. 
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because of much stronger mutual economic links and specialization. The plan system implied 
not cooperation, but rather a mutual complementarity of vast economic territories with a 
various level of socio-political and economic development. 
Despite the prevailance of the European culture in the face of Russian-speaking society, and 
the suppression of national identity and self-determination in the whole Central Asian region, 
traditional and social relations kept on developing in Uzbekistan. To some degree, this fact 
was also admitted by the Center. Some authors stressed as to relations in the Asian society 
that “in the given society individual interests fully submit to group (family, community, 
colleagues in workplace) interests. The latter subordinate to the interests of larger groups 
(strata, classes) which in their turn, do to the state... Such a society is different by its attitude 
to state property on land which played substantial economic role in the society. State property 
on land was an alternative to private property”.102 The plan system with the monopoly of the 
state on production means, and the fusion of economic and political power within totalitarian 
regime might have been relatively easy to introduce in such societies. And in comparison with 
East European countries, Central Asia stood apart from so called process of “capitalist 
modernization” which supposed to decrease socio-economic gap between developing and 
developed societies. 
After independence, as was mentioned earlier, Uzbekistan had to choose between a big bang 
(shock therapy) and gradual strategy. The supporters of the shock therapy suggested a 
package of decisive measures which are rather comprehensive to reach desired stabilisation, 
price liberalisation, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, promotion of private sector, and 
trade liberalisation. The idea of these changes was to mould as closely as possible each aspect 
of the economy to the free market model. As an essential part of its strategy, the measures 
proposed to eliminate price controls and trade barriers and by giving a free way to foreign 
economic units to act on the domestic market. That should encourage domestic competition 
and stimulate only really profit-making domestic enterprises, while all others have to be 
decisively closed. 
According to other views, “this approach has been argued that their general suitability to the 
situation in developing countries has been far from evident and that since stabilisation 
policies are likely to induce recession, they bear the risk of collapse in the financially and 
                                                 
102 Tukhliyev N., Taksanov A. Natsionalnaya ekonomicheskaya model Uzbekistana. Tashkent. 2000. p.27 
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structurally fragile economies of transitional or developing countries... The stabilisation 
could be met at the lower level of economic production”.103 
Nevertheless, the World Bank’s approach is based on a set of measures to ensure economic 
stabilization and induce economic growth. First, the trade regime should be liberalized with 
the transition from non-tariff to tariff methods of regulation; barriers to external capital flows 
have to be removed and integration of domestic markets with world capital markets; third, 
deregulation of labor market; fourth, reforms in the tax system; fifth, privatisation and 
denationalisation. The World Bank strategically adheres to the aims of decreasing the role of a 
state in the economy, and developing competition environment. 
Some authors, alluding to the experience of East Asian countries, believe that the role of state 
was a key element to the success of industrial policy in providing new export-oriented 
branches of the economy. For example, South Korea provided substantial state assistance to 
heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s. In Japan, they were steel, electronics, machinery 
industries that benefited from state subsidies and protectionism relatively to import.104 
The question in this regard is whether the neo-classical views would have led to the expected 
changes and economic growth or if their programs have been able to provide the efficient 
balance in the economy are equally not incontestable. 
Nevertheless, Uzbekistan perplexed many international observers by its performance in the 
mid-1990s. The country which had not follow standard model of market-oriented refroms, 
faced the least decline in output. 1997 Uzbek output stood at about 85% in 1991, as compared 
to an average of 60% for the Baltic, Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe and the 
USSR. Total cumulative loss in output was only 59% of 1991 output by 1995 and 89% by 
1997- as opposed to 126 and 207%, respectively, for other transition countries.105 
It is interesting that the IMF model predicted loss of 18,9% in 1994 which did not materialise. 
Moreover, Uzbekistan got growth of 1,6% in 1996 – the only country in transition. According 
to the neo-classical point of view, „the mildness of Uzbekistan’s transitional recession could 
be largely explained by a combination of its low degree of initial industrialization, its cotton 
production (which was re-directed from CIS markets to the world markets), and its near self-
sufficiency in energy“.106 The author of the research questioned an official discourse in 
                                                 
103 References to  Taylor (1993), Harrigan (1991) are taken from Wöhrmann F. (2000) Economic Discourse in 
Uzbekistan. The Perception of Economic Change between Market Principles and Social Traditions. Veilag für 
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104 Chang Ha-Joon, Nolan P. (ed.) (1995) The Transformation of the Communist Economies. London. p.391 
105 Zettelmeyer J. (1999) “The Uzbek Growth Puzzle”. IMF Working Staff paper. Vol.46. N.3 
106 The same. 
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Uzbekistan that it was allegedly an appropriate macroeconomic policy of the government with 
structural and investment changes, which had provided a rather slide decline. At the same 
time, the author expresses his doubts on that „the country would have done better by pursuing 
more vigorous liberalisation and reform policies from the very beginning“. 
Other economists share the official views that relative success of Uzbekistan was based on the 
following pillars of the economic strategy: 
1) gradual transition to a socially-oriented market economy with a strong and progress 
oriented state; 
2) the development of real sector as a priority; 
3) intensive industrial policy versus deindustrialization; 
4) the combination of import substitution and export-orientation policies; 
5) the gradual opening up and integration with the global economy through step-by-step 
foreign trade and exchange rate liberalisation. 
They conclude that „the chosen strategy has become one of the main determinants of 
relatively better output performance in Uzbekistan compared to other CIS countries... which 
is the key to understand the „Uzbek growth puzzle“.107  
For our part, the following two aspects might be crucial in explaining the Uzbek gradualism. 
One of them is that the government asserted its readiness to trade off the lower degree of 
economic efficiency for the higher degree of social stability with probably hardly optimum, 
but socially less unpopular, redistribution of national income.  
The Uzbek President writes: “Transition to a market is beyond doubt. It is an order of time,  
objective reality… In view of the established complicated economic situation, the low level of 
living standards of many families, transition to a market economy by virtue of big bang 
measures  is unacceptable for the republic… The main task is to make this process as smooth 
as possible, with safeguarding the least losses for population and avoiding social shakes”.108 
The official policy proceeded from the fact that the low level of local social welfare formed 
for decades of Soviet ruling in the republic could channel into social explosion and unrest 
                                                 
107 Islamov B. Once More on „Economic Growth Puzzle“ of Uzbekistan. Magazine Ekonomicheskoye 
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108 Translated by the author from Karimov I. (1992) O’zbekiston – o’z istiqlol va tarraqiyot yoli. The collection 
of works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 1998, p.39. 
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under the pressure of complex social costs during transition period.109 It is reasonable to 
believe that the poor and “hungry” society could hardly be prepared to any appeals and efforts 
in absorbing and adequately perceiving new democratic and market values. Therefore, 
according to President Islam Karimov, it would take some time to change the way of thinking 
in society and bring it closer to the new requirements, to new environment conditions. 
The second point is based on the assertion that, when talking about the role of a government 
in the economy, it sometimes brings little when handling with some common indicators like 
the share of the state sector in GDP, in aggregate investments, or in aggregate expenditures in 
the economy, and so on. These figures do not necessarily have to reflect the quality of 
government influence on the economic processes. On the contrary, the experience of some 
countries, especially in East Asia, shows, that even if commonly accepted indicators are 
insignificant in their values, nevertheless, the government has always played a very important 
role in the domestic progress.  
It would thus be more reasonable to look at the tools used to follow general macroeconomic 
strategy more or less successfully. International financial institutions representing neo-
classical and neo-liberal views in modern economic policy, aims at the creation rather stable 
forex and trade system in country-members and in the world economy on the whole, so that to 
provide universal and fair terms of trade via the common ways of international financial 
settlements, free movement of goods, capital and services. On the other hand, a government in 
the transformation society may have the intentions to find its niche in the world by developing 
its comparative advantages through nationally prioritised policy instruments which make 
great concern among the supporters of free international economics. So, in rapidly changing 
world intentions may not coincide with the reality of modern capitalism. And it is quite more 
tough task for transition economies which have neither former socialist system of regulation 
over the economy in their classical type, nor genuine market economy so far, with its more or 
less independent mechanisms of production process and redistribution of national income.  
In this respect, economic reforms seem to be uneasy in several ways. To some extent, the 
strategy is similar to that of East Asian economies with highly developed industrial branches 
which have provided overall economic growth and social progress for the last a few decades. 
However, the pre-requisites, initial conditions and methods of pursuing industrial policy by a 
state as one of the principal tools of modernisation in the economy could be qualified 
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differently. Firstly, East Asian countries started with such reforms as early as in 1960-70s 
(Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan), Japan – even one decade earlier. At that time the world 
economy was expanding maintaining stable demand on its part for a number of industrial 
products produced by East Asian economies (automobiles, ships, home appliances, computers 
and etc.). These products were in strong need to primarily satisfy quantitative world demand. 
And only some years later, with markets to be saturated through both a wider assortment of 
goods and strengthening competition, the quality characteristics were subsequently much 
more demanded. East Asia with already established flexible production process and a stable 
network of traditional consumers on the world market, was then able to invest enough to 
produce products of higher quality. Secondly, in almost all countries of that region the process 
of industrialisation was carried out with substantial external financial support. At first it was 
the USA which had supported the Japanese economy after the World War II. Then, Japan 
itself invested much in the industrial production of other countries of the region (Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia) ensuring sustainable success of the “flying geese” model.110  
In the given light, Uzbekistan favored import-substitution policy with the subsequent 
enhancement of export industries too. There are two aspects here which may particularly draw 
our attention. The first one, as the republic tries to apply two-pronged strategy, the main 
difficulty with this approach is to provide optimal incentives for all those producers, sectors or 
branches touched by the policies which vary by substance. In addition, it is also important to 
see what kind of tools are used by the state to create production incentives in the economy.  
Usually, government can collect revenues and redistribute income among sectors and 
household groups by both explicit taxes and subsidies. The latter could be so called quasi-
fiscal operations which can include such mechanisms as multiple currency exchange rates, 
inflation tax, subsidized and direct lending, non-remunerated reserve requirements and credit 
ceilings, price and wage controls. All of them were more or less used by Uzbekistan. 
However, the most significant among them was foreign exchange regime. 
The government introduced tough restrictions on forex and trade operations in the last quarter 
of 1996, trying to offset the pressure on balance of payments, because of a number of shocks 
(poor cotton harvests, decline in world prices on export commodities – cotton and gold). 
Moreover, the government declared about the necessity to protect national economy from 
negative external trends, such as global financial crisis in 1997 and Russian financial crisis of 
1998. The government voiced a few reasons to explain these the main of which were: 
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- to contain the deficit of the state budget by reducing the cost of external public debt service 
and budget-financed imports of capital, intermediaries, and consumer goods; 
- to promote the development of import-substituting and export-oriented industries by 
lowering the costs and increasing the volumes of capital and intermediate goods imports for 
these industries; 
- to support living standards by maintaining relatively low prices for „essential“ consumer 
goods, such as bread, flour, and vegetable oil; 
- to preserve official international reserves. 
However, the results of the policies proved to be rather controversial. On one part, it was 
succeeded in rationalizing the structure of imports in line with the goals of the whole 
macroeconomic policy (grain and energy independence, technical modernisation of the 
economy, etc.). In particular,  import of oil and oil products was decreased from 25,5% up to 
3,8%; foodstuffs – from 36,8% to 12,3%, in 1992 and 2000, respectively. At the same time 
import of machine and equipment increased from 9,2% to 35,4% during the same period.  
On the other part, such a policy resulted in a number of negative consequences the main of 
which were: 
⇒ relaxation of monetary discipline and increase in official real exchange rate of national 
currency, which obstructed to export and export-oriented branches. 100% foreign 
exchange surrender for centralised export (cotton, precious metals) and 50% surrender for 
decentralised export (all other goods) at highly appreciated official exchange rate led, to 
some extent, to the decrease in foreign trade operations in 1997 and 1998. In particular, in 
1997 total foreign trade volume decreased by 4,3% in comparison with 1996, including 
decrease in export by 4,4% and import by 4,2%. In 1998 foreign trade slowdown was 
even sharper and equal to 23,5% comparing to 1997, including 19,6% and 27,3% declines 
in export and import, respectively111;  
⇒ looming environment and risk, which promoted the decrease in foreign direct 
investments (FDI) and export-import transactions. For example, according to data 
provided by EBRD, FDI were equal to $167 mln. in 1997 and only about $70 mln. in 
2000 recording one of  the lowest indicator among transition economies in that year112; 
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⇒ distortions in domestic relative prices, which led to inefficient distribution of resources 
among domestic economic branches and resulted in potential decrease in social welfare113;  
⇒ strengthening monopolist enterprises, which hindered the objective development of 
competition on the part of domestic and foreign economic units. The World Bank pointed 
out that „this (distorted economy) allows for many enterprises producing negative-value-
added at international prices to record profits at distorted domestic prices and to continue 
perating without restructuring“.114 Moreover, to some extent, it leads to the breach of 
consumer rights, since state enterprises are unable to operate efficiently in view of new 
financial environment, at least for some time, and, as a rule, forced to produce goods of 
lower quality with rather limited assortment and at higher prices;  
⇒ importers, who have an access to official forex market, have rent profits at the expense 
of those who do not have such opportunities.115 
Of particular attention is the policy in the agricultural sector affected by foreign exchange 
policy priorities. As far as the sector provided about 50% of foreign exchange and 19% of 
budget revenues, the state used the resources to finance its industrial projects. Not-
withstanding the variety of forms of ownership in agriculture, the influence of state remained 
substantial. The government withdrew resources from agriculture through the combined 
mechanism of state procurements of cotton and grain, and multiple forex regime in order to 
redistribute these resources as investments in other prioritized areas, such the energy complex, 
for example.116 
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To somewhat degree mitigate the losses in the agrarian sector, the government maintained the 
centralised distribution of inputs like fertilisers, seeds, fuel and others, as well as agricultural 
machinery and equipment. But this system may also be full of drawbacks. Local authorities 
which supervise such distribution, might influence the commercial decisions of agricultural 
producers, because this system authorizes local state bodies to choose, who and how much 
may get from the centrally allocated resources. From the organizational point of view, this 
system also looks suboptimum, as it creates a fertile ground for the abusements and briberies 
among local authorities. In terms of limited resources, hypothetically only those who were 
close to local authorities might be a criterion of such centralized distribution, rather than real 
economic needs of agricultural producers. 
As for other forms of government support, it was VAT exemptions of agricultural producers. 
According to some data, they amounted to 6,5 bln.soums in 1996, 11 bln.soums in 1997 and 
15 bln.soums in 1998. Costs of irrigation which had been fully covered by state budget, were 
equal approximately 75-85% of all expenses on national economy of Uzbekistan. Producers 
did not pay for land and water. Many credits to agriculture were usually subsequently 
converted into credit subsidies and were later on written off. Subsidies for capital investment 
and for machinery services at more cheap official import also served a kind of government 
assistance to the sector as a whole. 117 
Despite some support from the government, the negative influence of state procurements on 
the largest agricultural products (cotton and grain) at overvalued official exchange rate as well 
as tough control through licenses over the part which could be sold at free prices, has 
remained in the limelight of issues in the agricultural sector for the most part of post-
independent development. 
 
2.3.2. Unemployment 
Uzbekistan is the most populous country in Central Asia comprising over 40% of regional 
labor force. But the slow down in population growth rates from 2,1% in the first half of 1990s 
to 1,5% during 2000-2005 has been clearly observed. In 2001, fertility in rural areas remains 
higher than in urban ones, reflecting the domination of rural population both in total 
                                                                                                                                                        
government at official exchange rates. Some estimates show that these volumes reached 65-75%. See: World Bank (1999) 
Uzbekistan: Social and Structural Policy Review, Report No 19626. p.13 
117 World Bank (1999) Uzbekistan: Social and Structural Policy Review, Report No 19626.  
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population and its growth rates.118 These figures may serve as a background to unemployment 
issues. 
In the past years the official unemployment rate was very low – less than 1% - barely 
reflecting undergoing serious structural changes. Yet official statistics covered only those 
people who voluntarily were coming to authorities to register as unemployed. It gives them 
the right to have government benefits. However, the unemployed suffer rather low stimulus to 
register, because of very low size of such benefits. In addition, there is a hidden 
unemployment. For example, in many economic units, there are certain workers who 
officially the staff of the company, but actually they do not work being on forced leaves. In 
this respect, the actual rate of unemployment is expected to exceed official figures. According 
to some estimates, non-registered unemployment or part-time jobs could fluctuate from 6% to 
25% across the country, including differences among the branches of the economy, and 
regions. For instance, the overview made by the Ministry of Labor in 1997, assessed the 
hidden unemployment as 5,5%. Losses in labor related to production standing, forced leaves 
and forced part-time work were evaluated as 1-2% of total labor force.119  
The excess of labor force in large state-owned enterprises seems to be an implicit problem. 
Employers are reluctant to retire huge number of their workers. There are probably two main 
factors explaining such unwillingness. Firstly, in terms of a shortage of funds for the technical 
modernisation and re-equipment, the managers prefer to keep up production process via extra 
number of workers who still are ready to work even for lower wages in order to keep their 
jobs. Secondly, in most cases, the directors hardly desire to lay off the workers who have 
recommended themselves as experienced and high skilled staff, and show some kind of 
“paternalism” by providing them with social benefits and care. Nevertheless on-going 
structural reforms in agriculture and reorganisation of agrarian enterprises started in 1998, 
was also promoting the higher number of work force to be sacked.120  
Besides, unofficial employment is also a case nowadays. In Uzbekistan, primarily in big 
cities, there is historically developed market of private labor force – “mardikors” where 
people can be hired for a variety of private works (construction, cultivation of land, different 
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home services and etc.). Only in Tashkent, the capital of the republic where usually one can 
find many opportunities to use such labor, there are about 4-5 private labor markets where 
daily about 10 thousand of such “mardikors” suggest their services.121 
To resolve the problem of unemployment becomes of crucial importance for Uzbekistan 
today. Therefore, it remains the top issue in the respective government programs. An official 
discourse believes that the given issues can be solved through a variety special programs in all 
sectors of the economy and by developing real sector, in particular in rural areas. In this 
respect, small and medium-sized business and service infrastructure are among the priorities. 
According to some data, in 1996-1998 it was about 631 thousand of jobs in the economy 
which were newly created, and half of them were jobs and private activity in the agrarian 
sector of the economy.122 Notwithstanding the attempts of the government to create jobs 
through the mixture of direct and market-oriented methods, the issues of employment and 
creation of new jobs will, most probably, remain pressing problems in the nearest future, 
especially in terms of the forthcoming liberalisation in the economy.  
2.3.3. Income and Poverty 
Among the attempts to reach macroeconomic stability through curbing inflationary processes 
and maintaining reasonable size of budget deficit, the government limited wage increases both 
in the public sector other spheres of economy.123 As a consequence of such policy, wages 
faced sharp differences both in regions and in economic branches. The highest wages were 
remarked in the industrial sector (50% higher that of the republican average), in transport 
(from 130% to 145% in different years), construction (121,7% in 1992 and 152,4% in 1997), 
the financial sector (182% in 1992 and up to 216% in 1997). The lowest wages were recorded 
in public sector (public healthcare, culture and arts, education, sport) with 20-30% lower than 
the average in the whole economy.124 Such differences determined also the regional 
divergence of income across the republic. Those regions (Tashkent, Andijan, Bukhara, Navoi) 
with primarily industrial branches of the economy, construction and services outpaced the 
other territories (the Republic of Karakalpakstan, Djizakh, Syrdarya, Khorezm, Surkhandarya) 
                                                 
121 Some surveys estimate unofficial unemployment in Uzbekistan at about of 2 mln. people in 1999. See UNDP 
(1999). Uzbekistan. Human Development Report. 
122 At the meantime, however, foregn observers are very critical about the way and outcome of this policy 
arguing that “policy bears the essence of the Soviet period which implies the plans on creation of new jobs and 
labor balanced on almost every level of administrative management”. In particular, before May, 1998, the state 
rulled the economic units with staff of more than 100 thousand, to create not less 7% jobs for most “susceptible” 
members of the society. See: UNO (2001). Uzbekistan: Obshaya otsenka strany. p.12 
123 The official policy linked the wage increase to the increases in efficiency in proportion of 0,7% wage increase 
to efficiency increases by 1%. 
124 UNO (2001). Uzbekistan: Obshaya otsenka strany. The same. p.13 
 65
with both agricultural orientation of production, and with the domination of public sector. In 
1998 average income in agriculture was equal to 52% of the republican average while average 
wages in industry was 145%. At that time, the share of agriculture in total GDP declined from 
37% in 1991 up to 28% and industry –from 26% to 19% in 1998. On the contrary, the share of 
services increased from 26% to 42%. 
Industrial and investment policy in Uzbekistan had impact on the formation of real wages in 
the agrarian sector. If in 1990, wages in agriculture exceeded the country’s average by 15%, 
then, in 1994 they were 30% lower than the republic’s average. In 1994 agriculture faced 15% 
decline in average wages, while industry did 5% growth. Even though these figures could be 
considered as relatively good comparing to those in other former Soviet republics, the 
population was certainly hit by the decrease on a half of the size of disposable income in 1996 
comparing to 1991.125 
The poverty in transition economies is one of the complex issues. There can be few detailed 
research on this topic, since most of literature refers to lack of data as well as to the variances 
and difficulties of a methodological character to conduct an objective assessment. Therefore, 
available data allow only indirect calculations and social polls conducted by government and 
non-government organisations.  
The priorities of social policy in Uzbekistan are based on the attempts to avoid sharp income 
differentiation in the society. In spite of the fact that the Gini’s coefficient, which has to show 
differentiation between the richest and the poorest parts of the society had increased from 
0,026 to 0,032 in 1989-1996, it was still lower than corresponding indicators in other 
republics.126 Available data on the share of poor people in total population also look better 
than in other republics.127 
At the same time, the Ministry of Labor estimated that in 1996, 14% of the total population 
were living below the official poverty line, calculated on the basis of monthly minimum wage 
of 750 sums, or $12 at the official exchange rate128. Other researchers suggest that “the poor 
people in Uzbekistan are those who have the lowest income and want, but unable to improve 
material well-being by their own”.129 For example, in 1991, according to some assessments, 
about 75% of population had average per capita income lower the value of consumer basket. 
                                                 
125 The same. p.13.  
126 For comparison: in Kazakhstan the coefficient changed by 1,2 times; in Turkmenistan – less than 2 times; 
Kyrgyzstan – almost 7 times higher. See Central Asia 2010. UNDP HDR 1999 
127 UNDP (1999). Uzbekistan. Human Development Report. p.26 
128 IMF (1999) Republic of Uzbekistan: Recent Economic Developments in 1998-1999. IMF Staff Country 
Report. p.5 
129 UNDP (1999). Uzbekistan. Human Development Report. 
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In 1996, some social polls revealed the share of poor and extremely poor groups of population 
in the republic to be equal to 27,6%. Some regional observations of employment, income and 
poverty in Namangan, Djizakh, Surkhandarya, Republic of Karakalpakstan concluded that the 
low-income regions cover about 45,6% of such groups. Given that these were the regions with 
agricultural specialization, one may expect these two groups to be the families living in rural 
areas. In the industrialized regions, such groups were significantly less – about 18%.130 
2.3.4. Structural Changes and SMB 
Uzbekistan was relatively successful in dealing with privatisation and denationalisation at the 
initial stages when privatisation of small- and medium-scale enterprises was actually finished. 
As of April 1, 2001, the official statistics shows 186 thousand of small- and medium size 
enterprises are registered. If in 1992 the agrarian sector of the economy included 5,9 thousand 
farms, in 1993 – 7,2 thousand, in 1995 – 17,1 thousand, then by 2000 – it was already 43,8 
thousand, including 38334 dealing with cultivation and 5425 – cattle-farming. From 1991 to 
2000 the share of the non-governmental sector in output considerably increased: in industrial 
output – from 10% to 65,4%; in agriculture – from  66% to 99%; in capital investments – 
from 34,4% to 34,6%; in construction – from 7,6% to 81,2%; retail trade – from 52,5% to 
96,8%; services – from 14% to 57,1%.131  
Nevertheless, some negative affects of structural changes was also observed. The basic 
problem in many cases was that these shifts looked superficial. While changing the structures 
and names, the privatized enterprises were by substance retaining old management. As 
workers were formally given wider possibilities to influence the company’s administration 
and the decision-making process, it was director who was actually reserved his substantial 
influence in the company, while ordinary stock-holders were given no real power. In addition, 
privatisation and denationalisation failed to suggest efficient price mechanisms to give state 
property its real value. In such situation some enterprises might have been sold at lower prices 
than they might potentially cost. Moreover, lack of active public advertisement, especially to 
potential foreign investors, led the process to slow-down. Thirdly, in privatized enterprises 
new owners were reluctant to carry out technical modernisation of production process as it 
                                                 
130 The same. p.32. Besides, international organizations such as the UNDP, UNO, World Bank indicate on 
methodological insufficiencies when estimating poverty in Uzbekistan. The government methodology is based 
on nominal minimum wage as a basis for the calculation of poverty. However, real minimum wage has been on 
downward trend which is not taken into consideration. Since “decreasing level of public healthcare and 
education, reductions of privileges, as well as higher prices on foodstuff, and vague situation with jobs are not 
taken into account, there is little doubt that they would expand poverty”. See: UNO (2001). Uzbekistan: Obshaya 
otsenka strany. p.15. According to the data from the World Bank, in 1999 about 30% of population lived below 
the poverty line. See: www.worldbank.org, country data. 
131 Magazine Ekonomicheskoye obozreniye. 2001. No 8-9. p.16 
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was expected before privatisation. On the contrary, though the state helped the enterprises 
import necessary technological equipment to improve production process, this process saw a 
faint pattern.132 Fourthly, in terms of worsening macroeconomic conditions in 1997, and 
subsequent real income decline, possibilities for private investments were restrained. As a 
result, out of 8,68 mln. emploees, only 1/12 (700 thousand) had acquired shares of domestic 
enterprises. Finally, privatisation of large state-owned enterprises, still needs to be fulfilled. In 
1998 only 23% was privatised, as business environment itself was deteriorating.133  
The non-state sector in Uzbekistan included not only private enterprises, but also those with 
substantial state equity holdings. This gave the government an exclusive control over the 
enterprises and diminished the attractiveness of such enterprises to foreign investors. In 1998, 
non-state economic entities accounted for 89% of total legal entities, including 45% 
private.134 
Since the state continued using state procurements for almost all agricultural products for a 
while, it restricted the establishment of various forms of ownership in agriculture. In addition, 
the process itself seemed to remain relatively superficial. Qualitatively, the agricultural 
departments of local municipalities were rather bureaucratic units which under the existing 
regime forced to require state plans. The President of Uzbekistan noticed in this regard that 
“the most important problem the republic faced was formalism and deception and superficial 
attitude towards works. Most of the local leaders simply did not understand why the 
transformation and new property rights were introduced. In many cases the distribution of 
land to farmers did not take place at all, local khokimiyats (authorities) and kolkhoz directors 
took the land for themselves”.135 Social polls among entrepreneurs has discovered that land 
and housing problems were of the highest priorities to introduce real property rights in 
agriculture.136 
Despite the government support provided to the SMB, a number of key problems still have to 
be solved. The entrepreneurs notice that much remains to be done, so that to improve business 
                                                 
132 In 1997, 13,9% of the observed enterprises possessed the supplied, but not installed equipment in their 
warehouses with total value of 5,9 bln.sums, including that of $70,8 mln.USD which came from abroad. In 1998, 
10,6% of enterprises had “not-installed and not-used in production process” equipment which was even higher – 
8,1 bln.sums and $51,1 mln.USD. Most of such equipment was imported through government channels and 
under commercial credit lines which have to be returned. Tukhliyev N., Taksanov A. (2000) Natsionalnaya 
ekonomicheskaya model Uzbekistana. Tashkent. p.112 
133 IMF (2000) Republic of Uzbekistan: Recent Economic Developments. IMF Staff Country Report. No 00/36. 
p.32 
134 The same. p.13 
135 The quotation is referred to in Wöhrmann F. (2000) Economic Discourse in Uzbekistan. The Perception of 
Economic Change between Market Principles and Social Traditions. Veilag für Entwicklungspolitik, 
Saarbrücken. Bochum. p.106 
136 UNO (2001). Uzbekistan: Obshaya otsenka strany. p.17 
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environment in Uzbekistan. They still indicate on the imperfection of domestic legislation 
which is differently treated by executive state bodies that gives a basis to interfere in private 
sector activities, in many cases, without sufficient reasons breaching the rights of private 
entrepreneurs. Although the number of state-led inspections decreased significantly, such 
interventions are considered by businessmen as still being the often case.137  
Another problem is limited access to financial resources by the SMB. It is rather difficult to 
obtain funds to start up the business. The procedure itself, including the requirements from a 
bank for necessary documentation is rather complicated. The banks themselves are reluctant 
to finance SMB, as they are concerned about the solvency and reputation of private 
entrepreneurs.138 In many cases, entrepreneurs misinterpret the concept of business culture 
and still have lack of experience, skills and knowledge even after the decade of new relations 
in the economy. Therefore, along with the improvement in the business environment, it is 
strongly required to provide wide training opportunities for young entrepreneurs to improve 
their professional experience and skills.  
2.3.5. Challenges in the Financial Sector 
The mechanisms according to which money, finance and investments are allocated, is one of 
the key elements in reorientation of the economy away from plan system to market relations. 
From this viewpoint, development of the financial sector in Uzbekistan is important in 
considering two sets of issues. On the one hand, during the years of independence the 
previous banking system monopolized by the only State Bank was destroyed, and at the same 
time two-tier banking, with the Central Bank at the head and a network of commercial banks, 
was created. A number of legal documents such as the laws “On Central Bank”, “On Banks 
and Banking Activities” developed in accordance with Western models, were also enacted. 
Besides, the Association of Commercial Banks, the Banking and Finance Academy, the 
Regional Banking Center and most recently the Institute on Studies of the Banking Sector 
Problems, were set up to provide comprehensive infrastructure assistance for the development 
of banks and other financial institutions in the republic.  
On the other hand, the whole system of commercial banks itself does not function at full 
capacities so far, in line with market conditions. It could be explained by a number of 
                                                 
137 International Financial Corporation/World Bank Small and Medium Size Enterprises Survey for Uzbekistan, 
2003, http://www.ifc.org/centralasia 
138 As an example, the Business Fund which was found to support private entrepreneurship had to be stopped and 
reconsider the system of credits lending, because only a small part of the credits disbursed by the Fund in 1993 
and 1994 had been serviced and eventually repaid. Some credits were even used by entrepreneurs for other 
purposes than those in agreements. That was resulted in tightening credit procedures as a whole. 
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problems at the macro- and micro-level which directly influences its progress. First of all, this 
includes the new principles of interrelations between state and commercial banks, the 
necessity of further liberalisation of the banking system. Government has currently its equities 
in almost all banks that allows to take a close look at all banking activities. In such a way, the 
state tries to reach its macroeconomic goals and carry out programs of overall economic 
development. For instance, to pursue restrictive monetary policy and keep up inflation low, 
the state sought to control the lending process and interest rates on credits.139 Central Bank’s 
credit rate and bank reserves with Central Bank were then promoting increase in interest rates 
on credits of commercial banks. 
Secondly, commercial banks served as one of the principal tools to pursue state-led industrial 
policy. A number of specialized commercial banks were founded to finance concrete 
economic sectors, industrial branches and individual state-owned enterprises in accordance 
with government priorities (ASAKA-bank for car industry, Pakhta and Galla banks – for 
servicing the agricultural sector; the National bank for foreign economic activity – for 
operations in the foreign sector). As a result, such policy caused the situation when most part 
of credits (about 85% in 1999) was allocated to the government sector in comparison with 
only 15% credits was directed to private sector on real market basis.140 Moreover, very often 
credits to state owned enterprises were converted into government subsidies and subsequently 
written off.  
The banking sector was also heavily dependent on foreign exchange and tax regimes. Under 
the system of substantial supervision and regulation, banks had to function as tax bodies to 
collect budget revenues, as well as monitor foreign exchange inflows and outflows through 
the accounts of their clients. Since tax collection and foreign exchange regulation was carried 
out on the basis of information made available to the government by the banks, there were 
poor private incentives to conduct economic transactions through the bank system.  
Consequently, some general conclusions for the sector could be drawn. The share of credits of 
commercial banks in total capital investments either remained at the same level for many 
years, or even decreased (1996 – 7,5%, 1997 – 7,2%, 1998 – 6,2%).141 Among all credit 
resources (including centralised credits, foreign credits, credits from various funds, and funds 
of enterprises), those from commercial banks were the smallest pointing to a passive role of 
                                                 
139 According to directives, in 1999 in order to get credit from banks it was necessary to provide mortgage which 
ought to cover 80% of credit value. 
140 Wöhrmann F. (2000) Economic Discourse in Uzbekistan. The Perception of Economic Change between 
Market Principles and Social Traditions. Veilag für Entwicklungspolitik, Saarbrücken. Bochum.  p.130. 
141 UNDP (1999). Uzbekistan. Human Development Report. 
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banking system in the economy. Secondly, because of state control over interest rates on bank 
lending, and since it was a usual case to write off substantial part of commercial credits in 
favor of inefficient state-owned enterprise, real interest rates were negative and therefore, 
reflected losses for commercial banks. On the other hand, negative interest rates discouraged 
domestic savings and long-term investment policy from banks (in 1998 about 80% of credits 
were allocated short-term basis). The private sector, including population, also regarded the 
banking sector as less lucrative among their investment alternatives, and tried to find other 
opportunities to invest money in more profitable sources of income (in foreign currency – in 
the cities, in live-stock – in rural areas, etc.).  
The third factor is that access to hard cash on the accounts with commercial banks was 
limited. Cash withdrawals were permitted only to pay wages. Due to an emerging gap 
between cash transactions market and bank settlements, the outflow of money from the 
banking sector increased. Money velocity accelerated that exerted subsequent pressure on the 
markets of goods and services. Population confidence in the domestic financial system thus 
remained low. 
But, it still remains crucial to complete the restructuring of banking sector property, accelerate 
privatisation and development of competition. Since the state holds rather high equities in 
total capital of the banking sector, the attractiveness of commercial banks for private 
investors, especially for foreigners, is relatively low. Moreover, the support of specialized 
commercial banks by the state only result in exacerbating monopolistic and oligopolistic 
trends which undermine the development of competition. With only 30 commercial banks in 
2004, the whole banking capital is usually concentrated in 4-5 specialized banks servicing the 
government-prioritised sectors. In such terms, foreign credit institutions (international, 
governmental and non-governmental), as a rule, try to obtain the government guarantees for 
the allocated resources and prefer to work with the same (2-3) commercial banks, while the 
smaller ones remain always out of the benefits of such cooperation. In this respect, the 
forthcoming privatisation of the largest domestic commercial banks (ASAKA and National 
Banks) during 2004-2006 is crucial. Supported by World Bank and EBRD this would 
promote the process of deregulation in the banking sector, and stimulate further progress to 
raise attractiveness of commercial banks in the eyes of foreign investors. 
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2.3.6. Availability of Data and Statistics 
In terms of transition, access to objective data on the domestic economic trends is of 
particular importance. It is crucial for the state itself to provide transparency of the pursued 
policy for economic entities and population. Uzbekistan declared about irreversibility of 
market reforms and close cooperation with the world community. One of the steps on this 
direction is to create appropriate opportunities for domestic and foreign investors which need 
a clear vision of state intentions about domestic reforms. That is important to keep their own 
business and investment plans and activities in pace with national development strategy.  
One of such elements to be pointed out is the national accounts system. The latter is quite 
different in the plan economy and market system. However, during transition period, even 
true market methods of statistical analysis are not fully acceptable. Official statistics in 
Uzbekistan is unable so far to cover all economic processes as well as to explain a number of 
factors which in terms of market and transition economies may give controversial results.142  
There could be a few explanations for this. Partly it may occur due to the retention by national 
statistics the use of the formerly used tools to assess economic activities. Also there might be 
still the cases when some economic units, especially state-owned, are still not reluctant to 
counterfeit figures with the attempts both to hide inefficiency of their activities and/or evade 
taxation. If so, inauthentic or patchy figures may lay the basis for prolifiration of speculations 
on lack of transparency in government policy, increase the extent of opaqueness, and hence, 
weaken investment attractiveness of the country in the international business circles.  
For that reason, the adoption of national law „On National Statistics“ at the December 2002 
meeting of the parliament was critical. It provides a legal basis for more comprehensive 
access to information and economic data by domestic and foreign economic agencies and 
investors. It will also imply a step on the way of making domestic economy more open to the 
world economic community. Moreover, economic entities themselves should be not only just 
participants of a data collection process, but also immediate consumers of such data which 
would help them draw up their activities alongside government economic programs and 
priorities. Subsequently, as more market-based instruments to collect, assess and analyse 
economic processes will improve, then the state may be capable of developing its forecasts in 
                                                 
142 Partly because of the differences in methodological approach, the data provided by official statistics and that 
of international institutions may differ. For instance, consumer price index as an estimation of inflation provided 
by national statistics was 28% in 1997 and 18% in 1998, while the IMF and the World Bank estimates were 50% 
and 25%, respectively. The official statistics claimed that Uzbekistan’s GDP grew by 5,2% in 1997 and 4,4% in 
1998, while other estimates showed 2,4% and 3,4%, respectively. IMF (2000) Republic of Uzbekistan: Recent 
Economic Developments. IMF Staff Country Report. No 00/36. 
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close cooperation with private sector by taking into account their immediate needs, 
opportunities and problems. It will allow to design a more realistic prognosis with keeping in 
mind the potential factors to influence on the domestic economy, so that then to be more 
realistic and successful in pursuing further reforms. 
 
2.3.7. The Staff Monitored Program of the IMF 
For the domestic reforms, Uzbekistan was granted financial support from international 
financial institutions, mainly at the initial stages. But the scope of such assistance was 
relatively insignificant in comparison with other transition economies. The main reasons for 
this were both the reluctance to make large external borrowings, and the divergences over the 
path and nature of the reforms between national government and multilateral institutions.  
From 1995 the government's stabilization program had been receiving financial assistance 
from the IMF under the Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) and Standby Arrangement 
were also approved in December, 1995. However, both lines were suspended in autumn 1996 
when the government restricted operations with foreign exchange trying to avoid currency 
outflow. But later, Uzbekistan had to make a few foreign borrowings on the commercial basis 
for 1997-1998, so that to keep up internal investments opportunities of local enterprises. 
Further international and technical assistance was limited to the concrete projects in various 
economic sectors (agriculture, trade, transport infrastructure, training of government 
officials). 
The April 1999 parliamentary speech of the Uzbek President outlined the intentions of the 
government to accelerate market reforms through comprehensive liberalisation and 
deregulation in the economy. To a certain degree, it implied the readiness to renew strongly 
required negotiations with international financial organisations, so that to acquire their 
support for the policy which was carried out in Uzbekistan. Since that, the government had 
reiterated its efforts to introduce current account convertibility and subsequently improve 
trade regime as a preparatory stage for membership in the World Trade Organisation.143  
As a preliminary step, the government developed, in consultations with the IMF, the 
Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies for 2002 which is part of Staff Monitored 
                                                 
143 Uzbekistan was granted an observer status in GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, from 1995 - 
WTO) in 1994. 
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Programs suggested by the IMF to transition and developing economies.144 The 
implementation of the given Program was monitored by the IMF staff during 2002-2003.  
By substance, it was a program of concrete measures to be undertaken to lift some restrictions 
in domestic economy and intensify the reforms. First of all, it required Uzbekistan to meet 
certain macroeconomic parameters, so that to be assured of serious steps on market-oriented 
reforms. In terms of limited domestic resources to boost economy, there was a perceived 
exigency in Uzbekistan to attract additional financial funds from abroad and, therefore, agrees 
to accept standard conditions of the IMF on economic policies in agriculture, the foreign 
sector, monetary and fiscal areas. Yet political implications of this collaboration could be seen 
in a goodwill of national government to back up global trends on liberalisation and in turn to 
benefit from appropriate support for its domestic policies. The cornerstone of the obligations 
stipulated by the Program was to introduce current account convertibility and eliminate 
multiple exchange rate causing the economic distortions among domestic sectors. In this 
respect, the government committed to move gradually to reach these goals. In line with the 
conditions of the Program, the government liberalized its foreign exchange regime.145 In the 
trade area export bans on a number of goods was steadily decreased to 3 items in 2003, and 
removed 20 items of goods from the list for which the allocation of foreign exchange was not 
recommended.  
At the same time the government issued two degrees to reform the government procurement 
system in the agrarian sector. Starting with 2002-harvest, 50% of grain and cotton produced 
could be freely disposed by farmers at their discretion, while the other 50% of each of items 
would be sold to the state at regional commodity prices for grain and at world market price for 
cotton. Moreover, in fiscal and monetary areas the government started with the liberalisation 
in the banking sector and price regulation. 
During 2002-2003 period, the IMF staff delegation headed by E. von Vryer, Head of IMF 
department for East Europe and CIS countries, visited Uzbekistan a few times to assess the 
results of the stabilization policies pursued by the government within cooperation of the 
republic with the IMF. It was stressed that significant changes took place in the economy 
during the year 2002 and the republic had succeeded in many areas foreseen in the 
                                                 
144 The document was signed by the key economic officials (Deputy Prime Minister on Macroeconomic Issues, 
Minister of Finance, Chairman of Central Bank), and published both in national press (see Biznes Vestnik 
Vostoka newspaper, 14 February, 2002) and in IMF’s official website on request of the Uzbek government. In 
such a way, the government tried to display publicly its strong adherence to reforms and cooperation with 
international financial community. 
145 Since October 15, 2003 all the restrictions on current account convertibility have been officially eliminated. 
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stabilisation program. However, he also stressed that more decisive steps should be done by 
the government to bolster closer cooperation with the IMF, alluding to the fact that the main 
pre-requisite for such relations (“de-facto” current account convertibility) had been still not 
achieved. It was expected that the subsequent years would require further actions and 
consultations on this issue between the government and the IMF. In turn, the government 
hopes that the progress made by Uzbekistan in the implementation of the programe, will give 
financial institutions and bilateral creditors a better basis to provide financial assistance to the 
republic.146 
 
2.4. Summary 
In sum, all the post-Soviet states were in relatively worse conditions to start with economic 
reforms than countries of East and Central Europe, for example. The crisis in the USSR was 
exacerbated in the early 1970s, and had become more evident by the 1990s. It manifested 
widely in a production decline, state budget imbalances, hyperinflation and low investment 
activities in all the Soviet republics after the declarations of state independence. Uzbekistan 
was to be confronted with a handful of specific problems exacerbated too by the legacy of 
social and economic shortcomings of the former system. Socio-political and economic 
situation in the country in the 1990s was dominated by general opaqueness and fragility. This 
was particularly reflected in the low standard of living of population because of abrupt 
reduction in real wages, social insurance and pensions; in income differentials and 
unemployment; and in the shortage of essential consumer goods. Against this background, the 
republic preceded by the threats of social destabilisation through the growth of criminality, 
drugs business, terrorism, extremism, bribery among government officials. 
For the aforementioned reasons, but also due to the institutional shortages, Uzbekistan 
embarked on the way of gradual and state-led market-oriented reforms. After almost a decade 
and half of independent development there is no common conclusion among economists on 
whether the rejected big-bang strategy could have been a more success and thus brought 
better economic benefits in domestic conditions than the adopted gradualism. Yet it is obvious 
that the government was desperately keen in political and macroeconomic stability during the 
first phase of transformation process, and most likely was loath to challenge the former by 
following even more popular and seemingly well-grounded and sweeping measures on 
economic adjustment. The policy started with setting up legal base for institutional and 
                                                 
146 See the letter of the government of Uzbekistan to Mr.Horst Kohler, Managing Director of IMF, www.imf.org  
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structural reforms. As the next stage, the state put an emphasis on import-substitution 
development (energy, agriculture), to reinforce acquired political independence, reduce 
dependence on the food and energy supplies from outside, and implement large-scale 
industrial projects. Since 2000, Uzbekistan has been committing itself to comprehensive 
liberalization. But large-scale restructuring and privatisation, the consequences of tough 
monetary, fiscal and foreign exchange policies in the past will require substantial changes in 
production processes and redistribution of income and resources among the branches of the 
economy. The economic growth may therefore slow down and require some time for the 
economic recovery in terms of more marketable conditions.  
In general, the policy measures in the past recorded success in achieving stated goals, but 
equally faced some objective controversies. It is worth noting that to tackle the multi-edged 
development tasks may be consistent with additional costs, while political benefits in 
particular are not always optimum placed from the economic perspective. For the most part of 
the former development, Uzbekistan was not a large beneficiary of multilateral financial 
assistance comparing to other CIS states, due to the disagreements over the pace and scale of 
local reforms. In terms of domestic financial constraints and unfavorable world prices on the 
main country's exports, however, the republic was to make resort to basically commercial 
foreign borrowings. The lion part of these funds was attracted to implement large-scale 
industrial projects which foresaw the solution of not only purely economic tasks. The 
domestic energy sector was an evidence of such policy targets. The issue of its specific 
contribution to the reinforcement of political independence and sustainable development, both 
in the past decade and in the years to come, is taken up in the next chapter. 
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Chapter III. THE ENERGY SPHERE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
UZBEKISTAN 
 
3.1. The Energy Sphere as Integral Part of the Development Strategy 
3.1.1. National Priorities in the Energy Sector After the Independence 
 
“It is well-known that the economic prospects of any state are to a significant degree 
determined by the availability of its own energy resources”.147 
Since 1991 the fuel and energy complex of the republic has experienced substantial changes. 
It took one of the central places in the overall strategy of the reforms during transition to a 
market economy. By looking through some key works of the President I.Karimov to discuss 
the debates on economic reforms and prospective development in Uzbekistan, one may 
notice, how often a particular attention is paid to the role of the fuel and energy complex in 
this respect. What could stay behind these considerations? Why did the energy sphere become 
target priority for domestic investment after independence? Why was it so critical to place an 
emphasis on the development of domestic natural base and how was it implemented? 
Better understanding of this issue will require from us to take a short look back at the Soviet 
past again. As mentioned, specialization of the republics played a significant role in the whole 
division of labor in the planned economy. I.Karimov writes: “...In such a system all matters, 
i.e. which region has to produce raw materials, which region should process them, and where 
finally these products are to be exported, was already pre-determined. Uzbekistan was 
supposed to be a supplier of cotton, gas, gold, non-ferrous and rare metals, fruits and 
vegetables... In other words, the role of Uzbekistan in such a closed system was so strongly 
defined that it was merely unable to leave it”.148 
The Soviet policy imposed a strict control on main enterprises which were critical in Union’s 
terms, while the republic was left with those economic areas only which could not de facto 
provide its economic sovereignty. Natural gas produced in Uzbekistan was supposed to meet 
both the domestic and exports needs. Among the consumers of Uzbek gas were largely the 
republics of the Central Asian region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan), but also Russia 
and Ukraine. The existing gas pipeline from Bukhara to Russian Ural made it possible to 
transport gas to Siberia, while Turkmen and Uzbek gas were piped towards Saratov and 
                                                 
147 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1997) Uzbekiston XXI asr bosagasida: havfsizlikka tahdid, 
barqarorlik shartlari va tarraqiyot kafolatlari. Extract from the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. 
Tashkent, 1998. p.633. 
148 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1993) Uzbekiston – bozor munosabatlariga otishning oziga xos 
yuli. Extract from the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.363. 
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linked to the Russian gas pipeline system. Since the domestic gas producing sector in 
Uzbekistan was relatively developed in the Soviet times, most industries consumed mainly 
natural gas, with less share of other energy resources. Contrary to that, the population, 
especially in rural areas, mostly used coal for domestic heating, as the gas pipeline system in 
the residential sector was almost undeveloped.  
As regards the oil and oil products, their most part was imported from other republics. The 
Centre was reluctant to invest into the development and exploration of region’s oil fields, 
which came as a result of the highly centralised system of management in relations with 
peripheries in the planned economy, as well as because of the availability of large-scale 
energy projects in Siberia. Yet throughout the entire period of the existence of the USSR the 
central authorities in Moscow might also have had keen interest in retaining key aspects of 
development under direct control in order to avoid any possibility for the region to be become 
self-sufficient and therefore be less dependent on the Centre and its decisions, although this 
had been never recognized by Soviet planners. In this sense, oil imports came mainly through 
the pipeline starting in Russian Omsk and going through Kazakhstan (Pavlodar and 
Chimkent) to Ferghana Valley, and with Turkmenistan as a final destination. In the early 
1990s, energy resources were the second largest tradable product which amounted to 14,8% 
of total export and 25,5% of total import of oil, gas and by-products.149 Against the 
background of total trade deficit, the republic recorded a deficit in trade with energy resources 
too which thus made the republic substantially bound on external energy supplies, especially 
on the oil imports. In particular, in the second half of the 1980s, the republic imported about 
5,5 mln.tons of oil and oil products with that figure peaking at more than 9 mln.tons in 1991, 
while domestic production being at about 2,8 mln.tons in the last years of the USSR.150 
In this regard, the question of what was behind domestic policy decisions to channel huge 
investments into the energy sector in the post-Soviet time needs to be scrutinised in a broader 
context of political and economic implications. 
The idea of oil self-sufficiency became a dominating national priority in Uzbekistan very soon 
after the declaration of independence. The President I.Karimov wrote that “one of the main 
priorities of the first phase of economic reforms was to ensure speeding up the fuel and 
energy complex’s development, increasing oil and gas extraction. And in such a way, to 
                                                 
149 Magazine Economicheskoye obozreniye. No 8-9, 2001. 
150 In the early 1990s, the republic remained net importer of coal and oil and oil products, while being net 
exporter of some amounts of gas and electricity. The net import for these products in 1990 was equal to 0.6, 9.5, 
-3.0 and –0.5 tons of oil equivalent, respectively, with total net import amounting to 6.6 toe. See also: Energy 
data bank of the ECO secretariat at: 
http://ecosecretariat.org/ftproot/Publications/EnergyDataBook/Energy_Databank/Uzbekistan/uzbekhstan.xls. 
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safeguard energy independence of the republic”.151 Further according to him, through active 
government investment policy in the energy sector, one could reach a few, primarily 
economic results. First of all, the necessity of deep structural changes in the economy was 
reiterated with the energy sector having been assigned a critical role in the reforms. The 
Uzbek President noted that “it was very important to determine key links like oil and oil 
independence, as well as fundamental industries which could stimulate sustainable growth in 
the entire economy”.152  
Secondly, such a policy entailed the rational use of foreign exchange by reducing the amounts 
of the imported oil. On the other hand, the development of hydrocarbons export could give an 
additional source of foreign exchange. The energy complex was one of the first spheres in 
which import-substitution strategy had been applied. 
Thirdly, in terms of successful reforms, energy resources are critical for perspective 
industrialization of the country.  
Fourthly, during the Soviet period Uzbekistan had experienced high dependency on imported 
raw materials, consumer goods, technology which were yet in shortage in the republic. From 
this point of view, “the reduction of the economy’s resource-oriented bias and the elimination 
of one-sided specialization of the economic structure as a result of monopolistic policy of the 
Centre... has the decisive significance”.153 
Similarly this issue was not of purely economic significance. The sweeping political events on 
the Soviet arena in the early 1990s could not have influencing the inter-republican relations. 
According to the President I.Karimov, economic transformation in Uzbekistan at that time 
was to be seen as integral part of a big national political agenda. Speaking about the results of 
the first phase of economic reforms (1991-1995), he specifically noted: “At former times we 
imported 4 mln.tonnes of oil. At present this import has been decreasing from year to year... 
This is not only economic, but also a big political task”.154  
A couple of years later, these discourses took an even more explicit form being then linked to 
the domestic national security tasks too. In particular, among the rhetoric debates on the 
necessity of stable transformation process in the frame of a new economic security concept in 
                                                 
151 Our translation from I.Karimov (1995) „Iqtisodiy islohotlarni chuqurlashtirich yolida“. Extract from the 
collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.192. 
152 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1995) „Iqtisodiy islohotlarni chuqurlashtirich yolida“. Extract from 
the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.355. 
153 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1992) Uzbekiston oz istiqlol va tarraqiyot yoli. Extract from the 
collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.14. 
154 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1995) „Iqtisodiy islohotlarni chuqurlashtirich yolida“. Extract from 
the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.320. 
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1990s, they could be seen as another effort to reinforce various aspects of just acquired 
independence: “Despite favorable climatic conditions, we imported  sugar, milk ..., grain, 
meat, potatoes, spirt. Could this meet our requirements for national security ? We had even to 
import such primary consumer goods of daily use, like matches and salt.  
Therefore, domestic production of strongly needed goods (and resources) is an important task 
in ensuring national security, sustainability and stability on the whole. This task bears both, 
economic and political meaning”.155 
In one row with a national task to localize production of consumer goods in the years of 
independence, Uzbekistan placed an emphasis on import-substitution energy policy too. In 
Soviet time Uzbekistan was part of common transport and energy system. But after the 
collapse of the USSR, this system could hardly work as stable as before. On the one hand, 
Uzbekistan, being located in the centre of Central Asia, was linking the republics to each 
other. On the other hand, such a geographical location made the republic itself directly 
dependent on both the Russian energy resources, and on territories, the resources had to cross 
before reaching Uzbekistan. Against the background of political instability across the whole 
post-Soviet space, it was hard to rely on prudent economic and political relations between the 
states. Russia continued to supply energy products to the entire region, like to other ex-Soviet 
republics for some time after the collapse of the USSR. Yet, with prices for energy products 
in Russia moving towards the world level and in terms of growing claims to pay in cash for 
the products supplied, it became hard for importers to meet both of these conditions. Other 
suggested schemes of inter-republican trade, such as barter, could be even less negotiable due 
to the presence of inadequate price mechanism and the politicization of trade.  
Uzbekistan was then strongly reluctant to be involved in any political blackmail which could 
arise spillover effect on the domestic political situation by declaring “mutual advantageous 
cooperation with any state in the world”. The President I.Karimov characterises this principle 
by saying that it is necessary “to take into consideration mutual interests drawing from own 
national interests. We do not want to find ourselves under the influence of any other state 
again. Uzbekistan has acquired its independence not for that to pass it over again to anyone 
else”.156 
                                                 
155 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1997) Uzbekiston XXI asr bosagasida: havfsizlikka tahdid, 
barqarorlik shartlari va tarraqiyot kafolatlari. Extract from the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. 
Tashkent, 1998. p.582. 
156 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1992) Uzbekiston oz istiqlol va tarraqiyot yoli. Extract from the 
collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.23. 
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Hence there was an explicit bias towards less import dependency on consumer goods and raw 
materials, such as oil, construction materials and etc. in the new post-Soviet development 
strategy in Uzbekistan. Although official discourses regarded domestic macroeconomic 
stability to be a result of reasonable economic policies through the prioritised used of internal 
economic resources,157 those steps might have been an integral part of general actions to 
strengthen political independence too so that to somehow relieve the possibilities of external, 
non-economic by substance, pressure on the country. “Uzbekistan faces the threats of great 
power chauvinism and aggressive nationalism which among the other purposes intend to limit 
foreign economic relations of Uzbekistan through the creation of unequal conditions… There 
are some political groups on the post-Soviet space who are trying to destabilize situation in 
the region... They recommend to use the tools of the energy and transport blockade against 
Central Asia... This is a potential threat to the national interests and security of 
Uzbekistan”.158 
In this regard, substantial investments were made after the declaration of independence both 
to discover new oil fields and expand domestic production in Uzbekistan. Subsequent growth 
in the energy sector was at average rate of 5,5% in the years of independence which mainly 
came from the increases in oil extraction (by 3,6 times), gas and condensate (over 2 times) 
and natural gas.159 By the mid-1990s, production of oil and gas in Uzbekistan had doubled, in 
1994 alone – by 40%. Natural gas extraction increased by 5% in 1994. In 1995, production of 
oil and gas condensate and gas increased on another 37% and 3%, respectively, over the 
previous year, and totalled 7,6 mln.tons and 48,6 m3, respectively.160 The national output of 
petroleum products – gasoline, diesel fuel, oil and lubricants, as well as jet fuel – expanded 
considerably. This virtually eliminated the need for fuel imports as a primary resource for 
power generation and consumption in the industrial sector.  
Uzbekistan has also ramped up its gas production by nearly 50% since the early 1990s and 
reached the level of 57,5 bln.m3 in 2003.161 On the contrary, although coal marks the second 
largest reserves in the region, comparing to oil and gas, its production and consumption have 
                                                 
157 By the mid-1990s, macroeconomic stabilisation and economic growth in Uzbekistan in 1996 (1,6%) was 
mainly explained by the continuous supply of domestic resources, primarily energy resources (oil and gas). See 
in: Uzbekistan. Five Years of Independence: its Own Path of Development. 1996-1997. 
158 I.Karimov (1997) Uzbekiston XXI asr bosagasida: havfsizlikka tahdid, barqarorlik shartlari va tarraqiyot 
kafolatlari. Extract from the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.467. 
159 See: R.Zakhidov „Mirovye tendentsii proizvodstva i potrebleniya toplivno-energeticheskih resursov i 
energetika Uzbekistana  (The World’s Trends in Fuel and Energy Resources Production and Consumption, and 
Energy Complex of Uzbekistan) “. Report in the seminar on „The Energy complex of Uzbekistan in XXI 
century”. Ekonomicheskiy Vestnik Uzbekistana, No 4-5, 2001. 
160 See: Uzbekistan. Five Years of Independence: its Own Path of Development. 1996-1997. 
161 Uzbekistan Hopes to Be Key Gas Exporter. http://www.interfax.com/com?item=Uzb&a=on&id=5762680 
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faced stable decline since the independence, largely due to shrinking state subsidies within the 
line of government priorities to gradually change domestic energy consumption in favor of 
gas, but also due to limited domestic funds to maintain production of all energy resources. 
The production decline was thus about 40% from 1992 and stood at average 2,5 mln. tons in 
2000-2003. (Table 3.1)  
Table 3.1. Production of Energy Resources in Uzbekistan, selected years 
 
Production 1980 1990 1998 2000 2002 2003 
Oil (mln. tons) 1,33 2,8 8,1 7,5 7,2 7,1 
Natural gas (bln. 
m3) 
na 36,67 54,8 56,4 57,7 57,5 
Coal (mln. tons) 5,7 6,4 2,953 2,5 2,7 na 
Electricity (mln. 
kWh) 
na na 45,935 46,457 49,3 49 
Source: EIU Uzbekistan Country Report, Uzbekenergo  Joint Stock Company, Uzbekneftegaz, ADB, Bisnis 
 
In general, energy policy began to play an important role in Uzbekistan after the 
independence. It was correlated with the capital-intensive industrialization policy and overall 
macroeconomic policy on domestic stabilization. National energy policy was expected to 
close the gap between rising demand on energy and oil products in terms of import-
substitution industrialization on the one hand and secure energy supplies on the other hand. 
Energy supply consisted mainly of energy products and resources imported from other Soviet 
republics, primarily from Russia. In attempt to hedge the economy against the risk of 
disruptions in energy supply, Uzbekistan made a stake on the development of local energy 
resources. Strategically, in terms of socio-economic and political turbulences after the 
collapse of the USSR, the desired task was implemented which was to minimize negative 
effects of these events by embarking on the way of the reinforcement of independence and 
therefore, leaving small space for any external source of potential instability to spread and 
fuel domestic processes. Against this background, the republic not only reached full self-
sufficiency in coal and gas, but also became net energy exporter for the first time in its history 
in as early as 1994, and tried to further strengthen this position in the subsequent years. 
 
3.1.2. Organization of Decision-Making in the Energy Sector 
The whole energy sector and its related institutions are composed of a number companies and 
institutions which, to various degrees, take part in the decision-making process in the energy 
sector. They are: the Cabinet of Ministers (the Central government), the Ministry of Finance, 
the National Oil and Gas Holding company called Uzbekneftegaz (for the hydrocarbon 
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sector), the Stock Joint Company Uzbekenergo (electricity) and its legal entity Uzbekugol 
(coal), and other institutions. 
The energy sector in general has been considered as a strategically important area by the 
government from the very outset. For this reason, all critical decisions, as to the industry 
structure, the form and content of sector regulation, pricing, the corporate structures of 
operational entities, privatization and private sector participation, including the establishment 
of joint ventures, investments into the development and exploration of oil and gas fields on 
the territory of Uzbekistan, are made at the highest level by the President and/or the Fuel and 
Energy Complex of the Cabinet of Ministers.162 The implementation of these decisions is 
delegated further to the respective agencies in the energy sector.  
In 1992, the National Corporation of the Oil and Gas industry Uzbekneftegaz was set up as a 
fully government-owned company. Its main task was to preserve the former assortment of its 
products which involved the development of manufacturing technology for the petroleum 
products, such as gasoline, oil, lubricants, solvents and jet fuel formerly imported from the 
Soviet republics. In 1993, Uzbekneftegaz consolidated more than 260 enterprises in the oil, 
gas and oil refining industry previously submitted to Moscow. By a Presidential decree dated 
December 11, 1998, the national corporation of the oil and gas industry Uzbekneftegas was 
converted into the National holding company Uzbekneftegas as a legally founded joint – stock 
company of a public type, in which the state was to hold 51% of the company’s stock, with 
the rest 49% due to be sold to strategic investors. Yet the latter remained unrealised because 
of low attractiveness of the proposed investment package, as well as financial problems 
around the national company, currently embracing about 80000 workers.  
On October 21, 2003 the Cabinet of Ministers took another decision directed on the 
improvement of the set-up of Uzbekneftegaz in order to increase sustainability and 
coordination between the oil and gas economic units involved into geological, exploration, 
transportation, processing and sales of energy products, as well as for better investment 
credibility.163 According to the document, the oil and gas decision-making structure is based 
on a three-tier vertically integrated system of the respective companies, although the policy-
making level includes the highest level and a number of other non-energy state institutions 
(Annex 3.1). In our case, Uzbekneftegaz, as a first implementation tier company, controls and 
coordinates the whole activity in oil and gas industry both directly and through five other its 
                                                 
162 See for example: President Uzbekistana i Glava Gazproma Obsudili Sotrudnichestvo (President of Uzbekistan 
and the Head of Gazprom Have Disscussed Cooperation). www.uza.uz, 23 July 2003 
163 See the Decree No 460 dated 21 October 2003 “On the Improvement of the Management Structure in the 
National Holding Company “Uzbekneftegaz”. 
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sub-units.164 The middle implementation tier consists of the two sub-levels: upper and lower, 
both report directly to Uzbekneftegas. The upper level includes the four joint-stock companies 
with 51% of stock are to be held by Uzbekneftegas, up 10% - for the employees these 
companies, 39% - for private investors, as well as a newly created general department as a 
legal entity. They include: 
- Uzgeoburneftegazdobycha – oil and gas exploration, drilling and production, as well as 
processing of natural gas and recovery of gas liquids which emerged the reorganized 
Uzburneftegaz – drilling company; 
- Uztransgaz – transportation of natural gas; 
- Uznefteprodukt – oil products sales and distribution, also includes some petrol stations; 
- Uzneftegazmash – manufacturer of oil and gas equipment. 
- Uzneftegazsvyaz – general department for maintenance communications network. 
The lower level embraces 3 specialized companies, one production complex and the two 
education institutions, and a specialized journal. In particular, they are: 
 the open-type joint-stock UzLITIneftegas (25% owned by Uzbekneftegas) 
 the open-type joint stock Uzvneshneftgaz – foreign relations; 
 UzVCh (company deals with safety and security issues), its stock are fully owned by 
state, but managed by Uzbekneftegas; 
 the Shurtan gas and chemical complex (the largest gas production unit in the country); 
 the Bukhara college on Oil and Gas Industries, the Ferghana oil college – the two regions 
with the main Bukhara and Ferghana oil refineries; 
 the Editorial Board of Oil and Gas in Uzbekistan Magazine 
The lowest-tier subsidiaries are dealing with the construction issues mainly on a regional 
basis. All of them are open-type joint-stock companies, yet strongly linked with the top level 
management and control in Tashkent.  
This is a new structure developed in close cooperation with an International  consortium 
headed by French Investment Bank BNP Paribas. It has been significantly improved and 
simplified comparing to the previous one. The number of intermediary units was reduced 
                                                 
164 If the Cabinet of Ministers were assumed to be the highest level de-facto involved in decision-making, there 
would be a four-tier system. However, formally the organizational structure is made up of the companies directly 
involved in the oil and gas industry where Uzbekneftegas is considered to be on the top. 
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through the mergers and reorganization, making administration in the oil and gas industry 
more compact and coordinate. In particular, the formerly existed subsidiaries 
Uzneftepererabotka which embraced refinery companes, and Uzneftegazsnabjeniye which 
secured food and catering service in the industry, were dissolved and their sub-units were 
transferred to Uznefteprodukt. Uzneftegazstroy, which was previously responsible for 
construction, was merged by Uzbekneftegaz itself, while the construction companies came to 
be reporting directly to Uzbekneftegaz.  
Yet, on the whole, the new set-up is still strongly integrated into vertical relationship both 
between the Central government and energy companies, and inside the energy sector itself. 
Although almost all the companies in the sector are joint-stock and legally independent, their 
remain dependent on the main decisions taken by Uzbekneftegaz in that it concerns the 
supplies of equipment and raw materials, as well as financial injections and loans, including 
foreign. This thus enables Uzbekneftegaz to keep watch and subsequently retain its 
interventionary status in regional exploration, production, processing, construction or any 
other oil and gas related activities throughout the country regardless the level of operation, 
since no legal framework is known as preventing such activities. In addition, the whole sector 
itself is seen in terms of natural monopolies whose activities are subject to immediate state 
regulation.165 Moreover, the energy sector remain strongly committed to the government after 
the latter mediated and channeled the huge amounts of foreign credits and loans on the 
sector’s modernization, upgrading, and the construction of new facilities which have all been 
capital-intensive projects. Since all these borrowings were made under the government’s 
guarantees, the energy sector will most likely be retained under a close state supervision 
unless these borrowings will be at least all repaid. Nevertheless, the recent decisions has 
confirmed that in terms of the forthcoming privatization of Uzbekneftegaz, a controlling stake 
will be held by the government, with 48,7% to be sold to a foreign strategic investor.166 
The picture of the main policy-making institutions in the power energy field has much in 
common with the oil and gas complex (Annex 3.2). In accordance with a President’s decree, 
the Ministry of Power Generation and Electrification which had been found in 1990, was 
abolished.167 In attempt to decentralize the energy system, the government set up the State-
Joint Stock company “Uzbekenergo” to succeed the abolished Ministry, both by its assets 
                                                 
165 It is especially reflected in energy price policies made not on the sector’s level, but on the level of the 
government with the involvement of other non-energy state bodies (See Annex 3.1). These policies could be 
most likely explained with the efforts to maintain domestic industrial competitiveness and follow social goals. 
166 Uzbekneftegaz Restructuring Complete. The Times of Central Asia, http://www.times.kg/news, 25 June 2004 
167 See the President’s decree of February 21, 2001 „On Deepening Economic Reforms in the Energy Sector”. 
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and commitments. At present, the Uzbekenergo contains the two main fully-owned 
subsidiaries – the Uzelectroset (transmission system) and the Uzenergosbyt (buyer and seller 
of power, as well as export); as well as specially new created supervisory body 
Uzgosenergonadzor to supervise operations in energy sector. There are 15 regional 
subsidiaries for distribution and sale of energy from Uzbekenergo, 7 thermal plants, 6 
hydropower stations, one transmission company. Gradual corporatization and offer of up to 
49% of the shares of power and thermal plants to investors has been envisaged.168 
The main tasks of Uzbekenergo are: 
• sustainable energy supply in the economy, including the residential sector, regulation and 
coordination of domestic energy system functioning; 
• development of short- and long-term prognosis and programms for the development of 
electro and power system and coal industry, development of production and consumption 
energy balances for the domestic economy; 
• investment activities dedicated to the reconstruction, upgrading, modernisation and further 
development of power generating capacities and electricity grids, as well as coal industry 
enterprises, including the assistance of foreign investors; 
• coordination of coal exploration activities, improvement and introduction of new cost-
efficient methods of exploration in coal mines, so that to further increase its share in total 
energy generating structure; 
• development of recoverable and non-traditional sources of energy; 
• organization of the development and realization of the measures rational use and energy 
saving programmes. 
Besides, most recently another government authority – the Supervisory Committee over the 
processes in the energy field Uzgosenergonadzor was also founded. Its main functions are 
determined as follows: 
• development, ratification, and control over the fulfilment of legal documents and rules in 
the field of production, transportation and consumption of energy and coal; 
• development and control over the realization of preventive measures to provide security 
conditions while producing, transporting, and sale of energy and coal; 
                                                 
168 In enterprises involved in design, civil works and maintenance the sales of a minimum of 75% has been 
planned. 
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• scrutinize the security measures on newly built objects related to the requirements of 
production, transportation, and consumption of energy; 
• licensing energy production on plants connected to the common electricity system. 
Yet within these functions Uzbekenergo remains actually highly dependent on central 
government’s decisions, prescriptions and priorities. For instance, Uzbekenergo is hardly able 
to undertake any sovereign steps without preliminary consultations and approvals from the 
Cabinet of Ministers. The latter is concerned to preserve its domination in the energy field 
through retaining a full control in all hydropower plans, the energy networks communications 
system, and the two aforementioned affiliates of Uzbekenergo. Since the issue of investments 
into the construction of new plants and the development and expansion of sources of energy is 
usually debated on the highest level, the direct submission of Uzbekenergo to the Cabinet of 
Ministers is necessary for the government to keep its influence felt throughout the entire 
events in the energy sector. 
The coal industry today is under the supervision of the joint stock company “Uzbekugol” 
(Uzbekcoal) which operates within the structure of Uzbekenergo, but as an independent legal 
entity. In comparison with oil and gas industry, the role of coal industry has decreased in 
years of independence. Nevertheless, the government priority is to renew the role of the 
sphere in the economy. The structure of government monopoly in coal industry faces changes, 
even though they are undertaken gradually. Most recently, the government has abolished the 
sales company “Uzbekugol” and transferred its functions to local authorities. By this measure, 
the state tries to improve overall management in the coal sphere and reduce the number of 
intermediaries. Moreover, the shares of a few enterprises of coal industry, such as the open 
stock companies “Informugol”, “Svyazugol”, “Ugolstroy” which are state companies, are 
suggested to be sold publicly. 
At the same time, the government is very cautious with the privatization of the largest coal 
companies. Partly it is related with the strategic significance of coal industry in the near 
perspectives169. Most of coal enterprises possessed huge government stakes. On the other 
hand, the largest joint stock company “Ugol (Coal)” is governed by the Council of Directors. 
The chairman and its deputies must be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers before their 
appointment. Therefore, key positions in management and decision-making are also regulated 
by the government so far. 
                                                 
169 See: The National Programme of Coal Industry Development in 2002-2010. 
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Thus the energy sector’s development is currently in the limelight of close government 
regulation through a number of functions divided between various state bodies. The most 
important economic function is carried out by the Ministry of Finance which has regulatory 
responsibility of price setting of all energy forms, while direct insiders, such as 
Uzgosenergonadzor (electricity), for instance, is in charge of technical supervision only.170 In 
addition, many decisions of an operational or commercial nature as to the sphere are regulated 
or at least subject to approval by the Ministry of Finance, the Anti-Monopoly Committee or 
directly by the Cabinet of Ministers. As regards privatization issues, decisions are made and 
implemented by the State Property Committee headed by another Deputy Prime Minister. The 
State Committee for Nature Protection is in charge for the environmental aspects. 
 
3.1.3. Main Producers in the Energy Sector 
According to official sources, about 187 oil and gas fields are discovered at present, including 
91 gas and gas condensate fields and 96 oil and gas, oil condensate, and oil fields. The 
Uzbekneftegaz is engaged into the development of 88 fields, while another 58 are ready for 
development, nine are held in reserve, and 17 are in geological exploration. There are five 
main regions with supposedly the largest domestic hydrocarbon reserves. They are: the 
Ustyurt area, Bukhara-Khiva, South-Western Gissar, the Surkhandarya and Fergana regions. 
In 1992, the prospective Mingbulak oil field was discovered in Fergana Valley. However, the 
largest oil reserves were discovered in the Western part of the republic which contains over 
60% of Uzbekistan’s known oil fields. The Kokdumalak oil field plays a key role in total oil 
production in the republic today, since it gives about 70% of the country’s oil production. The 
Ferghana Valley, which hosts the newly discovered Mingbulak oil field in Namangan area, 
accounts for 20%. Moreover, the Ustyurt plateau and the Aral sea (Karakalpakstan) have been 
targeted for the further exploration. For instance, according to some estimates, the Ustyurt 
plateau contains 1,7 bln.tonnes of oil and condensate. 14 new oil and gas fields were 
identified in 2000 – 2003, five of them in Ustyurt region.  
                                                 
170 The Uzbekneftegaz subsidiaries have to receive approval from the Ministry of Finance for the prices that they charge for 
their goods and services and, for certain goods and services, have to charge prices that the Cabinet of Ministers establishes. In 
addition to the exogenous price policies, cash and payments among oil and energy units also remained controlled and 
supervised by the Ministry of Finance. See: Uzbekistan. Energy Sector: Issues, Analysis, and an Agenda for Reform. World 
Bank, June 2003. p.21. The most recent government decision is intended to improve collection of payments in the public 
utilities sector (PUS) but with simultaneous intervention into price policies. Although the PUS currently is not a formal part 
of the energy complex, it de facto serves immediate interests of the energy sector in part of sustainable payments, the efficasy 
of energy use and subsequent modernization of the system. The real impact of this decree is yet to be determined but the 
goverment explicitly retains its lever as the last important price maker. See: President Decree on Measures to Prevent 
Unreasonable Increases in Tariffs and Tightening Responsibilities of Consumers for Timely Payments for Communal 
Services. Information Agency UzA, 12 February 2005. 
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Total probable gas reserves at the fields are estimated at 5.1 – 6.25 trln.m3, with commercial 
reserves of 1.62 trln.m3. Foreign experts said the level of commercial gas reserves in 
Uzbekistan is double that in Britain, Europe's biggest gas producer. Specialists at national 
holding company Uzbekneftegaz said the country had developed less than 23% of its gas 
resources. Proven reserves are found in the following five regions: Bukhara-Khiva (73% of 
potential developed), Gissar (35%), Surkhandarya (11%), Fergana (27%), and Ustyurt (12%). 
According to Uzbekneftegaz, proven reserves are about 37% worked out. About 40% of the 
forecast gas potential is found in Bukhara-Khiva gas region. Shurtan field with 400 – 600 
bln.m3 forms the basis of the region's hydrocarbon potential. 
The Kandym fields with proven geological reserves of 283 bln.m3 of gas and recoverable 
reserves of about 210 bln.m3 are the most promising in Bukhara-Khiva region. Proven gas 
reserves at Kandym total 150 bln.m3. Once commercial development begins Kandym will 
yield 8–10 bln.m3 of gas a year and Khauzak and Shady fields may produce about 3 bln.m3. 
Recoverable gas reserves at the Kokdumalak field in the same region total 145 bln.m3. 
Gissar region has nine oil and gas fields with the majority of gas reserves found at Adamtash 
field in the Southwest Gissar block. Uzbekneftegaz estimates recoverable reserves at the field 
of total 35 billion – 55 bln.m3. The Ustyurt region is also promising with potential of 1.7 
trln.m3. The 11 blocks cover 105,000 km2. Urga, Shagarlyk, and Berdakh are the most 
promising structures with an estimated 46 bln.m3, 36 bln.m3, and 30 bln.m3, respectively. 
The main producer in coal industry is the Angren open-cast mine which is alone possesses 
half of coal reserves, and produces about 80% of total republican coal. However, 
contemporary problems are seen, that make production low-profitable and inefficient. 
Capacity utilization of Uzbekistan’s mines is rather low, largely because existing equipment 
which has not been upgraded since 1992, has virtually exhausted its service life. The vital task 
for the government is to modernise production process, otherwise huge reserves will remain 
untapped and tiny in total domestic energy consumption. 
The other two coal deposits – Shargun and Boysun (the Surkhandarya area) are much smaller 
than the Angren deposit by both reserves and production capacities. Nevertheless, coal 
produced in Shargun, for example, is of higher quality, and gives 3 times more energy than 
brown coal of Angren. Therefore, these two deposits, even being rather small, are also 
important for the consumers, especially in Surkhandarya region itself, the primary consumers 
of the Shargun and Boysun coal.  
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The location of the main producing areas pre-determined the construction of new oil refinery 
facilities after independence, making them easily available for raw oil and condensate 
supplies. The first most prominent investment project in the energy field within the CIS since 
Independence was the construction of a new Bukhara oil refinery which was put into 
operation in 1997. The project’s cost was amounted to more than $400 mln. To realize the 
construction, a consortium was formed which comprised the Technip Company of France, the 
japanese companies Marubeni and JGC. As a result of the construction of the first production 
line, Uzbekistan’s processing capacities increased by 2,5 mln.tons of crude oil and 
condensate. At the same time, Uzbekistan has two refineries at Ferghana and Alty-Arik 
(the Ferghana Valley) built in the Soviet era. Being one of the largest in Central Asia, 
Ferghana oil refinery is specialized in the processing of carbonic-hydrogen products, and 
oriented towards fuel and lubricating oils, while Bukhara oil refinery oriented for gas 
condense production. It was designed for high quality and international standard gasoline, 
diesel oil and aviation kerosine production.  
The Alty Ariq oil refinery established in 1906 has been merged with the Ferghana oil refinery 
plant and became an operational part of the Ferghana refinery. The Ferghana oil refinery was 
originally constructed to supply oil products locally, as well as to Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and other republics of the former Soviet Union. It started operations in 1958 with 
one crude and vacuum unit. It has since grown steadily and now has total crude and 
condensate capacity of 8,7 mln.tonnes of production annually. 
High losses during the refinery process due to out-ofdated equipment in the Ferghana refinery 
plant urged the government to reconstruct its facilities with the foreign assistance from 
Eximbank of Japan and EBRD. $180 mln.loan agreement was used to realise the project. 
Among others loan proceeds have been used for the construction of a new desulphurisation 
unit ther to meet the necessary requirements of the domestic market. 
In the gas industry, Uzbekistan invested more than $50 mln. in 2001 – 2002 to modernize its 
exploration facilities under the program. In 2001 the government launched the Shurtan gas 
and chemical complex (Kashkadarya region) which included installations to clean gas, a 
natural gas booster compressor station, and a plant with total amount output of 125000 tonnes 
of polyethylene, 137000 tonnes of liquified gas and 100000 tonnes of light gas condensate.171 
This complex, being located near the Shurtan gas fields in the south-western part of 
Uzbekistan, was completed in December, 2000, at a cost of approximately $1 bln. A 
                                                 
171 A.Obidov „O razvitii neftegazovoy otrasli Uzbekistana”. Report in the seminar on „The Energy complex of 
Uzbekistan in XXI century”. Ekonomicheskiy Vestnik Uzbekistana, No 4-5, 2001. 
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consortium, including Swiss, Japanese and American companies, international financial 
institutions and the government of Uzbekistan, totalled $600mln. of foreign investments. The 
two aforesaid plants are used to extract and convert hydrosulphur from gas and condensate 
into sulphur. Now it produces about 15 bln.m3 annually, while further plans to increase annual 
output to 20 bln.m3 are also considered.172 
In an attempt to develop domestic infrastructure of gas distribution, an underground gas 
storage facility in Khodjaobod (the Andijan region) was constructed and opened in 1999 at a 
cost of $72 mln. The storage allowed to increase gas shipments to Uzbekistan’s industrial 
heartland in the Ferghana Valley. Annually Uzbekistan puts into operation about 100 km of 
gas pipelines, both to serve industrial and private consumers (the residential sector) that 
provides sustainable work of the gas complex with the other sectors of economy. 
In order to attract foreign investments, the government is seeking to offer about 80 oil and gas 
fields, both producing and virgin, for prospective investments. Notwithstanding lucrative gas 
reserves, investors were cautious about the long-term projects. The first large-scale 
production-sharing agreement was signed in 2001 between the government and the Trinity 
Energy Group (UK) which committed to invest more than $400 mln. over a 40-year period in 
exploration and production of gas condensate deposits in the Ustyurt plateau and South-
Western Gissar area.173 Besides, Russian companies are also very active. The representatives 
of Gasprom and Itera have succeeded in negotiating to form a joint venture with 
Uzbekneftegas for the development of new gas fields in Uzbekistan with the purposes of 
“increasing gas production, developing the system of gas transportation, attracting 
investments into the given field, and also privatization natural gas industry of the republic”.174 
It resulted in a few gas investments from Russia into gas development in Uzbekistan which 
will be discussed later. 
At the same time Uzbekistan has the best developed power and energy system in the entire 
Central Asian region. “It is well-known that an economic development of a state depends, to a 
considerable extent, on its energy base. From this point of view, Uzbekistan has a very strong 
                                                 
172 Uzbekistan Hopes to Be Key Gas Exporter. http://www.interfax.com/com?item=Uzb&a=on&id=5762680 
173 A Trinity Energy subsidiary, UzPEC Ltd, invested $13 million in the oil and gas complex in 2003. 
UzPEC said the figures received through exploration show the license area may contain gas. Once geological 
exploration is completed forecast reserves could be increased. UzPEC plans this year to invest more than $50 
million to explore and develop Uzbek fields. It will begin natural gas production in late 2005 and reach the level 
of 2 bln.m3 in 2006. See: Uzbekistan Hopes to Be Key Gas Exporter. 
http://www.interfax.com/com?item=Uzb&a=on&id=5762680 
174 See „Gazprom and Uzbekneftegas expand cooperation”. www.uza.uz, 18.12.2002 
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energy system”.175 The government thus sees “the strong energy system” as an integral 
positive and equally needed condition in the entire development strategy during transition, 
whereby the political significance of these words seem no less important than its primarily 
economic contribution.  
Actually, Uzbekistan’s energy system comprises 37 thermal and hydropower plants. The 
energy system is largely based on Syrdarya, Tashkent, Novo-Angren, Navoi thermal plants. 
The energy system produces almost half of all power generated by the Central Asian Unified 
Energy System, the part of which it remains. 
“The existing capacities of the energy system will allow to provide with energy all the 
domestic investments in the nearest future without constructing new electricity-generating 
capacities”.176 
In fact, that power generating capacities in Uzbekistan increased between 11,4 GW in 1992 to 
11,8 GW in 2002 which allowed to steadily increase in both domestic output and consumption 
(Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2. Electric Power Production and Consumption (mln.kWh) 
 
Description Reported Forecast 
 1999 2000 2001 2005 2010 
Total output: 45372 46457 47070 55000 63000 
PS 439333 45487 46100 53700 61700 
HPP  38608 40905 41000 48500 55600 
HES 5325 4582 5100 5200 6100 
BS 1386 950 950 1300 1300 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
consumption: 
46564 47382 47070 55000 63000 
Effective 38577 39112 40040 45700 53100 
Energy 
Balance 
-1192 -925  - - 
Source: Ministry of Macroeconomic and Statistics of Uzbekistan, Uzbekenergo Joint-Stock Company 
Note: PS-power stations, HPP-heat power plants, HES-hydroelectric stations, BS-block-stations 
 
Much of Uzbekistan’s electric power is generated from natural gas-powered plants (85%), 
with smaller amounts generated from coal (5,3%) and hydroeclectric facilities.177 The largest 
gas-fired plants are Syrdarya (3GW) and Navoi (1,25GW) plants which together account for 
                                                 
175 Our translation from I.Karimov (1997) Uzbekiston XXI asr bosagasida: havfsizlikka tahdid, barqarorlik shartlari va 
tarraqiyot kafolatlari. Extract from the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.633. 
176 Source is the same. p.634 
177 M.Usmanova „Sostoyaniye i perspectivy razvitiya electroenergetiki Uzbekistana (State and Perspectives of 
Energy Complex Development in Uzbekistan)“. Report in the seminar on „The Energy complex of Uzbekistan in 
XXI century”. Ekonomicheskiy Vestnik Uzbekistana, No 4-5, 2001. 
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one third of all generating capacity of the republic. There have been installed a few power 
generating units with a capacity of 150-300 kW in each of the plants. Several coal-powered 
facilities, including the 1,8 GW coal-fired Angren plant, are located near the Angren open-pit 
mine close to Tashkent. In addition, many hydroeclectric plants (the largest being Charvak, 
with 0,62GW capacity) supply almost 15% of the country’s electricity. The infrastructure of 
energy transmission is the most developed in Central Asia. The length of electricity lines is 
amount to 233000 km, cabel lines – 200000 km which currently allow Uzbekistan to be a 
leading regional power producer. 
At the same time, further investments in energy system are continued. The construction of the 
largest Talimardjan Regional Power Plant is under way and soon completed. Installed 
capacity of the power station will be 3,2 GW, four energy units with a capacity of 0,8 GW 
each. In addition, the investments of $60 mln. are expected to rebuild the heat and power plant 
in Mubarek that will increase capacity from 60 MW to 100 MW. This modernisation strategy 
may thus allow not only to meet domestic demand, but simultaneously foresee the 
implementation of a number of export initiatives across the region in the future. 
 
3.1.4. Main Consumers of Energy Resources 
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan is also a large energy resource consumer. 
In the early 1990s, the republic consumed just over 7 mln.tons, with less than a third of this 
amount being produced domestically.178 Since 1998, as it has been mentioned before, 
domestic needs for oil have been covered by country’ own oil supplies.  
As for gas, Uzbekistan became self-sufficient in gas in the mid-1980s, while producing some 
volumes for export too. Consumption of gas has steadily increased along with its 
production.179 Currently, gas is the most consumed energy resource in the domestic economy. 
On the whole, during 1990-2001 period, through the substantial increase in oil and gas 
production in Uzbekistan, their share in total consumption of energy resources increased by 
5,5%. However, the structure of consumption is extremely uneven: 85% for gas and 10% - for 
oil and oil products. With a domestic policy emphasis on the consumption of relatively cheap 
                                                 
178 Here it needs to be also stressed that oil consumption fell from 7.4 in 1991 to 4.8 mln.tons of oil equivalent in 
1995 due to less consumption in all sectors of the economy. Among macroeconomic challenges (fall in output, 
GDP), the targeted efforts by the government to shift consumption towards gas (for example, in tranport), and 
partly energy-saving steps could be also noted. 
179 By sector division, total gas consumption increase in 1990-1995 was a result of almost double-fold increase 
by households, from 6 mln.tons of oil equivalent (toe) to 13.7 mln.toe, while agriculture and industry both saw 
mainly declining trends. While population benefited from access to low-priced gas as part of social benefits, 
other sectors suffered from complex general macroeconomic situation. 
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gas,180 the share of coal in total consumption decreased substantially – by 3,4 times and 
reached less than 1%.181 
In the regional context, the lion’s share of energy produced by Uzbekistan is consumed 
domestically – about 46 GW per year. Only a tiny part is exported to Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan (about 2-3 GW). However, this amount is crucial for Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan 
which fire imported gas to produce energy at domestic thermal power plants. In terms of 
further economic growth, the demand for energy in the region is expected to increase steadily 
which is congruous with Uzbekistan’s plans to expand export markets, including through 
increases in energy and gas supplies to its neighbors.   
The break-down of energy resources consumption by sector reveals that the industry (25.8%) 
and household sectors (40.7%) were the largest consumers in 2002.182 The largest industrial 
consumers are non-ferrous metallurgy, some chemical industries, the industry of construction 
materials, and large electro smelters for metals and ceramics, all of which are material- and 
energy-intensive. Equally the fuel and energy complex itself is a huge consumer of resources. 
As it has been underlined before, electricity in Uzbekistan is mostly derived from 85% 
thermal plants which fire natural gas, 10% – oil and 5% - coal as a primary resource. The 
largest natural gas-powered facilities include the Syrdarya, Tashkent and Navoi plants. The 
most coal consumer facilities are two power plants in the vicinity of the Angren mine near the 
capital Tashkent, the larger of them is the Novo-Angren power plant.  
The share of final energy consumption by population increased substantially, from 17,7% in 
1990 to almost 41% in 2002, which might be explained by the government’s intentions to set 
up a sustainable gas supply network with a wider public access. In particular, the level of 
gasification in rural areas has doubled (from 25,6% in 1992 to more than 50% in 2003), while 
in the cities these figures run up to 85%.183 Although these figures may reflect the priorities of 
social orientation in carrying out the reforms, yet the trends may be seen as an outcome of 
                                                 
180 In 1994-99, domestic price of oil amounted to 20-30% of the world prices ($20-40 against $110-160 per ton). 
Domestic price of gas was equal to 15-25% of the world prices ($10-25 against $65-95 per m3) at curb market 
exchange rate, which was in place due to foreign exchange restrictions. The situation changed little in the 
beginning of the 2000s. Domestic wholesale and retail prices for gas were counted to be about 23% and 11%, 
respectively, of its average regional export prices ($45 per m3), while the wholesale and retail prices for coal - 
31% and just over 15%, respectively, in 2001, with average export price $35 per ton. For statistical data see: 
Energy Information Administration, www.eia.gov/uzbekistan; Uzbekistan. Energy Sector: Issues, Analysis, and 
an Agenda for Reform. World Bank, June 2003, tables in Annex 3.3; see also IMF reports in various years. 
181 The decline in domestic coal consumption mainly occured in the first half of 1990s at the expence of 
simultaneous decline in all consuming sectors (industry, households, agriculture due to aforementioned reasons.  
182 The other consumers of energy resources in the economy were agriculture (5.8%), transport system (10%), 
public and commercial services (8.5%). See: IEA Energy Statistics for Uzbekistan in 2002. Available on IEA 
website at www.iea.org. 
183 Uzbekistan Hopes to Be Key Gas Exporter. http://www.interfax.com/com?item=Uzb&a=on&id=5762680 
 94
other processes too. Increase of the residential sector share in total energy consumption of 
gas, for example, could be equally caused by an increase in population on the one hand, and 
the relatively lower prices of energy resources in the households sector compared to those in 
the industrial sector, on the other hand. 
Currently Uzbekistan seeks for the rationalization of energy consumption by changing the 
share of oil, gas and coal in the total consumption structure. Since oil and gas are not 
renewable resources and tend to be exhausted sooner or later, the need for involvement of 
coal into the production process is seen by the government as an alternative. Through these 
measures, it aims to reduce a burden on the oil and gas complex. In particular, it is planned to 
reduce the gas consumption of power stations and increase the coal-based power output. 
These measures are expected to improve the fuel balance structure by tripling  coal-used 
portion of the power output from about 5 percent and correspondingly decreasing natural gas 
consumption from 84 per cent to 71 per cent. Investments of US $254 million are expected to 
be chanelled into the coal industry in over 10 years period. While Uzbekistan annually 
produces 2.7 mln. tonnes of coal, its production is expected to increase to 9.4 mln. tonnes 
after modernization.184  
Further industrial growth and the diversification of energy consumption are due to be in line 
with the simultaneous energy-saving programmes. The latter are necessary to encourage both 
the efficient use existing energy resources and total hydrocarbon reserves, as well as for the 
reduction of a burden on energy-intensive production. 
 
3.1.5. Contemporary Challenges in the Energy Sector 
At the same time, the contemporary development of domestic economy has revealed the wide 
specter of problems exacerbated during transition to a market economy. These difficulties 
partly inherited from the former planned system, have been especially aggravated during the 
last years. With the structural changes in the entire fuel and energy balance, growth rates of 
primary energy resources extraction lags behind domestic energy consumption. For instance, 
in 1995-2001 total production of energy resources increased by 15,7%, while domestic 
consumption increased by 18%. It is especially true for local oil and related products. In 2001, 
the total extraction of energy resources was insignificant, while oil extraction faced a slide by 
                                                 
184 According to the National Coal Industry Development Programme during 2002- 2010, the measures include 
construction of the second coal supply line and equipment installation at the Novo-Angren state district power 
station (SDPS); modernization of the existing coal supply facilities at the Angren SDPS; efficiency increase 
oriented reconstruction and re-equipment of the power facilities.  See also: Mavlany J. Energy Sector of 
Uzbekistan, Report of 28 November 2003, http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/0312UZ_Power.htm 
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3,7% for the first time in the recent years. Similarly, production decline of oil products, such 
as heavy oil and diesel, is also observed, although local production capacities are 
underused.185  
In addition, due to the shifts in national priorities, coal extraction went down from 6,5 to 2,5 
mln.tonnes, i.e. by 2,6 times since the early 1990s. As a result, the share of natural gas only in 
total production and consumption of energy resources is about 85%, with the comparatively 
smaller volumes of other resources. In such terms, it imposes an extremely high burden on the 
energy sector, causing its one-sided development in addition to the strong dependency on the 
exhaustable sources of energy, with the subsequent discrimination of others, including the 
renewable ones. Not at least the majority of the existing problems originate from the Soviet 
period, and, as a rule, have much common with the shortages of the former system (See Box 
in Annex 3.3). 
In the given context, a few aspects could be set out to highlight the Uzbekistan’s challenges in 
the energy sector. Despite the steps taken by the government on active technical 
modernization in the energy production sector since Independence (the construction of the 
Bukhara refinery and the Shurtan gas and chemical complex, the reconstruction of Ferghana 
refinery plant), the best part of domestic industry suffers from out-of-date equipment. Most of 
this equipment has been still used since the Soviet times. That is particularly true for the fuel 
and energy complex, ferrous metallurgy, chemical and construction materials industry which 
are the largest consumers of primary energy resources. Being one of the main problems of the 
Soviet system, the wasteful consumption of energy resources has been still a case during the 
whole period of independent development of Uzbekistan too. Naturally, while it increases 
GDP energy intensity and reduces competitiveness of the economy in international 
framework, this also has negative consequences on vulnerability and national security of the 
republic. GDP energy intensity in Uzbekistan was 3 times higher than that of industrially 
developed countries during the 1990s. This trend is attributable to almost all the countries in 
transition so far, especially to former Soviet republics, even after a decade of sovereign 
development (Diagram 3.1).  
The reasons of this problem could vary from country to country, though some general features 
are found in almost all former planned economies. In Uzbekistan, many large and middle-
scale enterprises, pre-dominantly state-owned, kept their activities after Independence. It is 
                                                 
185 A total refining capacity of the 3 main refineries in Bukhara, Ferghana and Alty Aryk is about 11,1 mln.tons 
per year with plans to further increase domestic capacities by another 2,5 mln.tons. Yet in 2002 the refineries 
refined only 6,1 mln.tons of crude oil and gas condensate, mainly as a result of sliding domestic oil production. 
See: Uzbekistan. Energy Sector: Issues, Analysis, and an Agenda for Reform. World Bank, June 2003. p.6. 
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obvous that they were not prepared to act in new conditions. Despite new economic 
conditions, most of them retained monopolist nature. Besides, most of the equipment was 
obsolent, and this all encouraged inefficient use of energy resources. In such terms, they did 
not have neither sufficient resources nor incentives to improve energy consumption. 
 
Diagram 3.1 Comparative Data on Energy Intensity in Central Asia and Developed Economies186 
 
 
 
Source: Energy Intensity in EBRD’s main regions, http://ebrd.org/country/sector/energyef/about/energy.pdf 
 
Secondly, energy prices continued being underpriced both to support financial and production 
activities in real sector and for social considerations.187 Yet as the experience of the Soviet 
economy shows, after some period of time this policy comes to failure, since relatively cheap 
energy resources eventually lead to overconsumption, but not to their efficient use, as well as 
to dwindling energy reserves and aging capital, due to lack of both internal resources and 
foreign injections to maintain investment process. With neither production costs nor profit 
margin to be covered, this process finally results in permanent decrease in production 
Thirdly, despite the measures of the government on significant increase of energy prices 
throughout the 1990s and in 2001-2003, under the inadequate exchange rate regime with 
highly appreciated national currency (Uzbek sum) price distortions on energy resources still 
remained substantial, while any increases were offset by inflationary trends.  
                                                 
186 Alternative sources also point at low efficiency in Central Asian energy use. For example, Diagnostic Report 
on Energy Resources in Central Asia gives the following figures for 1999: Kazakhstan – 1.02 tons of oil 
equivalent per $1000, Kyrgyzstan – 1.0, Tadjikistan – 0.85, Turkmenistan – 2.16, Uzbekistan – 1.21, Central 
Asia – 1.16, while OECD – 0.37, Germany – 0.33, Japan – 0.28, USA – 0.44.  
187 Partly such a strategy is explained by official authorities as necessary measures to pursue socially oriented 
economic reforms, to provide access for local population to relatively cheap energy resources. 
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Fourthly, one of the distinctions in energy development in the past decade was oil and energy 
independence. The republic ceased import of oil and steadily increased its gas production. It 
suffices to say that 17% out 51% of total government investments into the economy during 
1991-2000 were spent for the needs of fuel and energy complex.188 Yet economic price of 
political decisions is as usual high. Energy self-sufficiency forced the country to invest 
heavily in the development of its energy complex, also through the multilateral foreign 
financing. Currently it is another burden put upon on the sector development in addition to 
domestic outstanding energy payments. 
Thus, the core of the modern energy problems in Uzbekistan could be seen not only in the 
changes of economic interrelations and management system, but in a set of financial and legal 
instruments in government policy. They are: 
o financial destabilization in the energy complex due to arrears and debts between energy 
consumers and suppliers; 
o high technological costs and weak incentives to innovations to reduce production costs; 
o inadequate price policy which caused subsequent disproportions between prices on 
various types of energy and oil resources, as well as between energy resources and other 
goods and commodities; 
o tax policy which encouraged fiscal interests rather than efficient investment activities in 
the energy complex; 
o overconsumption and high energy intensity of the economy. 
In such conditions, simultaneous reforms in various dimensions are strongly required. 
 
3.1.6. Strategy for Further Development 
Urgent Tasks 
“Only in terms of oil independence, the republic can feel itself really independent”.189 
The strategic energy priorities are most likely to balance between the following critical tasks: 
                                                 
188 See  „Problemy razvitiya TEK i voprosy bezopasnosti strany (Problems of Fuel and Energy Complex 
Development and Country’s Security Issues)“. Report in the seminar on „The Energy complex of Uzbekistan in 
XXI century”. Ekonomicheskiy Vestnik Uzbekistana, No 4-5, 2001. 
189 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1995) „Iqtisodiy islohotlarni chuqurlashtirich yolida“. Extract from 
the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.384. 
 98
• higher production efficiency via the reduction of energy intensity of domestic 
industries 
• adequate use of the mineral resource base  
• support of domestic competitiveness  
• satisfaction of  domestic demand for energy in terms of steady economic growth 
For this, there are the two main questions which have to be resolved first and foremost, i.e. (a) 
to improve financial situation and maintain its economic viability; (b) to create competitive 
market environment in the sector. Both of them are closely linked and dependent on a number 
of coordinate measures in price policies, corporatization, demonopolization, privatization, as 
well as on the attraction of foreign investments into the sector.  
To resolve financial problems of the sector is complex and time consuming process requiring 
a step-by-step approach in local conditions. It is to focus mainly on the elimination of 
commercial deficiencies and operational inefficiencies.190 One of the fundamentals of this 
process is to move towards appropriate pricing of energy commodities and products. Prices 
are critical in three dimensions: to meet all costs and allow for accumulation of surpluses for 
investment inside the enterprises; to adequately pay the interest and repayment on borrowing; 
and to provide returns on equity capital. But current situation does not allow to undertake 
drastic price liberalization in all energy subsectors, on their products and services, since it 
directly affects the two largest energy consumers: the residential sector and real sector. The 
first one has relatively low purchasing power, while the second one needs to face serious 
restructuring and privatization programs. Since price increases in the sector are unavoidable 
and a matter of time only, the government would need to devise and announce a specific 
programme of these increases which would remove uncertainties, and allow for consumers to 
plan for reduction in consumption, as well as raise the credibility among potential investors. 
In the long run, such programs would transform into integral part of energy policy making all 
the parties concerned familiar with the clear principles of tariff setting for both investment 
plans and for better transparency and predictability of domestic policy measures.  
On the other hand, certain groups of population will without doubt be in need for protection to 
offset the harshness of regular price increases. This means additional social protection costs 
for the government. The policy will concentrate itself on the mobilization of its own resources 
                                                 
190 Commercial deficiencies include non-payments, poor collection procedures, quasi-fiscal activities in the 
sector. Operational inefficiencies include physical losses due to old energy infrastructure and inadequate 
maintenance. For more details see: Uzbekistan. Energy Sector: Issues, Analysis, and an Agenda for Reform. 
World Bank, June 2003. p.8. 
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or to search for the off-budgetary sources of financing these costs. Moreover, price increases 
may be launched with those products which affect the residential sector to a lesser extent. 
According to the structure of consumption, price increases would first face coal and 
petroleum products, while gas and electricity could be covered at the next stage.191 
Demonopolization and corporatization are seen as the main vehicles to better understand the 
cost structure and profitability of the different components of the energy system, and to 
increase efficiency, transparency and accountability in the management of the sector. 
Privatization is seen as the main vehicle to mobilize resources to meet current and future 
capital needs – particularly those of the rapidly aging energy equipment. As the analysis 
shows, current structure of decision-making barely addresses the monopoly cases. In power 
industry, Uzbekenergo still retains monopoly status through two its subsidiaries Uzelectrosbyt 
(buying and selling of energy) and Uzelectroset (transmission grid). In the first case power 
generation and distribution companies are therefore significantly dependent on both price 
policies and infrastructure and thus may have little incentives in production and marketing. If 
the generation and distribution companies could enter into direct contractual aggreements 
under the supervision of the third responsible authority, acting on the basis of legally 
separated entities, it would back their market positions under the influence of the improved 
internal structural and financial capabilities. The role of the Uzbekenergo will thus change 
from the intervention into commercial deals towards the creation of adequate transmission 
and infrastructure facilities.  
In oil and gas industry the work has been already underway to improve the organizational 
structure. Yet, like in some other state institutions, commercial activities continue to be 
complemented by regulatory functions.192 In such case, neither Uzbekneftegaz nor its 
subsidiaries seem to be free in the independent implementation of their specific functions. If 
Uzbekneftegaz is supposed to be a regulatory body, then its structure should be based 
primarily on the general problems, such as a granting of licences for exploration and 
production activities, environmental issues, as well as dealing and the supervision over 
monopoly aspects in the sector, such as access to the domestic pipeline system. In turn, the 
main production units would be engaged more independently into production and subsequent 
transportation of their products on commercial and mutually beneficial terms. Finally in the 
                                                 
191 Uzbekistan. Energy Sector: Issues, Analysis, and an Agenda for Reform. World Bank, June 2003. p.8. 
192 It still remains unclear about a status of Uzbekneftegaz which embraces the mixture of both commercial and 
regulatory functions. The company is equally the licensor of new consessions for explorations and drilling, 
partner in any production and sharing agreements, has its own dominant position in exploration and production 
activities and own refineries, gas processing and gas transmission companies via respective subsidiaries, as well 
as an intermediary to the policy initiatives devised at the government’s level. 
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long run, given close interrelations between the energy industries and for saving 
administrative costs, a single supervisory agency for all energy industries (oil, gas, coal and 
electricity) could be set up. In addition to the aforementioned technical issues, it is critical that 
the given agency would be logically provided with the economic functions too which include 
price and tariff policies and which is not the case nowadays. The body would be in particular 
engaged into setting and monitoring the prices for different categories of consumers and 
selecting the form of price regulation to be adopted. This would not only promote an urgent 
economic revival of the sector, but also reinforce the creditworthy and transparency among 
foreign investors whose assistance to the sector is another critical aspect. 
But the aforementioned measures would require adequate legal framework too. These steps 
might include not only the adoption of appropriate new national laws on oil and electricity 
outlining the substance of structural reforms in the energy sector, but also the improvement of 
the existing legal base directed on the elimination of impediments to put the sector on the foot 
of sustainability. It also means the legal reinforcement of commercialization of the sector via 
pushing through contractual obligations between suppliers and consumers of energy 
resources. In other words, these measures should promote a commercial discipline and 
financial viability of the sector which in turn is crucial to strengthen competitive environment 
both among energy producers and consumers. 
As mentioned, foreign investments into the sector are essential for a number of reasons. There 
is a perceived exigency to replace the hydrocarbon reserves by accelerating exploration and 
development at existing deposits and undertake exploration for new resources. In power 
industry, the situation is even more critical in view of the high level of out-of-dated 
generation capacities in thermal plants and transmission lines which both lead to significant 
losses of the energy produced.193 It obviously requires huge financial injections. Yet the 
resource constraints faced by the sector are substantial, while a large amount of public 
financing in the energy sector in the past decade put certain limitations on further investments 
from central budget too. This makes foreign investment crucial both in financial terms and in 
terms of technologies and know-how. Yet, the interests of investors are confined to primarily 
exploration and development activities. For that reason, investors are less keen so far in the 
                                                 
193 To some degree, the government has already started with the realization of the aforementioned measures. In 2000, the 
Cabinet of Ministers issued Decree “On the Programme of Reconstruction and Development of Generating Capacities in 
Uzbekistan till 2010” according to which system’s modernisation is due to be implemented. In 2000, EBRD and concern 
“Siemens” (Germany) used $27,8 mln. credit line to begin modernizing two of ten power units at the Syr-Darya power plant. 
The construction of a hydroeclectric power station is expected to increase the plant’s power-generating capacities from 600 
MW to 3600 MW. Another project on the reconstruction of the Tashkent State Regional Power Plant is fulfilled by 
Mitsubishi (Japan) which earmarked about $234 mln. for this purposes. The impact on environment is expected to be 
decreased by installation of modern steam-gas turbines into the energy production.  
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long term and huge investment projects with diversified commitments urged by the relatively 
young privatisation programs. Moreover, foreign investments inflow is immediately 
correlated with the impact of measures on the improvement of financial situation and 
regulatory arrangements, in addition to the creation of the adequate legal framework in the 
sector. Once investors see the elements of revival and profitability, they will express much 
more viable desire to vye for a particular field based on their competitive strength. In such 
terms, it will require from the government more intense preparatory activities to tackle the 
aforementioned problems as soon as possible, as well as express its preparedness for dialogue 
and talks on the multiple choices for investors. In terms of global competition for foreign 
investments, the policy should be able to consider different forms of privatization, including 
asset sales, concessions, joint ventures, and even management contracts, for businesses where 
investor interest is low.  
Equally, however, the mobilization of additional resources from foreign sources is currently 
related to economic and, to some extent, to political costs too. Economic costs include both 
direct and indirect. Direct costs will probably arise from the necessity to make concessions 
and bear PR costs in order to face severe competition in persuading investors to put money 
into the various subsectors, which include not only exploration and production activities, but 
also relatively less profitable services and infrastructure facilities, as well as Uzbekneftegaz 
itself. In turn, indirect costs are expected to be caused by the urgency of the preparatory 
measures at the pre-investment stage. For example, if energy prices are gradually liberalised, 
the government will need to intensify its social policy to somehow mitigate the adverse 
effects and the consequences of these processes on certain social groups. As to political costs, 
they may mainly be generated by the internal nature intrinsic to foreign investments. In line 
with the most important driving forces of investments to seek for cost effective activities 
worldwide, at present they may look for the establishment of a control, very often a 
substantial control, over the units in new places.194 For the local government it means to relax 
its own influence sphere resulting in a some kind of a loss of sovereignty in the new 
globalized business order. Nevertheless, to attract foreign investments it is an urgent task in 
helping the country reach more ambitious and far-reaching goals of national scope. 
 
 
 
                                                 
194 Micic M. International Trade. St.Martin Press, New York, 1998, p.267. 
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Complementary Measures 
As stressed above, Uzbekistan is still among countries with high consumption of energy per 
unit of GDP produced. To this respect, the reduction in energy intensity in the fuel and energy 
complex itself should be considered as the priority in oil and gas industry. The main task of 
state policy is to encourage energy saving, as well as investment activities of enterprises for 
modernization and technological progress. This strategy is to be a two-pronged, which means 
both to raise efficiency of current consumption and to rationalize it through looking for 
additional sources of energy. According to official estimates, the potential for saving in 
domestic economy is very high and will make up about 12 mln.tons of oil equivalent annually 
by 2010 via modern energy-saving technologies, develop hydro, solar, thermal and wind 
sources of energy generation.195  
The initial emphasis on high volumes of extracted hydrocarbons (oil and gas) in the past 
decade was justified by the necessity to reach macroeconomic stabilization and avoid sharp 
production declines and social backlash. However, at present, in terms of irrational use of 
non-renewable resources, this approach needs some reconsideration. It becomes vital for the 
republic to develop domestic economy on the basis of efficient production and consumption 
of traditional resources (oil and gas), as well as to increase the share of other energy sources, 
including non-traditional (solar energy, for instance). 
In turn, to enhance investments into the resource-saving technologies, it is necessary to 
develop complex measures on structural changes in the economy which would assume 
restructuring and the sanation of inefficient large and medium-size industrial enterprises in 
general and in the energy sector in particular. As a sound atmosphere in the energy sector with 
efficient full-accountability and profitable enterprises will form, one would be possible to 
expect firms and companies to be more efficient and innovative. Enterprises with a more 
financial discipline will invest more prudently and minimize productive factor use, including 
waste of energy resources.  
It is also clear that investments into the energy-saving technologies should be considered as 
one of the priorities in the overall strategy which results both in direct and indirect 
advantages. These positive consequences could be characterized through the reduction of 
energy intensity, as well as direct costs of production; higher quality of products and overall 
competitiveness, both on domestic and foreign markets; less negative environmental effects. 
                                                 
195 Mavlany J. Uzbekistan: New Energy Saving Programm. BISNIS service, 2001, 
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/010730UZENERGY.htm 
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Among the economic measures of energy saving, the following steps could be useful: 
reasonable privileges196 to economic units using energy saving technologies; accelerated pace 
of amortization; flexible taxation; financial sanctions for the infringement of contractual 
obligations of consumers before the energy suppliers. 
Equally the middle- and long-run prognosis of energy consumption in Uzbekistan is a vital 
and necessary element of energy development. These forecasts are based on the necessity of 
diversification for production and consumption of domestic energy resources. That implies 
that a certain share of traditional sources of energy (oil and gas) could be replaced with 
renewable and more endowed resources (like coal,197 solar energy). This strategy is important 
not only from economic point of view, but also from political one to ensure national security. 
At the same time the developments in the energy sector should go with the worldwide trends 
too. One of them is liberalization which related to deregulation and competition, development 
of regional and inter-state energy markets. As a rule, liberalization leads to more efficiency in 
the energy sector, strengthening mutual influence and inter-dependence between energy 
systems of states and regions of the world. Therefore, energy cooperation within Central Asia 
is of crucial importance for all, the states and the public of the whole region. 
Another trend is decentralization which will be related to the decrease of construction of large 
central heating, electro– and energy supply capacities on large territories. The focus should be 
made on the capacities of smaller scale, with primarily efficient use of gas turbines, stream 
installations, other renewable sources in production of energy. 
In addition to the comprehensive measures on the macrolevel, a number of steps has to be 
undertaken on the microlevel as well. According to some estimates, enterprises of the republic 
possess approximately 15-20% energy-saving potential.198 The main idea of the mentioned is 
that energy-saving should become a basis for the overall strategy of development of the fuel 
and energy complex in Uzbekistan for years to come.  
The role of energy audit, in this respect, is of no less significance. It will be based on 
gathering and analysis of data on purchasing and using most efficient energy resources. These 
data should reveal energy losses of enterprises during production process, therefore, 
                                                 
196 The privileges should have their limits, as their abusement may result in inefficiency in the entire economic 
system (prices distortions, redistribution of income, corruption).  
197 On the condition of the adequate economic (competitiveness) and environmental balance in terms of possible 
greenhouse effects, though the question may remain open at least in the short run. 
198 According to those estimates, energy saving of 1% across the republic makes possible to decrease energy 
generation by 500 mln.kWh, and therefore, to save 100 mln.toe. See: S.Uspenskaya „Energeticheskiy audit i 
energosberejeniye“. Ekonomicheskiy Vestnik Uzbekistana. No 9, 2001 
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subsequent development of measures to eliminate such losses, including investments into 
resource-saving technologies and equipment. Besides, improvement of management and 
planning on energy saving, establishment of special norms and energy standards, as well as 
thorough statistical accounts are expected to be the most desired steps on energy management. 
Thus, further development strategy for the energy sector will depend on decisive steps on 
macro- and microlevel. This approach requires the entire set of organizational, economic, 
technological, ecological, as well as political steps. If on macrolevel, the principles should 
take into account globalisation, liberalisation, diversification, decentralisation and 
modernisation trends, on the microlevel the more attention should be paid to the efficient use 
of energy resources. Stability and security in the energy supplies, as well as diversification of 
energy sources is not only economic, but also a big political task which ensures energy 
security of the country. When energy resources are equally regarded as a factor of sustainable 
development and integral part of international diplomacy, it requires to pursue prudent energy 
policy for domestic and regional stability. 
 
3.2. Perspectives for Resource-based Industrialization  
3.2.1. Mineral Base 
“If we take into account that the republic is forced to rely primarily on its own resources, it 
becomes clear why one needs first to develop the vital basic industries, such as the oil and gas 
complex, the energy sector, gold mining and non-ferrous metallurgy, communications and 
infrastructure...” 199  
In transition economies, reforms include substantial trade-offs between a variety of economic 
and social objectives, let alone political constraints and imperatives. To provide high and 
sustainable economic growth, and to raise country’s productive capacities, is a pre-requisite of 
social prosperity and political stability. The main task is how to provide desired efficiency of 
socio-economic and political measures in terms of consumption and capital formation, both in 
level and time; the composition of output by sector; the profit distribution; adequate size of 
investments, etc., i.e. all which could maintain the process of transition from one type of 
economic development to another which is qualitatively different and complex.  On the other 
hand, the process of industrialization will touch upon labor-intensive industries too, such as 
agriculture for instance, which could be inadequately perceived in societies traditionally used 
                                                 
199 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1995) „Iqtisodiy islohotlarni chuqurlashtirich yolida“. Extract from 
the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.384. 
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labor force, but suddenly shifted to the mechanization of production. It makes additional 
pressure on social aspects reflected in the more proportional distribution of income between 
the rich and poor people, between the rural and urban areas, the issues of migration from the 
rural areas to the cities, as well as rising unemployment. The question is how to make this 
process steady and at least social costs. 
Industrial policy became one of the important elements of domestic policy in Uzbekistan after 
independence. It was reflected in huge government investments into capital-intensive spheres, 
like the mining and energy sectors. Rich mineral base allowed to benefit from high rents at 
relatively short period of time, so that to keep state budget balance stable. Yet for Uzbekistan 
it appears to go a long torny way to complete this process. The case is also exacerbated by the 
existence of the old industries which were mainly developed in the Soviet era. Most of them 
represent basically the initial stages of extraction and manufacturing of raw materials, with 
small value added. Therefore, they contribute comparatively little to the whole national 
income. After ten years of independence, agriculture still gives twice as much in total GDP 
than industry. On the contrary, the share of industry decreased in comparison with 25% in the 
early 1990s to 14-15% during the last five-year period.200  
“We did not choose an easy way. At the early stages, we had to limit our domestic consumer 
market... Our domestic and borrowed funds were primarily earmarked for investments, for the 
import of new machine and technologies. We were increasing investments, rather than 
consumption... Today we have already got certain results... Difficult years of the hard work to 
lay the national-building and economic foundation of the country in order to provide national 
interests of the republic and its people, have already gone by”.201 
A particular emphasis was put on an import substitution strategy of structural transformation 
and modernisation of the economy through a number of large industrial projects in the past. 
Political implications of this process could be probably seen in that the state intended to the 
gradual elimination of the former, so called “Soviet structure” of the economy with agrarian 
and resource orientation which would remind somehow “Soviet Uzbekistan”.  
Equally, however, industrialization is a long-lasting and costly process which will require to 
take into account the comparative advantages of the country in terms of capital invested. The 
latter implies a group of human, natural and social capital in any particular country. Resource 
                                                 
200 IMF, State Committee on Statistics of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
201 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1997) Uzbekiston XXI asr bosagasida: havfsizlikka tahdid, 
barqarorlik shartlari va tarraqiyot kafolatlari. Extract from the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. 
Tashkent, 1998. p.571. 
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endowment is normally considered as an initial positive pre-requisite for industrialization 
comparing to the countries with a poor mineral resource base. But it is not the only important 
factor. For example, small economies with limited domestic market and poor natural 
resources, relatively unfavorable geographical location (far distance from the main world 
markets) and so forth, were facing difficulties with industrialization.202 On the contrary, the 
most striking thing is that the countries poorly endowed with mineral resources, turned out to 
be much more efficient with the use of the latter that subsequently had provided faster rates of 
economic development, while “rich countries” had faced lagged economic growth and huge 
dependency on primary exports (Persian Gulf states during the oil shocks in 1973-74 and 
1979, Venezuela, Nigeria, Cameroon). If industrialized countries did well with structural 
changes in consumption and less dependency on energy import, then, the biggest challenge of 
oil producing countries was high dependency on export of one resource – oil203 which caused 
stagnation and socio-economic problems in their economies after sharp decrease in oil prices 
in 1983-1986. That is why, the question whether resources are a curse or a blessing for a 
country still remains a source of disagreements between the economists worldwide. 
Mineral and natural resources of Uzbekistan would be in principle sufficient to secure its 
economic development in terms of an assumed economic autarky. From the outset, they are a 
topic of the official discourse on the highest level: 
“Uzbekistan possesses sufficient potential which would allow it to overcome its heavy legacy, 
overcome the crisis, achieve economic independence and then, join the most leading countries 
in the world. The rich natural resources endowment makes possible to change the entire 
domestic structure of the economy, and to develop those industries that provide comparative 
advantages of the country on the world markets. In terms of independence, land and 
resources in a line with economic, scientific and technological opportunities and intellectual 
potential, will serve as a basis for social progress and as a guarantee of people’s welfare”.204 
What might be political implications of these quotation? First and foremost, natural resources 
gave the government access to funds, to finance structural changes in the economy. Secondly, 
since commodities, such as gold and copper, could be easily sold on the world markets at any 
time, such a strategy provided the republic the possibility to find out its primary niche and 
                                                 
202 By „small economy“ in the given context, must be seen a country with relatively small economic potential 
measured on GDP, population and territory. For more details, see: R.M.Auty (1990) “Resource-based 
Industrialization: Sowing Oil in Eight Developing Countries”. Clarendon Press, Oxford 
203 Atif.R.Kubuasi (1984) „Oil, Industrialization and Development in the Arab Gulf States”. Sydney-New 
Hampshire 
204 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1993) Uzbekiston – bozor munosabatlariga o’tishning oziga xos 
yuli. Extract from the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.95. 
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what is more important, to set up much-needed contacts with foreign investors. Thirdly, the 
mineral resources were considered as a foundation to a stable development of domestic 
industries in terms of the socio-political and economic turmoil across the former Soviet space. 
And finally, it was probably a political sign to show that Uzbekistan had a sufficient potential, 
including mineral, to keep up its newly acquired sovereign development. 
 
Table 3.3. Assessment of Mineral and Energy Potential of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
 
Value of mineral reserves Assessment of mineral potential 
 Types of minerals Bln.USD % from total value 
 
Bln.USD % from total value 
Total 1025 100 3540 100 
incl.oil, gas, condensate 285 28,8 1164 32,9 
Coal 105 10,2 110 3,1 
Non-ferrous, rare, 
radioactive and black 
metals 
154 15,2 713 20,2 
Ceramic and glass 
materials 
66 6,4 89 2,5 
Refractory and other 
mining materials 
155 15,1 194 5,5 
Raw materials for 
production of fertilizers 
42 4,1 95 2,6 
Raw materials for chemical 
industry 
62 6,0 468 13,2 
Construction materials 146 14,2 707 20,0 
Source: Ekonomicheskiy Vestnik Uzbekistana, No1/2, 2001, p.44. 
 
Uzbekistan today is the 11th in the world by copper reserves, 7-8th – by uranium, as well as the 
third largest producer of natural gas in the CIS (after Russia and Turkmenistan). Following 
neighboring Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, the resources in Uzbekistan are huge enough to 
be influential in both domestic and regional terms (Annex 3.3). 
There are also the reserves of various non-ferrous metals like copper, lead, mercury, tungsten 
and others. It is interesting that while extracting copper, another 15 metals may be extracted 
similarly. They are gold, silver, molybdenum and some others. Endowment with copper and 
other by-metals are sufficient for 40-50 years, while lead and mercury – for 100 years. The 
main mines of these metals are located in the Tashkent region (Almalyk) and the Almalyk 
mining plant (with its mines Kalmakir and Dalneye) is not only the largest producer of copper 
and molybdenum, but also one of the largest plants in the republic at all. 
Lead and mercury are produced mainly in the Djizakh region (Uchquloch) and Surkhandarya 
(Hondaza). The peculiarity of extraction there is their high productivity, because one may 
obtain 99,99% of metals out of rock extracted. In addition, the rare metals like lithium, tellur, 
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selenium are necessary materials for the production of semi-conductors, solar batteries, 
thermogenerators, steel, some types of glass. 
The reserves and the use of phosphorites have another priority for Uzbekistan today for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the reserves are tremendous (from 100 mln.tonnes and even 
boundless depending on the mines: Qoraqat, Northern Djetitov – both Central Kyzylkum). 
Secondly, they can be used to have phosphor fertilizers. The latter could be primarily used 
domestically in agriculture. Thirdly, it can be widely exported. 
At the meantime Uzbekistan has huge reserves of kalium used in the production of fertilizers 
for domestic agriculture. Their mines are located in Tubakat (Kashkadarya) and 
Surkhandarya. They are expected to be available within the next 100 years. There are 
sufficient materials to produce calcium and caustic soda. 
3.2.2. What May It Bring ? 
Yet the question is whether the republic could benefit from its natural wealth and, if yes, to 
what extent. There have been already a number of debates on this issue. In particular, some 
researches conclude that it was cotton, energy and mining industries which had prevented 
abrupt decline of GDP at the early stages of post-Soviet development in comparison with 
other transition economies (see J.Zettlemeyer, 1999, R.M.Auty, 2000). Others (B.Islamov, 
2001) see this success not in natural resources, but in the policy measures which maintained 
stable investments into the real sector.  
Here there is a dilemma which many governments face. On the other hand, the government is 
the main owner and distributor of mineral resources, partly because they serve as a stable 
source of revenues. The government has a direct control over prices on energy resources that 
may mainly consist of excises levied on producers of energy resources. In such a way, these 
efforts are directed on the repression of inflation and provide an access to cheap energy 
resources for producers and residential consumers. On the other hand, however, such a policy 
runs a risk of both misallocation of the resources among economic sectors, and their irrational 
consumption. As mentioned above, the Soviet system was inclined to overconsumption of its 
energy resources. Specifically, in such a system with misleading incentives for consumer and 
producers of energy resources, government seeks to settle domestic resources bottle-necks 
with supply-side rather than demand side remedies. 
The role of fuel and energy complex has increased significantly during the years of 
Independence, from 6,5% in 1991 till 21% in 2001. The energy sphere played a key role in 
the realization of structural changes and pronounced investment projects. It is reasonable to 
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expect that in the middle-run the energy complex will keep its dominant influence on real 
sector development. 
It needs to be emphasized that in comparison with other countries, such as Russia, 
Turkmenistan, or Kazakhstan, for example, Uzbekistan is not heavily dependent on both 
export and import of energy resources, since most of the domestically produced resources are 
to meed local demand.205 Only 10% of the most tradable resource produced, natural gas, was 
exported in 1999-2001, while comparatively insignificant volumes of electricity were traded. 
At the same time the latest steps undertaken by the government may witness about the 
country’s intentions to expand its energy exports both in size and geography. In particular, 
Uzbekistan's gas export potential until recently was less than 7.8 bln.m3 a year, or 15% - 16% 
of production. There are plans to triple its export potential from 7.3 bln.m3 in 2002 to 20 
bln.m3 by 2020. It may come from higher gas sales both across the region, i.e. to Kazakhstan 
(1.45 bln.m3), Tajikistan (700 mln.m3) and Kyrgyzstan (1.2 bln.m3), as well as in the CIS and 
even farther. For instance, the country is studying the possibility of exporting natural gas to 
Afghanistan, China, and Eastern Europe. Exports are going to be increased by modernizing 
and expanding production capacity and adding new gas fields in the Bukhara-Khiva and 
Ustyurt regions.206 
Equally, however, although the role of the energy sector as a necessary pre-requisite for the 
future development is not compromised, long-run success is going to be also dependent on 
how these export earnings from physical assets will be absorbed and spent within the 
economy bringing social effects. In other words, sustainability and progress has much to do 
with the policy actions in a much broader context, embracing non-energy areas too. 
The world experience showed that in countries with rich energy resource base other 
manufacturing industries actually remained underdeveloped.207 The reasons for mounting 
inefficiencies could be found in a number of factors, such as waste of resources, poor 
incentives to energy saving, inadequate legal and institutional environment, etc. The 
preoccupation of governments with resource-based industrialization (RBI) and their snail-like 
progress in the creation of competitive non-resource based manufacturing provided an 
                                                 
205 In 2000, the share of energy products in total export was about 10% in comparison with Russia and 
Kazakhstan where total energy and mineral export may make up to three fourth of export earnings. 
206 Uzbekistan Hopes to Be Key Gas Exporter. http://www.interfax.com/com?item=Uzb&a=on&id=5762680. 
The energy exports is analyzed more closely in the Chapter IV. 
207 Such a trend is referred to as “Dutsch desease” reflecting the phenomenon of deindustrialisation or the 
contraction of the traditional manufacturing (exporting) sector due to the rapid expansion of the extractive sector 
of the economy. This took place in Holland when natural gas extraction grew rapidly which adversely affected 
other industries. For theoretical explanation of this phenomenon see in Micic M. International Trade. St.Martin 
Press, New York, 1998, pp.154-157. 
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inadequate industrial base from which to sustain economic growth and export diversification. 
These countries embarked on the way of industrialization during the period of oil shocks 
which allowed them to accumulate substantial volumes of foreign exchange at the expense of 
the oil consumer in oil-importing countries. Their experience shows that those (Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Cameroon) who prudently pushed the development of both oil based and non-oil 
based industries (agriculture) could achieve more sustainable economic growth after the 
decline of energy prices in the mid-1980s. Compared to them, others (Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, 
or Venezuela) to a different extent failed in ensuring stable manufacturing development.208 
Some researches discovered that main factors of success in RBI are secured by resource 
endowment, physical capital, institutional infrastructure, and the government policy.209 For 
such countries, the average distribution of capital consists of 60% from natural capital 
(resources endowment), 20% - human capital, 20% - social infrastructure. A study of 
investment potential in developing countries demonstrated that all resource-based industries, 
except wood products, have capital-labor ratios three to ten times the average for all indutries 
combined, and labor coefficients 33% to 80% below the average. This suggests that such 
industries are highly capital-intensive and do not need much labor force.210 
In past years Uzbekistan’s official policy was dominated by the development of a number of 
huge, capital-intensive projects in fuel and energy complex. In terms of shortage of 
government funds, the state redistributed national income among the main sectors of 
economy, primarily from labor-intensive agriculture to capital-intensive industry. However, 
given the current endowment with more than sufficient labor force, the trend which most 
probably will retain in the foreseeable future, it is also important to enhance labor-intensive 
projects related to palpable social and economic effects. It necessiates a gradual move from 
capital-intensive energy-related sectors to the development of manufacturing industries. The 
latter include first of all light and food industry which in turn are closely related to the 
agricultural sector where the main labor force is concentrated. It is expected that the share of 
these industries will increase in the middle-run. According to estimates, further on these 
spheres could take almost a half of the total industrial structure. Correspondingly, the share of 
energy complex will tend to decrease by two times compared to 2001, and is supposed to 
reach 10%. 
                                                 
208 R.M.Auty (1990) “Resource-based Industrialization: Sowing Oil in Eight Developing Countries”. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford. p.215. 
209 R.M.Auty „The IMF Model and Resource-Abundant Transition Economies: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan“. 
Working Paper 169, November 1999. 
210 Atif.R.Kubuasi (1984) „Oil, Industrialization and Development in the Arab Gulf States. Sydney-New 
Hampshire 
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Such a shift in priorities from capital-intensive to labor-intensive industries will be in line 
with the tasks to secure the efficient use of domestic resources. This comparative advantage of 
Uzbekistan would allow the encouragement and support of structural reforms in the 
agricultural sector, as well as to keep up necessary incentives for the agro-related industries. 
The stable development of labor-intensive industries could cushion the potential difficulties of 
transition period, stimulate more employment, raise income and its more balanced distribution 
among economic sectors. As a whole, this economic basis would strengthen the pillars of 
social stability in society. In these conditions, it becomes important to have a closer look at 
the possibilities and constraints of a progress through a prism of specific development models.  
 
3.3. Possible Scenarios of Development 
Model 1 suggests that the mining and energy sectors would remain top priority on the 
domestic development agenda due to a number of reasons. Firstly, Uzbekistan is well 
endowed with mineral and energy resources for such development. Secondly, these sectors 
are critical in earning foreign exchange which could be subsequently used by the state in 
pushing ahead various import substitution industrial projects, as well as undertaking social 
programmes. Thirdly, the sectors are essential in terms of national security, since the republic 
itself is a large consumer of these resources which would be necessary to ensure economic 
growth. The main feature of this model is therefore based on the retention of a strong 
government control over the aforementioned sectors through a number of instruments (fiscal, 
monetary, trade, investment, legislation). Moreover, since both mining and energy are capital 
intensive, the state policy is going to remain the main intermediary to negotiate all investment 
projects between foreign investors and domestic beneficiaries. Thus, political and economic 
tasks of the government are expected to follow a self-sufficiency pattern in key inputs, which 
will have an impact on the structure of export and GDP, and finally strengthen country’s 
dependency on a couple of staples in the long-run. 
Model 2 would foresee the targeted development of the agricultural sector and 
entrepreneurship, basically small and medium-size business (SMB). Unlike the former 
scenario which requires huge financial injections, the market reforms are going to start with 
the industries of lower capital intensity, such as agriculture, trade, and services. The basic 
principles of this model are two-pronged: to restrict state interference with domestic processes 
on the one hand, and to enhance the accumulation of private capital for future industrialisation 
in a larger scale, on the other hand. The first principle is mainly reflected in the simplification 
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of tax legislation and reduction of tax burden in domestic economy; liberalisation of foreign 
economic activity; the enhancement of competitive environment; the measures on export 
expansion, etc. If these are pursued properly, it is expected to reinforce the implementation of 
the second principle.  
The main advantages of the given model are in that would require less investments, but could 
be realized within a relatively short timespan, since private sector is expected to react rapidly 
to the reforms launched by the government. On the other hand, the legalization of a significant 
part of the shadow economy would add to the sustainability of the mobilisation of investment 
resources and to a confidence building process between private sector and state agencies. As 
the next step, the expansion of manufacturing industries and large-sacle industrialisation 
processes are expected to be intensified basically due to investments made by private sector in 
order to sustain the strengthened competition both on domestic and world markets. 
Model 3 supposes that like in the past, state policy would continue to back up only a few 
largest domestic industrial companies which are going to have a privileged access to market 
resources. Thus the interrelations between state and these companies are very similar to those 
in large TNC, which take place between general office and different company’s units. 
Decisions are made according to a hierarchy, transactions between the government (general 
office) and selected industries (subunits) are internalised (or “quasi”-internalised) through an 
organisational chain from government via financial intermediary to a selected branches or 
firms, and the activities of the “subunits” would be monitored and coordinated by bureaucrats 
(salaried government employees) which otherwise would be done indirectly through a price 
mechanism. The state support in the given case is mainly provided with the purpose of 
improving the structure and efficiency of national export, which, as a rule, would consist of 
the products of these companies. At the same time, a great deal of small firms will also benefit 
by delivering various spare parts, raw products, etc. for the head companies. If these efforts 
succeed, one may expect long-term benefits in terms of improved exports structure, better 
competitiveness, sustainable balance of payments and the possibility to put through with the 
desired higher level of industrialisation.  
 
3.4. Between Constraints and Opportunities 
None of the aforementioned models, however, could dominate national development due to a 
number of the objective constraints. Although being capital-intensive, the first model of a 
commodity orientation is a more easily negotiable area for the inflow of foreign investors, due 
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to high returns per capital invested within a short period. In addition, the liquid staples could 
be easily sold on the world markets at any time. Yet equally, this approach is inconsistent and 
short-sighted in terms of the rapid exhaustion of domestic opportunities after it has been 
kickstarted. The question is also quite relevant with regard to the efficiency in using the 
natural resource base which most probably may simply become a second-background issue in 
this case. Moreover, the impact of exogenous factors, such as the volatility of prices in the 
world commodities markets, high costs of foreign borrowings in coupe with the running-out 
capacities of the mining and energy sectors, is huge. Consequently, domestic policy becomes 
fully related to the influence of external factors to determine the fate and consequences of 
domestic reforms and national welfare. 
Since Uzbekistan is a country with an explicit labor excess, the development of labor-
intensive industries would have good prospects foreseen by Model 2. The majority of 
population has already private agricultural plots and historically and traditionally is linked to 
agriculture as the main source of their income. Moreover, their agricultural output may be 
demanded not only on domestic market, but also beyond national borders, both in Central 
Asia and in the CIS. The established network of domestic light industry also creates pre-
requisites for the intensification of inter-sector supply schemes from which both sides could 
benefit. This could make local population as the primary beneficiary from growing income 
and job opportunities. Then private investments into manufacturing would provide some 
diversification of export structure with real steps towards the output of more finished goods 
contributing to the evolutionary industrialisation of the country. Another advantage is in that 
the republic may avoid substantial external borrowings reducing the risks of drowning in 
unsustainable foreign debts problems. Yet the most important assumption is that the 
aforementioned processes may occur provided that appropriate policy measures and 
environment would be set up. The latter will obviously a time-consuming process with the 
necessity of a complex approach to the solution of the contemporary problems in the republic.  
The most time-consuming and costly developments are expected to take place within the 
Model of Industrial Development (Model 3). Although the Korean experience could serve as 
a pertinent case,211 Uzbekistan’s position, however, is challenged by some domestic 
                                                 
211 This idea was especially popular in Uzbekistan in the mid-1990s, when the South Korea’s experience was 
seen as a successful pattern to pursue domestic industrialisation. The case of Korea was referred as to reinforce a 
central role of state in pursuing the reforms. However, South Korea’s success in this particular case was mostly 
ensured by drastic measures on the structural reforms in the real sector through massive privatization of large-
scale enterprises. In other words, the fact that these enterprises had become private and thus could negotiate on 
an independent footing the strategy of target support by the Korean government. And the central role of the 
Korean government was in skillful coordinating of the activities of the main state institutions, and appropriate 
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constraints. First and foremost, since domestic resources are limited, this scenario’s viability 
should be considered in relation to the external sources of sustainable funding. There are two 
possible ways in this regard: either to borrow on the world capital markets on commercial 
terms, or promote sustainable foreign capital inflows, in particular FDI, in priority areas of the 
local economy. As the first way is very costly and exerts a serious pressure, both economic 
and political, on modern and future generations, the second alternative if succeeded is much 
more preferable. But the dilemma for the state is in that on the one hand, the policy intends to 
improve ownership and management in large-scale industrial enterprises through 
incorporatisation and privatisation, but understandably will retain its majority stake in equity 
capital for strategic and national security reasons. On the other hand, the state will need 
foreign capital to support its privatisation process and subsequently contribute to the 
industrialisation process too. Yet for foreign capital, investments into exploration and 
development of mineral base is most probably a more attractive deal than in those units whose 
profits could be a matter of much longer run. Even when decisions in favor of the non-mining 
and non-energy enterprises have been made, the majority stake in overtaking of large scale 
local enterprises may become a critical issue for foreign capital.  
This will thus require from the government to undertake some crucial measures on the 
elimination of administrative barriers, the simplification of organizational procedures and gain 
the sufficient creditworthy in order FDI to take more active part in the domestic structural 
reforms, including large-scale privatization and industrialisation initiatives in years to come. 
Transparency, sustainability and irreversibility of the government actions towards better 
business environment through a set of adequate foreign exchange policy, foreign trade 
reforms, simplification of customs procedures and creation of favorable investment climate 
are expected to be essential in this model. In other words, the state has to balance between the 
intensification of multi-edged reforms on privatisation, modernisation, improvement in 
financial situation in industries, and the enhancement of foreign capital to mitigate limited 
financial opportunities for the implementation of such measures. 
It is worth noting that the aforementioned models are different in that they concern their 
specific elements, such as the role of the government, private sector, both domestic and 
                                                                                                                                                        
adjusting a set of macroeconomic tools, such tax, budget, monetary, investment and foreign economic policies 
for the common goal. This common goal was the creation of effective incentives for modernization in different 
industries, promotion of their products in external markets. At the same time, one developed financial mediation, 
financial and industrial groups, which served as the main intermediates for capital flows from the state to private 
sector playing the role of classical price mechanism in a market economy. The point of some authors about the 
Korean economic success also emphasizes strong land reform and upgrading of knowledge which had crucial 
role in complementing subsequently general government policies. See more: Chung H.Lee The Economic 
Transformation of South Korea: Lessons for the Transition Economies, OECD, 1995. 
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foreign, social impact, investment priorities, policy tools, etc. But it does not necessarily mean 
that they may not overlap or even follow each other. On the contrary, the models or some 
elements may be intertwined and reflect a particular stage of the development. For example, 
an emphasis on the export-oriented industrial development (Model 3) may take place 
simultaneously with the improvement of conditions for agricultural and entrepreneurship 
development (Model 2) which would lead to the general improvement of business climate. 
The question only whether the resources, both domestic and foreign, may be available on the 
sustainable basis. Besides, much will depend on how well the long-run benefits in the most 
progressive Model 3 could be perceived by the society comparing to a more direct impact 
from the implementation of Model 2.  
 
3.5. Summary 
During the Soviet era huge mineral resources were considered as a sufficient argument to 
develop in Uzbekistan some mining and processing industries. All the resources were 
underpriced allowing an access to high rents of relatively cheap local mineral resources. After 
the independence in 1990s, the government relied on natural base not only as a tools to 
undertake structural reforms to overcome one-sided resource specialization. The government 
considered its resource potential as a guarantee for sustainable economic growth in the future 
which could bring social welfare, national prosperity and political stability. Ultimately 
resources were also believed to be both political and economic tool in reinforcing just 
acquired national independence and exerting, on its basis, some efforts for sustainable 
cooperation with similar states in the region.  
In sovereign Uzbekistan energy policy began to play an important role in trying to balance 
between capital-intensive industrialization policy and domestic stabilization. The well-known 
and widespread distortions of prices in an input-output scheme in the former Soviet system 
inhibited a sound and reasonable distribution of resources among the economic sectors. 
Therefore, national energy policy was twofold by favoring import-substitution strategy. On 
the one hand, it sought to secure stable energy supplies for domestic demand in industry, but 
also implementing socially-oriented projects through wider access to energy for population. 
On the other hand, strategic task, especially at the outset of independence was reflected in 
attempts to minimize a potential of spreading socio-political and economic destabilisation 
from the other republics. Both these tasks were seen as necessary conditions  to reinforce 
political independence of the country. 
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At the same time, the republic had to pay high price to achieve these goals. The pressure on 
the country in general and its energy sector in particular could come from not only the 
changed economic interrelations, necessity of reforms in the management system, 
accumulated foreign debts as a result of the implementation of large-scale and costly import-
substitution energy projects, etc. The issue may partly concern a set of financial and legal 
instruments in government policy itself too, which specifically are: 
o financial destabilisation in the energy complex; 
o high technological costs and weak incentives to innovations; 
o disproportions between prices on various types of energy and oil resources, as well as 
between energy resources and other goods and commodities; 
o fiscal orientation of tax policy; 
o overconsumption of energy resources leading to high energy and material intensity in 
GDP. 
In this regard, the national energy strategy should foresee stability and security in supplies of 
energy in the future. Prices should promote efficiency in production and energy-saving. From 
the social point of view, it is crucial to take into account minimum privileges provided by 
state to the needs of those social groups who will really need some government support. 
Politically, the national energy strategy should stem from the national interests of Uzbekistan 
and contribute to its energy security. For these purposes, a combination of organizational, 
economic, political, technological, ecological steps will be required, including: 
 forecast and formation of energy demand taking into account energy-saving activities; 
 development of the small-scale energy sector, i.e. construction of thermal ES of small 
capacities, similarly improving generating capacities; 
 prudent regional energy policy between regions having an excess in energy and those with 
energy-shortages; 
 reasonable technological and ecological policy; 
 optimization of price and fiscal and investment policies; 
 gradual demonopolisation and incorporation of the energy sector; 
 the enhancement of foreign investments on the basis of bi- and multilateral energy 
cooperation on the interstate, regional, and interregional levels. 
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The world experience showed that in countries with rich energy resource base other 
manufacturing industries actually remained underdeveloped. Although the role of the energy 
sector as a necessary pre-requisite for the future development is not compromised, long-run 
success is going to be also dependent on how these export earnings from physical assets will 
be absorbed and spent within the economy bringing social effects. In other words, 
sustainability and progress has much to do with the policy actions in a much broader context, 
embracing non-energy areas too. The latter include first of all light and food industry which in 
turn are closely related to the agricultural sector where the main labor force is concentrated. 
Such a shift in priorities from capital-intensive to labor-intensive industries will be in line 
with the tasks to secure the efficient use of domestic resources. This comparative advantage of 
Uzbekistan would allow the encouragement and support of structural reforms in the 
agricultural sector, as well as to keep up necessary incentives for agro-related industries. The 
stable development of labor-intensive industries could cushion the potential difficulties of 
transition period, stimulate more employment, raise income and its more balanced distribution 
among economic sectors. As a whole, such an economic basis would strengthen the pillars of 
social stability in society. 
Generally speaking, Uzbekistan’s sustainable development could be analysed within various 
development models which are not new in international practice. Among others, the following 
could stem from: 1) an emphasis on the development of the mining and energy sectors 
through the expansion of liquid commodities exports; 2) the targeted development of the 
agricultural sector and entrepreneurship; 3) policy-led efforts on the protection and support of 
the large-scale corporate interests, both in domestic and foreign markets. The realization of 
each of the models will depend on local demographic, technological, financial, ecological and 
foreign constraints, as well as at the particular stage of the reforms in each single area, both in 
the domestic and external sector. Not at least, this is going to be connected to regional 
developments too, including regional trade in energy and the related products, improvements 
in infrastructure, structural reforms, common investment strategy, and export expansion, with 
particular geopolitical and geoeconomic implications. But this is to anticipate the following 
chapter which will examine all the aforementioned issues. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE ENERGY ISSUE IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION 
4.1. Energy Potential of the Region 
“A number of various political, economic, military, transport and ecological problems are 
piled up in the Central Asian region. If we take this into consideration, the only appropriate 
principle to ensure consequent and sustainable development of the whole region today lies in 
preserving and supporting domestic and foreign balance. Only in case of keeping the geo-
strategic balance and stability in the region one may resolve these challenges. In its turn, it 
may serve as a significant contribution to the solution of common security issues”.212 
 
The developments in post Soviet Central Asia have already ranked among the hottest and 
controversial topics in the discussions on international relations for the last time, though only 
as much as one and a half decade ago the countries from the region were known little to the 
world community.  
The food for such debates may partly come from the speculations over the amounts of natural 
reserves both actual213, and those which may be explored in the future. In Western literature, 
Central Asia is included in the so called “Caspian basin”, with Caucasus. But only two 
countries of Central Asia (Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) have direct access to the Caspian 
sea. The other republics (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tadjikistan) have little to do, neither 
geographically nor legally, with its huge resources. However, due to socio-political and 
economic developments in the last years the Central Asian region has come under the 
spotlight of international attention. As the words of a British geographer H.Mackinder come 
on the mind who particularly noted: “The might of this wide region stems from the vast 
amounts of wheat, cotton, energy resources, metals, and population which enable the region to 
develop, though being left much far away from the oceanic trade”.214  
Central Asia possesses a significant and diversified energy base, although the resources are 
unevenly spread throughout the region.215 Apart from vast volumes of proven recoverable 
                                                 
212 Translated by the author from Karimov I. (1997) O’zbekiston XXI asr bo’saga’asida: xavfsizlikka tahdid, 
barqarorlik shartlari va taraqqiyot kafolatlari. Collection of works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 
1998, p.422. 
213 In view of wide range of estimates, it is hard to show genuine natural and energy potential of Central Asian 
countries. All figures should be considered as approximate and subject to change. 
214 Mackinder H. The Geographical Pivot of History, The Geographical Magazine 23/4 (1904). Translated by 
the author from the reference in Alimov R.M., Arifkhanov Sh.R., Rizaev S.R., Tolipov F.F. (2002) Tsentralnaya 
Aziya: Geoekonomika, Geopolitika, Bezopasnost. (Central Asia: Geoeconomics, Geopolitics, Security), 
Tashkent. p.87 
215 The figures, as to resource potential of the region are actually confusing due to a variety of estimates. We try to operate 
with some modest figures, though they still remain impressive (Annex 3). For example, according to US Energy Information 
Administration, proven oil reserves in Kazakhstan may range between 9 and 17 bln.barrels with future potential of 92 
bln.barrels; gas 65 and 88,3 trln.cubic feet, respectively. For Turkmenistan: up to current 1,7 bln.barrels of oil, with potential 
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hydrocarbon reserves, the region has huge hydro-power capacity, large deposits of uranium, 
and favourable conditions for the development of non-conventional renewable energy (Annex 
4.1a). 
The ratio between the natural resource potential and the volume of mined/generated energy 
indicates the time of availability for a particular resource in a country or the whole region 
(self-sufficiency). In 1998, this indicator for proven recoverable coal reserves stood at more 
than 600 years; for oil, 65 years, and for natural gas, nearly 75 years.216 But these figures may 
be seen as conditional and subject to change regularly, especially after a number of oil and gas 
projects in the Caspian area, such as Eastern Kashagan, Karachaganak of Kazakhstan, the 
Ustyurt region in Uzbekistan, Dauletabad in Turkmenistan are discovered and launched with 
the help of foreign investments.  
One needs to be careful in treating estimates of this kind, as they could embrace some degree 
of both objectivism and subjectivism. On the one hand, it is obvious that with time gone by, 
such figures are destined to reconsideration, since new fields are discovered as the volume 
and geography of research and exploration works tend to expand in the region. Yet, the level 
of knowledge about the true resource base leaves much to be desired, due to lack of funds for 
conducting research projects.  
On the other hand, there could be some differences of a methodological nature. However, the 
aforementioned two explanations may not be sufficient to make the whole picture clear. 
Speaking broadly, it could be supposed that these estimates would also be a result of long-run 
geopolitical and strategic interests, both domestic and external, as an opportunity to secure 
political support of far-going economic concerns. If domestically, it is the government itself 
which is interested in showing bigger resources potential to encourage foreign investments; 
then, from the “outside” these heightened interests are expressed by influential multinational 
corporations majoring in extraction and development of profitable energy resource base 
across the globe. Moreover, in recent years such corporative interests are more often merged 
with the national political priorities that encourages us to consider them in a close interaction. 
From this point of view, Central Asia, a specific region located on the cross-roads of regional 
                                                                                                                                                        
of another 38 bln.barrels, and gas 71 and 159 trln.cubic feet, respectively; Uzbekistan’s current oil 0,6 bln.barrels with 
potential of 2 bln., and gas of 66 trln.cubic feet with potential of 35 trln.cubic feet, respectively. The French estimates say 
about 70-250 bln.barrels of oil reserves;, the British showed more restrained 28 bln.barrels of oil and 243 trln.cubic feets of 
gas; Russian experts believe that there are 7 to 8 bln.tonnes of oil and 5 trln.m3 of gas in the whole Caspian region. Sources: 
Energy Information Administration http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspstats.html. See also: Testimony by John 
J.Maresca, Vice President of UNOCAL Corporation (USA) to House Committee on Asia and the Pasific. 12 February 1998, 
Washington D.C. See also: Babak V. Kazakh Oil: Economic Booster or Dead Weight? Central Asia and Caucasus, 2001; 
Patridge D. Central Asia: How Vast are the Riches in the Caspian?. RFE/RL, London, 16 July 1998 
216 Diagnostic Report on Energy Resources in Central Asia, http://centrasia.cintech.ru/energy-eng.pdf 
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and international interests on the entire Euro-Asian continent, could be considered as a target 
of international expansion on different levels. 
The region also has huge hydroenergy potential. Estimates show that just over 10% of the 
hydropotential are currently utilised. Consequently, it gives an ample opportunity to meet the 
growing demand of the region for electric power through the use of relatively cheap hydro-
power resources, provided this does not conflict with the irrigation needs of the region's 
countries. 
Geographically an uneven distribution of energy resources could represent the following 
picture: a large part of proven recoverable coal and oil reserves is found in Kazakhstan, while 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the best endowed in hydropower, with natural gas reserves 
more evenly divided between Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Annex 4.1b). 
The geographical structure of fuel and energy production and consumption in Central Asia 
shows that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are to account for more than 80% of the total 
production and consumption each, with Kazakhstan being the largest producer of primary 
energy in the region (oil and coal), and Uzbekistan topping the list of consumers (oil, gas and 
electricity, Annex 4.2).  
Availability and accessibility of certain categories of primary energy in Central Asian 
countries have largely determined their consumption structure. Thus, Kazakhstan also mostly 
consumes coal, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - hydro-power, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - 
oil and natural gas. Comparative data on consumption structure for the whole region by type 
of primary energy resource is shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1. Structure of Regional Energy Consumption, % 
 
 1992 1999 2002* 
Coal 29.5 22.3   23.3 
Oil and oil 
products 
29.8 21.3   19.4 
Natural gas 37.9 53.1 56 
Hydro power 2.2 3 3 
Net import 0.6 0.3 -1.7 
Source: Diagnostic Report on Energy Resources in Central Asia; * calculations based on IEA statistics 
 
Natural gas accounts for more than a half of total energy consumption in Central Asia, with 
two thirds of it consumed by Uzbekistan. Coal comes second, with more than 90% consumed 
in Kazakhstan. The region's hydroelectric energy resources are concentrated in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan which produce nearly two thirds of all hydropower. In addition, there are some 
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differences in energy consumption by country and the type of energy resource. For instance, 
in Kazakhstan, petroleum products are mostly consumed by industrial enterprises, whereas in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan the main share of consumption falls to transport. 
Coal is the basic fuel used by power stations in Kazakhstan, accounting for over 70% of the 
total power generation. The electric power sector in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is based on 
hydropower, while natural gas is the main input in the electric power stations of Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. Industry and public are the main consumers of electric power in the region. 
Let us now touch upon the issue of energy interdependence between the republics. This factor 
is crucial, since it had an influence on inter-state relations in the past and will obviously 
sustain in the future. The logic of regional cooperation is also much determined by this factor. 
“...In Central Asia Uzbekistan takes a central place from the point of view of geopolitical 
location, and the republic has thus a potential to provide equality and balance of powers, as 
well as to create a basis for cooperation in the region. The territory with existing and 
potential reserves of natural resources reinforces its particular position on the political and 
economic map of the world”.217 
“Hydroenergy capacities in the republic are not used to a full extent. The fuel and energy 
complex of Uzbekistan not only meets the increased domestic demand for energy resources. 
Since many years Uzbekistan has been supplying its natural gas to other countries too”.218 
Uzbekistan is the only republic which has borders with all the republics of the region. If on 
the one hand, the republic could serve as a hub of intraregional relations, on the other hand the 
country itself becomes largely dependent on its neighbors. Uzbekistan has been the largest gas 
producer in the region in the last years which allowed for some export to be available to the 
neighbor states: Kazakhstan, 900 mln. – 1.2 bln.m3, Kyrgyzstan - 1.1 bln.m3, and Tajikistan 
500 mln.m3 on average219 (Table 4.2.). Gas is mainly supplied through the Soviet-time 
Tashkent-Bishkek-Almaty gas pipeline (capacity almost 22 bln.m3) which runs through 
northern Kyrgyzstan to Southern Kazakhstan, and Gazli-Shimkent pipeline (13 bln.m3) 
(Annex 4.3).  
 
 
                                                 
217 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1997) Uzbekiston XXI asr bosagasida: havfsizlikka tahdid, 
barqarorlik shartlari va tarraqiyot kafolatlari. Extract from the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. 
Tashkent, 1998. p.600. The President’s book contains a specific chapter elucidating the natural resource potential 
of the republic. 
218 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1993) Uzbekiston – bozor munosabatlariga otishning oziga xos 
yuli. Extract from the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. p.95. 
219 Uzbekistan Hopes to Be Key Gas Exporter. http://www.interfax.com/com?item=Uzb&a=on&id=5762680 
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Table 4.2. Major Gas Export Markets of Uzbekistan 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 Mln. 
m3 
Share, 
% 
Mln. 
m3 
Share,
% 
 
Mln. 
m3 
Share,
% 
Mln. 
m3 
Share,
% 
Mln. 
m3 
Share, 
% 
Mln. 
m3 
Share,
% 
Kyrgyzstan 1039 17 934 12 1158 31 598 13 775 14 504 12 
Kazakhstan 523 8 1829 23 1831 49 1398 31 1355 24 945 22 
Tajikistan 563 9 882 11 755 20 747 16 729 13 416 10 
Ukraine 4037 66 4253 54 - 0 1788 39 2759 49 2463 57 
Total 6236 100 7971 100 3744 100 4530 100 5618 100 4328 100 
 
Source: Uzbekistan. Energy Sector: Issues, Analysis, and an Agenda for Reform. World Bank, June 2003. p.26. 
 
Kyrgyzstan has relatively small gas reserves, totally estimated at about 5,5 bln.m3. Since 
Independence, domestic gas production declined from 0,097 bln.m3 in 1992 to 0,014 bln.m3 in 
2000. As a result, the northern territories of Kyrgyzstan are dependent on natural gas imports 
from Uzbekistan, while Turkmenistan supplies gas to the Southern part of the country.220 
Regardless of its huge gas reserves, the gas sector of Kazakhstan remains underdeveloped. 
Especially, the sector’s development is hampered by lack of infrastructure. While deposits are 
mainly located in the western part of the country, the large consumer areas are located in the 
north and south. Although the structure of energy consumption is quite contrary to that of 
Uzbekistan (with 75% of coal and only about 15% for gas), lack of internal routes connecting 
the gas fields in the west to industrial and residential consumers in Almaty, Djambul and 
Shymkent, made some regions strongly dependent on Uzbekistan’s gas supplies. With 2000, 
natural gas consumption of more than 13 bln.m3, Kazakhstan imports about a third of its 
natural gas needs, mainly from Uzbekistan and Russia. 
Uzbekistan is the largest part of the Central Asia Power System (CAPS) which was developed 
in Soviet times and completed in 1991. Uzbekistan generates 51% of the total power in 
CAPS, Tadjikistan – 15%, Kyrgyzstan – 14%, Turkmenistan – 11%, Kazakhstan – 9%.221 The 
Unified Dispatch Center (UDC) is located in Tashkent and responsible for maintaining the 
balanced and synchronized operation of the power transsmission and distribution systems of 
the five Central Asian republics. Yet, an ad-hoc inter-state Central Asia Power System 
Council was set up in the early 2000 consisting of the local officials from respective energy 
bodies in each country. A number of sessions have been already held whose main tasks was to 
tackle to the general coordination of power energy consumption and production throughout 
the region via sustainable supply and transmission of energy between energy-rich and energy-
                                                 
220 Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html 
221 Mavlany J. The Energy Sector of Uzbekistan. Business Information Service for NIS, 18 June, 2001 
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poor regions.222 In addition, it was confessed that the development of adequate legislative 
documents to enhance the role of this new organ in addressing energy problems across the 
region. Since both the CAPS and UDS are currently in need of upgrading and modernisation 
to avoid electricity losses, it would also require close interaction on the regional level to 
attract foreign assistance. Recently, the Asian Development Bank approved $600000 project 
for modernisation of electricity system in Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan which is expected to 
increase energy efficiency in the entire Central Asian energy system.223  
Uzbekistan is an exporter of electricity in Central Asia, though it also imports electricity for 
domestic needs. In 2002, Uzbekistan produced more than 49 bln.KWh of electricity, of which 
about 1 bln.kWh was exported to Tadjikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. But it is the small 
countries Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan which possess untapped hydropower potential, 10% of 
which is only used so far. Gas and electricity exports to Kyrgyzstan in winter help Uzbekistan 
obtain excessive water and electricity from Kyrgyzstan in summer periods. The given process 
is strongly linked to Intergovernmental Irrigation Agreements between the two countries 
concluded regularly on bilateral basis. 
Uzbekistan, in turn, is dependent on the other republics too in that it concerns their 
infrastructure facilities. The republic has to cross the neighboring countries, so that to keep up 
its exports and imports activities. There are the two pipelines - Central Asia-Center and 
Bukhara-Ural going back in Soviet times. The first of them brings natural gas from southern 
Uzbekistan and goes to North-Western direction through the territory of Western Kazakhstan, 
and further to the north finally joining the Russian pipeline system. The second pipeline is 
used little. Both pipelines are in poor state and need modernisation. Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan have already invested into the modernisation of their own parts, since both of 
them express keen interests in getting it restored. For Turkmenistan, it is almost the only 
opportunity to maintain its high gas export level, while Kazakhstan is well positioned to rely 
upon transit fees.224  
In turn, Uzbekistan supplies gas to Tadjikistan partly as a fee for both rail transit services and 
the use of a transit pipeline which crosses the Leninabad region in northern Tadjikistan and 
links Uzbekistan’s regions in Ferghana Valley with its Bukhara natural gas fields in the south 
                                                 
222 Press Release of Kazakhstan Elictricity Grid Operating Company On the Results of the Central Asian  
Integrated Power Grid Council 45th Session of 13 May 2002. 
http://www.kegoc.kz/index.php3?numberPage=11&lang=eng&parent_id=1089876325 
223 Asian Bank to Support Uzbek Government’s Energy Saving Policy. www.uzreport.com. 13 March 2003 
224 According to some data, Kazakhstan’s benefits from such fees may run up to $400 mln. per year. Energy 
Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html 
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and west.225 Therefore, exports advantages to supply energy resources within the region are 
intertwined and balanced with the relatively unfavorable geographical location and 
dependency of Uzbekistan on regional infrastructure to reach the third countries. Therefore, it 
is a full set of political and economic factors, both domestic and regional, which could 
determine the essence of advantages/disadvantages of any state in the regional scale. 
 
4.2. Common Development Challenges 
The republics of Central Asia consider their resources as a blessing which could provide 
necessary conditions for sustainable economic growth, efficient market-oriented reforms, 
social welfare and comprehensive integration into the world community. But the most period 
of the post-independent development was marked by general decline in both production and 
consumption of various types of energy resources. The main factors explaining those trends 
could include the whole set of macroeconomic, structural, political and geographical factors.  
First and foremost, all the states had to survive severe industrial falls resulted finally in the 
general economic downturn which reduced solvent demand for energy, especially strong in 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The break-up of long-standing economic links including in the 
power industry of individual countries and limited access to foreign markets are also among 
the factors included in the given group. The latter is closely correlated with the specific 
geographical situation of the countries lacked the opportunity to bring their products to the 
world markets.  
In addition to uncertainties in the first years of independent development in using the 
traditional route to reach world markets through Russia which had plunged into domestic 
socio-political and economic turbulences, all other attempts, including those to preserve a 
common economic space in the CIS were mostly ineffective. Besides, new priorities in the 
Russian policy to avoid a burden of the former peripheries affected the whole aspects of 
bilateral relations, further reinforcing centrifugal trends across the entire post Soviet space. 
 In addition, some developments in national policy of the regional states were also the result 
of the external and internal factors. Even among relatively rich republics, resource distribution 
and their contribution to national income was quite controversial. Turkmenistan has the 
second-largest natural gas reserves in the CIS. However, due to declared economic and 
                                                 
225 According to data available, out of the total gas supplies to Tadjikistan, about 200 mln.m3 cover payments for 
rail services, and 160 mln.m3 for pipeline tranzit. See: Uzbekistan. Energy Sector: Issues, Analysis, and an 
Agenda for Reform. World Bank, June 2003.  
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political neutrality, which gradually transformed into self-isolation, the republic did little well 
with domestic reforms.226 The economic growth was largely explained by huge exports of 
primary natural gas export, but not with qualitative changes in the economy. According to 
official data, the share of energy in total exports for the last years has been not less than 80%, 
the trend which is seemingly to sustain in the near future.227  
In the past decade, the issues of energy supplies from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan were hindered by a number of difficulties. In particular, the difficulties are related 
to water issue, namely for some countries water is a source of energy (Tadjikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan), while for the others it is a vital element in agricultural production (Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan). Lack of water resources and natural disasters significantly pre-determine the 
issue of energy exchanges in the region. As a result, pricing of energy exports has lost much 
of its economic meaning, frequently being inconsistent and politicized and subsequently 
exacerbating the situation.228 Although mutual supplies of energy among countries were 
mostly based on intergovernmental agreements, they were repeatedly violated, mainly for 
economic reasons, but also due to drought seasons. In the last years, because of disagreements 
over prices and the debt of Kyrgyzstan for the gas received, the regional states were seeking 
opportunities for extra gas supplies. Thus, Kyrgyzstan wanted some supplies from Russia, 
while Kazakhstan intended to develop its own Southern gas fields (Amangeldy and Airyktau) 
to meet domestic demands. By doing so, Kazakhstan plans to be independent from 
Uzbekistan’s gas supplies by 2005.229 It seeks for opportunities and investment to reconstruct 
existing, as well as to build new electricity lines, especially in electricity deficit Southern 
areas making dependency on electricity imports less significant.  
However, though these efforts may have been driven by national priority and security 
concerns, it is going to contribute little to regional energy developments in the longer run. In 
particular, Russia may express weak interests in the gas projects in Kyrgyzstan which because 
of its mounting external debts could hardly guarantee stable payments for the supplied gas. In 
                                                 
226 Pomfret R., Anderson K.H. (1997) Uzbekistan: Welfare Impact of Slow Transition. Working Paper No 135, 
World Instutute for Development Economics Research, The United Nations University. 
227 S.Tsalik. Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit?, Caspian Revenue Watch 
228 For example, the price for southern Kazakhstan was $35-40 per 1000 m3 of gas, mainly for cash, while for 
Kyrgyzstan ranged between $40 and 54 per 1000 m3 in 2001, with half payment each in cash and barter. See: 
Uzbekistan. Energy Sector: Issues, Analysis, and an Agenda for Reform. World Bank, June 2003. p.27. 
Although it remains uncertain whether it is barter deals that pre-determine higher prices for Kyrgyzstan, or it is 
higher prices forcing to favor such a way of transaction, their adverse affect is evident for both states.  
229 According to government’s plans, Kazakhstan plans to produce 35-40 bln.m3 by 2010 and about 70 bln.m3 by 
2015. Because of relatively low levels of domestic gas consumption, the republic intends to be another huge gas 
exporter in Central Asia. See: S.Tsalik. Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit?, Caspian Revenue Watch, 
p.151 
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such case, economic costs may bring about long-run political consequences connected with 
the possible, not always adequate claims of the Russian business on economic assets of 
indebted energy economic units in Kyrgyzstan. As for Kazakhstan, its southern gas fields may 
not have sufficient reserves in the long-term perspective. According to some estimates, they 
may be sufficient for just over a decade only.230 The same is situation with Tadjikistan 
exacerbated by overconsumption and non-payments by individual consumers, but whose 
dependency on gas supplies from Uzbekistan, and partly from Turkmenistan remains high.  
Finally, structural challenges have much to do with the internal developments in the energy 
sectors of each single country. Yet some similar features of these challenges affected their 
development could be set out. They were mainly as follows: 
- high dependency on imports of power equipment that can be explained by the previous 
division of labour; 
- obsolescence of a large portion of capital equipment in the fuel and energy industry; 
- lack of investment, especially in power industry; 
- increasing share of energy in the cost of industrial output of Central Asian countries, 
resulting from growing costs of energy and leading to a loss of competitive advantage in 
both external and domestic markets; 
- the difficulty of finding staff for the fuel and energy industry and the power engineering 
industry;  
- lack of information on the overall availability of energy resources throughout the region; 
- high energy intensity of economy and, as a result, significant waste of fuel and energy 
across sectors. 
To sum up, all the countries of the region met the independence with inefficient and 
uncompetitive domestic energy industries as a legacy of the Soviet past. Most of the 
equipment was outdated causing little efficiency in the use of domestic raw materials. Energy 
intensity reflecting the use of energy resources to produce $1000 of GDP was several times 
higher than in major industrialized countries and regions (Figure 3.1, Sub-chapter 3.2.1.4.), 
though the range of energy intensity was different in various countries, with Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan having reduced the given figure and the others having seen an increase in the 
energy intensity. But it should be noted that above-mentioned reductions in energy intensity 
in some countries occurred mostly as a result of a decline in industrial output and freight and 
                                                 
230 EIU. Uzbekistan Country Report 2000 
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passenger turnover in the public sector, as well as a fall in energy consumption for defence 
needs, rather than through efficient energy-saving policies of Central Asian countries.231 
Besides, energy shortage of industry, households and the communal sector through disruption 
or failures in energy supply could be seen as another factor explaining this process. In other 
words, these reductions cannot yet be accepted as an outcome of sound and efficient fuel and 
energy policy measures to enhance the economy and population to saving and more efficient 
activities, but most probably were a consequence of decline in economic development and 
living standards. 
In the light of the aforementioned trends, currently there are no long term contracts to provide 
price stability, and the opportunities for entering into such contracts are normally slim, given 
the general knowledge in the industry and the region about unreliable production levels and 
therefore, supplies. Moreover, for Uzbekistan and other concerned Central Asian states to 
favor even economically the most viable energy route in the Southern direction looks uneasy 
in these terms. In particular, it will require (a) first and foremost, guarantees of security and 
stability in the Southern countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan); (b) be competitive with potential 
contenders (such as Iran, or Afghanistan, for example, with their own mineral reserves); (c) 
the restoration almost fully destroyed energy infrastructure in Afghanistan;232 (d) huge foreign 
investments; (e) capabilities of export markets to pay for the energy supplied.   
 
4.3. Intra-regional priorities 
The following two strategic intertwined goals in the energy field are going to determine 
sustainable development of the regional countries in the future: 
¾ self-sufficiency of the region in energy resources; 
¾ development and diversification of pipeline network system, both inside and outside the 
region, securing sustainability of export routes from Central Asia.233 
 
                                                 
231 Diagnostic Report on Energy Resources in Central Asia, http://centrasia.cintech.ru/energy-eng.pdf 
232 According to some estimates, only 6% of population in Afghanistan have access to electricity making domestic power 
market attractive for Central Asian export. Yet inadequate electricity infrastructure (transmission lines of low voltage, poor 
coonections to Central Asia’s electricity lines) in coupe with low purchasing power are among the main setbacks to 
commercial sales of energy. Uzbekistan’s coal company UzbekUgolalso supplied 6500 tons of coal in the first three months 
of 2002 claiming that the total absorptive capacity of the Afghan market might make up about 200000 tons. Yet payment 
issues remain one of the main aspects in such deals. 
233 This aspect is scrutinized more closely in the next subchapter. 
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The energy self-sufficiency of the region depends not only on its primary energy base but also 
on the ratio between its annual generation and consumption. The ratio for 1999, for instance, 
exceeded 1.0 for the whole region (1.43), with Kazakhstan achieving 1.67 and Turkmenistan, 
2.33. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who are net importers of energy resources, are obviously less 
self-sufficient, while Tajikistan had the worst rating (0.4).234 Yet in terms of the hidden 
potential for expected economic growth, with a further emphasis to continue with 
industrialisation in each country, consumption of energy will steadily rise and therefore, 
require sustainable production patterns too. 
Nevertheless, past development has seen a decline in the energy security for the region. Some 
critical measures are thus needed to reverse the trend in individual countries and the entire 
region.  These measures, in particular, may include: 
• policies seeking to increase intensive economic use of domestic energy potential through 
construction of new fuel and energy processing facilities, enhancing the energy efficiency 
of the economy; 
• intensification of efforts to involve bi- and multilateral foreign investors in prospecting 
and developing new hydrocarbon deposits, building pipelines and power grids, building 
new generating facilities for oil and gas networks and overhaul of existing ones together 
with their infrastructure; 
• the search for partners and new transport routes for energy exports from the region; 
• market reforms in the energy sector and improvements in tariff policy; 
• strengthening of cooperation in energy across the region. 
Both the energy sector and the entire economy of the region face a major task of steering their 
efforts towards sound and efficient use of available fuel and energy. The rational and efficient 
use of fuel and energy in terms of its current status and likely development, would imply, first 
and foremost, the optimisation of the regional balance of fuel and energy and, more directly, 
enhanced efficiency of fuel and energy use at all stages of the energy cycle from the 
extraction of raw materials to the consumption of final energy in all economic sectors.  
Energy efficiency in Central Asian economies could, in particular, be improved through: 
• the recording and monitoring of fuel and energy consumption;  
                                                 
234 Diagnostic Report on Energy Resources in Central Asia, http://centrasia.cintech.ru/energy-eng.pdf 
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• further measures on persistent modernisation and upgrading of energy-consuming 
equipment; 
• improvements in the location of production networks by reducing the distance from the 
producer of energy to its consumer; 
• reduction material and energy intensity in manufacturing, including through 
improvements in the quality of raw materials and large-scale recycling of production 
waste; 
•  using more efficient and environmentally clean technologies in final consumption. 
In other words, better efficiency is strongly correlated to adequate policy measures on energy 
conservation. Central Asian countries have built up significant potential for energy 
conservation235 and need to proceed to its objective assessment and efficient implementation 
so as to facilitate development through conservation of energy, stimulate economic growth 
and reduce environmental tensions. Significant savings of fuel and energy could be achieved 
through economic restructuring that would focus on increasing the share of less energy-
intensive production units. The above measures would require sound investment and a solid 
legal framework as well as trained and competent personnel and broad-based information 
campaign to facilitate participation in conservation measures of both consumers and 
producers of fuel and energy. 
In addition to the aforementioned steps at the national level in each of the countries, optimum 
use of the resource potential could and should be achieved through broad intra-regional 
cooperation in the energy sector. This condition is indispensable with any efforts seeking to 
strengthen the self-sufficiency of Central Asia in terms of energy supply, increase its energy 
export potential, save investment resources for further increase in the production capacity of 
fuel and energy complexes and for fuel and energy imports, and to reduce environmental 
pressures both regionally and globally. In particular, these policies should be directed on: 
• establishment of regional energy market to secure guaranteed and economically viable 
supply of required amounts of energy to meet the needs of the economy and population of 
the region; 
                                                 
235 According to some estimates, these figures might amount 30% of the overall primary use of energy in the late 
1990s. See Diagnostic Report on Energy Resources in Central Asia, http://centrasia.cintech.ru/energy-eng.pdf 
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• joint funding of projects involving the exploration and development of new fuel deposits, 
building new hydroelectric power stations (and modernising existing ones) as well as 
identifying and establishing new energy transport routes; 
• avoidance of setbacks in non-discriminatory transit of energy through the region for intra-
regional and external needs; 
• efficient intra-regional energy exchange as a prerequisite for the utilization of available 
energy capacity at maximum efficiency; 
• sustainable operation of Central Asian power grids that would enhance reliability of 
power supply at the national and regional levels; 
• development and implementation of concerted policies in external energy markets; 
• implementation of wide-ranging energy-conservation programs on a national scale and 
development of intra-regional cooperation in this sphere (harmonisation of laws and 
regulations, information exchange, etc.); 
• coordination of regional efforts for the development and implementation of common 
investment policy, with a particular emphasis on foreign capital, to undertake regional and 
national structural reforms. 
The analysis has revealed that a number of factors stood behind the decline in Uzbekistan’s 
exports of both natural gas and other energy products over the last years. This decline 
particularly, occurred due to (a) specifics of domestic policies on self-sufficiency and the 
necessity to meet first and foremost domestic demand; (b) declining domestic production and 
structural challenges; (c) deteriorating infrastructure facilities, particularly gas transmission; 
(d) inter-state disagreements on price and energy supplies across the region exacerbated 
domestic challenges of political and economic character. Yet Uzbekistan needs and still 
capable to improve the reliability and timeliness of energy, primarily gas supply to its 
neighbors, otherwise the chances to loose the markets seem to be high. For this purpose, the 
countries must find the way to improve current mechanism of energy trade, favoring 
commercial conditions and overcoming ineffective barter transactions. Subsequently 
strengthening economic criteria, one also needs to reduce and ultimately de-link it from 
intergovernmental agreements on irrigation and transit services between the countries. It is 
also critical to enhance direct horizontal linkages between the energy consumers and 
producers throughout the region by holding talks and signing agreements between the 
immediate parties concerned in each country. The expansion of private investment into sector 
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development in Uzbekistan would be in line with the facilitation of their role in further export 
development within and beyond the region.  
Central Asia, thus, may possess that energy potential which could be enough for the region to 
be self-sufficient in the future. It is true that further increase in fuel and energy output cannot 
be absorbed by intra-regional markets only. It means that sustainability and progress of the 
energy sector and the whole economy are expected to be much dependent on the possibilities 
of export expansion, searching for new markets and a diversified pipeline network to and out 
of the region. But this task looks to be uneasy, especially in terms of geopolitical and 
geoeconomic imperatives around Central Asia.  
 
4.4. Growing International Interests 
4.4.1. General Patterns 
The geopolitical and strategic importance of Central Asia was reiterated a few times by both 
regional and non-regional politicians and academicians on different levels. The President of 
Uzbekistan I.Karimov, for instance, related this significance to the system of global politics.  
“The balance of power on the vast space across the world depends, to a considerable extent, 
on the path which the new states of Central Asia will choose to move ahead. And those who 
participate in the development of a qualitatively new order of international relations today 
can not have confirming this fact…Uzbekistan is a strategical centre of the peninsula that 
includes extremely rich fields of oil and gas of the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and the 
Tarin Basin. Therefore, in terms of the world’s shortage of energy, the peninsula is 
surrounded by the energy reserves which are going to play a key role for Eurasia and the 
entire world in the nearest future”.236 
Equally, former US President National Security Assistant Zb.Brzezinski suggested that the 
region’s perspectives in the global international network of interests would be, among other 
factors, defined by its mineral-resource base. To put it literally: “Availability of the resources 
of the region represents those goals which rouse national ambitions, stipulate for corporate 
interests, revive historical claims, restore imperial intentions and rekindle international 
rivalry…”.237  
                                                 
236 Translated by the author from I.Karimov (1997) Uzbekiston XXI asr bosagasida: havfsizlikka tahdid, barqarorlik shartlari 
va tarraqiyot kafolatlari. Extract from the collection „Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari“. Tashkent, 1998. pp.421-424. 
237 Translated by the author from Tsentralnaya Aziya: Geoekonomika, Geopolitika, Bezopasnost. Group of authors (2002), 
Tashkent. p.89. Original quotation from Brzezinski Zb. The Grand Chessboard.American Primacy and its Geostrategic 
Imperatives (Basic Books –Harper Collins Publishers, Inc, 1997). 
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As it has been emphasized before, the resource-rich countries are expected to have more 
opportunities for economic and socio-political development provided on appropriate domestic 
policy of the government. That is why, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ex-Soviet 
republics of Central Asia, especially those with rich mineral resource base, have been trying 
to exploit their natural resources as the means for providing economic and political 
environment for the further development. However, Central Asia’s remoteness from the main 
world markets, as well as lack of pipeline infrastructure to export strategic energy resources 
(oil, gas, and electricity) to consumers outside the region, was a major challenge to to those 
efforts. In addition, since the region was integrated into the common economic system under 
the Soviet rule, all the states in many ways remained dependent on each other, including 
energy supplies.  
On the other hand, increased world demand, especially from industrially developed countries 
of West and Asia, for energy resources from Central Asia, contributed to the fact that Caspian 
basin and Central Asia together are considered as new, tremendous potential source of energy 
products in the nearest future. Even though the accurate estimates of energy base of Central 
Asia are quite at variance in the world reports, sometimes even speculative, they might be 
impressive enough to attract much of international attention in the past decade.  
At the same time the substance of the issue goes obviously much beyond the size of proven 
oil and gas reserves requiring some geopolitical scrutiny in terms of a new diversified system 
of pipelines needed to be built out of the region. The problem is how to give or not give 
Central Asia the possibilities to mitigate its land-locked situation by bringing its resources to 
the more diversified markets of final energy consumers. This issue is surely of priority 
significance for any of Central Asia’s republics and for the region as a whole.  
The President I.Karimov’s words are adequately reflecting this desperately desired way in a 
labyrinth with multiple choices to capture the region: “The clear thing is that only if stability 
and geo-strategic balance are retained, the given region may face consequent and sustainable 
development and become an appropriate partner for the world community… The new states 
intend to be “equal among equal”, seeking for being integral part of the world”.238 
What makes this task not so easily attainable is that international interests in Central Asia are 
characterized by a complex diversity of geopolitical and strategic goals of the third countries 
stipulated by their national foreign policy agenda. It subsequently reflects in the scale and 
                                                 
238 Karimov I. (1997) O’zbekiston XXI asr bo’saga’asida: xavfsizlikka tahdid, barqarorlik shartlari va taraqqiyot 
kafolatlari. Collection of works “Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari”, Tashkent, 1998, p.417-422. 
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level of involvement in regional trends in Central Asia. The principle “Who will control the 
transport and energy infrastructure, will be able to take over the control over the “live artery” 
of the region” caused a hidden rivalry between main international actors throughout the most 
part of the last decade. In other words, it was evident that international powers were seeking 
commercial interests in coupe with political, sometimes even outweighing interests of the 
regional states. Under such conditions, the energy endowment of Central Asia will not mean 
automatic social prosperity, as the sustainability and development of energy complex is going 
to fall under pressure of not only direct economic issues, but also a set of socio-political ones.  
Thus, the development of energy resource base in the region does not confine to its local 
production only. The biggest challenge for foreign investors is still how to transport these 
resources to foreign markets. In terms of Central Asia’s land-lockedness, the determination of 
pipeline routes acquires a particular geopolitical meaning. In the last decade, there were only 
few possible choices to transport Central Asia energy resources outside the region. Yet the 
current century is expected to bring much new in energy developments across the region. 
These changes should be obviously scrutinized through the prism of higher interests to the 
region from main regional and non-regional players; national factors of the past developments 
in those states;  intensification of bi- and multilateral relations of the Central Asian states with 
these powers; and the level of cooperation or rivalry between these major powers. For this 
purpose, let us set out some main factors to represent the established network of these 
interests with a subsequent impact on regional energy patterns. 
The USA 
One of the key reasons of new trends and developments in Central Asia is without doubt the 
US policy relatively to the region. There are various views among US policymakers and 
academic circles on the types and levels of the American involvement into the region. These 
arguments even favor specific countries, namely Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which should 
allegedly receive the most US attention for comprehensive strategic (first country) or narrow 
commercial (second country) reasons. A closer look at US foreign policy, however, reveals its 
adherence to so called “full-spectrum dominance”. Reflecting the whole specter of political, 
military and economic, including energy implications, these interests could be summarized in 
the following main areas. They are: security, including reinforcement of independence of each 
of the Central Asian states and the fight against the terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking; 
assistance in pursuing market economic and democratic reforms; integration into the world 
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community, including enhancement of active regional cooperation; and national energy 
interests.239  
As the US sets are convinced, such an approach could finally serve to US national security 
concerns by fostering comprehensive development of the states, bring prosperity and 
economic growth, and alleviate the social distress exploited anti-Western extremist groups to 
fill in the economic and ideological vacuum. 240 Besides U.S. support for free market reforms 
directly serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services 
and sources of energy and minerals. The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has obligated funds 
for short-term insurance, loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural 
equipment and bulk agricultural commodities to all the states except Tajikistan.241 The 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all the Central 
Asian states on insuring U.S. private investments overseas, and has obligated funds for 
financing or insurance in all the states except Tajikistan. 
On June 1, 2004, the U.S. Trade Representative signed a Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement with ambassadors of the Central Asian states to establish a U.S.-Central Asia 
Council on Trade and Investment. The Council will meet at least yearly to address intellectual 
property, labor, environmental protection, and other issues that impede trade and private 
investment flows between the United States and Central Asia and that hamper intra-regional 
trade and economic development. 
The USA increased and expanded the scale of military and development assistance to Central 
Asia after the events of September 11, 2001. The figures show that cumulative foreign aid 
budgeted to Central Asia for the period of 1992 - 2003 amounted to $3.2 billion, or about 13% 
of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian states, reflecting the lesser priority given to these 
states prior to 9/11. During 2002 spending for Central Asia was greatly boosted in absolute 
amounts ($584.13 million) and as a percent of total aid to Eurasia (25%). The aid amount for 
2003, however, appeared to return to about the previous percentage level (Table 4.3.). 
  
 
                                                 
239 Osnovnye Napravleniya Tsentralnoaziatskoy politiki SshA. The Magazine Tsentral Asia and Caucasus, 1997, 
No 8. http://www.communike.se/cac/magazine/08_1997/st_13_kolinz.html 
240 Nichol J. Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests. Congressional Reserach 
Service, the Libraray of Congress. p.2. www.fas.org/man/crs/IB93108.pdf 
241 For example, in 2002 the Eximbank of the USA approved the guarantees for export equipment and related 
products and services at $78 mln. for Navoi Mining Complex in Uzbekistan, and another $20 mln.for export of 
mining tracks and other construction equipment to replace the out-of-date equipment in Navoi complex. 
Eksimbank SShA predostavlyaet garantii v podderjku eksporta oborudovaniya dlya NGMK. www.uza.uz, 
12.02.2003 
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Table 4.3. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia 
(in millions of dollars) 
 
Country Cumulative Funds 
Budgeted FY1992-
FY2003a 
 
FY2003 
Budgeteda 
FY2004 
Estimatea 
FY2005 
Requestc 
 
Kazakhstan  1,054.4 100.43 68.6 40.22 
Kyrgyzstan 697.35 54.71 44.08 39.54 
Tajikistan 550.59 49.36 33.47 36.35 
Turkmenistan 227.71 10.98 8.66 9.28 
Uzbekistan 595.33 83.46 53.94 53.22 
Total 3,188.83b 306.77b 208.75 178.61 
Percent 13 15 14 27 
 
a. FREEDOM Support Act and Agency funds. 
b. Central Asian Regional funds are included in the total. 
c. FREEDOM Support Act and other Function 150 funds, not including Defense or Energy Department funds; the FY2004 
estimate and FY2005 request exclude funding for exchanges. 
 
Source: Nichol J. Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests. Congressional Reserach Service.  
 
The aforementioned can bear at least two implications. On the one hand, it probably was a 
swift gesture of gratitude for the support from Central Asia for the US operation in 
Afghanistan. Yet in the longer run, the USA may attempt to seek for better security not only 
in terms of global fight against international terrorism, but also as the necessary condition for 
further economic liberalization and the development of Caspian-Central Asian energy 
resources. 
The latter argument has much to do with a number of energy and geopolitical concerns. The 
USA leads the world in oil consumption, with about 20 mln.barrels a day half of which is 
imported oil. Even when the US found that dependence on oil imports threatens then US 
national security, American energy policy has changed little for the last decade. Instead of 
reduction in oil imports, the USA are seeking diversification of supply sources to avoid 
dependence on a single or a group of suppliers.242 In this respect, speculations on Central 
Asian energy resources gave the food for thought that the region was important to the extent 
to keep the oil prices down in international perspective. It may look like that after military 
intervention in Iraq, Central Asia has to somehow fell off out of energy attention of the USA. 
Yet one must not forget that since significant increases in oil prices and inability of OPEC, as 
the main traditional partner of the USA to manage price volatilities on main world markets, it 
remains in strategic US interests to keep an eye on every possible source of energy out of the 
destabilized traditional Middle East. In addition, investments already made by US companies 
                                                 
242 The lion’s part of oil import comes from Saudi Arabia. 
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in Central Asia are huge and will most likely remain under the spotlight of U.S. support and 
protection.243 The American estimates of Central Asian energy reserves which are the most 
promising, may speak in favor of their strategic interests for diversification of its energy 
import through the globally pursued strategy. Not at least, energy interests of the USA in 
Central Asia are in compliance with its strategic interests to resist and counterbalance any 
dominant presence and expansion of geopolitical and geoeconomic influence of other powers, 
such as Russia, China and Iran, in Central Asia.244 
Russia 
The Russia’s interests in the region were pushed by a number of economic and political 
events related to Afghanistan, Caucasus, the CIS, as well as by the active US engagement in 
the development of energy projects in Central Asia during the last decade. Just a few years 
ago Central Asia had largely fallen off the Moscow’s field of interests. There was a period, 
especially in the first half of the 1990s when it seemed Russia had sort of forgotten its 
interests in the region devising its foreign policy basically towards swift and comprehensive 
integration with the West. It was pursuing a much less apparent policy in relations with the 
Central Asian region and seemed to be allowing them to go their own way to a large extent.245  
The given situation has yet been cordially changing since the end of the 1990s marking a new 
milestone in Russia-Central Asia relations. The current Russian government has made not 
only a clear declaration that the entire CIS, including the Central Asian region, is of vital 
interest in foreign policy,246 but already kept up its promises with a number of concrete steps 
in political, military and economic areas. The following measures may only speak in favor of 
the whole seriousness of the Russian intentions towards the region, both in time and space, as 
well as on the level of involvement. 
                                                 
243 As much as $30 bln. have been invested in the development of oil and gas fields in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaidjan. Energy Information Administration, www.eia.gov.  
244 Nichol J. Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests. Congressional Reserach 
Service, the Libraray of Congress. p.2. www.fas.org/man/crs/IB93108.pdf , p.14; Bondarets L. Voyenno-
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It was an unprecedented step, when Moscow had moved to join Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization (CACO), a purely Central Asian grouping in June 2004 in Astana. The 
unanimous support for this decision from Central Asian states now allows Russia to take part 
in economic, political and military regional processes on a multilateral basis. Despite the 
assertions that “the US policy is not aimed against the interests of Russia”, the over active 
economic and political support of the region is of great concern for Russia.247 Some experts 
believe that membership of Russia in CACO was encouraged by an apparent attempt to check 
U.S. growing clout in the region.248  
The Caspian and Central Asian energy resources and related issues on diversification of the 
pipeline network from the region may represent another feature of such kind of rivalry 
between Russia and the other countries (see map in Annex 4.3). In the past, the USSR 
considered oil and gas exports largely as a source of foreign exchange. This apprehension has 
widened largely in current terms. There is a perception that this is not just about cash foreign 
exchange, but also about long-run strategic interests, especially in the regions, like Central 
Asia, to embrace much of underdeveloped production potential and transportation of energy 
resources. For Russia, the energy issue in Central Asia is currently turning out to be an 
integral element of foreign policy, as well as a well-grounded lever to dominate in the region. 
It has likely much to do with the fact that Russia is now receiving more money from the 
export of its oil. Oil and natural gas are helping Russian ambitions and presenting the 
government with new opportunities that could not have been anticipated some time ago.249  
In the given context, while expressing little support to any alternatives for energy export 
routes from Central Asia, Russia simultaneously lobbies the use of its own and existing 
pipelines by the regional energy exporters. Its recent strategy is based on the renewed 
intensive investments into the regional energy development, exploration, and transportation 
systems, currently on the bilateral basis. For instance, Russia is the largest buyer of Turkmen 
gas and Kazakhstan’s oil, both for domestic use and for further export through its pipelines 
(Annex 4.4). In April 2002 Russia and Turkmenistan concluded 25-year intergovernmental 
agreement on Russian purchases of Turkmen gas. According to the agreement, from 2005, 
                                                 
247 Former Assistant to the US President on Security issues Condoleeza Rice said: “Our policy is not aimed 
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Russia will buy about 20-30 bln.m3 of natural gas from Turkmenistan annually, from 2008 – 
up to 70 bln.m3 which makes Russia the main consumer of Turkmen gas, at least in the 
middle-run.250 The largest share of Kazakhstan’s oil is exported through Russian 
infrastructure. The “northern route” which goes through the Russian port of Novorossiysk in 
the Black Sea, alone transports about 28 mln.tons of oil annually. Within the given project, 
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium was found with 11 companies, including from Russia (24% 
of total share), Kazakhstan (19%), Shevron Texaco (USA-15%). As the main stockholder, 
Russia initiated the decision to increase throughput capacities up to 67 mln.tons, in order to 
raise efficiency of its functioning which also implies even more Kazakh oil will be claimed.251 
In 2002 Russian “Gazprom” and Kazakh state company “Kazmunaygaz” set up a join venture 
which is in charge for buying and transportation of natural gas from Kazakhstan’s 
Karachaganak gas field to the Orenburg refining facility in Russia. In 2003 the facility refined 
about 5,5 bln.m3, in 2004 – 7 bln.m3. Russian “Gazprom” is urging the Kazakh side to 
establish another joint venture in Orenburg which would allow to transport another 8-10 
bln.m3 after the third stage of Karachaganak production bloc is put into action.252  
The year 2004 could be characterized as remarkable in the Uzbek-Russian energy relations. 
The Uzbek National company “Uzbekneftegaz” signed a 15-year Production and Sharing 
Agreement with Gazprom at the end of April to extend the life of the local Shakhpakhty gas 
condensate field in the Ustyurt region. Gazprom pledged a $15 mln.investment. In addition, it 
is anticipated that according to Gazrom plans, it will have signed another PSA with 
Uzbekneftegaz on the development of gas condensate fields in Ustyurt region with $995 mln. 
investment commitments by the end 2004. Generally, Russian Gazprom in 2003 bought 2.5 
bln.m3 of gas from Uzbekistan under the agreement which is also expected to increase to 7.7 
bln.m3 in 2004 and at least 10 bln.m3 in 2005. Totally Uzbekistan will provide Gazprom with 
87 bln.m3 of gas in 2004 – 2012.253 
Uzbekneftegaz has also signed a 35-years long Production and Sharing Agreement (PSA) 
with the Russian oil company Lukoil under which the partners will produce natural gas in the 
Kandym-Khauzak-Shady project in the Bukhara-Khiva region. Lukoil will own 90% and 
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Uzbekneftegaz the rest 10% of an operating company which will deliver the gas. Anticipated 
capital costs are expected at around $1 bln. and commercial production starting in 2007 whose 
peak is due to reach 9 bln.m3. Also a new refining facility is going to be built, with the first 
stage to be launched in 2010. Commenting on this project, Lukoil President made the 
following statement: ”The investment climate in Uzbekistan enables us to be confident that the 
company will receive the profit rate that is planned for the entire 35 years. The Uzbek 
leadership has taken a big step toward not only Lukoil, but also towards all Russian 
investors”.254 It was also made known that an agreement with Gazprom on sales of gas 
produced had been reached according to which Gasprom would become an authorized body to 
decide whether to sell this gas in Russia or abroad. Given that the aforementioned projects 
have been the largest ones in the energy sector in Uzbekistan ever, these words may not only 
signal on a new momentum in Uzbek-Russian cooperation endorsed on the highest level, but 
also could be seen as some sort of a call to other Russian companies to take the opportunity 
for the reinforcement of their position in the regional context which in turn would be much in 
line with national Russian interests.  
The small countries of the region Tadjikistan and Kyrgyzstan have also not been left without 
appropriate attention from Russia. In addition to military bases in these countries, Russia 
sought to strengthen its energy positions there too. The Russian Unified Energy Systems 
energy company RAO EES is the main initiator of the plans to create common energy market 
on the entire CIS space. There is a Russian-led ad hoc Electroenergy Council in the 
framework of the CIS which hold a few sessions in 2004. As a result of its recent session, 
Russia concluded an agreement with Tadjikistan on tranzit of 1,4 bln. kWh electroenergy to 
Russia, while Kyrgyzstan had already begun supplying the Southern regions in Russia with 
total commitments of more than 1 bln.kWh in 2004. The Tadjik Primer-Minister declared 
during the meeting that his country was using only 3,4% out of 520 bln. kWh total energy 
potential making it clear that Tadjikistan was in need of about US $2 bln. in investments to 
raise its hydro energy production up to 15 bln.kWh annually. He also made known that 
international energy consortium on the Sangtuda hydropower station would be set up very 
soon, embracing Tadjikistan, Iran and Russia as its members.255 Visiting the Tadjik capital 
Dushanbe in October 2004, Russian President V.Putin surprised his audience by pledging 
substantial financial investment in Tadjikistan. “The Russian side – both its state structures 
and private companies – intends to invest some US $2 bln. in the Tadjik economy within the 
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next five years. I do not think any other country has, in the past 12 or 13 years, ever invested 
such an amount of money, or even announced plans to invest such an amount of money in 
Tadjikistan”, he said.256 In addition to this investment, RAO EES promised to invest US $200 
mln. in Tadjikistan’s Sangtuda hydropower station. The Russian Rusel aluminium company, 
meanwhile, pledged to invest US $560 mln. into a dam at the Rogun hydropower plant along 
further investments into the largest producer and exporter of aluminium not only in 
Tadjikistan, but also in the whole Central Asia. An agreement was also signed between the 
Government of Kyrgyzstan and Russian Energy Company RAO “EES” in August 2004, 
according to which Russia pledged to invest about $2 bln. USD to complete the construction 
of Kambarata’s two big hydropower stations in Kyrgyzstan.257 Being the largest company’s 
investment project abroad, the given deal, as well as those in Tadjikistan, may bring to Russia 
not only purely economic benefits from regional export of energy, but also be strategically 
important in terms of regional water resources management and its distribution in Central 
Asia. 
Russia also takes part in privatization of national energy companies in the regional states 
which may give it some influence on the decision-making process as to regional energy 
trends. By now Russia has already concluded, or is going to make up long-term cooperation 
agreements in the energy field with each of five republics, seeing such cooperation as a 
lynchpin of its national priorities in Central Asia. For example, recently Russian companies 
Gasprom and Itera expressed their keen interests to participate in tender on privatisation of the 
gas-transport system of Uzbekistan.258 Gazprom also vowed its willingness to become a 
stockholder of the Kazakhstan’s gas transport system. In particular, Vice Chairmain of 
Gazprom emphasized: “Kazakhstan is important for us, first and foremost, as a transit state, 
and therefore, we look with attention at how the Kazakhstan’s gas transport system is 
developing. We would like to become shareholders of the gas transport system if it is due to 
be sold, since it would be advantageous for both Kazakhstan and Russia, and for Gazprom as 
well”.259 Russia is concerned about the poor throughput capacities of the Kazakh gas system. 
By using its facilities as a “transit state”, the Russian side favors its long-run export deals with 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan which (the states) are all part of the Soviet-time Central Asia-
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Centre gas pipeline bringing gas to Russia.260 Currently some parts of this system has already 
outdated, especially the Uzbek part. Russia and its “official agent” Gazprom have pledged not 
only to renovate the existing system, but also increase its throughput capacities from 42 bln. 
to 54 bln.m3 during 2004-2006, and up to 80-90 bln.m3 by 2010.261 It does go with the 
Agreement on Strategic Partnership in the Gas Sector dated December 2002 between 
Uzbekneftegas and Russia’s Gazprom, foreseeing 5 bln.m3 of Uzbek gas supplies within the 
further 12 month period starting from May 2003 which may reach 10 bln.m3 by 2010 in 
addition to the Turkmen 70-80 bln.m3 by 2010.262 So far, Gazprom imported 20 bln.m3 and 2 
bln.m3 gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, respectively, in the first half of 2004.263 
Thus, Russian investments in the Central Asian energy sector on different levels, either in 
production, infrastructure, or decision-making, may follow not only direct economic benefits, 
though they seem to be impressive too. Russia will most probably need more oil for a quickly 
growing park of cars and trucks. Presumably, Russia will also experience a rapid increase in 
electricity demand in its residential and service sectors, for which natural gas is likely to be 
the most favorable source of generation. In terms of narrow opportunities for the region to 
export its resources at its own, it is gong to be Russia and its authorized agencies who are 
expected to take dominant control over the most part of the economic rent provided by these 
resources. Partly the benefits could also come from energy resales further at world prices, at 
least twice as higher as the regional ones, as well from transit. Political implications are also 
well perceived. Most probably Russia may have an interest in controlling Caspian and Central 
Asian oil and gas exports to improve her own bargaining position with Western oil investors. 
The stakes are access to capital and market power. The oil and gas export pipelines are the 
instruments giving Russia a political leverage. If Russia succeeds to preserve its influence in 
the energy sector of each republic, it will manage to remain influential not only in the intra-
regional relations, but in those around Central Asia.  
China 
If we take into account the incredible economic development of the Eastern part of the world 
in the last decades, it becomes clear, why the eastern route is going to be of another particular 
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meaning in perspective Central Asian energy development. China is of primary attention, as 
far as the given question is concerned. Taking geographic propinquity to the region, it does 
hide its growing interests to participate in regional energy trends in Central Asia. Although 
China’s influence is so far limited here in comparison with other major players, some 
purposeful and far reaching attempts to reinforce its position could be observed during the last 
years.  
The two important factors stipulate such moves in Chinese foreign policy towards the region: 
- domestic development 
- geopolitical concerns. 
Recent Chinese economic performance could not have impressing. In 2003 its GDP reached 
US $1,4 trln. ranking the country’s economic potential as the sixth largest in the world. After 
more than doubling in size in 1990s, China’s economy is expected to double again in the 
coming decade and will have quadrupled by 2020. The latest economic development is taking 
place at the background of the reinforcement of chemical and heavy industries, broadened 
urbanization, increased demand for cars, trucks and other industrial means causing significant 
increase in domestic energy consumption. In 2003, share of oil and gas in total energy 
consumption structure reached 21,9% and according to forecasts, inputs are going to come up 
to over 40% by 2010. Industrial power consumption – 70% of the total energy consumption – 
has grown by 10% in 2001. Household consumption also faces growth between 10% and 14% 
per annum. It is conservatively estimated that the rate of urbanization will rise from the 
current 30% to at least 40% of the country’s 1,3 bln.people. More than 520 mln.people will 
live in densely populated cities, mainly on the east coast, requiring electricity, transport, and 
heating.264 
Despite being the world’s fifth largest oil producer, the country has been steadily increasing 
oil import since 1993 (Table 4.4.). In 2003 Chinese oil import exceeded 91 mln.tons 
representing 40% of its total oil consumption. There are some estimates which suggest the 
volumes are expected to increase further making the country significantly dependent on 
foreign energy resources at around of 80% by 2030.265 In addition, China will need to import 
                                                 
264 Shiu D. Kitay: Neft I Politika. www.continent.kz, No 12 (124) 23 June-6 July 2004; Lelyveld M. China Seeks 
Oil Investment with an Eye on Pipeline, www.times.kg, 12 March 2003 
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about 21 mln.tons of gas in order to sustain the planed economic growth rates. It means that 
China’s dependency on gas imports may finally run up to 40%.266 
 
Table 4.4. Dependency on the Imported Oil in China 
 
 1995 1997 2000 2002 2003 2004* 2010* 2020* 
Domestic 
consumption, 
mln.t 
161 197 200 210 227 280 350 500 
Import, mln.t 37 68 66 76 91 110 150 300 
Dependency 
on oil 
imports, % 
6,5 18,3 27 30 34,5 37 46 60 
 
* forecast 
 Sources: Compiled from data of ADB, IEA, „China sucht Erdölversorgungs-Sicherheit/Aufbau einer strategischen Reserve“, "Neue 
Zuercher Zeitung", 16 August 2004; Zheng L. “Polygeneration Based on Coal Gasification: A Strategic Technology for China” Report 
 
Given that the per capita reserves of China are very low, especially on oil and gas, one may 
suggest that the future of the country will be significantly determined by its efforts to address 
national energy needs. In addition, China expresses its geopolitical concerns about political 
events on international arena since September 11 attacks on the USA. As a result, the latter 
has proved to be close not only to China itself, but to the places of Chinese oil import origin. 
Currently, the structure of oil import barely reflects national interests, given that 56% of oil 
comes out from unstable Middle East, 14% - from Asia and Asia Pacific, 23,5% - Africa and 
6,5% - others.267 For this reason, China has decided to pursue a comprehensive strategy on the 
search for new sources of energy across the globe both to diversify the list of energy suppliers 
to China and find out the most secure routes for its transportation. The fact that China 
conducts exploration and development activities in 24 countries worldwide may only confirm 
how seriously these issues are concerned on the highest level, subsequently getting its plans 
materialized if they are really going to fit the Chinese interests.  
A decade ago China laid the ground to the establishment of the “Shanghai Forum” group of 
nations embracing Central Asia’s republics plus Russia. Among security concerns, economic 
and energy priorities are of specific interest too. From this point of view, China made its 
initial steps towards energy resources in “newly discovered” Central Asia by buying 60% of 
stakes in two oil fields in Kazakhstan – Aktobemunaygaz (100 mln.tons) and Uzenmunaygaz 
(140 mln.tons) in 1997 with total investment commitments at US $9,5 bln. The China 
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National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) outbid US and Western companies which allowed 
China to contract a 3000 km pipeline to Western China, as well as to use Iranian refinery 
facilities for further export to China in the future268 (map in Annex 4.3).  Recently China and 
Kazakhstan have agreed and begun construction works on a 998-km oil pipeline Atasu-
Alashankou to bring Kazakh oil to Western China not crossing the Russian territory. The 
plans are to deliver 10 mln.tons of oil at the first stage, with the gradual increase up to 50 
mln.tons annually in the future with first supplies expected to be already in 2006.269 
China also negotiates a more than 3000-km gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Kazakhstan to Xinjiang. Yet, due to high capital costs (about US $10-12 bln.) and complex 
natural-geographic conditions, as well as the current shortage of funds to finance the project, 
its realization has been postponed so far. But China is prepared to continue its energy 
presence in the region, because it perceives that oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia to 
China could be extended in a way, so that to join the pipelines of Russia and Iran as well. This 
model has been dubbed the “Pan Asian Global Energy Bridge” – a Eurasian network of 
pipelines linking energy resources in the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia to Pacific coast 
through China. Then, the pipeline could be extended to Korea and Japan for another 1000 km 
which are traditionally net importers of energy resources. For example, according to some 
estimates, Japan’s gas needs will double by 2010, so will its total energy needs.270 
 Thus, China’s look at the Central Asian direction approaches a cautious, but purposeful 
expansion refusing short-run benefits in favor of long-term outcome. China relies upon 
perception that the method of pressure and rush attempts to acquire trust and will of the region 
may bring little. Through the persistent expansion of its influence on its small neighbors by 
virtue of economic and energy linkages, China is expected to further address its national and 
geopolitical priorities. 
Iran 
Another influential power, Iran, avails itself to get profit from underdeveloped transport and 
pipeline system of Central Asia too. Its interests are briefly to promote itself as a transit 
country for the Caspian and Central Asian oil to the Gulf and establish close political and 
economic ties with the region. Iran has sought to develop close relations with Turkmenistan. 
For Iran, Turkmenistan represents the bridgehead to Central Asia for trade and political links. 
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Turkmenistan shares a long border with Iran, and there is already a gas pipeline linking it to 
the northern part of Iran, where most industries of Iran are located. Moreover, it could 
eventually transit Kazakh and Uzbek oil and gas to Iran. Iran itself has very large gas and oil 
reserves, but they are predominantly in the south, close to the Persian Gulf. From economic 
point of view, this cooperation between the regional countries and Iran is beneficial to both 
sides. For Turkmenistan, for instance, it opens an alternative to export its gas to Iran, for 
Kazakhstan – its oil, which may go much further to Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and then, 
further towards world markets. For Iran, it goes much beyond today’s economic benefits, 
shaping far-going geoeconomic and geopolitical implications. First, Iran has a desperate need 
for foreign exchange and would benefit from oil and gas transit fees. Second, with oil and gas 
transit, Iran would be in a better position to develop trade with the region. Central Asia could 
eventually become an important market for Iranian manufactured goods. Third, Iran is in 
advantage to provide its northern regions with Turkmen gas and Kazakh oil, while southern 
fields would work for export through seaways or towards west through oil and gas pipelines 
to Turkey and then, Europe (see the map). In such a way, Iran would strengthen its position in 
the Gulf, essentially in relation to Saudi Arabia, potentially also in relation to other oil 
contenders. Emerging as a Central Asian power would also reinforce Iran’s position in 
relation to the Gulf neighbors. In turn the combination of oil and gas transit and trade could 
establish Iran as regional power in Central Asia. 
Iran pursues purposeful policy to suggest favorable transit deals and trade in the region by 
offering the least costly world market access for Central Asian crude. Recently Iranian vice-
minister for transport and communications made it clear that further import of Central Asian 
energy resources on a swap-deal basis would make other alternative export routes 
unprofitable pointing at the US-supported route through Turkey.271 In this regard, President of 
Kazakhstan N.Nazarbaev also emphasized that the southern route through Iran was the most 
attractive for both Kazakhstan and even American companies involved into Kazakhstan’s 
energy projects.272 The National Kazakhstani Oil and Gas Company ”KazMunayGas“ and 
”Kaznafta“ company plan to build two oil reloading terminals in Iran with a volume totaling 
150,000 tons. These terminals are expected to export annually 1.5 million metric tons of 
Kazakhstani oil to Persian gulf countries in addition to the current 1 mln.t.273 A pipeline from 
Turkmenistan has also been already built by Iran. In 2002 Turkmenistan supplied about 5 
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bln.m3 to Iran, though its throughput capacity was brought to 12 bln.m3.274 In turn, Iran is 
ambitiously contemplating the possibility to increase swap oil supplies from the Caspian 
region through investments into modernization of existing and building up additional 
domestic pipelines which may increase volumes of oil transactions from current 8 mln.t to 
almost 25 mln.t annually by 2010.275 
On the other hand, Iran itself behaves as a strong competitor in regional energy projects not 
only in terms of the Caspian energy reserves, but also tapping the markets of large energy 
consumers, such as China and India, for example. Iran suggested to build a pipeline bringing 
Iranian gas to India through Pakistan. It might have also affected the Pakistan’s decision to 
suspend its talks within the Transafghan gas project with reference to the necessity of reserve 
assessment in the Turkmen gas field, despite several meetings at the highest level between 
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been already held, as well as project’s 
feasibility study has been also launched by the ADB. Against the background of warming-up 
in bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, it is Iran who succeeds in pushing its gas 
project to the huge Indian market, rather than the Transafghan pipeline dated back to the early 
1990s.276 
Hence by choosing an Iranian outlet, as opposed to any other routes, the Central Asian oil 
exporters could thus keep more of the economic rent. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan has 
evidently realized it when making so far insignificant swap deals with Iran. For Central Asia, 
Iran also represents the outlet that is the most secure from outside interference and pressure. 
Yet it certainly enhances Iran’s position as a hub of energy supplies from the Persian Gulf. 
The EU 
In the last decade, the EU’s involvement has remained comparatively moderate, at least with 
regard to the determination and pursuance of its clear priorities in the Central Asian region. 
Some experts relate this fact to the emphasis on the solution of intra-European problems, such 
the war in Jugoslavia, socio-economic issues in Europe, etc.277 On the other hand, the process 
of regionalisation and formation of the common European identity is still underway which 
makes it at least not simple to bring together the diversity of views under a common foreign 
policy which may allow the EU be actively involved in international politics and sustain its 
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positions in different parts of the world.278 Attention to Central Asia was confined to the 
active development of bilateral contacts of some European countries, such as Germany, with 
the region, against the background of little interests from the others. Even financial 
investments into the most competitive mineral and energy projects from European companies 
were largely exceeded by the injections from US and Chinese corporations. It was partly a 
reflection of poor coordination of EU member-countries to form adequate external energy 
relations on the supranational European level, although quite the contrary seems to be 
required in terms of the importance of energy security for Europe.279 Therefore, in the past, 
Europe concentrated its policy mainly on technical assistance within TACIS, infrastructure 
development through TEMPUS (education) and INOGATE (energy routes) programs.280 
Since 2000, the EU has been attempting to expand the areas of its involvement. The Central 
Asian states concluded Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) on a bilateral basis 
with the EU within which the latter had pledged to provide necessary technical and financial 
assistance to the states in the fields of administrative and institutional reforms, trade and 
investment, and democratic transformation.281 It was in line with the new EU’s security 
strategy which has experienced significant changes since the war in the Balcans. Its main 
implications meant that this approach might serve as a useful pattern for the handling similar 
explosive conflicts in other parts of the world,282 or going even further and broadening the 
opportunities for the prevention of other security threats in the face of international terrorism, 
narcotrafic and export of weapons. 
At the same time, the EU’s interests in Central Asia should be considered through the prism 
of its energy strategy which is an integral part of common European security policy.283 Europe 
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279 Westphal K. “Central Asia and the Security of European Energy Supply”. In Seidelman R., Giese E. (eds.) 
Cooperation and Conflict Management in Central Asia, Zentrum fuer Internationale and 
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283 Given the mounting energy dependence, the European security strategy developed under the leadership of the 
EU High Representative X.Solana and adopted on 12 December, 2003, sets out the given issue among the 
primary concerns for the EU in the future. Thus common security in general and energy security in particular 
will subsequently necessitate the reinforcement of the European Foreign and Security policies in tackling global 
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is poor in energy resources whose regional production is going to go down in the future 
giving thus the way to the steadily increasing consumption of imported energy resources, 
especially natural gas. According to some long-term forecasts, given the EU’s enlargement to 
the East in 2004, now every 2,4% annual economic growth will cause 1,8% rise of energy 
import bringing import dependency to almost 70% by 2030. While share of oil is expected to 
remain stable providing one third of total energy consumption, the share of natural gas is to 
increase by 67% (from 23% in 2000 up to 32% by 2030). It means that Europe will continue 
to consume even higher volumes of imported gas by 2030 facing 65% increase comparing to 
2000. In its turn, share of domestic production is expected to decline by about 32 percentage 
points during the period considered  (See Tables 4.5. and 4.6.). 
 
Table 4.5. Structure of EU-25 Energy Consumption by Fuel 
 
2000 2030 Increment  
(2000-2030) 
 
Mtoe % Mtoe % Mtoe % 
Solids 303 18 296 15 -7 -2 
Oil 634 38 685 35 51 8 
Natural Gas 376 23 630 32 254 67 
Nuclear 238 14 185 9 -53 -22 
Renewables  98 6 170 9 73 75 
Gross Energy 1650 100 1968 100 318 19 
 
 
Table 4.6. Prospects for EU-25 Natural Gas 
 
Billion m3 
per year 
2000 2010 2020 2030 Increment 
(2000-2030) 
Imports 209 49% 352 506 576 81% 367 
Production 221 51% 221 166 132 19% -89 
Total use 423 100% 573 672 708 100% 285 
Gas in 
electricity 
126 31% 209 274 287 43% 161 
Gas in final 
energy 
277 69% 336 365 383 57% 107 
 
Mtoe – millions of ton equivalent 
Source: Capros P. European Union – 25 Members Energy and Transport Trends to 2030.  
 
Currently oil imported to Europe originates to 34% from the former Soviet republics with the 
major part coming from Russia; 20% - from Norway and 15% from Great Britain. Smaller 
amounts are imported from Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. The main gas 
                                                                                                                                                        
challenges and threats. See: A Secure Europe in A Better World. European security strategy, Brussels. On-line 
version available at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 
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exporters to Europe are: Russia (43,9%), Norway (27,7%) and Algeria (27,3%).284 Against the 
background of the regional energy import patterns, large single European countries, such as 
Germany, still continue highly concentrating Russia as the major energy supplier.285 In 
addition, some forecasts say that beyond 2010 North Sea and EU production will not expand. 
Gas consumption will require supply of about 18 bln.m3 by 2030, 10 bln.m3 are expected to 
come from Russia, Middle East and North Africa, with only 2,5 bln.m3 from North Sea and 
the rest 5 bln.m3 from intra-regional production.286  
In the given context, it becomes vital for the EU to actively work over three intertwined issues 
in the realization of its energy security strategy. They are: diversification of its energy 
consumption structure; diversification of energy supplies by its origin; and expansion and 
improvement of transport routes to secure sustainable energy imports. For the EU Central 
Asia may represent a particular energy interest by its untapped and still undeveloped resource 
potential on the one hand, and huge political and economic potential of Europe itself on the 
other hand which is so far underrepresented in this region. European multinationals possess 
significant financial resources in order to realize the projects on diversification and 
improvement of export infrastructure of Central Asia and let it access on an attractive and 
integrated European market of goods, services and energy. Politically the EU has rich 
experience of common rules, fruitful economic relations, international laws and norms, 
concerning both the establishment of a common economic area and sustainable regional 
energy market in particular. Both are crucial in promoting stable development in the region. 
Turkey 
Taken into consideration the strategic EU-oriented priorities on the one hand, Turkey seeks 
the opportunities to play an important role in Central Asia by virtue of economic, political, 
social, historical and cultural instruments, on the other hand. Its interests are political and 
economic ties with Central Asia, as well as transit revenues and access to oil and gas.  
                                                 
284 Westphal K. “Central Asia and the Security of European Energy Supply”. In Seidelman R., Giese E. (eds.) 
Cooperation and Conflict Management in Central Asia, Zentrum fuer Internationale and 
Umweltforschungspolitik. Justug Liebig Universitaet, Frankfurt-am-Main, Peter Lang Verlag, Band 10, 2004. 
pp.216-217. 
285 The EU and Russia kickstarted an energy dialogue to resolve specific bilateral problems. The establishment 
of a kind of “constructive interdependence” through predictable trade rules, improved networks and 
encouragement of investments by promoting a more stable and transparent legal framework, as well as key 
reforms in the Russian energy sector is believed to help improve the EU’s energy supply security in the short, 
medium and long term. See: The Energy Dialogue between the European Union and the Russian Federation 
between 2000 and 2004. Communication from The Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. 
Brussels, 13.12.2004; on-line version is aivailable at the European Commission’s web-site: http://europa.eu.int/. 
286 Capros P. “European Union – 25 Members Energy and Transport Trends to 2030”. Presentation on PRIMES 
and ACE Mathematical Models. On-line version is at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/russia/events/doc/2003_presentation_energy_transport_trends_2030.pdf  
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The nomination of Turkey to counterbalance the potential expansion of neighboring Iran and, 
to some extent, to neutralize the Russia’s influence on the region was supported by the USA. 
A major pre-occupation for Turkey itself is to reduce dependency upon the Arab Middle 
Eastern oil. Its energy priorities could be characterized as multi-edged directed not only to 
meet quckly rising energy needs of a large and expanding domestic market by possible 
supplies from Central Asia, but secure some political benefits too. The following tasks are 
brought forward by the government: provide diversified, reliable and cost-effective supply 
issues; liberalization of the energy sector; and become a major consumer and transit territory 
in the region.  
According to some estimates, Turkey’s energy demand is growing up to 8% annually which 
should provide energy consumption increase from 82,2 mln.tons of oil equivalent (toe) in 
2000 to 179 mln.toe by 2010; for natural gas – up to 55 bln.m3 by 2010 and 83 bln.m3 by 
2020.287 Turkey lobbies East-West energy projects, consisting of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
crude oil pipeline, the Southern Caucasian Natural Gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum), and 
Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe gas pipeline projects.288 These projects, according to Turkey, 
would allow both balanced domestic consumption and transit some energy resources to other 
parts of Europe. Thus it would also be in line with the Green paper “Working Towards a 
European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply”,289 as a fourth largest source of energy 
to Europe. On the eve of potential accession of Turkey to the EU, Turkey is interested to use 
energy sphere as another area of close cooperation with the EU.  
The most ambitious oil project with Turkey’s involvement is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline which is built under the immediate US-led policies and implemented by a consortium 
of European energy multinationals. Being launched in September 2002, an almost 1800 km 
long pipeline is expected to be completed in 2005 with $2.93 bln. of construction costs and 
                                                 
287 Mekhmut Q. Turkey’s Energy Politics in the Context of Eurasian Geopolitics. Event Report, July 2002. See 
on-line version at www.bcsia.usg.harvard.edu. See also Kilic A. Turkey and European Energy Security, 
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288 Since 30 March 2000 Turkey is a signatory to an Umbrella Agreement of INOGATE programme which 
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countries to Greece via Turkey. By 2020 Turkey thus plans to become a huge natural gas transporter from the 
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another $600 mln. in linefill and loan interest during construction.290 However, the project is 
likely to be confronted with a number of issues in order to become sustainable and 
economically more viable.291 The latter stems from hopes to see Kazakhstan’s involvement as 
an important oil supplier, though Kazakhstan does not seem yet to show its ultimate 
commitment in view of other alternatives with China and Iran. Moreover, Russia neglects any 
route through Turkey which would weaken its own position. On the contrary, Russia itself is a 
large supplier of natural gas to Turkey through the Blue Stream pipeline built and put into 
operation a couple of years ago. Moreover, there are plans of Iranian gas supplies which may 
give Turkey to use its transit status towards Europe and for Iran – another export option.  
At the same time, a number of factors are serious setbacks to the full realization of Turkey’s  
interests in Central Asia. Turkey’s variant of Central Asian oil export is both costly and 
politically vulnerable compared to the alternatives suggested by Iran, for instance. Turkey will 
barely compromise Russia’s interests in the region, since it has close economic, trade and 
energy relations with Russia. As it has become clear from the past experience, common 
historical, religious and linguistic values are insufficient elements for ambitious Turkey’s 
dominance in the regional processes. Finally, domestic situation, related to security of the 
transit pipelines through Turkey may only exacerbate the energy projects put up by the 
country on the regional level. 
 
4.4.2. Geopolitical Implications 
The Central Asian energy discourses should be considered not only in the light of immediate 
interests of major players towards the regional states, but also through the prism of their 
policy strategies towards each other. The issue is whether the energy-related activities will 
remain an aspect of contention between the major players, or on the contrary will promote 
some changes in foreign policy doctrines towards tolerance and better coordination.  
In taking sometimes even open forms, the rivalry, mainly between the USA, Russia, China, 
Iran and the EU over the construction of future pipelines out of the region would mean that 
                                                 
290 The scale of activities by both the parties involved and documents prepared are impressive. The financing 
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each of the states will follow its strategic priority interests in the given region. The USA, like 
the EU, is a newcomer to the region and simultaneously an outsider. The US policy towards 
the regional resources will be obviously based on universal ambitions. As the world’s leading 
oil importer harboring the major part of the world’s oil industry, the US has a persistent 
interest in a stake in and preferably a control of the major global energy provinces, wherever 
they are. At the same time, it has to face a difficult task not to allow any contenders to make 
its presence dominant in Central Asia. So far, the U.S. policy has been to avoid any 
understanding between the region’s oil and gas exporters and Iran, to prevent the latter from 
serving as a transit point. Since the end of the Cold War the United States has viewed Iran as 
one of the major adversaries. By accepting of a transit route through Iran, the United States 
would not only recognize Iran as a major power in international oil politics, in the Gulf and in 
Central Asia, but also renounce on its ambition to get the Central Asian energy to the 
Mediterranean. Hence the position of the Gulf in the world oil market would be reinforced, 
also strengthening the supply and price risk. To sum up, for oil supplies and prices the United 
States would face an even more significant Gulf, but with a stronger Iran. 
On the other hand, economic boost in China and its rising political credibility across the 
whole region is another concern for the USA on the way to its efforts to limit Chinese 
involvement. More than 55% of American academicians and policy-makers believe that 
China is a potential threat to American national interests.292 From this viewpoint, the USA 
tries to minimize any involvement of China in oil tenders in Saudi Arabia and Iran, in post-
war reconstruction of Irak, as well as directly in Central Asia by impeding the process of 
construction of oil pipeline from Western Kazakhstan to China.293 
Therefore, the USA is going to face a dilemma to isolate Central Asian energy from Iran and 
minimize Chinese expansion on the one hand, but comply with some of Russia’s interests if 
needed, on the other hand, which would mean a recognition of a more resourceful and more 
self-confident Russia.294 Since the pipeline projects through the Afghanistan’s territory are at 
least the plans of an indefinite long-run period, Russia could be perceived as more acceptable 
variant in comparison with Iran and China. Before the events of September 11, what liked 
Russia, usually did not like to the USA. Against the background of common Russian-
American interests and reciprocal relations between these two countries during the last 
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decade, their views on Central Asian energy resources were sooner developing in competitive 
manner, rather than on the basis of friendship and cooperation. “Geostrategic implications for 
the US are clear: America is too far, so that to dominate this part of Eurasia, but it is too 
mighty, not to get involved… Russia is too weak to revive its own imperial domination in the 
region, or to exclude such domination coming from other states. But it is too close and strong 
to exclude her at all”, wrote Zb.Brzezinski.295 
Yet, currently Russia is becoming a great energy producer and exporter being independent 
from the OPEC. The USA seems to see in Russia another significant source for its energy 
import. Russia recently agreed to support calls of the American administration to increase oil 
and export of oil regardless of world prices. After the meeting with US Energy Secretary 
Spencer Abraham, Russian Prime-Minister M.Fradkov confirmed that Russia was interested 
in gaining a 10-12% share of the US crude oil market which makes Russia a logical strategic 
partner to the USA.296  
The interest of the United States is also apparently to get the Central Asian oil to the 
Mediterranean or to the Indian Ocean. The reason seems to put a downward pressure on 
Atlantic crude prices, partly to reduce the overall supply and price risk in the world oil market 
due to the dependency on the Gulf. The U.S. is also eager to provide assistance to Turkey 
economically by getting transit revenues. Baku (Azerbaijan)-Tbilisi (Georgia)-Ceyhan 
(Turkey) oil pipeline is thus more politically motivated rather than a reflection of an 
economically efficient route to bring Caspian and Central Asian energy to world markets 
avoiding the Russia’s territory. On the contrary, the Transafghan gas and oil pipelines from 
Turkmeninstan to Pakistani seaports through Afghanistan are more economically viable 
covering 1500 km with capital costs at approximately $2,5 bln. First attempts were made as 
early as 1994. There was even an agreement between the governments of four countries, 
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan Pakistan and Uzbekistan. However, the unstable situation in 
Afghanistan postponed the project. In this respect, the U.S. oil companies in the region, such 
as Chevron and Unocal, also political actors, with an increasingly important role in the region, 
are still willing to renew the project, once the political situation in Afghanistan has stabilized.  
The advantage of Russia in comparison with others is in its strong cultural and historical 
influence on the countries reinforced by the strengthened economic relations within the recent 
years. Central Asia, like other areas of the former Soviet Union, is still bound to Russia in 
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many ways. Spare parts for a number of machines being used across the territory still come 
from Russia. Other connections remain as well. In addition, many might not consider Central 
Asia the best place to invest part of this newfound wealth. But for Russian investors and the 
Russian government, the region is actually well-positioned for investment. Where Russia 
might try to expand its economic relations overseas, there aren't that many markets, for 
example, where really Russia can be competitive. It happens that in Central Asia there is 
something of a natural market, a natural basis for economic relations between these countries. 
It's relatively cheap to buy up assets in a place like Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan, for example. 
Russian companies know the region and speak the language of the people they are dealing 
with. That's the big advantage of Russia before Western companies operating in the region.297 
 Russia is ready to cooperate with other major players, regardless of the USA, China, Iran or 
the EU provided that the latter should recognize Russian interests in Central Asia and 
therefore, coordinate their policies with Russia. Russia has good relations with Iran in many 
energy-related activities, including construction and maintenance of the scientific nuclear 
facilities, development and exploration of energy base in Iran, etc. Besides Russia and Iran are 
the most concerned parties in the transport corridor “North-South” across the Central Asian 
region.298  
In its turn, Iran is emerging as an independent player trying to keep up friendly contacts with 
all its neighbors and a constructive dialogue with the EU on energy issue and in economic and 
political fields which could help it offset the US sanctions on investments into Iran. Iran 
attempts to maintain good relations with its northern neighbour Russia also because of the 
unresolved problem of the Caspian status whose positions are quite different. China and Iran 
cooperate in political and military area, as the Chinese arms supply are a major concern and 
reason for the US warnings.299 In its turn, given Iran possesses one of the largest energy 
reserves in the world, China expresses its growing interests in the development and 
exploitation works there which finds appropriate countenance in Iran. Recently the both 
countries signed a Memorandum envisaging a special provision to favor the development by 
Chinese companies of one of the largest domestic gas reserves, without preliminary tender 
arrangements with other contesting companies from Europe and Japan.300  
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China is surely concerned by the fact that the USA is steadily becoming dominant in the areas 
where Chinese energy imports originates from. In this regard, China also sees in Russia a 
relatively acceptable long-term sustainable supplier of energy for its growing economy. 
During Russian President's official visit to China in October 2004, Gazprom and the China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed an agreement on a strategic partnership. 
According to the agreement, the two sides are to prepare for natural gas supplies from Russia 
to China. The agreement stipulates cooperation in oil and natural gas exploration, production, 
transportation and sale, gas-transporting and gas-distributing systems development, as well as 
underground gas storage construction and handling in China.  
Moreover, Russia and China set a common goal for their bilateral trade to reach $60 billion by 
2010, which is 3 times higher than current volumes, presumably bearing in mind increasing 
Russian hydrocarbon supplies to China. Talks are also underway a 3,000-mile gas link from 
the Kovykta field in eastern Siberia, first proposed nearly a decade ago, and a 1,500-mile oil 
link from western Siberia to Daqing, the heart of China's refining industry.301 But China fears 
that the strategy to import from Russia is, however, not entirely risk free. The one factor that 
constricts the ability of Russia to increase exports is infrastructure - namely, inadequate 
pipelines and port facilities. Since American firms possess the technological wherewithal and 
capital funding to assist Russia, the latter's export and piping routes will likely mirror the 
preferences of the United States. This puts China in an acute position as the two combined 
could potentially compromise its national interest. Although East Asian and domestic issues 
remain more important for China than any West Asian considerations, China cannot afford 
not to be more sensitive to events in the region in the future. China's position as a serious 
economic and political player at the world stage requires that it has a regular supply of oil, 
without which it could be easily held hostage.  
Russia, in its turn, will not step aside from the Chinese efforts to catch some part of the 
Central Asian energy pie. Recently the Russian Minister of Energy and Industry expressed its 
hidden concern on bilateral actions between Kazakhstan and China to build export pipeline 
towards east. He said: “Our prospects (i.e. those of Kazakhstan and Russia) on the 
exploration and routes of transportation should be made known and agreed on as early stages 
as possible. Then, we will avoid surprises on the one hand, and be prepared to any possible 
developments on the other hand”. Although Russia was invited to take part in the project and 
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fill in the pipeline once it has been built, Russia seems not to be in a hurry, probably in fear of 
undersupplying its own pipelines which face now a proficit of capacities. On the contrary, the 
Russian side raises the issue to expand throughput capacities of the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium bringing oil to the West, not the East. 302 
Each of the players has its own imperatives in devising foreign policy which are going to 
reflect its strategic geopolitical priorities. If this continues, it surely will bring little to the 
regional states to free up their economies from the negative influences of poor infrastructure, 
land-lockedness, as well as the suboptimum development and use of its natural resource base. 
In addition, geopolitical contradictions may lead to a zero outcome, since none of the players 
has a full set of dominant and long-term advantages. It means that any pipeline project in 
Central Asia will face a great risk to be at best continiously postponed, both for economic and 
geopolitical reasons. In the worst case, Central Asia may encounter the danger of 
marginalization from the main foreign investment flows benefiting thus little from its 
abundant energy reserves. 
It seems to be well perceived by the Central Asian states, since all of them are striving to 
combine “good neighborhood” with the regional powers, such as Russia, Iran and China, and 
simultaneously “strategic partnership and cooperation” with non-regional ones, such as the 
USA and EU, for instance. Another strategy of the major players towards the region would 
suggest that it is not going to be a zero-sum game, but compromised, result-oriented steps 
whose positive effects will cover both “regionals” and “non-regionals”. The Central Asian 
states badly need the political and security stability that will attract continuing investment in 
the development of its energy resources. The zero-sum notion that there is a certain amount of 
oil for the regional powers to fight over is dangerously shortsighted, particularly at a time 
when the world’s hunger for energy is growing so quickly, and ever more pipelines and 
export routes are needed to get supplies to market. There is more than sufficient market share 
across the globe to guarantee the region substantial national revenue. The latter is desperately 
needed for social and infrastructure projects of national and intra-regional scale which mainly 
remains a strategic task of the regional governments. What is needed is a dynamic, well-
coordinated partnership that profits from local comparative advantages and economies of 
scale to get untapped energy resources to the markets that need them. 
The United States, the European Union, China, Russia and Iran on the one side, and the 
Central Asian states on the other side should view the region as a single integrated energy 
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marketplace. Together they may begin a comprehensive “Eurasian energy dialogue” that 
would bring together the major outside investors—especially the United States and the 
European Union—with the region’s key actors. Joint projects that combine the experience, 
resources and technologies of Western, Asian and Russian firms can bring online energy 
deposits that would otherwise remain in the ground.303 Tension and rivalry between them over 
access to Central Asian energy could be eased by a more transparent and cooperative 
approach to the development of its energy resources being equal parts to this energy dialogue. 
Any outcome for the West would be more palpable and durable insofar as Russia, China and 
eventually, Iran would be partners. Hence the issue of energy should be predominantly 
oriented to the search for the multiple ways to unlock Central Asian oil and gas and promote 
diversification of transportation routes making their effects felt throughout the long-term 
period. Finally, it is also in vital interests of the young regional states to somehow balance 
close relations with the West and the links with their great neighbors. 
 
4.5. Summary 
Cooperation on the regional level acquires a particular significance. Central Asia in general 
has a vast energy base which, however, is unevenly distributed throughout the region. The 
bulk of water and hydropower resources are concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while 
fossil fuel resources are mostly located in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It 
allows to  secure stable power supply to the domestic market on the one hand, and significant 
volumes of oil, natural gas and coal for export on the other hand. 
But nowadays, energy industries of Central Asian countries has plunged into serious 
technological and economic difficulties. The wear and tear of machinery is extremely high. 
Ineffective pricing and tariffs policies with regard to energy, a drop in solvent demand and 
failure to pay for energy supply by domestic and foreign consumers impede the capacity to 
invest in the maintenance and development of fuel, generation and transport facilities that 
form the basis of the power industry.  
There are two strategic goals in the energy field which may contribute to the sustainability of 
Central Asian development in the future: self-sufficiency of the region in energy resources; 
and development and diversification of pipeline network system, both inside and outside the 
region.  
                                                 
303 Bremmer I. and Hawes C. An Insatiable Thirst for Oil. 
http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/October2004/October2004Bremmer.html 
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Equally energy efficiency and conservation policy are called to reduce energy intensity of 
Central Asian economies which exceeds several times that of leading industrial nations so far; 
minimize fuel and energy losses in all branches of economy promoting realization of 
substantial potential for energy savings which, if tapped, would greatly contribute to 
economic recovery and release significant investment resources for further development of 
mining and generating capacity, pipelines and networks, as well as to the easing-up of 
regional and global environmental pressures.  
To make these goals viable, Central Asian countries are to attract large-scale investment into 
the energy complex assisting in the exploration and development of new fuel resources, the 
modernisation and construction of new power plants, construction of new pipelines and 
electricity transmission lines and maintenance of existing ones, as well as the implementation 
of energy conservation projects. In addition, appropriate tax and fiscal and price policies, 
legal framework, market reforms, and training of experts are also to be essential. 
The regionalisation of Central Asia’s energy markets has a bright future, if pursued properly, 
since the regional states are closely connected through existing regional energy network and 
trade in energy resources. Besides, there is still shortage of energy in some countries. 
Therefore cooperation of Central Asian countries in the sphere of energy would imply 
establishment of regional energy market, coordination in pursuing intra-regional and 
interregional energy policy, so that to maintain intra-regional energy security and efficiency 
of regional energy exports. It would be unwise and wasteful to restrict trade in energy 
resources to Central Asia already because its power production potential and vast resources 
exceed the requirements of its economy and population.  
The main obstacle to further increase in exports of fuel and energy from the region is a poorly 
diversified network of pipelines bringing oil, gas and electric power from Central Asia to 
world and regional energy markets. At present, energy exports from Central Asia are mostly 
to go through Russia. A number of energy projects are at different stages of development, 
with the support from foreign multinationals, as well as governments and financial institutions 
(summarized in Annex 4.4). Foreign investment in the Central Asian energy industries can 
only be welcomed. Obviously, as economic stabilization continues and investment laws get 
better, foreign investment may significantly increase.  
Equally yet their realization will be largely dependent on how Central Asian states will 
manage to balance regional interests with the geopolitical and geoeconomic imperatives of the 
USA, Russia, the EU, Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkey. The USA driven by its universal 
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principles to push forward democratic values on the global level, are nevertheless trying to 
defend its geopolitical interests in the whole Eurasian continent, together with Russia, China 
and Iran. Russia has been showing very active engagement into regional economic and 
political processes in the last couple of years, striving for the restoration of its weakened 
positions in the past. China is concerned in both finding as much as possible diversified 
energy sources outside China for its rising economy, and pursuing active cooperation with 
major powers in the region (Russia, Iran, India) to strengthen its credibility and influence. Iran 
attempts to benefit from its advantageous geographical location by bringing forward 
economically viable energy and transport routes for Central Asian energy exports. The EU is 
gradually increasing its presence in the region enhanced by its future dependency of energy 
imports and security concerns over the potential global threats.  
In general, there are probably a few main alternatives related to Central Asian energy 
developments in the future. The first one would imply that the launched hidden rivalry 
between the main players could continue. For Central Asia it gives little positive effects in 
terms of the necessity to solve its desperate energy infrastructure problems, the efficient use 
of resource and secure sustainable foreign exchange and investments into the regional 
economies. The second way would ideally suit for the regional interests, since it recommends 
not to consider Central Asia as a battle field, but regard it as a space to bring the main 
competitors together, since none of them currently has an advantage and potential to dominate 
there. It is better for them to share common experience, costs and technologies, with the 
region to see global energy supplies and prices more stable, as well as set up the pre-
conditions for prosperous and sustainable development in the region. Finally there could be 
also some sort of the mix-up of the two previous scenarios, when some countries, such as the 
USA or China for example, could prefer closer cooperation with one countries, but again with 
the purpose to restrain a rising influence of the others. 
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Chapter V. INTEGRATION WITH THE WORLD ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
5.1. New Pillars of Foreign Trade Policy 
In the Soviet period Central Asia was not represented in foreign economic activities in a full 
manner, being actually cut off from the rest of the world. The scope and depth of foreign 
relations were significantly limited, while what was eventually allowed was nevertheless 
remaining under the close Centre’s spotlight.304 The foreign economic field was a state 
monopoly with the tough control from Moscow through organizational and institutional 
components, such as Soyuzvneshtorg (the Union Ministry for Foreign Trade), 
Vneshekonombank (the State Bank For Foreign Economic Relations, etc.)).305 
The share of Uzbekistan in total foreign trade turnover was insignificant.306 With the 
perestroyka to be launched in the mid-1980s, some ideas of liberalism came into the system of 
the centralized planning. The distribution of functions between Moscow and the Union's 
republics became the main subject of talks. Understanding of the shortages of the existing 
system forced the Union's government to hand over some of its functions in foreign trade to 
the republican authorities. Moreover, there was also a certain degree of awareness to launch 
some market mechanisms in domestic economy, such as free markets of goods and services, 
yet state monopoly on means of production was still supposed to remain.  
This wave of liberalism also touched upon Uzbekistan. In 1989 the republican agency 
"Uzvneshtorg" was set up to deal with foreign trade issues. It was, however, soon reorganized 
into the State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations. Then, after the declaration of 
independence, the given Committee was changed into the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations in 1992. Simultaneously, a number of other institutions in the frame of the system 
of foreign economic relations were also established, such as Customs, Insurance, Financial, 
etc. agencies. Foreign trade becomes one of the main fields of active government regulation. 
The retention of active government involvement at the initial stages of transition was 
                                                 
304 Basically, Uzbekistan was a host to a number of international cultural events with some sort of infromation 
and propagandist character, such as the Biennial International Film Festival of the countries of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America, in which only foreign countries from the Third world friendly to the USSR, took part regularly. 
Higher institutions for teaching and training specialists in orientalistics and language philology were also 
existing in the republic, still only a limited number of local staff in comparison with those who were able to 
graduate from the Moscow’s universities in similar fields, could make proper diplomatic career in the Soviet 
embasies abroad. See also Inomjonov Kh. “Aussen und Sicherheitspolitik der Republik Usbekistan in den ersten 
Jahren der staatlichen Unabhaengigkeit“ within the Central Asian project.  
305 According to some estimates, more than 80% of export and foreign exchange were controlled by Moscow and 
Russia, with 2/3 of total gold sales and more than 65% of the whole Soviet imports. See: Hanson Ph. The 
Economies of the Former USSR: an Overview, in Eastern Europe and the CIS, Paris, OECD, 1999, p.81. 
306 These figures amounted 4% for export and 4,8% for import in 1990. See: Annex 1.1b. 
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explained by lack of institutional base and expertise on the market system. With time going 
by, however, priorities within domestic strategy are obviously going to be shifted. 
The foreign economic sector is not an exception. The key element in the new domestic 
strategy in the years to come is to be so called “optimization” of government policy in the 
light of liberalization of processes in the foreign economic sector. This “optimization” must 
be understood not only as the reinforcement of domestic economy and its long-term 
sustainable economic growth, but also as successful integration of Uzbekistan into the system 
of international relations which, in turn, is a complex process to require both time and 
additional efforts, and, therefore, prudent national strategy as well.  
It is beyond the purpose that a transition economy which is trying to expand its foreign 
economic relations, should rely on exclusively market forces and mechanisms. Therefore, 
active government policy could play the role of a creator and coordinator in the domestic 
process, particularly at the outset of the reforms. In the long-run, however, there is a strong 
need for the appropriate adaptation of government policy and its tools to the permanent 
changes which take place both in domestic life and across the world. 
Liberalization of foreign economic relations becomes a more crucial and necessary element of 
the reaction to these changes. On the one hand, liberalization implies more freedom and 
sovereignity to economic units included in the system of foreign relations; transition from the 
direct administrative methods of regulation towards indirect, market tools in government 
policies; and the hindrance of existing barriers and obstacles in foreign trade. In this particular 
case, this is an objective and integral part of domestic liberalization of economic and socio-
political life, further structural and legal reforms in Uzbekistan. But on the other hand, it is a 
step forward to acknowledge the common rules and procedures widely extended in the 
civilized world community, the equal member of which Uzbekistan became after the 1990s. 
The main forms of such liberalization, according to the world practice, could be the expansion 
of foreign investments into the country, the avoidance of centralized system in foreign 
economic relations, the elimination of protectionist barriers for imports, export promotion, 
and current account convertibility of national currency. The skillful combination of the given 
forms allows the country to integrate with the world community on a mutually advantageous 
basis, with the simultaneous irreversible actions towards market mechanisms, and minimizing 
potential threats and damages of the multi-edged process. Since this process could also be 
seen as some kind of input-output one, they suggest to apply these tools in order to pursue 
national domestic interests too. How effectively they can be used by the government is 
 162
significantly dependent not only on real domestic conditions, specific to any single country, 
but also on the government itself which is liable for implementing general strategy of national 
development. 
At the same time, the strategy of long-run sustainable development of Uzbekistan requires to 
take appropriate measures towards the permanent improvements against the existing bottle-
necks in the system of foreign economic relations. These challenges could be mainly set out 
as follows: 
¾ the absence of a well-grounded scientific strategy in foreign economic relations, at least 
for the medium run; 
¾ poor development of organizational infrastructure of foreign trade and export promotion 
strategy chosen by the government as the priority for sustainable development; 
¾ insufficient market skills and knowledge among many economic units acting in the 
foreign field. This deficiency reflects in inefficiencies of their access to regional and 
world markets, low legal and technical experience both of which are integral part of 
foreign economic practice; 
¾ lack of or a limited access to commercial information in world markets; 
¾ the undeveloped system of technical assistance in key areas of foreign economic relations; 
¾ the comparatively low level of coordination among state agencies, including those directly 
involved in foreign economic relations. 
On the contrary, it is critical that all the tools may be equally significant and give no efficient 
results if they are secluded from each other and pursued without appropriate coordination with 
the other policy components. Moreover, existing problems may considerably weaken the 
efficiency of not only the programmes and steps in foreign economic area, but also affect 
those operating with primarily domestic issues. Actually, the reforms, either domestic or 
foreign, are strongly interrelated with some impact on each other in short- and long run. 
Therefore, Uzbekistan is in great need for comprehensive and well-grounded scientific 
foreign economic strategy, as well as for prudent technical assistance programmes conducive 
to the further development of foreign trade and joint entrepreneurship. 
Some priority areas the national strategy should embrace, will concern the main components 
of foreign economic policy, including import and export policies, as well as the reforms in 
domestic legislation, the shifts and priorities in government policies, and the role of FDI in the 
frame of overall liberalization in the foreign economic sector. 
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5.1.1. Necessity for Import Policy Adjustment  
One needs to emphasize that for a decade of independent development, Uzbekistan tried to 
follow consequent reforms in domestic trade regime in accordance with world's trade 
practices. In short, these steps could be characterized by the following characteristics and 
priorities, different in time and tools of their realization: 
1991-1994 - with a relatively low level of import tariffs (5-10%), the restrictions were 
imposed on exports. Export licenses were required for 74 groups of goods and 40% customs 
tariffs on export was introduced. The main aim of the foreign trade policy at that time was to 
control the main flows of goods, services and financial capital in trade with other republics, in 
terms of high uncertainty and mistrust in the post-Soviet territory, instability of mutual 
monetary and payment relations, and actually transparent customs borders between the former 
Soviet republics. 
1994-1995 - all import duties on consumer goods were lifted, in order to balance domestic 
demand and inflation. The number of goods which required export licenses was significantly 
reduced, from 74 to 4 positions in the end of 1995, however the level of tariffs continued to 
increase up to 50%, and in some cases - even up to 100%. 
1996-1997 - the period of initial macroeconomic stabilization. At that time differentiating 
import tariffs (from 5 to 50%) were introduced, and export customs were preserved, though 
two times were steadily reduced during 1996, except for raw materials. The feature of that 
time is that foreign exchange restrictions were introduced in IV quarter of 1996. 
1998-2004 - import customs and duties had been adjusted very often, especially in the recent 
years and reduced on average. However, they still remain high enough to serve as a serious 
barrier to imports. Export customs were fully eliminated. 
More specifically, foreign trade development in Uzbekistan in the past may bear the following 
main implications (See Tables (a) and (b), Annex 5.1).  
In the years of independence, foreign trade turnover has doubled from $3,083 bln. in the 
1990s to $6,68 bln. in 2003. The main shifts in priorities are embraced by the structure of 
main imports to the republic in different years. By giving a look at the merchandise structure 
of the early 1990s, one may see, that almost half (46% in 1992) in the republic's imports was 
food products, which fell to less than 10% in 2003. The latter figure points at the shifts of 
priorities from import to local production of major food products to cushion the food problem 
and rationalize domestic policy in redefining the national borders for economic security. On 
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the contrary, the share of machines and equipment in total imports saw eightfold increase 
from 5,2% in 1994 to 44,4% in 2003 as a result of government priorities to modernize and 
establish new industries in the domestic economy. The share of energy and related products 
fell down from 13,3% to 2,7% for the given period, which also was ensured not only by the 
economic necessities of continuous supplies of energy to domestic industries, but by political 
reasons too: while being less dependent on the main outside suppliers from North (oil and fuel 
from Russia and Kazakhstan) and from South (gas supplies from Turkmenistan), the country's 
potential would allow to turn into one of the main regional energy exporter in the future. 
Finally, imports of services increased from 0,3% in 1994 to 10,2% in 2003, which was 
basically related to permanent growth of transit tariffs on Uzbek goods across the territories of 
the neighbor countries. 
In more general way, the current scheme of national trade policy is made up of the following 
main elements307: 
1. strategic or social goods, which are supposed to have no opportunities to be produced in 
the republic, as well as raw materials and intermediate goods for the needs of domestic 
economy, including export-oriented industries, are levied with the least import taxes; 
2. the main group of imported consumer goods and other wares whose analogues are also 
produced domestically, are facing more protectionism; 
3. the goods which have good perspective, such as high technological equipment, home 
appliances, food and textile industries, but ill-developed at present for objective reasons, 
are protected until they become competitive.  
The government of Uzbekistan had eventually pledged to provide current account 
convertibility of national currency according to Article VIII of the Agreements of the IMF on 
October 15, 2003.308 The former, restrictive foreign exchange policy was consistent with the 
                                                 
307 Zarudnaya V. Tamojennye Stavki Umenshayutsya. No Voprosy Ostayutsya. www.zamon.info, 2004, march  
308 It needs to be pointed out, however, that international commitments arisen from the Article VIII of the IMF 
Agreement, as well as the tough macroeconomic parameters defined in the specially concluded the Staff 
Monitored Programme, put the domestic policy-makers under a certain extent of pressure. The Government 
decided to follow step-by-step devaluation of national currency - sum, by determining as a starting point, 
relatively over-valued exchange rate for the sum, according to international experts. From the national point of 
view, one of the main grounds for choosing this strategy was a fragile situation with many Uzbek enterprises, 
which are working with commercial foreign borrowings. The fears that decisive devaluation could merely put 
them into severe pressure in terms of repayments on foreign debts appearantly turned out to be a primary 
concern for the Government in this respect. However, such the strategy will require from the Government 
considerable foreign exchange funds to satisfy domestic needs in foreign exchange. In these particular terms, the 
Government took complimentary measures on restrictive monetary policies and on operations with cash in 
domestic consumer retail markets, with parallel high import duties, which severely restricted imports of small 
units and physical entities to the country. The latter step caused a great concern among multilateral donors and 
private sector as to be an obstacle on the way to favorable business environment, especially for small-scale 
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general trade regime. For that reason, liberalization of foreign exchange regime seems to have 
direct influence on tools and content of domestic trade policy and certainly requires 
appropriate adjustment in compliance with the changes which have been taking place. 
Moreover, with the intensification of integration with the world community, import policy in 
particular would require a clear steps on its further strategy in order to make the international 
commitments fully feasible. Political implications of this step are also important. 
Domestically this step can serve as an integral part of general intentions of the government to 
launch large-scale liberalization in all fields of domestic life: political, social, economic, legal, 
public. In international terms it may probably aim at convincing the world community of the 
irreversibility of the domestic reforms, the improvement in business climate, consolidation of 
stability, and finally, accelerated integration into the system of world relations. Yet the 
consequences of holding by the line are still due to be assessed. 
Trade restrictions hit investment climate, as well as socially unpopular. Whilst they continue 
they will undermine all other efforts to improve the policy and administrative regime for FDI. 
Their fundamental solution requires a changed approach to macroeconomic policy in which 
balance-of-payments management is handled by policy tools than by any others. It is going to 
be in line with the views of the government too, as the President of Uzbekistan I.Karimov has 
confirmed the necessity to abide by internationally accepted norms and standards in pursuing 
foreign economic policy. "We need to shift over promptly to the civilized, worldwide accepted 
forms of foreign economic activities…, to create legislative and economic conditions to 
attract foreign capital into our economy in a more widely way ", vowed the President 
I.Karimov, when spoke about national priorities in the new century.309 The aim should be to 
achieve as soon as possible normal business arrangements in which foreign investors and 
local business can freely import their requirements and readily pay for them at a market-
related exchange rate. 
But, exchange rate will obviously be further devalued to prompt other steps in the adjustment 
of domestic trade practices. In particular, further devaluation of national currency is expected 
to promote higher revenues from import duties and tariffs on consumer goods, denominated in 
foreign exchange, which would finally lead to the distortions between domestic and world 
prices of the similar goods. Such a situation would imply that under import taxes in 2001310 
                                                                                                                                                        
economic units. See for example: IFC/World Bank Small and Medium Enterprise Survey for Uzbekistan. 
www.ifc.org/centralasia 
309 Translated by the author from Karimov I. Uzbekistan Ustremlyonniy v XXI Vek. Speech at XIV Session of 
the Parliament. Newspaper "Narodnoye Slovo", 15 April 1999. 
310 New import taxes as for 1 January 2004 do not seem to change significantly. Available at www.bisnis.uz 
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domestic prices for video- and audio appliances would be by 2,1 times, grain products - by 
1,58 times, carpets - by 2,64 times higher than the world ones (Annex 5.2). In real terms, it 
leads the following undesired consequences: 
 severe price distortions on goods and services and therefore, inefficient distribution and 
use of the resources; 
 growth of cases of import taxes evasions which generates illegal import, especially in 
border areas with the countries, which do not apply similar restrictions; 
 the prices on consumer goods will apparently be soaring; 
 negative influence on the development of export industries311 
The government of Uzbekistan has solid ideas about the pivotal elements in its import policy. 
"We should, we are obliged to set up necessary conditions in domestic market, so that those 
goods, which we can and need to produce by ourselves and for which there are all 
opportunities, are to be produced in our own territory... Nowadays 75% of all sewing 
products traded in domestic market, almost 50% of shoes, about 80% of toilet soap and 
synthetic cleaning means, over a half of locally consumed animal fat and tinned food, (and) 
actually all the range of home appliances, is of import origin... There appears to be a 
question: what do our organizations and enterprises deal with? What activities are their 
leadership engaged in, notwithstanding their responsibilities for production of consumer 
goods?.. And there are no moves or efforts to look into market - no marketing, no output of 
demanded products, no application of modern management, no bonus schemes for staff 
workers through increases of their wages. We devised a broad system of tax privileges to 
encourage local production of consumer goods. What else has the government to do, what 
can it give? What kind of conditions should be set up yet, so that our stagnated managerial 
staff (in enterprises) could work properly? ".312 
A few important points could be drawn from this statement. The government follows a certain 
level of so called "critical import" - the size or volume of import which is allowed to the 
country both for economic and political reasons, and, therefore expresses primary concern if 
the domestic economy steps over this bounds. This is the right of any sovereign country to 
proceed from national priorities. However, as evident further from the words, this approach 
was attentuated by an extremely poor market behaviour of the local enterprises which 
                                                 
311 All these aspects are analysed in more details in subsequent subchapters. 
312 Translated by the author from the speech of the President of Uzbekistan Karimov I. made at the meeting of 
the Cabinet of Ministers devoted to the outcomes of socio-economic developments in the country in the year 
2002. http://www.press-service.uz/rus/rechi/r02172003.htm. 
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presumably had to, but failed to efficiently substitute for the limited import, although many of 
such local enterprises are usually given certain range of tax privileges in addition to the high 
level of tariff protection from analogical import. Yet, most of these enterprises still remained 
heavily dependent on the government and its decisions and thus kept being state units by 
substance. In such terms, the combination of these factors causes small incentives for such 
enterprises to follow market principles, accomplish necessary research in marketing, or 
simply doing better in line with the consumer demand and technological improvements. They 
factually become producing absolutely unnecessary and undemanded products which finally 
leads to overloaded warehouses of unsold goods.313 Moreover, the domestic consumers have 
no choice, but to put up with both unsatisfactory quality and unjustifiable the high level of 
prices in comparison with potential import.314 
For these reasons, it needs not to underestimate the general role which imports plays in the 
encouragement of competition, raising social welfare and economic growth of the country. 
Competition from import is a stick to punish domestic monopolists and a carrot to show local 
entrepreneurs which fields are going to be the most profitable. It is true that a discriminating 
feature of high efficiency in the Asian economies was a flexibility of the entrepreneurs in 
defining and using the niches in the markets through permanent improvement and expansion 
of the assortment, as well as of capital funds in reply to the ever-changing situation.  
Such flexibility is seriously limited in closed economies or in those which significantly rely 
on a couple of strategic large investors by providing them the high level of protection from 
competitive imports and therefore, exclusive market rights in particular sectors of the 
economy. Investments by DAEWOO (in automobile assembly and component 
manufacturing), BAT (cigarette manufacturing) and Coca Cola (beverages) were investments 
of this type, because they were strongly encouraged by the government. In such particular 
cases, domestic economy runs the risks to be heavily monopolized by a number of companies. 
In these conditions, there are several controversial issues for policy-makers to confront with, 
i.e. by providing protectionist measures the policy has to face with the problems of the 
rationale and the efforts on setting up competitive environment favoring a handful economic 
                                                 
313 Only during the year 2002 alone, such stocks of unrealized goods exceeded the established standards by 3,8 
bln.sums or about $4 mln.USD. The source is the same. 
314 For example, protective levels of tariffs and other fees for home appliances and electronics to support 
domestic production show that local prices make almost no difference with the similar imported groups of 
products embracing tariffs. Without tariffs, the latter become up to 1,5 times cheaper than domestically produced 
home appliances. If we assume that the costs of production factors in Uzbekistan are not at least higher (actually 
probably even lower) than in the other countries of the CIS where many of the products come from, one may 
suggest that domestic producers have rather little incentives to reduce production costs. On the contrary, the 
retention of the current tariff levels benefits them through protection from outside competition. Consequently 
locally produced home appliences come to be more expensive that the analogues in the neighbor countries. 
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units only. Moreover, the theory of such protective import policy points at the two bottlenecks 
in this policy. The first one is the uncertainty of time needed for local industries to become 
competitive. If it takes indefinite period of time which also does not guarantee the process of 
structural transformation to end up successfully, then the costs to society of such process in 
the long run could be comparatively higher than those potentially caused by alternative short-
term adjustment. The second factor underlines that with time gone by, even if the process 
would be going slowly and its outcome could be questioned, in the long run protectionism 
may become politically unpopular to be removed, since during this time political pressure, 
including from a number of lobbying groups, may develop and stay behind the conservative 
decisions to retain traditional shelter to domestic industries.315 
The recent system suggested that enterprises with foreign investment are entitled to export 
“products of their own production” and to import “products for their own needs” provided 
such products are approved by the government. This is intended as a concession to foreign 
investors but actually speaks of relatively restrictive approach to a fundamental requirement 
of business. The concession specifically excludes other forms of foreign investment and all 
other businesses which act as service providers and suppliers. 
Certainly one of the important principles in the long-run should be a system which can 
equally meet the national interests, i.e. of both domestic producers and consumers. As far as 
the government relies on selective import policy for economic, healthy and security reasons, 
import taxes are expected to continue playing important role here. Moreover, at least during 
so called "transition period", these tariff protections are justified if pursued in compliance 
with the rules and outcome of the negotiations on a bilateral and multilateral basis with the 
countries-members of the WTO.  
Yet subsequent competition with imports must not be also excluded, since the domestic 
consumers should have the rights to choose products of better quality among wide assortment. 
For local competitiveness of real sector to be maintained and enhanced, both productive and 
technological, import duties should subsequently tend to be reduced. Given the forthcoming 
long-lasting process of membership in WTO with its bearing rules on rates of duties, the 
efficacy of customs administration, the freedom to export and import and foreign exchange 
arrangements will require significant liberalization that would be also be highly beneficial to 
the investment climate. For this reason, further changes in import policy should take into 
                                                 
315 For this reason, the expected protection is to given to the industries which may satisfy two tests, i.e. that 
industry is able to become internationally competitive (Mill’s test); and that the industries may pay back social 
costs too incurred during protection period. See: Dynamic Arguments for Trade Barriers, in Mikic M. 
International Trade, New York, 1998, p.375 
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account the aforesaid process of irreversible liberalization and the steps towards it should be 
taken already today, i.e. before the process of entrance has initiated, in order to show the 
world community the seriousness of intentions and consistency of the measures undertaken.   
Thus, import policy should not necessarily mean the autarchy and isolation from the world 
community. Moreover, it is not to be a manipulation which gives exclusive and long-term 
protection to a number of domestic oligopolist companies from foreign competition. On the 
contrary, there should be a strong understanding of this measure as a forced and temporary 
step, aimed at giving rise to the particular environment to support and develop certain 
competitive industries, but which, from the very beginning, should take care of appropriate 
modernisation, higher efficiency and rapid efforts to produce competitive products, since they 
have to face clear time limits. It is common knowledge that sustainable development in the 
long run could be dependent much on the intensive development of export-oriented industries. 
 
5.1.2. Rethinking Commodity-Based Policy Behaviour 
The export structure of Uzbekistan on the eve of independence provided ¾ of total export 
revenues, mainly from the export of cotton, gold and other non-ferrous metals, with cotton 
alone provided 2/3 of export revenues. At that time, the given export structure considerably 
reflected objective needs of the republics and played a positive role in stabilization of the 
abrupt cease of Union’s subsidies after the collapse of the USSR. On the other hand, relatively 
rapid re-orientation of foreign trade from traditional Soviet consumers to the Far abroad made 
the export revenues sustainable for years. In such conditions, the share of the CIS countries in 
foreign trade (export) fell down from 69% (82%) in 1992 to 27,6% (22,9%) in 1996. The 
main reasons of shifts in trade vector were break-up of the traditional economic ties between 
the ex-Soviet republics, economic crisis touched upon all the states; collapse of the financial 
system which led to growing non-payments, both domestic and inter-republican, etc. 
Simultaneously, however, such the situation reflected the shortcomings of the planned system 
too, with the misallocation of economic resources, highly politicized decision-making 
process; forced and undisputable measures of the Centre relatively to most of the republics 
without taking into account appropriate economic and socio-political impacts of those steps. 
As a result, the Soviet economy continued its stagnation under the pressure of accumulated 
domestic and external problems.316 
                                                 
316 The impact of the given system could be revealed not only in the Soviet Union, but also in other Socialist 
countries, particularly in East Europe. The Eastern European countries were not allowed by the USSR for free 
trade development with Western Europe, mainly for political reasons. After the development in the “Soviet 
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In case of Uzbekistan, price factors have also played their role. The country turned out to be 
an immediate beneficiary of high world prices for cotton in the first half of the 1990s, since it 
was the second largest cotton export in the world. In such cases, efficient trade policies should 
have allowed for raising exports and get maximum benefits. Moreover, the rich domestic 
mineral base made the republic the 8th largest world’s gold producer, one of the tens of gas 
producers, as well as a large exporter of other non-ferrous metals. But what are the 
perspectives for Uzbekistan to remain as large commodity exporter? 
The first concerns on this occasion arose with the severe falls in world prices on the main 
commodity exports of the country. Another strike on the economy was bad harvest of cotton 
at that time. Moreover, traditional consumers of the Uzbek staples, Chinese imports of the 
Uzbek non-ferrous metals, for example, had also come down because of the complex of 
domestic factors in China itself. The reliability on commodity trade played against 
Uzbekistan. The country experienced huge losses in billions of foreign exchange which were 
of great significance for a country, those revenues were heavily dependent on a handful set of 
goods. 
At present, the situation on world markets seems to be quite favorable. Prices for cotton and 
gold have been soaring in the recent months, which could be explained not only with the 
structural changes in the world demand, but apparently also with the impact of world currency 
markets, weakening US dollar, a traditional unit of counting on many transactions in staples 
in the world markets, as well as by a high degree of uncertainty about the world security and 
stability. Thus, these moves in prices on commodities could get out of the control for non-
economic reasons too, which makes it also difficult to regulate them through pure economic 
                                                                                                                                                        
autarchy”, when the goods and services produced could be traded within the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA, est. in 1949) only, the Eastern European economies faced mounting systemic challenges 
with lower efficiency in production process, uncompetitive products in wider international measurements, 
domestic deficit of goods, out-of-dated industrial sector. The collapse of the CMEA brought about re-orientation 
of foreign trade in Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) in favor of the West. The degree to 
which the administered division of labor within the former CMEA had failed to exploit opportunities to trade 
with Western countries has been assessed then in a number of studies. For example, so called “gravity models” 
taking into account two groups of main factors: “size” of trading partners (GNP and population) and “trade 
resistance” (distance between countries, adjacency, trade policies) revealed that under “normal” conditions East 
European countries would have exported several times as much to OECD countries as they usually did. It was 
also estimated that the exports of six European countries to the EU could have been five times higher in 1985. A 
similarly large discrepancy between hypothetical and actual trade was revealed for East European imports from 
the EU. Correspondingly, some estimates show that intra-regional trade in Eastern Europe would have amounted 
to only 27% of total trade, instead of actually 67% in 1985.Similar studies tried to estimate such figures for the 
former Soviet republics, however they fall shortage of reliable empirical data. Nevertheless, the general trend of 
the distortions in flows and size of forced foreign trade seems to be in place. According to the available sources, 
in terms of hypothetical liberalization, inter-republican trade within the USSR would have amounted to 20-40% 
of its actual performance only. See: Wang Z., Winters L. (1991). The Trading Potential of Eastern Europe. 
CEPR Discussion Paper 610. London; Smith A. Eastern Eropean Economies, in Eastern Europe and the CIS, 
Paris, OECD, 1999. p.62-73. 
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tools. In such conditions, some ideas are debated on the possibility to set optimum export 
tariff which is intended to influence the world prices through putting limits on cotton export 
from Uzbekistan. Taking into account the fact that Uzbekistan is one of the largest producers 
and exporters of cotton, some authors believe that under particular conditions it is justified for 
the republic to pursue aggressive price-making and profit-maximization policy.317 
However, does Uzbekistan really have the sufficient set of tools and opportunities to keep the 
world prices moving in the desired direction and remaining at the most-wanted level? May 
exports restraints by Uzbekistan make prices soaring in global terms?  
The following considerations come on mind first. Certainly, much will depend on the prices 
elasticity of demand and supply of cotton, with less elasticity being the most desired and 
successful case for the republic. However, the actual elasticity of cotton in the world markets 
seems to be as desirably low, since there are substitutes for cotton. But even with the needed 
elasticity, it appears to be hard for the republic which does not dominate the world market, 
because there are other producers, including potential ones. To set up an organized union or 
structure in the form of a cartel, similar to OPEC, for example, is going to be something 
complex task not only for economic, but also for political reasons.318 The suggested restrictive 
trade policy would reap its fruits in the short-run, mainly since traditional consumers would 
find it not suitable to change their supplier and still continue rely on Uzbek cotton for a while. 
However, in the long run, they would be probably searching for other deliveries too. 
The concept of “export restraints” and “optimal export tariff” may look like a well-grounded 
argument which is believed to serve the national interests.319 But in the global perspectives, 
this kind of strategy seems to be a zero-sum game, even they could result in the unilateral 
benefits for one country. In general, they may worsen the terms of trade only, and therefore, 
                                                 
317 Trushin E. Liberalizatsiya Torgovli: Uroki Mejdunarodnogo Opyta. Magazine Ekonomicheskiy Vestnik 
Uzbekistana. 1999, No 11. The author, however, further admits that the given policy may be successful in the 
short-run only, and seems to be inconsistent in the longer run. 
318 Establishment of the oil cartel was preceded by the distinctive pre-requsites, different interests and situation 
in the international relations., immediately around oil and oil-products, but also much beyond these energy 
resources. Oil by its own is appearantly more valuable product today than cotton. On the other hand, the 
participation in such kind of cartels would provide the country with some leverages of regulation, but also 
require from it higher integration with the organization, abiding by particular committments and even political 
decisions, as well as the risks to be undeliberately involved into political games too. And as the previous 
experience has shown, the latter factor is one of the main reasons due to Uzbekistan was reluctant to take part in 
the similar groupings before. 
319 Equally, however, its effectiveness in terms of the magnitude and distribution of rents will depend on a 
number of presumptions, including the aforementioned demand and supply elasticities in the importing country, 
the competitive position of the third-country suppliers, the size of the export quota, and the institutional 
arrangement for issuing export permits. Find out more on export restraint explanations in Pomfret R. The 
Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.343-347. 
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the world’s welfare will appearantly diminish too. International experience shows that 
successful evidence of such policy in real conditions is nevertheless seldom.320 
As another crucial Uzbekistan’s exports is composed of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, the 
policy in this area is also requiring an adequate policy on the national level. One should take 
into consideration that domestic mining companies have needs in getting normal rates of 
return, i.e. their income must cover not only production costs, but also leave sufficient room 
for making profits. To devise policy without doubt is a much easier task than its 
implementation. The losses coming from lower royalties are obvious, but if these royalties are 
high enough or inadequate foreign exchange policy discriminates against economic 
development, then the exploitation of the existing mines or the exploration for new deposits 
would be similarly less attractive. In particular, implicit taxation of mining industries through 
overvalued exchange rate, for instance, is going to discourage sufficient investments into 
these sectors, including foreign. The government would remain the main investor and those 
funds would not be sufficient in general or even used inefficient in mainly state enterprises 
which operate in the mining sector. Besides, this is a great burden on government budget 
whose funds could and should be freed and used in other, more needed areas.321 
To sum up, sustainable economic growth in the long run has much more to do with further 
structural changes in the domestic economy and the development of industries with higher 
value added with the emphasis on export, than with the short term benefits of volatile 
commodity exports. Domestic policy with relation to primary industries is better to connect to 
a number of consequent measures on the national level, such as restructuring, attraction of 
foreign investments, tax and foreign policies, etc. designed to enhance necessary 
improvements there. 
5.1.3. Domestic Potential for Export Expansion and Diversification 
One of the main consequences of the fall in export revenues in the mid-1990s was the feelings 
about the necessity to develop the new strategy for export expansion and promotion. With the 
                                                 
320 For instance, the attempt of Brazil to exploit its much more monopolist situation in the world’s markets of 
coffee, failed soon, since high prices for coffee encouraged some new producers. The latter succeeded not only 
in bringing the prices down, but finally in diminishing the Brazilian share in the world market of coffee. Another 
example is the OPEC whose actions to use its power in the international arena were successful only up to 1974, 
but also finally came to nought, both because of changes in demand (energy-saving measures in the main 
consumer-contries) and supply (raise of production in non-OPEC states) side. All these trends caused the fall in 
prices for oil in the mids of the 1980s. Yet Hong Kong’s clothing exports and Japan’s auto and videorecorders 
exports to the USA and the EU, respectively in the first half of 1980s were more successful in reaping the 
benefits of export restraints. See: Pomfret R. Foreign Trade Policy For Economies in Transition. Magazine 
Ekonomichskoye Obozreniye, 1998, August; Pomfret R. The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements, 
Oxford University Press, 2001, p.330. 
321 On the detailed issues in energy sector see Chapter 3. 
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purposes of export development, increase in export of goods and services, expansion of goods 
assortment and sales markets, the government Programme for Development of Export 
Potential for the period till 2000 was worked out.322 The given programme of measures 
provided various privileges in domestic taxation and foreign trade. For instance, customs 
tariffs were abolished for all goods and services exported, except raw materials.323 The tax on 
profits (income) was diminishing with the higher ratio of exports in total production.324 
Growth of revenues in foreign exchange was also freed of profit tax, while VAT exemptions 
on raw materials used for exported goods, and ad hoc credits and privileged loans up to 3 
years were also widely used. 
The government of Uzbekistan has made liberalization of the foreign economic activity and 
promotion of export as one of its top priorities in recent years. There are additional tax 
privileges for industries to promote export production. From July 1, 2000, export-oriented 
enterprises were exempted from tax on income from export, and property tax are reduced by 
50% under the export ratio runs to 25-50%, is not going to be paid at all, if the export reaches 
50% of the output.325 
Simultaneously, the government took regular measures designed to reduce administrative 
barriers. Export promotion was encouraged both in general and selective manner with relation 
to branches and industries of the economy, the character of participants, as well as to sources 
of financing, with a priority on foreign investments. Generally speaking, such a great deal of 
legislative documents adopted in the field of foreign economic activity was as much essential 
and necessary as it was in successful economies of South East Asia in its time whose way of 
export expansion Uzbekistan was trying very much to follow. 
These measures, however, did not bring those much-needed results expected by their 
designers. In many times, successful cases were single, taking the form of distinctive projects 
in particular fields of the economy.326 In general, the situation changed little in reply to the 
                                                 
322 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan No 110 dated 12 March 1998. 
323 Respective Decrees of the President dated 10 October and 26 October 1997.  
324 President’s Decree “On Additional Measures to Encourage Enterprses Producing Goods for Export” of 20 
March 1996. 
325 President’s Decree “On Additional Measures Designed to Encourage Export Production” of 5 June 2000. 
326 For example, textile works „Kabool-Ferghana Company“ in Ferghana with the participation of the Korean 
“Kabool textile” was intended to manufacture 25000 tonnes of local cotton fibre from raw cotton. The foreign 
investor was also committed to provide another $1 bln.USD for re-equipment, upgrading and technological 
modernisation of a number plants in the Uzbek textile industry. According to some data, this company export 
revenues had been amounted to more than $230 mln.USD during 1997-2001. And since light industry in general 
and textile industry in particular was among the Government’s priorities, any efforts on foreign capital inflows 
are strongly encouraged. Multialteral donors are also due to back these developments. The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development is lending $1.2 million to privately held, Tashkent-based Gisad O’zbek, to 
finance part of the Uzbek textile company’s start-up working capital. Gisad O’zbek will use locally produced 
 174
legislative steps and required additional policy decisions. Most large exporters, for example, 
were to function in keeping with the export plans pledged by them before the government. As 
a rule, only a few of them succeeded such plans. Many of them showed weak export 
performances.327 If we take into account that these industries are going to play the key role in 
industrial development and sustainable economic growth in Uzbekistan, strengthening its 
position in foreign markets, etc., then much work need to be done in this area. As the 
Chairman of the State Agency for Ill-Performed Enterprises, pointed out, “No country in the 
world has achieved its economic goal so far by following import substitution policy. On the 
contrary, the countries which expanded their export successfully through pursuing industrial 
policy, provided their nation with the higher standard of life and economic development”.328 
Thus, the main impediments to export expansion, among the others, has been the following: 
¾ low competitiveness of the domestic products in the world markets which was caused by 
high production costs, out-of-dated equipment and production processes, relatively poor 
quality characteristics; 
¾ ill-financial performance of the enterprises in view of rising non-payments and mutual 
debts between economic units; 
¾ high transport expenses (transit fees imposed by other countries); 
¾ domestic changes in the countries – traditional consumers of the Uzbek goods (changes 
in tastes and demand for the Uzbek goods); 
¾ incomplete structural problems (many enterprises still seem to have shortage of new 
approaches in corporate management, qualitative regulation in finance, efficient and 
sustainable organization structure, etc.); 
¾ costs of the domestic macroeconomic policies (anti-export bias in tax and foreign 
exchange regime, trade policies). 
In the search of the ways to solve many-sided domestic challenges in the foreign sector, 
international experience may be very useful. Given the hightened interests for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
yarn to manufacture about 5,000 tonnes a year of knitted cotton fabric, mostly for export. See Mirzakhidova Sh. 
Razvitiye Eksportnogo Potentsiala Respubliki Uzbekistan. Magazine Bozor, Pul, Kredit. 2002, No 2; Uzbek 
textile plant gets $1.2 million EBRD loan, EBRD Press release, 22 December 2004. 
327 For instance, the association “Uzmashprom” reached only 54% of its plan targets, “Uzstroymaterialy” (Uzbek 
construction materials company) - 44,8%, “Uzpisheprom” (Uzbek food industry) - 27,9%, “Uzchimprom” 
(Uzbek Chemical industry) - 25,2%, “Uzavtoprom” (Uzbek Auto industry) - 25%, National Oil and Gas 
company “Uzbekneftegas” –  only 49,6%. Mirzakhidova Sh. Razvitiye Eksportnogo Potentsiala Respubliki 
Uzbekistan. Magazine Bozor, Pul, Kredit. 2002, No 2. 
328 Saidova G. „Osnovnye Problemy Makroekonomicheskoy Politiki”, Magazine Rynok, Dengi, Kredit. May, 
1998. 
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achievements of South East Asia’s successful export-oriented development, we find it 
necessary to summarize once again those important pillars of that success which, to our mind, 
could be particularly good lessons for Uzbekistan to improve the situation to the better. In the 
given context, the following lessons from new industrialized countries of Asia are important: 
 sound macroeconomic policies and an unrestricted access to domestic and import inputs 
were absolutely vital for exporters. As it became clear, they cannot be substituted by 
specific export incentives. But even though the latter are also significant from case to 
case, they must be granted very cautiously in order to avoid or discourage rent-seeking 
activities and minimize budget burden. 
 to pursue import substitution and encourage export expansion seems to be very 
complicated task in the light of setting up similarly favorable conditions for all. The point 
here is to prevent a policy-induced bias against exportable products. Thus, the policy 
regime should aim at equalizing the domestic resource costs of earning one unit of foreign 
exchange through exports with the domestic resource costs of saving one unit of foreign 
exchange through import substitution. 
 export subsidiaries mainly granted in the form of tax rebates or exemptions and credit 
facilities at interest rates below market rates are said to account for greater assistance to 
exporters than duty drawbacks or exemptions. 
 tremendous marketing and institutional support for business entities from which smaller 
and newcoming exporters gained especially large benefits. 
 FDI are crucial to the extent, as they may not only provide much-needed capital, 
technology and human skills, but may also contribute directly to export growth. 
 increasing diversification and technological sophistication of exports which was mainly 
obtained through steady process of technological transfer and continuous efforts on 
building up of professional skills and knowledge. Among additional direct measures, 
intra-regional networking in terms of trade and investment helped also this process 
considerably.329 
Similarly, East Asia’s export success should not be universalized and expect immediate 
effects on Uzbekistan’s export strategy. It has to be admitted that there are a number of 
                                                 
329 Agarwal J., Laughannen R., Luecke M., Mannerkamp P. Export Expansion and Diversification in Central and 
Eastern Europe: What can be learnt from East and South East Asia? Institut fuer Weltwistschaft, Kiel, 
November, 1995. 
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distinctions between the countries concerned. These differences are mainly reflected in the 
following aspects: 
o East Asian countries did not face the painful experience of transition economies, including 
Uzbekistan, which had to cope with an obsolete capital stock and suffered from declining 
production at the initial phase of economic reforms; 
o export growth was achieved in Asia in a relatively open trading environment, while 
Uzbekistan had been cut off from the immediate foreign trade for the decades of the 
Soviet rule; 
o East Asian economies were export forerunners in a large number of manufacturing 
industries at times of high world economic growth. On the contrary, the world economy 
has been stagnating since the 1990s. Moreover, Uzbekistan has to face more severe 
competition for its exports from many developing countries, including East Asia itself, as 
well as from other transition economies of the Eastern Europe and the CIS due to similar 
export structure. 
Uzbekistan pursued the two-pronged strategy of import substitution and export promotion. In 
terms of factors and appropriate conditions to do this job with equal success, Uzbekistan 
seemed to have come under particular pressure. Introduction of foreign exchange restrictions 
led to highly appreciated exchange rate of national currency, which was certainly beneficial 
for import substitution industries. On the contrary, the multiple-exchange rate system and 
regulation over the whole inflows and outflows of foreign exchange, including also the 
restrictions on the imports of raw materials via encouraging the higher local content in 
production even more discouraged domestic exports in favor of the import-substituting 
industries.330  
In Uzbekistan, a number of particular measures should be thus undertaken to help exports 
developing on the sustainable basis. These steps might reflect in that: 
 both foreign and domestic investors should be equally encouraged to expand export. That 
means that tax and privileges must not discriminate against any sides. 
 subsequent steps on restructuring and privatization of middle and large-scale state 
enterprises need to be intensified to attract foreign capital in the forthcoming years. The 
                                                 
330 See also Pomfret R. Foreign Trade Policy For Economies in Transition. Magazine Ekonomichskoye 
Obozreniye, 1998, August. 
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experience of some East European economies, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Poland, points at the efficient cases of FDI inflows in the recent past.331 
 conditions for small and medium-sized business need to be set up to expand their 
opportunities on the regional markets of the CIS and Central Asia. In some cases, the role 
of the government is critical to support these long-run and promising trends. This support 
could come either through the targeted incentives or mutually advantageous schemes of 
collaboration with the larger domestic companies which could do this job better in view of 
more financial and management capacities. 
 foreign exchange, tax and customs policy measures require concerted adjustments.332 
According to the legislation, for example, only export in foreign exchange could be 
exempted from VAT. If the given exemption were viable for all the exports, it would 
increase its level on aggregate.333 
 improvements in trade policies would suggest to pull aside restrictive and administered 
tools. The list of the banned exports, for instance, could be in no need anymore. As 
domestic and world prices equalise, better export opportunities are available if the 
elements of direct bans are abolished. It would be in compliance with the non-interference 
principle of the government contributing to its higher credibility. 
 measures are equally necessary to encourage export and import operations not only in 
foreign exchange, but also in national currency. The division of operations to be carried 
out in foreign exchange and in national currency should now serve more as a tools of 
                                                 
331 Foreign Direct Investments: New Trends in Transition Countries. The World Bank/William Davidson 
Institute, Transition, October 1999. See also: Rojec M.  The restructuring of firms in foreign privatizations in 
Central and Eastern European countries. Magazine Transnational Corporations, Vol.10, No 3. 
332 The experience of South East Asia suggest the following useful lessons in this regard. Before a variety of 
export promotion measures were introduced, the multiple exchange rate system was replaced by a unified rate in 
Taiwan in the 1960s. The effective devaluation amounted to 60% for exporters that was also followed by a 
number of administrative, fiscal and trade supportive measures. Consequent measures to promote domestic 
export in Korea, for instance, were also followed by a major devaluation of national currency in 1964 which 
played additional encouraging signal for domestic producers. On the contrary, insufficient trade reforms and 
liberalization efforts in Indonesia appearantly to be unable to completely remove the anti-export bias of 
government policies, including the negative consequences of the so called Dutch desease syndrome. Being more 
well endowed with natural resources, the country proved to show less impressive economic performance than 
other economies of the region. Thus real exchange rate policies was critical aspect of export promotion, 
regardless before or after the package of complementary incentives had been introduced. Find out more in: 
Agarwal J., Laughannen R., Luecke M., Mannerkamp P. Export Expansion and Diversification in Central and 
Eastern Europe: What can be learnt from East and South East Asia? Institut fuer Weltwistschaft, Kiel, 
November, 1995; Chung H.Lee The Economic Transformation of South Korea: Lessons for the Transition 
Economies, OECD, 1995. 
333 Sirajiddinov N., Gulyamov R. Reforma Vneshnetorgovoy Politiki v Protsesse Liberalizatsii Valyutnogo 
Rynka Uzbekistana. Magazine Halqaro Munosabatlar, 2001, No 3. 
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accounting and must not thus be the ground for granting some sorts of privilleges or 
pursuing discriminatory actions, as it was in the past.334 
 reliable transport communications system needs to be developed to help export 
development. It means that appropriate additional measures could be essential in speeding 
up and raising efficiency of cargo traffic from Uzbekistan to the CIS and other countries, 
including the signing, if necessary, inter-governmental agreements on tariffs, transit fees, 
etc. both on bilateral and multilateral basis. 
 trade links with traditional partners and consumers from the nearest regions, such as the 
CIS, for example, has to be strengthened. It is not only economically viable given 
transport costs form a high content in the Uzbek exports, but the established links are 
important in revealing prospective markets in Europe or Asia through the concerted 
efforts with the neighbors. 
One of the important elements to sustain export in the long-run is a question of technological 
improvement through the transfer of technologies and expansion of local technological 
capabilities. The transfer of technologies to Uzbekistan may occur in different forms, either 
through construction of turn-key plants or technology licensing and the purchase of 
equipment. Here there is a dilemma for the national policy. In the first form, new technologies 
are not only supplied, but also used under strict control of foreigners consequently requiring 
the limited use of local factors, mainly only labor force. It certainly may find little 
countenance among the local leadership for fear of loosing the key levers of control in 
economy. It may have also limited influence on technological learning. In turn, two other 
forms are efficient to the extent, to which the user can obtain and process sufficient 
information to choose among available techniques, and to adapt the new technology to local 
conditions with only limited support from the suppliers. Yet although the local users would be 
sovereign in using these technologies and the state may retain its strategic control, the 
equipment would still remain dependent on the imported spare parts, raw materials and 
maintenance services provided by technology suppliers.335  
In addition, one may expect that firms in industrialized countries will hardly transfer 
proprietary technology to potential competitors in the world markets if this is likely to 
                                                 
334 The initial imporant step in this direction has already made. The decision to hold auction sales on strategic 
commodities (cotton, benzin, diesel, non-ferrous metals) on the Republican Commodities Exchange was crucial, 
even though these commodities are supposed to be traded for domestic consumption only. It is certainly also true 
that further steps should be done to open these trades for export also. 
335 Such practice was quite the case in Eastern Europe in the end of 1960-beg.70s when limited attempts to open 
domestic economy to foreign investors and required modernization resulted in controversial results. See: Smith 
A. Eastern Eropean Economies, in Eastern Europe and the CIS, Paris, OECD, 1999. p.64. 
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undermine their competitive positions. In this case, two trends may appear to develop: either 
Uzbekistan will benefit from inflowing outmoded technology, or modern technology may 
come on the condition of export markets segmentation. To all probability, if foreign investors 
are attracted in the export oriented industries, as the main contributors of technologies and 
funds, the following is better to take place. An exporting firm in Uzbekistan may concentrate 
on manufacturing operations while their partners abroad will be responsible for product 
design, quality control, and marketing. 
As the next stage, to build up technological and management capabilities are necessary. One 
needs to understand that channels of technological transfers is crucial, but not sufficient 
element. Technological capability may be defined as ability of local firms to select, adapt, and 
apply hitherto unknown technologies. From this point of view, there is a lot of debates which 
point at the high educational level in almost all transition economies as a very strong 
advantage to attract FDI and pave the way towards sustainable economic growth. However, in 
fact it is very hard task to determine direct influence how the high level of education may 
influence economic growth, at least in short period of time. The more modern viewpoint 
emphasizes that learning on the job is more precise and important alternative form of human 
capital formation. It occurs as a result of gathering experience in the performance of new 
activity, in the sense that the time required to perform a certain task declines with cumulative 
output. It allows the professional qualifications of many members of the labor force to 
improve simultaneously, while in case of general education, for instance, the skills of labor 
force can normally change very slowly and if only new entrants have a higher educational 
level than those who leave the labor force. In this context, the main policy implications are so 
that further emphasis in government policies should be made on maintaining strong 
investments, especially private, not only into a good educational system of general education, 
but also in the schemes which would encourage permanent up-grading of technical and 
managerial skills. 
Finally, if the country wants to face sustainable export boost, the crucial role of institutional 
and marketing component should be taken into consideration. The export promotion success 
across the Asian region, led by Japan, was significantly contributed to this factor and 
appropriate policy measures. All countries which chose the outward-oriented strategy tackled 
the issue on the national level by creation appropriate organizational structures most of them 
financed by state budget. For instance, in Japan, that was Japan External Trade Promotion 
Organization (JETRO), in Malaysia - Malaysia Trade Development Corporation 
(MATRADE), in Singapore - Singapore Trade Development Board (TDB), in Korea - Korea 
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Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA). In addition to direct privileges and subsidies in from 
of tax exemptions, drawbacks, credit and financial facilities, as well as extremely favorable 
general environment, the Asian governments provided wide range of indirect assistance to its 
exporters through the given agencies which was reflected in collecting and distributing market 
information, finding customers for their products, advertising products abroad, etc.336  
Given the strong need of domestic exporters in Uzbekistan for such kind of assistance in the 
past, further policy in this area should be drastically improved. It is absolutely clear nowadays 
that reliance exclusively on trends in foreign markets is not more enough and even dangerous. 
Efficient outward-oriented policy requires efficient institutions to take care of export interests 
in foreign markets and investments rather than relying on the initiatives of foreign buyers 
only. One needs to help domestic firms in creating the proper trade channels for exports and 
expanding an access to commercial and other necessary information on foreign markets. This 
could be reached by providing assistance in marketing new products and services, product 
development, including product design and packaging, training in marketing, participation in 
trade fairs and exhibitions, searching for potential partners, etc. In the long run, one may 
expect that in a row with public agencies of this kind, there will be also private trade 
associations which can subsequently coordinate their efforts in pushing forward and 
protecting interests of all exporters. 
 
5.2. The Significance of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the Foreign Economic 
Strategy of Uzbekistan 
5.2.1. Necessity, Role, and Advantages of FDI in Economic Development:  
Global Trends and Features 
History of world economic development has many interesting and useful lessons for all 
transition economies. If Uzbekistan has committed to follow liberalization in the foreign 
economic sector with the purpose of closer integration into the world community, it becomes 
of a particular significance to realize those tendencies which have driven the world 
community for the last decades. International experience is rich in the cases of withdrawing 
benefits from the division of labor and cooperation. Intense cross-border movements of 
capital has become one of the crucial aspects of such development. 
                                                 
336 Alimov A., Muminov R. Liberalizatsiya Vneshneekonomichskoy Deyatelnosti (Mirovoy Opyt i Problemy 
Uzbekistana). Magazine Rynok, Dengi, Kredit, 2000, No 11; Agarwal J., Laughannen R., Luecke M., 
Mannerkamp P. Export Expansion and Diversification in Central and Eastern Europe: What can be learnt from 
East and South East Asia? Institut fuer Weltwistschaft, Kiel, November, 1995. 
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It is common knowledge, for instance, that one of the main components of sustainable 
development in South East Asia (SEA) was played by the substantial inflows of foreign 
capital and appropriate domestic policies. However, the impact of Asia’s attractiveness for 
FDI on its export-oriented development is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, the proposition 
that large and rising inflows of foreign capital have significantly contributed to sustainable 
export growth, seems to be well-grounded. Some empirical analysis showed, for instance, that 
FDI and trade flows were positively correlated.337 Higher outflows of FDI from Germany, 
USA and Japan, the largest sources of the global FDI, to industrialized and developing host 
countries went hand in hand with higher exports from host to home countries of foreign 
investors. The steep increase of world-wide FDI over the last two decades, and close links 
beween trade and FDI could be attributed to globalization strategies of multinational 
enterprises. Innovative production techniques dramatically reduced transaction and 
communications costs. The liberalization of capital markets and related developments have 
added new dimensions to the international division of labor. Production processes could 
increasingly be fragmented and relocated to countries offering the most favorable conditions 
for producing certain goods or parts thereof, which could be supplied on world markets at 
competitive terms.338  
These FDI to South East Asia were mainly world-market oriented, rather than domestically 
oriented, and, thus, were directly linked with export expansion and export diversification at 
the host countries. Japanese firms which were among leading investors in SEA, are especially 
well-known for their world-market orientation. In countries, like Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand, foreign firms accounted for more than half of manufacture exports. 
Furthermore, much of the region’s export activity has been in sectors in which FDI and the 
associated transfer of technology and industrial know-how have been substantial. In this 
                                                 
337 Nunnenkamp P., Gundlach E., Agarwal J. (1994) Globalisation of Production and Markets. Kieler Studien, 
262, Tuebingen. 
338  In 2002, for example, FDI to developing countries of Asia, including NIC, China and India, amounted to 
more than 11 times the figure of 1987. The region’s share in total world-wide FDI flows soared to 26% in 1993 
and went down to about 14% in 2002, mainly because of severe competition from other regions, especially 
Central and Eastern Europe, as well as a result of massive financial crisis in 1997-1998. See for more details 
Agarwal J., Laughannen R., Luecke M., Mannerkamp P. Export Expansion and Diversification in Central and 
Eastern Europe: What can be learnt from East and South East Asia? Institut fuer Weltwistschaft, Kiel, 
November, 1995. p.21; Foreign Direct Investments: New Trends in Transition Countries. The World 
Bank/William Davidson Institute, Transition, October 1999, p.7; UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2003; 
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2003, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2003overview_en.pdf  
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respect, both FDI in, and manufactured exports of SEA shifted to more skill-intensive 
industries.339  
It needs to be stressed that one of the strongest benefits of FDI comparing to other forms of 
investments is that they are carried out on the long-term basis and mainly directly into 
production. This makes their influence on host economies more sustainable and prevent any 
negative short-term outflows of capital which may damage so far the fragile system of 
economic relations in small economies  similar to Uzbekistan.  
Notwithstanding significant foreign stocks in Asia in the mid-1990s, some new trends in the 
world distribution of financial flows were seen due to alternating financial and economic 
crises in Asia, Russia, Brazil in the second half of the last decade, and the measures 
undertaken in other recipient-countries. Total volumes of FDI inflows in Central and Eastern 
Europe hit a new record - almost $29 bln.USD, yet FDI flows were uneven across the region 
by increasing in 9 and falling in 10 economies in 2002. Moreover, this figure is much less 
than the corresponding indicator in China which alone proved to be the second largest 
recipient of FDI (about $53 bln.USD) and the largest economy by FDI stocks in the world in 
2002.340 
However, it changed little when traditional geographical movements of FDI across the world 
are concerned. Although, for instance, outflows from the EU to Asian developing economies 
increased significantly, when the periods of 2000-2001 and 1986-1987 are compared, the 
region remained a minor host for EU investors who preferred intra-regional engagements 
during the process of European enlargement towards East. There seems to be developing 
consequent and severe competition for foreign investments between the regions, who are 
potential recipients, as well as between those, who serve as a source of world-wide 
investments. While Eastern Europe consolidates its positions in targeting Western European 
markets and investors, Asia remains abiding to the US and Japanese markets.341 On the other 
hand, the distance between recipient and donor countries is also taken into account. So called 
“gravity models” reveal, for example, that for each doubling of distance, trade between two 
                                                 
339 Agarwal J., Laughannen R., Luecke M., Mannerkamp P. Export Expansion and Diversification in Central and 
Eastern Europe: What can be learnt from East and South East Asia? Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft, Kiel, 
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340 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2003, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2003overview_en.pdf  
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Luecke M., Mannerkamp P. Export Expansion and Diversification in Central and Eastern Europe: What can be 
learnt from East and South East Asia? Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft, Kiel, November, 1995. 
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countries of similar size diminishes by two thirds. A common border, on the contrary, tends to 
increase trade links between corresponding states by a factor of 2,5.342 Thus, the competition 
between the regions seems to be further under way with the emergence of new transition 
economies to behave as the viable alternatives to European and Asian companies in various 
industries. 
Nevertheless, the aforesaid tendencies worldwide do not diminish, but reinforce that crucial 
role which FDI could play in Uzbekistan too. Such a reliance on foreign capital should 
coincide with the whole strategy of national reforms in the foreign sector. In particular, this 
interrelationship is seen in the following important aspects: 
a) FDI may contribute to the liberalization campaign, pledged by Uzbekistan, especially 
through further reforms in the foreign sector. That would imply demonopolization of 
foreign trade by encouraging the more active involvement of domestic private sector and 
giving support for foreign investors. The latter are able to assist in reinforcing domestic 
competitive environment and finding out national competitive advantages of the country 
in international perspective. 343 
b) The 2004 Investment Programme of the government was about to reduce centralized 
state investments into the domestic economy, in view of expected higher volumes 
foreign assistance. In particular, $1,028 bln.USD of investments for 92 projects were 
expected to be attracted, a little bit more than in the previous year.344  
c) International experience is rich in successful examples which point at the key role of 
FDI in pursuing efficient structural changes, developing export industries through 
further expansion and diversification, creating competitive environment, as well as 
encouraging further modernization of branches and providing products of better 
quality.345 Therefore, the country needs consequent strategy with proper national actions 
to keep up sustainable inflows of capital. 
                                                 
342 For more details see Balassa B., Bauwens L. (1989) The Determinants of Intra-European Trade in 
Manufactured Goods. In Jacquemin A., Sapir A. (eds) The European Internal Market. Trade and Competition, 
Oxford. 
343 See more about the role of FDI in UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and 
Export Competitiveness. http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=2477&lang=1 
344 In 2003, the volumes of suggested foreign investments in the Government’s investment programme was equal 
to $860,44 mln.USD. However, two thirds of these investments were due to be attracted under government 
guarantees. Therefore, much work needs to be done to improve legal conditions and the mechanism of applying 
other forms of guarantees required for foreign investors. Zarudnaya V. Pravitelstvo Delayet Stavku na Investitsii. 
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345 Rojec M.  The restructuring of firms in foreign privatizations in Central and Eastern European countries. 
Magazine Transnational Corporations, Vol.10, No 3 
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d) In terms of the limited domestic resources, FDI would allow not only to cushion the 
given problem by providing necessary funds, but also ease the burden of expenses on 
domestic budget. The freed state funds could be efficiently used in pursuing more 
ambitious and targeted reforms in other fields, such as the development of legislative 
and court system, the improvement in designing guarantees for private domestic and 
foreign investors, the improvement in national governance and tools of macroeconomic 
policy, targeted welfare programmes, etc. 
e) Uzbekistan remains underperformed in some specific areas with the potential still to be 
tapped. It seems that the government also see the bottom of the given issue. “We can not 
be happy with the state of affairs in attractinng foreign investments into the processes of 
privatization of large-scale enterprises. It is especially true for the enterprises in the 
frame of the National Oil and Gas Holding “Uzbekneftegas”, Company 
“Uzstroymaterialy” (construction materials), the State Joint Company 
“Uzkimyosanoat” (chemical industry) and many others”.346 Let alone the quality 
dimension of the privatization process, the point concerns poor FDI performance in 
lucrative mining industry which can give an additional impetus for higher foreign 
investment.347  
In general, for the whole Central Asian region and Uzbekistan in particular, it is crucial to 
become beneficiaries of the world capital inflows, as SEA succeeded in doing so in its time 
and what Eastern European countries have been trying to do after the 1990s. Significant 
distance from the main sources of FDI in the world, however, puts on the agenda a number of 
socio-political, macroeconomic, legal issues to be addressed on the national level. In its turn, 
this requires appropriate analysis of factors and conditions to drive FDI inflows. 
 
5.2.2. Driving Forces of FDI Inflows 
In order to perceive the reasons and motivations of foreign investors on whether to invest or 
not into particular country under specific conditions and time, one needs to set out the forces 
under which investment decisions are taken. Besides, it is also crucial that the major 
                                                                                                                                                        
coordination and the development of human capital: knowledge flows in Malaysia´s TNC-driven electronics 
clusters. Magazine Transnational Corporations, Vol.11, No 3. 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=3334&intItemID=2926&lang=1 
346 Translated by the author from the speech of the President of Uzbekistan Karimov I. delivered at the annual 
meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers on the socio-economic developments in the country in the first half of 2003. 
Newspaper “Narodnoye Slovo”, 19 July 2003. 
347 The question of efficient state policy with regard to proportional distribution of FDI among the sectors of the 
economy in line with national priorities is another aspect which needs particular consideration. 
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contemporary international trends in worldwide FDI requires the clear assessment and 
reactions on the high level, i.e. by designing and pursuing national investment strategy.  
Let us start with some theoretical issues. There is vast amount of literature explaining FDI 
movements between countries. The inflow of FDI in transition economies, therefore, stands 
on various factors in both host and home countries of investors. Given the range of potential 
motives, it is very difficult to provide a single model covering all possible circumstances, 
because they may differ substantially from country to country. Thus, we try to define and 
generalize the factors which could be subsequently attributable to Uzbekistan. 
The issue why FDI movements worldwide have become so huge for the last three decades 
among other factors has much to do with the theoretical explanations. One of them stems 
from the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem on the differences of the production factors endowment in 
various economies.348 It states that under the conditions of identical and homothetic 
preferences, balanced trade and non-reversals of factor intensities, each country exports 
commodity which requires for its production the relatively intensive use of the factor found in 
relative abundance in that country. In other words, the question is about the relative 
availability of capital (K) and labour (L) in the host countries for foreign investments to be 
competitive in production of goods and services. In transition economies, in this respect, the 
proportion between these two factors, i.e. K to L is much lower than in the developed 
countries, due to lack of capital and excess of labor. That means that any additional injection 
of capital unit would mean high return per unit of capital invested, or higher marginal 
productivity of K, in comparison with investments at home. Consequently the strategy of 
profit maximization makes investors to seek for such places where they can reap the benefits 
from more efficient use of their capital. 
The new classical theory of economic growth backed mainly by the international institutions 
is based upon the assumption that real interest rates differentials adjusted to the fluctuations of 
foreign exchange rate is the main driving force for FDI, i.e. where the interest rates are higher, 
then, FDI will move into these countries. However, this theory does not explain, why the FDI 
move in opposite directions too, i.e. into the countries with lower interests rates.349 
Severe competition between transnational corporations (TNC) in the regional and 
international markets gave rise to the theories of product cycle on the basis of technological 
                                                 
348 The Pattern of Trade and the Heckschler-Ohlin Theorem, in Mikic M. International Trade, New York, 1998, 
pp.76-81. 
349 Abdurahmanov M. Faktory Privlecheniya Pryamyh Inostrannyh Investitsiy. Magazine Ekonomicheskoye 
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gap between various countries: a country in which an innovative process occurs will thus have 
a comparative advantage to export the new product to technologically less developed 
economy even with no clear evidence of comparative advantage in terms of factor 
endowments.350 The product-cycle theory then states that due to the fact that throughout the 
life cycle of the product its input requirements change, the comparative advantage will shift 
from one to another, less developed country depending on their overall factor endowments 
and production conditions. It finally means that after the technology of production to become 
completely standardised and universally available, TNC look for the transfer of technology to 
the least-cost producing country to increase their profits and remain competitive. 
Very similar to that, but more comprehensive and well-accepted theory explanation of FDI 
worldwide is the Theory of International Production which postulates three advantageous 
conditions for FDI: in ownership, location, and international advantage. The ownership in the 
given context means the comparative advantage of the investors before home producers in 
privileged possession of intangible assets. One example of such assets is technology, which is 
broadly defined as any kind of economically useful knowledge, for example, on lower 
production costs and competitive advantage. It may both in form of a patented process and the 
common knowledge of a group of employees. In most cases locational advantage is explained 
by the difference in the aforementioned resources (K and L), trade barriers or transport costs, 
when FDI is economically more viable to fulfil than direct export of goods to these countries. 
Internationalisation means that the aforementioned intangible assets exploitation costs should 
be less of any other means, such as licensing or outright sale of a patent or even export of 
final product. In addition, one view suggests that the advantages to the TNC from operating 
productive activities in several locations stem from horizontal and vertical integration 
between various activities of the given firm. Horizontal integration supposes to locate 
production process and sales in one country, while providing joint inputs, such as R&D, 
advertising, accounting, marketing and distribution, from central headquarters to serve 
production activities in other country. Whenever there are cost incentives for the integration 
of related activities within a single firm and factor costs or other incentives for the separation 
of these activities geographically TNC will be encouraged to expand investments in global 
                                                 
350 Every product goes through several stages in its lifetime, i.e. new product stage, maturity stage, and 
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relative uncertainty about sales, first consumers for these products are found in rich countries. See more: Micic 
M. Technology-based Trade Theories, in International Trade, New York, 1998, pp.230-233. 
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terms. Vertical integration makes emphasis on intra-firm trade in inputs rather than on the 
mechanism dividing into immediate production activities and headquarters services. Firms 
with production facilities in more than one country trade in differentiated products, including 
intermediate components, finished goods and headquarters services.351 
In terms of transition, several other determinants of FDI may also be of particular 
significance. The most important of those are political and macroeconomic stability, with 
particular requirements to low inflation and stable exchange rate, institutional and 
infrastructure development, size and growth of the host market, labor costs and productivity, 
and trade liberalization.352  
What could be derived from the international experience is that the applicability or 
compatibility of the aforementioned theories may not result in the expected results. That is 
because the significance of each factor of FDI may vary from country to country, and also 
over time. Looking once again at the group of South East Asian economies, for instance, one 
may reveal that even the common picture on the whole shows a success on encouraging FDI 
and linking it to export promotion strategy, within the group itself countries applied divergent 
strategies at various development stages. Following the Japanese example, Korea and Taiwan 
erected barriers against FDI at the early stages on the grounds that it would limit the scope for 
the build-up of technological capability of nation-owned firms. On the contrary, Malaysia and 
Thailand actively encouraged FDI. Being much better endowed with natural resources than 
South East Asia, India and Brazil were marked with less impressive policy for FDI 
encouragement which did not bring designed results, not the least because of general 
orientation toward import substitution.  
Or even, in case of interest rate differentials between the countries, there were empirical data 
that FDI inflows had been marked not only towards one direction with higher interest rates, as 
the theory suggests, but on both directions.353 Thus, cross border movements of TNC are 
becoming strongly encouraged by the pursuit for lower costs of production and higher profits. 
One evidence of this process could be seen in the trend which has been changing steadily for 
the decades. Although industrial countries themselves remain the largest recipients of FDI 
flows, their share fell from about 81% of the global FDI in 2001 to 65-70% in 2003. This 
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conservative trend is apparently continue changing, as new markets of the transition 
economies or elsewhere will be further liberalized and suggest steady absorptive capacities 
for investments.354 
 A number of other questions are also important to reveal which of the factors could play 
pivotal role in determining FDI into Uzbekistan and, how national strategy should deal with 
them in order to put this process on sustainable footing. Moreover, what the role of 
government policy is going to be in this regard: whether it must be further targeted by 
tackling priority areas of development and specific sets of business, or whether a bigger role 
of market-driven forces may be required, with the state oriented more on finding out and 
pursuing appropriate linkages between the reforms in main areas of domestic life. 
The general model of an open economy looks like the following: X-M=S-I=Y-C=I(f), where 
X – export, M – import, S – savings, I – investments. Y – national income, C – consumption, 
I(f) – foreign investments. National income partly consists of consumption (private and state), 
and savings after consumption. Domestic savings are an important source for keeping up 
investment process. The imbalances between savings and investments pre-determine to a 
substantial degree the interlinkages and further changes in the key areas, as well as processes 
in domestic economy, including macroeconomic policy. For example, if demand for 
investments exceeds national income, then the model shows lack of domestic savings to keep 
up the internal investment process. Therefore, this shortage is going to be redeemed by the 
additional funds from outside. 
According to some estimates, share of total domestic savings in GDP of Uzbekistan fell from 
27% in 1995 to 19-20% in 2000-2001, mainly because of the reduction of savings in real 
sector – from 15,7% to 5,1% GDP. The given difference, i.e. lack of savings between 
domestic savings and investments was basically compensated with substantial foreign 
borrowings of real sector.355 
The rate of domestic savings is much lower than in South-East Asia in the beginning of the 
reforms there in the mid-1970s.356 It is going to be a great concern, because in the long run 
domestic savings have to be a main source of domestic investment process. Therefore, 
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without tackling the given issue and undertaking necessary efforts to run up this figure to 
higher levels, one may hardly expect sound and consistent economic growth and prosperity.  
In terms of Uzbekistan, the scanty resources of domestic economic units in the transition 
period were also covered by foreign inflows, mainly in the forms of credits and loans. 
However, one of the consequences of these trends became the situation, in which the 
continuous borrowings of such kind in terms of poor export performance had resulted at the 
certain stage in worsening national balance of payments because of disruption in capital and 
current accounts. Eventually this may bring out reductions in official foreign exchange 
reserves and contribute to higher foreign debt.357 
On the other hand. the continuous use of foreign restrictions in the past brought about not only 
immediate distortions in prices and using domestic resources, but also evoked rent-seeking 
activities resulting also from vague and complicated domestic legislation concerning foreign 
investments. Direct foreign exchange restrictions, burdensome legislation, uncertainty in 
interpretation, as well as unexpected and often changes have been seen as the main risks of 
doing business.358 
This kind of problems were often in the spotlight of many international research and regular 
analyses of the situation in the country, as well as in independent polls and surveys provided 
by foreign governmental and non-governmental institutions. Much attention is given not only 
to a particular issue, single steps or achievements in some areas, such as current account 
convertibility. They also point out to the necessity of steps on wide range of issues, such as in-
depth and crucial reforms in better governance, banking sphere, legislation and court system, 
democratic and political processes.359 In general, a full range of potential factors of FDI cross-
border movements could be summarized in a single table (Annex 5.3). 
The last elements are new and bear corresponding political implications in this regard. The 
question is open to debate, whether and how the level of democratisation in the society may 
influence efficient economic prosperity, let alone economic calculations of these effects. Most 
of the Asian countries achieved their success with authoritarian regimes with few exceptions. 
                                                 
357 Uzbek Economic Trends, TACIS, Quarterly Issue, Tashkent, 2000. See also EBRD Transition Report 2003: 
Integration and Regional Cooperation. http://www.ebrd.org/pubs/index.htm. According to statististical data, one 
may judge that the country's foreign debt indicators worsened especially in the second half of the 1990s, when 
the country made a few foreign borrowings, basically on commercial basis. The current account situation, 
however, continued inconsistent performance with the fall in exports and persistent high level of import at that 
time.  
358 Khamedov A., Atabaev E. O Nekotoryh Aspektah Pravovogo Regima Eksporta Tovarov v Respubliku 
Uzbekistan . Magazine Halqaro Munosabatlar, University of Wolrd Economy and Diplomacy, 2002, No 2. 
359 See: IFC/World Bank 2003 SME Survey for Uzbekistan. www.ifc.org/centralasia ; Transition Report 2003: 
Integration and Regional Cooperation. http://www.ebrd.org/pubs/index.htm . 
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On the contrary, other countries (Argentina, for example) regained the credibility of their 
governments and economic policies only after the moves towards democracy. Nevertheless, 
these kind of issues have been pushed forward in international circles very often for the recent 
time, especially when the issues of FDI and foreign loans and credits are under consideration. 
Although it may be not the primary issue in corporate strategy in most transnational 
companies, such criteria are actively becoming an integral part of the main multilateral and 
bilateral donors and governments. The vivid examples of raising this issue up to the national 
level is the policy of the USA and the EU whose foreign assistance programmes, above 
exclusively economic matters, define security and democratization and political processes 
among the top priorities to be developed in recipient countries. Security and stability in these 
societies are considered in new dimensions, that is in the frame of human security and full 
realization of his rights and opportunities.360 The same position is distinctive in EBRD and 
World Bank which have gradually been changing their strategies from general resource 
allocation towards targeted projects with specified conditions on a wide-range basis.361  
This view seems to be shared by the government too. At least, it was specifically outlined in 
the Uzbek President’s speech that “the reforms in the economy could not be successful if they 
are not instantly interlinked to similar profound reforms in the political sphere, the system of 
state, and in the judiciary system. At a particular stage the process of reformation and 
modernization of a country inevitably stretches against the unresolvable challenges if these 
reforms in various fields are not correlated with each other through the common targeted 
tasks and common ideology. Just for this reason, the two fundamental principal purposes 
which we put ahead, i.e. cordial democratic transformation and formation of a free market 
economy in the country, must be the interrelated and complementary tasks”.362  
Such approach is expected to be reinforced further across the world, as it becomes clear that 
the marginalization of people does not conducive, but threatens desired stability and security. 
This view urges to seek for strong interrelationships between the economic, political and 
social components of stable and prosper development. In turn, the insufficient expansion of 
democratic values may also impede economic progress and prosperity through less efficient 
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economic reforms, less credibility of governments, and therefore, weak private initiatives and 
a slow confidence-building process. This is especially vital if the country wills to attract and 
benefit from larger volumes of FDI global movements. 
It has to be mentioned that as further foreign investments are available if the property rights 
perform well, the rumours and business experience in host countries are another information 
sources in the Western business circles. Business circles are seeking for and relying on 
information from a broader range of sources which are not necessarily consistent with the 
officially published investment guides of the host countries’ governments.363 
 
5.2.3. Legislative Guarantees for FDI 
The pivotal element of domestic foreign economic policy after independence was to set up 
legislative and institutional framework for the reforms. A great number of legal documents 
were adopted and appropriate measures were undertaken to develop legal base in the foreign 
sector. The pillars of these efforts were the national laws “On foreign economic activity”, “On 
foreign investments”, “On activities and protection of the rights of foreign investors”; as well 
as the Customs and Tax Codes, the Law “On enterprise” and others. 
“The development of legal base to attract larger foreign investments into the economy, 
providing the reliable rights and guarantees designed to protect the interests of foreign 
investors is going to be of  main significance for the future of Uzbekistan”.364 
The foreign investment law, for example, permits foreign investors to invest in any business 
activity which is not otherwise prohibited by legislation. There appear to be no business 
activities from which the foreign investment law, or any other law, precludes foreign investors 
in order to reserve such activities exclusively for national investors. There are a number of 
activities for which licences are required but these appear to be a standard list of areas 
involved with national security, public health and safety, natural resources, financial services 
and professional practice for which both local and foreign participants would need to obtain a 
licence. Foreign investors may invest through the usual legal forms including the acquisition 
of real property, the establishment of branches and through shareholding in Uzbek companies. 
The foreign investment law thus provides a framework which appears to be substantially open 
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for foreign investment in all forms and in all areas of business available to a national investor. 
The entry requirements appear to be straightforward, the performance requirements are 
minimal and investors are guaranteed the right of exit and fund repatriation. 
It needs to be emphasized that such steps at the national level aim at the formalization of the 
consecutive measures on creation of the favorable climate for capital inflows. International 
experience reveals, however, that it was not always easy to put the declared goals into action. 
Although such commitments in different countries are very similar by substance, in fact time 
and the extent of preparatory efforts which is needed to set up favorable environment for 
investments, including administrative procedures (starting point) and the kick off of 
production (final point) may be different in various countries.365 Moreover, in terms of the 
rapid changes in global trends, intensification of cross border movements of capital, and the 
expansion of globalization, national legislation as to foreign investments needs to become 
clearer, more transparent, stable and consistent. This process should equally take into account 
both international experience and specific domestic conditions to harmonise and  improve the 
legislation bringing it closer to international requirements. 366 
In this regard, as the development in the past has shown, it still to be a pressing issue in 
Uzbekistan how to improve the existing laws and undertake, if necessary, some additional 
measures to fill this lacuna. Almost all the national laws with regard to foreign investors are 
good enough, if not perfect, since they were developed in compliance with similar norms in 
more developed economies. The role of the laws in designing the rights and guarantees for 
foreign investors, however, still remains relatively low. One of the evidence of that view 
could be comparatively moderate volumes of direct foreign investments into the republic in 
the last years in comparison with the existing potential, or additional requirements from 
investors to provide them with government guarantees, regardless of a number of specific 
national laws rendering much-desired protection.367 
                                                 
365 According to the research conducted, company registration could take place wthin three days in Latvia, when 
it usually took more than three month in Slovakia, i.e. without a bribe. Investors in general, or foreign investors 
in particular complain often that implementation of legislation was inconsistent, unfair, rigid or corrupt. See 
Coolidge J. The Art of Attracting FDI in Transition Economies. The World Bank/William Davidson Institute, 
Transition, 1999, october. 
366 What is learnt from experience is that countries with poor legislation have to face a significant share of the 
shadow sector, most part of which usually consists of national firms. Developed practices, as a rule, prevent 
foreign companies from using these deceptive practices putting them in unfavorable condition with shadow 
sector. Therefore, national legislation must be improved and the aforementioned measures could be seen as a 
positive step towards the given direction. 
367 Among other factors, in 1996 there were 1152 enterprises with foreign investments registered in the republic 
with total equity capital $1561 mln., while only 152 in 2000 with equity capital $83 mln.USD. See: Gulyamov S. 
Aktualnye Problemy Razvitiya Zakonodatelstva Respubliki Uzbekistan po Inostrannym Investitsiyam. Magazine 
Obshestvennye Nauki v Uzbekistane. 2002, No 2. p.35 
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The recent policy of the government was based on the principle of a case-by-case approval of 
investments coming to Uzbekistan through the submission and consideration of the 
information and documents by investors. On the one hand, it might look like a formal process 
of collecting necessary data on investors in the country, because the approval of the 
documents was guaranteed if they were in order. On the other hand, this procedure witnessed 
about very firms ideas of the government to define directions and profiles of the foreign 
investments. The package of protections and benefits may only be available for those 
investments which the government deems to be appropriate. In a fundamental sense then, the 
current Uzbekistan foreign investment policy seeks to graft selected foreign investment onto 
the economy in designated industries and offers substantial protections and benefits to the 
selected foreign joint venture partner. 
The foreign investment law contains general guarantees of equal national treatment and 
further assurances of rights and protections on matters such as expropriation and profits  
repatriation which are of specific interest to the foreign investor. Among the protections is an 
assurance that new legislation which would worsen the position of foreign investments will 
not apply for 10 years after the investment is made (if otherwise, compensation will be made). 
Further it is provided that foreign investors can choose to adopt more favourable terms of any 
subsequent legislation.  
 The foreign investment law has several exclusive provisions for enterprises with foreign 
investment in relation to rights to import and export and foreign currency arrangements. Their 
intention appears to be to provide treatment at least as favourable as national treatment. There 
appears to be only one instance in which the foreign investment law provides less favourable 
terms than national treatment for enterprises with foreign investment, stipulating that where 
the chartered fund is not “formed” within a year of registration the company will deemed to 
be insolvent.  
In modern terms, the foreign investment law thus provides most of the minimum assurances 
that a foreign investor would expect in relation to national treatment. There are no particularly 
advantageous provisions for foreign investors in the law, except for the 10-year guarantee 
against adverse legislative change, which itself is flawed.368 Moreover, an absence of 
                                                 
368 For example, it may not be clear to a prospective foreign investor who seeks to invest through ownership in 
an Uzbek enterprise whether certain protections, such as those against expropriation and adverse changes in 
legislation, apply to the enterprise or only to the foreign shareholding. In this regard there may be a distinction 
between an “enterprise with foreign investment” and other enterprises. By implication, the variation from 
national treatment does not apply to other enterprises which, although they have some foreign ownership, fall 
outside the definition of an “enterprise with foreign investment”. These are likely to be smaller enterprises (with 
a charter capital of under US$ 150,000) but could also include very large enterprises which have less than 30 per 
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discriminatory laws may not automatically produce real benefits. The provided “national 
treatment” is of little comfort to foreign investors when the general standard of treatment of 
business is regarded as being poor. 
Let us consider two guarantees in the law which are in danger of being breached anytime. The 
first is the guarantee on repatriation of profits which may be caught up in the general foreign 
exchange difficulties, especially if it took place in history. If foreign exchange restrictions are 
imposed, then few investments could pay dividends and the guarantees have yet to be put to a 
sustained test. From the past experience, established foreign investors have revealed that there 
would be little chance of obtaining the foreign currency required to repatriate dividends.  
On the other hand, the 10-year stability provision is well intentioned but problematic for 
objective reasons. From a government standpoint it is very far reaching. It covers all foreign 
investments and appears to guarantee stability in relation to all areas of public policy except in 
relation to matters of national security. This ties the hands of government for a very long time 
and invites difficulties. Already there have been difficulties with new taxes and increased 
rates of taxes as established investors claim a right to retain the original arrangements. From 
an investor standpoint such an assurance is not of bankable value unless it is contained in an 
agreement with the State. But the government is understandably reluctant to enter into such 
agreements in all cases. In the event of a dispute with the state there is recourse to national 
arbitration unless there is an agreement with the state which provides for international 
arbitration. Naturally, experienced foreign investors will want to have recourse to 
international arbitration in the event of disputes with the state. Major investors will want to 
know how willing the government is to enter into agreements with foreign investors which 
provide for international arbitration and how readily judgements can be enforced. 
One of the critical aspects of the given situation to take place is that the laws adopted are 
apparently more declarative, since they descript the common principles of activities, rather 
than contain specific and clear mechanisms and the perception of awaited guarantees.369 It 
also seems to be true that this sort of national laws and their provisions are not regarded as 
legal norms of direct and immediate influence, when concerning rights and privileges for 
                                                                                                                                                        
cent foreign ownership. Presumably in the latter case it is assumed that the foreign investors are portfolio 
investors. Prospective investors are unlikely to be clear as to the status of small and medium scale enterprises i.e. 
those which would not fall within the definition of “enterprises with foreign investment”. For example, is an 
enterprise with a charter capital of US$ 100,000 and 100 per cent owned by a foreign investor covered by the 
guarantee against nationalization or covered by the 10-year stability provision? Or is such an enterprise to be 
treated exactly as one which is entirely nationally owned? Finally, is the treatment promised in the foreign law 
being met in practice?  
369 Gulyamov S. Aktualnye Problemy Razvitiya Zakonodatelstva Respubliki Uzbekistan po Inostrannym 
Investitsiyam. Magazine Obshestvennye Nauki v Uzbekistane. 2002, No 2. p.36. 
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foreign investors. On the contrary, they may embrace a lot of references to the variety of 
additional legal acts to be adopted on the middle level of power, i.e. by various ministries and 
state organs, whose decisions are to complement the national laws. In terms of vague 
definitions provided by national laws, it leaves a space for unnecessary duplication and 
various interpretation of the legislation by the government authorities on the middle level and 
foreign investors. In turn, it substantially complicates and reinforces existing internal 
inconsistencies and discrepancies in legislation.370 Such uncertainty with regard to general 
environment and to legal conditions in particular could not be seen in compliance with the 
efforts of the government to make domestic business climate more favorable. Thus, in view of 
the aforementioned legal spaces, domestic legislation could be potentially apprehended by 
investors as being more liberal or equally more rigid.  
There are at least two ways which may contribute to the clarification and some relief of the 
situation. If the government wants to keep the right for “worsening domestic investment 
climate”, as a result of its immediate actions, such as, for instance, introduction of foreign 
exchange restrictions, higher customs rates, higher social allocations, etc., it could be better if 
these cases would be represented in the given laws themselves. The alternative to this 
solutions might favor a provision which would authorize the government to enter directly into 
the agreements with investors to cover a selected list of issues, such as taxation, foreign 
exchange and export and import rights, etc. Standard or model terms would be prepared  and 
published as a part of the investment reviews and model contract packages, ensuring thus 
more stability in local terms.  
In these cases, the FDI donors, as well as government bodies, would clearly feel and aware 
the risks and consequences of the undesired situation, as well as the reasons and way-outs 
before the investment process had already been under way. All this would provide them with 
a clear mechanism assisting to avoid potential discrepancies and misunderstanding between 
the host country’s authorities and those desiring to do business in Uzbekistan relatively 
potential changes for the worse. The ability of Uzbekistan to offer proactively such 
arrangements on a transparent and orderly basis would be extremely well regarded by major 
foreign investors.371  
                                                 
370 See also  Khamedov A., Atabaev E. O Nekotoryh Aspektah Pravovogo Regima Eksportno Tovarov v 
Respubliku Uzbekistan . Magazine Halqaro Munosabatlar, University of Wolrd Economy and Diplomacy, 
2002, No 2; Uzbekistan. Foreign Trade Bariers. US Government Worldwide Country Analysis. See also Report 
of International Financial Corporation. 
371 An important step in protecting property rights was made with the government’s decree “On Additional 
measures designed to protect the rights of FDI” of May 2, 2003. Special departments for legal protection of 
foreign investments were established in the frame of the federal Ministry of Justice and in all of its subregional 
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To sum up, the necessary reforms of the legal base need to be pursued within the general 
framework to embrace further simplification, transparency and stability. In particular, these 
principles could be strengthened through the implementation of the following primary 
measures on: 
o the encouragement of competition and efficiency with protection being provided to all 
investors, both domestic and foreign. But, competition and efficiency in the domestic 
economy could be barely attainable until all the investors would do feel certain about the 
general local terms regardless of foreign investments are granted national treatment.  
o the terms of investments, rights and guarantees for protection which should be clearly 
defined in national laws. Various references should be eliminated, in order to avoid further 
discrepancies and misunderstanding in the interpretation of different provisions. 
o the creation of a clear mechanism of decision-making and applicability of legal 
procedures, in order to contribute to the rapid and positive solutions between the parties 
concerned. Any burdensome actions, bureaucracy and administrative barriers, especially 
concerning the particular agreemrnts on investments projects should be excluded, since 
such kind of delays are used to be interpreted by foreigners as additional transaction  costs 
of doing business and making investments. 
o transparency of national legislation, including the decisions of government authorities. In 
other words, investors are keen to know what kind of requirements they are going to meet 
before the Uzbek legislation and corresponding government agencies. Moreover, stability 
and consistency in legislation are able to strengthen the given principle. 
o appropriate domestic and foreign policies to issue if necessary public statements on the 
irreversibility of the reforms on liberalization and the commitments to follow these 
reforms, including to set up favorable business environment. 
                                                                                                                                                        
divisions. The department is commissioned to monitor domestic situation concerning the rights of foreign 
investments; analize and make inquiries based on the claims from investors against the actions of state bodies 
which have led to worsening and breaching the rights of investors; in case of illegal steps of the government 
authorities, to take actions in favor of investors, including the suspension of ill-grounded decisions in force, 
appropriate investigation procedures, bringing faulty government officials to administrative punity, etc.; as well 
as look into the existing situation and work out recommendations for further improvement, and some others. Yet 
it is relatively early to find out, to which extent the given measure has had a positive impact on the activities of 
the established investors, as well as on those willing, but still applying a wait-and-see strategy with regards to 
domestic situation. Obviously it will further depend on, how serious the government is going to be about 
privatization and the parallel institutional reforms.  
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o the steady improvement in national laws and correlation with well established principles 
of international law, i.e. to ultimately provide a legal framework for investment activities 
within the multilateral system of foreign economic relations. 
o the enhancement of foreign investments into the specific areas too. The question is how to 
improve legislation on using rich domestic mineral base with concomitant steps on 
restructuring and denationalisation of the mining companies on the one hand, and 
maintain national interests on the other hand. International experience refers to the 
examples of countries who managed to suggest investors so called investment contracts in 
line with the provisions of general legislation, but also specifying priorities and potential 
of each particular sector. This approach is, for example, widespread in some countries as 
to mineral and petroleum exploration and development.372 These would also be structured 
so as to enable the key financial terms, including acquisition value and forms, to be 
established through a process of competitive bidding. 
o complementarity of the reforms. This approach should foresee the measures to improve 
situation in the banking system; to create conditions for financial markets to function more 
actively; to expand non-centralized free market auctions and trades of resources and goods 
on domestic commodity exchanges; as well as the reforms in the administrative and court 
system. The latter supposed to be particularly important for the mechanism of protection 
of FDI rights to become viable and palpable in its action. 
As the aforementioned measures are undertaken to stimulate more investments, further steps 
could be justified. Most probably, they could comprise refocusing priorities in line with the 
global trends, when the requirement to the size of investments are cushioned or set aside at 
all, in order to allow small and medium enterprises to take more active part in 
transnationalization processes. Moreover, strict registration procedures and approvals are 
replaced with simplified rules which may include minimum standard of the requirements 
common to all economic units.373 Moreover, further deregulation and decentralization in the 
foreign economic sector is seen to be also essential, since it suggests more sovereignty and 
commissions of the regional authorities (khokimiyats) to keep on expanding direct dialogue 
with foreign investors. 
 
                                                 
372 For instance, the Latin American countries are vivid examples in this respect. Many of them developed and 
used specific and detailed system of national laws, such as oil, mountain, and forestry codes, to draw more 
volumes of foreign capital into the primary sector of domestic economy. 
373 World Investment Report 1999. Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of devlopment. UN. N.Y.-
Geneva, 1999. 
 198
5.2.4. Government Regulation: Where Are The Limits? 
To maintain efficient domestic laws are critical in pursuing foreign strategy by a country. 
However, there is some delicate aspects in the issues related to FDI. The necessary 
improvements in national legislation aim primarily at the protection of the interests and rights 
of foreign investors running business in Uzbekistan. But, to make the given process even 
more consistent and compatible with the national interests in terms of acute competition for 
FDI worldwide appears to be an uneasy task. Under such circumstances this would require 
from the government to search for the new approaches and tools in pursuing its policy. 
One may be observed, that in the last decades of the world development there has been a 
common trend towards general liberalization and adoption a number of complementary efforts 
to draw more volumes of FDI across the world. (Table 5.1)  
 
Table 5.1 Changes in National Regulations of FDI, 1991-2002 
 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Number of countries 
that introduced 
changes in their 
investment regimes 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
43 
 
 
57 
 
 
49 
 
 
64 
 
 
65 
 
 
76 
 
 
60 
 
 
63 
 
 
69 
 
 
71 
 
 
70 
Number of 
regulatory changes 
 
 
82 
 
79 
 
102 
 
110 
 
112 
 
114 
 
151 
 
145 
 
140 
 
150 
 
208 
 
248 
  of which:  
  more favorable to 
FDI 
  less favorable to 
FDI 
 
 
80 
 
2 
 
 
79 
 
- 
 
 
101 
 
1 
 
 
108 
 
2 
 
 
106 
 
6 
 
 
98 
 
16 
 
 
135 
 
16 
 
 
136 
 
9 
 
 
131 
 
9 
 
 
147 
 
3 
 
 
194 
 
14 
 
 
236 
 
16 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2003. FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspective. 
 
These shifts towards liberalization were specific and different in their forms over the time. In 
the end of the 1980s-beg.1990s, substantial steps were undertaken to open national borders to 
foreign capital, especially in the spheres to be regarded before as strategic ones, such as 
energy, communications, transport. These processes, which took place in Latin America, for 
example, were accompanied with large-scale privatisation measures. In terms of poor 
efficiency of national capital, the “open doors” approach was justified with a view that 
economic growth in these countries could be provided with the appropriate levels of foreign 
capital inflows. Facing the decline in FDI inflows, many governments accelerated the 
liberalization of FDI regimes, with 236 of 248 regulatory changes in 70 countries in 2002 
facilitating FDI. Asia is one of the most rapidly liberalizing host regions. An increasing 
number of countries, including those in Latin America and the Caribbean, are moving beyond 
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from just dismantling trade barriers to adopting more focused and selective targeting and 
promotion strategies to foreign investment. Financial incentives and bidding wars for large 
FDI projects have increased as competition to intensify. Therefore, national policies in the 
host countries became much more liberal and some encouraging steps were also pursued: 
legal restrictions on acquiring the shares of national companies by foreign companies were 
abandoned; while the establishment of joint ventures were fully supported, etc.374  
But, it was in the mid-1990s, when the competition for foreign investments had even more 
intensified, especially after the new recipients from East Europe and the former Soviet Union 
had come on the arena. Moreover, the needs of the host economies of South and East Asia, as 
well as South America were also maintained. In these terms, the general concepts and 
measures on liberalization proved to be insufficient. Countries began resorting to more 
concrete and targeted encouraging steps, such as the elimination of foreign exchange 
restrictions, profit repatriation, most-favored nation regime, applying the principle of equality 
to both domestic and foreign investors, etc, so that to attract more FDI. As domestic policies 
were providing more FDI flows, the emphasis in the recipients, mainly in less developed 
countries, was shifted towards more guarantees both to retain existing and enhance further 
flows in terms of sluggish global investment flows in the beginning of 2000s (see table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2 Types of Changes in FDI Laws and Regulations (% as of all changes) 
 
 1998 2002 
More Promotion 45 36 
More Liberal Entry and Operational Conditions 39 31 
More Sectoral Liberalization 10 8 
More Guarantees 4 20 
More Control (restrictions) 2 5 
Source: World Investment Reports for 1999 and 2003. 
 
It is a complex task to point at the universal measures, either tax, fiscal or political, which 
would be equally effective in different countries. One group of experts believe that the most 
important thing in this way is to improve general domestic business climate through using all 
available macroeconomic and political instruments, such as maintaining favorable real 
exchange rate, raise in efficiency of the activities of government bodies, liberalization of 
foreign trade, etc.375  
                                                 
374 Pavlichenko R. Regulirovaniye Pryamyh Inostrannyh Investitsiy : Tendentsii i Problemy. Magazine Mirovaya 
Ekonomika I Mejdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 2001, No 4. 
375 Pomfpret R. Foreign Trade Policy For Economies in Transition. Magazine Ekonomichskoye Obozreniye, 
1998, August. 
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General improvements are likely to play a substantial role in giving investors primary 
information and necessary conditions to evaluate the country’s possibilities and therefore, as 
well as to define its basic investment ratings. In terms of transition economy, however, it is 
sometimes difficult to use the classical methods of economic regulation and to maintain the 
much-needed stability in policy tools or actions as to specific priority targets (low inflation, 
stability in exchange rate, efficient financial infrastructure, etc.). Then, additional steps from 
the government seem to be important. This choice among the available measures, however, 
again may be hidden between their efficiency in reaching the goals, and the local capabilities, 
facilities, and political will to realize them. For example, costs of liberalization to be caused 
by the concessions for investments might be compensated through the achievemnts of the 
desired results.  
In this context, possible costs and the limits of available instruments may be of quite 
relevance. Financial incentives for foreign investors are directly related to the expenses of 
state budget, accompanied with the risk that the given measures would be fully and effectively 
put into effect. Tax incentives, on the contrary, do not require immediate costs and come into 
force only when the investment project is completed and ready for practical realization. 
Improving domestic infrastructure facilities (transport, communications) is not a targeted 
measure, since it does not make a difference between domestic and foreign investors, all 
parties will have access to them. What is also important in using the given instruments is that 
the choice is going to be dependent on the general national strategy the country follows. For 
instance, it is well-known that open South East Asia was principally better in applying variety 
of tools, such as tax rebates, duty drawbacks, tax and duty exemptions, than Latin American 
autarky economies not the least due to the general line in foreign economic relations.  
On the other hand, one needs to emphasize that general trend in world development is that 
government retains regulation over FDI in almost all countries. Despite the magnitude of bi- 
and multilateral agreements on free access to host countries’ markets, no agreement denied 
the control over FDI inflows.376 In Uzbekistan, the national policy is due to shift its priorities 
from strong government intervention in the past to modest and justified government control in 
the years to come. "We have to recognize that the government is actually still maintaining its 
too high influence in the domestic economy. It is reflected, first of all, in the existence of the 
still high number of enterprises to contain the state assets; in the high stake of the government 
in equity capital of the privatized enterprises; in the conservative mechanism of government 
regulation; and sometimes also in the direct intervention from the government into the 
                                                 
376 See more details in UNCTAD, Document N TD/B/com.2/EM/6/2, 1999. 
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activities of economic units... We need to eliminate the half-way reforms, and to reinforce the 
role of private sector in the domestic economy, as a primary task ", was emphasized by the 
President of Uzbekistan.377  
In this regard, some questions may be taken up: where are thus the bounds for the 
government, in order not to contravene property rights and equally to stand for the defence of 
strategic national interests? What is the substance of this policy going to be and which 
particular aspects should it comprise? 
In terms of general liberalization with the two key elements, such as the elimination of 
barriers and the principle of national treatment with FDI, the role of government would likely 
need to be present. This approach could be supported for some reasons. It is clear that in terms 
of a transition economy, loosening domestic conditions and domestic markets may have to 
face with other limitations set up not by the government, but by the economic units, in 
particular by large monopolist companies. The crowding-out effect may take place, when 
national firms undergo severe pressure from such large foreign economic units. Such 
undesired effects may happen in different forms. The one may develop in domestic markets of 
goods, the other one - in financial markets. As a result of the privileges provided by national 
legislation, as well as objectively due to the much stronger position and capacities, these 
companies would acquire large shares and domestic resources and therefore, depriving or 
diminishing opportunties for local firms. 
Besides, the strategic priority of any government is the interests of national business and 
industries. In the given situation, when national producers are basically poor-prepared and 
extremely vulnerable to external forces, it is the government which is the only efficient and 
strong party to resist any potential negative tendencies. The task of the government is to find 
what is called as the golden mean between the development of competition and stand against 
the monopolisation of domestic markets. Moreover, a small open economy, like Uzbekistan, 
is very vulnerable to abrupt changes because of capital flows in both directions. It requires to 
monitor domestic situation with balance of payments and to take appropriate measures, if it is 
under long-lasting and regular pressure. If so, the steps of the government to regulate foreign 
loans of domestic branches of foreign transnational corporations, transfer pricing, etc. appears 
to be justified, in order to subsequently avoid domestic macroeconomic imbalance.378 
                                                 
377 Translated from the speech of the President of Uzbekistan Karimov I. made at the meeting of the Cabinet of 
Ministers devoted to the outcomes of socio-economic developments in the country in the year 2002. 
http://www.press-service.uz/rus/rechi/r02172003.htm. 
378 See Transfer Pricing. UNCTAD, N.Y. - Geneva, 1999 
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The aforementioned steps, however,  should not damage the encouragement of competitive 
environment which seems to be equally a desired and hard task. The transition economies, as 
a rule, may not have either sufficient experience or effective organizational structures to 
maintain efficient local conditions for competition, as foreign investors can. In Uzbekistan, an 
issue of competition is affected, to some extent, by the constraints on foreign capital inflows, 
as well as by the focus on large-scale investors with the lowest prioritization of the small ones 
involved in trade and services. One of the important factor which may contribute to the 
solution of the problem, could be the principle of supporting not only large-scale, but also 
small-scale inflows. Such businesses include a variety of office support services, import and 
export facilitation services, industrial maintenance and supply businesses, technical services 
and so on. Such a network of effective support services is very important to prospective 
investors, including large investments. The true lies somewhere in-between and costs and 
benefits of the extent of government control will also depend on the contribution, both current 
and potential, from local and foreign sources, to be made by large-scale enterprises and the 
small and medium-sized sector. 
Environment protection is expected to be another aspect of government regulation. Since the 
authorities of host countries are dealing with a wide range of investors differed from each 
other by the field of activities, the character and form of production, priorities of business, 
etc., some contradictory views have been established in the world as to the actions of foreign 
investors abroad. Some investors come under the pressure, since they appear to deliberately 
use the environmental issue to transfer "dirty industries and technologies" to the third 
countries where environmental requirements seem to be less rigid, regardless of adequate 
economic and political conditions. The other group of investors, on the contrary, are distinct 
with much higher corporate requirements to meet environmental standards.379 The logical 
move in the policy direction in Uzbekistan urges to be equally liberal towards foreign capital, 
and also rigid to the extent, to which necessary steps to improve national legislation on 
environment are needed. Yet net benefits, both political and economic, are still to be counted 
in terms of competitiveness and the impact of national ecological problems on the extent of 
FDI flows.  
The growing share of foreign investment capital is more concerned with mergers and 
acquisitions and to a less degree with setting up new production facilities, or so called 
"greenfield facilities" relying on short-term and easily attainable returns on the capital 
                                                 
379 Pavlichenko R. Regulirovaniye Pryamyh Inostrannyh Investitsiy : Tendentsii i Problemy. Magazine Mirovaya 
Ekonomika I Mejdunaodnye Otnosheniya, 2001, No 4.  
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invested. Yet when FDI takes the form of "greenfield investment", it represents a net addition 
to the host country's capital stock, while FDI entry via an acquisition may not represent any 
addition at all to the capital stock, output or employment. Moreover, the latter often reduce 
competition in the domestic market and may lead to an increase in the market power of 
transnational corporations. Experience shows that in the economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, it was privatization of existing real assets which was the most often used and 
significant form of FDI attraction. But this kind of attraction promoted FDI mostly in 
activities with low-export intensity, such as communication, energy, banking and insurance 
which, in a row of positive effects, also finally put the countries' balance of payments under 
pressure. Some of those governments found themselves between the devil and the deep sea, 
when rushing to privatization with FDI and agreeing to many years of monopoly protection, 
became then required by the WTO or the EU to renegotiate the deals and allow more 
competition.380  
In this context, domestic policy in Uzbekistan is surely expected to follow long-term goals by 
encouraging more greenfield capital investments to back up export-oriented growth. Yet, 
Uzbekistan is to confront with the two particular problems in this case too. The first one is 
that the government was and is still trying to sell old state assets, especially a great deal of 
unfinished factories, including those left over from the Soviet times. But they represent little 
interests for potential investors. Moreover, the policy had difficulties to suggest the 
appropriate mechanisms of assets evaluation which is not going to be a major impediment to 
the sales of existing assets, but consequently may stall investors from greenfield projects too.  
The second one directly touches upon a problem of the public officials’ expertise. It may 
really reflect one of the primary concerns in transition, since it implies a shift from one socio-
political and economic system towards which are fundamentally different by substance. There 
are both elements of objectivism and subjectivism in the given process, when the relevant 
state bodies turn out to fall behind full-embracing political ideas and decisions or simply 
reluctant to continue with the reforms. One can find a lot of debates on these issues within the 
government itself. Almost every large speech of the President of Uzbekistan, regardless the 
sphere of the domestic reforms, reflects regular statements and critical points as to specific 
state bodies both on the national and regional levels. For instance, at the one of the 
government meetings in 2003, he was especially critical about the Goskomimushestvo, a 
responsible government authority for national privatization campaign, for its inflexibility and 
                                                 
380 The Art of Attracting FDI in Transition Economies. The World Bank/William Davidson Institute, Transition, 
1999, october. 
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holding up investments: “It is necessary to stress that the Committee (Goskomimushestvo) 
does not fulfill its functions to the full manner so far. There is no clear common efforts in the 
work of its regional subdivisions. The Central Apparatus and its regional divisions, as the 
recent attestation has shown, is badly provided with a competent staff. There is still many 
“casual” people who have poor imagination about the tasks of the Goskomimushestvo”.381  
Consequently, the possible ways out be partly found in administrative reforms.382 It is not 
going to be a process of formal reduction in number of government officials. It brings little, if 
the old style of work and methods of management remain. “First of all, the managerial set-
ups on different levels must be freed from the out-dated functions which were intrinsic to the 
old administrative-command system of distribution. If there would be no such functions, then 
there would be no needs for officials which supposed to accomplish these functions. They 
would be aware that their time has gone, that new approaches, other methods, other tools of 
management would be required. It must be modern market mechanisms, economic leverages 
and incentives which should come to replace the shouts, the administrative pressure and 
voluntarist decisions, the rights to allocate government resources according to the old 
principle "it is up to me to decide what and how much you will receive”.383 It certainly implies 
that this reform is going to bring the new principles of behaviour into the various spheres, 
such as access to necessary resources not through distribution from the government, but via 
free and open market and fair and auction trade. 
Finally, what is important is to see and tackle the problems in a complex way. For example, 
although domestic tax rates have been facing an annual decline in the recent past, the tax 
burden still remains relatively high, due to taxes on employers, high payments to social funds, 
etc. In turn, this affects production efficiency through higher labor costs and hence puts the 
country in less competitive position comparing to other countries.384 However, the reform in 
                                                 
381 Translated from the speech of the President of Uzbekistan Karimov I. delivered at the annual meeting of the 
Cabinet of Ministers on the socio-economic developments in the country in the first half of 2003. Newspaper 
“Narodnoye Slovo”, 19 July 2003. 
382 See more in the next subchapter. 
383 Translated from the speech of the President of Uzbekistan Karimov I. delivered at the meeting of the Cabinet 
of Ministers devoted to the outcome of socio-economic developments in the country in 2003 on 7 February 
2004. http://www.press-service.uz/rus/rechi/rechi.htm.  
384 It is important to restore coherence and stability to Uzbekistan’s tax policy. The tax regime should be fair, 
transparent and consistently administered. Above all, the Uzbek tax regime should be no more burdensome than 
that of neighbouring countries. There is no strong evidence internationally that frequent announcements of 
concessions encourage new investment (and even less so when there is a history of unforeseen new taxes). 
Investors will be more impressed by an attractive and stable tax regime which encourages new investment by 
reducing the early burden on cash flow and which is structured so as to tax profits rather than turnover or assets. 
Among such measures, could be seen, for example, accelerated capital allowances for investment; removal the 
restrictions on deductibility of capital allowances and on losses carried forward, as well as on the petty and 
unnecessary restrictions on deductions for labour costs, entertaining and advertising. 
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the given field, for instance, does not concern the reforms in the tax sphere only. It signifies 
the adequate steps in social policies, the improvement of the pension system through the 
development of the other forms of pension funds in addition to state ones, and the subsequent 
reduction of pressure on state budget. In turn, these measures will require sustainable 
development of financial and investment markets, insurance companies, banking system, etc. 
which are expected to promote the real sector doing better, as well as encourage more foreign 
capital. 
5.2.5. Domestic Policy Coherence 
In a row with the logics of the debates on efficient government policies as to FDI, the better 
coordination and policy coherence between domestic government agencies are called to play a 
significant role too. 
All previous efforts of the government have shown its evident desire to attract FDI to 
Uzbekistan. This is apparent from lack of legal restrictions on foreign investment, the 
commitment of senior government figures to promoting Uzbekistan abroad and the well-
meaning fiscal incentives that are made available. The priorities of the government are to 
attract private investment to export- oriented and import-substitution industries and special 
importance is placed on investments that introduce advanced technologies and/or pioneer new 
industries. 
The results have been mixed so far, and there is strong evidence that individual policies either 
failed to support the government’s objectives or in some cases actually worked against these 
objectives. For instance, the objective of attracting foreign investment is, to an undue extent, 
attenuated by the government’s own caution towards private investment and the market 
economy principles. This was manifested in policies which had retained a large commercial 
role for ministries and State enterprises and regulatory practices which were highly intrusive 
in normal business transactions such as imports. It was also seen in the government’s 
indifference to small and medium scale in trade and services in favor to large strategic 
investors. Another example could be seen in tough foreign exchange and trade policies in the 
recent past. 
The large role of the specific Ministries in the country reflected controversial impacts on the 
fulfillment of the government strategy with regards to foreign inflows. Nowadays the high 
level of government role which the prospective investors have to face at any way persists with 
the key coordinating role is undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations whose 
role was inherited by the Agency for Foreign Economic Relations established in 2002. 
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Investors will deal extensively with the relevant line ministry (which may have commercial as 
well as regulatory functions) and with the State Committee for State Property and 
Development of Enterpreneusrhip (GKI) when State asset sales are involved. The semi-public 
Foreign Investment Agency is playing a facilitating role which concerns the issues of 
searching potential Uzbek partners for prospective foreign investors, as well as gathering 
general information on local investment conditions which may be of interest for the comers. 
The Ministry of Justice and its divisions are going to serve mainly for registration procedures. 
Thus, significant prospective investors do receive extensive high-level political attention, 
including a meeting with the President and any other high government officials concerned. 
On the other hand, there was simply lack of coordination between government bodies which 
had led to undue losses of time for investors to get through all registration procedures, 
negotiations of particular rules, and to gain much-expected approval for making investment, 
although quite the contrary is required in this case. Moreover, some interviews of investors 
also believe that these processes were very much complicated by the centralization of 
decision-making when “there were only one or two decision-makers in the entire 
government”, also paradoxically the low relegation of power fosters a top overloaded echelon 
of the persons in charge.385 
In such situation, foreign investors may contact and see these government bodies not as equal 
and sovereign management partners, but as an intermediary link to the central government 
which eventually proved to be the key authority to address by substance the whole range of 
issues between investors and local bodies. It may witness not only about a little degree of 
sovereignty of each separate organ at the middle level in passing resolutions which may 
benefit them. It may be also a sign of high role of the government in the economy, low level 
of privatization, as well as a firm view and desire of the government strategy to negotiate 
every aspect and profile of foreign investments by scope and sectors of the economy. 
In present conditions, however, more flexible approach is needed to ensure efficiency with 
regards to both the quality of domestic policy measures and the bodies which normally 
undertake them in the context of the declared liberalization in economic activities. It primarily 
concerns the administrative reforms in Uzbekistan.  
                                                 
385 The Ministry of Justice, for example, is liable for registration of foreign investment projects up to $20 
mln.US. Foreign injections of higher volumes are to be enrolled with the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers 
only. See: Investment Policy Review of Uzbekistan. UNCTAD, 
1999.http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//poiteiipm13.en.pdf 
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“The time is ripe for the reforms in the administrative system and we can not put them off. In 
their absence, it becomes not simply complicated, but impossible at all to conduct deep 
economic transformation”, according to the President of Uzbekistan I.Karimov.386 
In this regard, there appears to be at least two significant rationales. On the one hand, it 
concerns the activities of the line Ministries and state bodies. For the recent years, many of 
such state organs have been changed in their forms of ownership in favor to various concerns, 
corporations, associations, etc. Yet in principle little of them have denied administrative spirit 
of management and, therefore in most cases they still retain highly intrusive ways of influence 
on economic units. The primary question lies in rationalization of relations between respective 
state agencies and economic units involved in each single economic area. The latter should 
become not only duly independent in their economic activities, but also actively involved, in 
cases of associations and unions, into the decision-making process and conduct real 
management over the administrative boards of such set-ups. This will be much dependent on 
the process of attracting necessary volumes of foreign investments which are expected to 
bring not only much-needed funds, but also modern and democratic values in administration 
of each particular enterprise and relevant unions of such enterprises in general. The inflow of 
investments would be also strengthened by the fact that many state agencies have retained lots 
of assets, especially non-working assets, which heavily affect their and budget funds. The 
large-scale privatization and selling-offs of these assets to foreign investors is clearly a top 
line in the adopted programme of privatization in the years to come. 
On the other hand, nowadays many line state agencies are responsible for realization of the 
decisions of the higher administrative level in government machinery. In such cases, they 
virtually immediately depend on the central government with consequently little initiatives at 
middle level. In perspective, however, these agencies should be more active to the sense, they 
would become equally more authorized and liable and willing for the job and projects, as well 
as for the decisions concerning each particular sphere adopted and realized at the middle 
level. This would also allow them to concentrate more on closer coordination of relations with 
the units and their existing problems, seeking for common solutions and developing general 
forecasts on further progress in the relevant industries. The development of closer horizontal 
linkages between the Ministries and state bodies would be also extremely crucial to make up 
common national strategy in relation to foreign investments. Their common efforts could 
                                                 
386 Translated from the speech of the President of Uzbekistan Karimov I. delivered at the annual meeting of the 
Cabinet of Ministers on the socio-economic developments in the country in thw first half of 2003. Newspaper 
“Narodnoye Slovo”, 19 July 2003. 
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become in this respect something very necessary and positive to form even clearer vision of 
openness and predictibility in the eyes of future FDI flows. 
The aforementioned processes could be given an additional impulse, if they would be 
complemented by the decentralization of decision-making and the enhancement of more 
economic power and commitments on the regional level too. It would embrace the transfer of 
some functions and responsibilities to local authorities, as well as the similar abolishment of 
unnecessary set-ups and stages in the administration system. The role and liabilities of the 
local municipalities are expected to increase in almost all aspects of socio-political and 
economic development in the republic. The case of such power transfer and efficient relations 
between the state and private sector could be seen during the establishment of free economic 
areas in the different parts of Uzbekistan.387  
But what is crucial in this respect is that these changes should be real, with the avoidance of 
shallow practices, in order to bring efficiency into the whole system of state administration. 
“It is of high significance to adhere to the principles of a market economy. Otherwise, this 
[centralized administrative control] would have not been eliminated, but a simple transfer of 
administrative regulation to the lower structures of the power system would have 
occurred”.388 
The problems to be encountered by prospective investors in obtaining clearance to invest have 
led to suggestions that more administrative coordination is also needed among the agencies 
which deal with the requirements of investors. In some countries this has led to the creation of 
the “one stop shop” foreign investor agency which is meant to handle the entire investment 
entry process. This approach is unrealistic as a single agency is unlikely to have all the skills, 
or be surrendered the necessary clout by the line ministries, to take over all the responsibility. 
It is of fundamental importance that the Agency for Foreign Investments takes the lead in 
ensuring that the foreign investment dimension of recommended reforms be taken fully into 
account. The Agency could be more proactive in working with the line ministries as well as 
ensuring that the foreign investment community is consulted as policy is developed. 
Certainly, one does not recommend significant change in the government machinery for 
dealing with particularly investment entry procedures. The largest pay-off will come from 
standardizing the treatment of investment terms through better policy development so as to 
                                                 
387 This issue is considered further. 
388 Translated from the speech of the President of Uzbekistan Karimov I. delivered at the annual meeting of the 
Cabinet of Ministers on the socio-economic developments in the country in the first half of 2003. Newspaper 
“Narodnoye Slovo”, 19 July 2003. 
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reduce the range of issues requiring individual attention and negotiation and to provide clear 
policy benchmarks for government agencies in their dealings with foreign investors. There is 
a need to clarify and focus the roles of individual agencies with the government machinery. 
At present all significant FDI is subject to an additional stage of approval over and above the 
regulatory and other approvals and agreements pertinent to its industry. This additional stage 
(sometimes described as “one more shop”) has not itself been the source of delays and 
frustration felt by foreign investors with the entry process. This suggests that the difficulties 
are principally the result of a lacuna in policy at the industry level and in the process of setting 
the terms and conditions for investment. 
However, the current ground for the government is to reconsider whether it is useful to 
continue with this registration procedure. If the government wishes to retain a mechanism to 
block foreign takeovers of existing Uzbek enterprises then there is a rationale for this device. 
But the rationale is not explicit and the registration procedure is ostensibly a quite formal 
documentary process. It would be helpful to intending foreign investors to know at the outset 
through reference to a government policy statement the circumstances in which FDI would 
not be welcomed.  
5.2.6. Foreign Investment Policy Statement 
Since Uzbekistan placed a strong emphasis on case-by-case approach in dealing with foreign 
investments, especially with the large ones, foreign investment policy was flexible within the 
existing legislation. In present conditions, however, if the reforms the government has 
committed to follow, need to be carried through, it would be useful to prepare a Foreign 
Investment Policy Statement of clarity and vision which sets out its national objectives, 
priorities and applicable terms in a manner which has a strong resonance with investors.389 
Then, it should be a key part of the mission of the Foreign Investment Agency to draft this 
Statement based on its close involvement with the industry investment reviews and the tax 
and regulatory reforms. Broadly speaking, this institution should play more important future 
role in order to contribute a foreign investor dimension to economic and commercial policy 
development within the government. 
The policy statements would, for each industry or a sector, take into account and settle the 
various ministries’ views and interests in line with government objectives. They will set out 
authoritative and standardized terms and conditions for investment in each industry. If well 
                                                 
389 Developed and proposed by the UNCTAD. See: Investment Policy Review of Uzbekistan. UNCTAD, 
1999.http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//poiteiipm13.en.pdf 
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prepared they would be of major benefit in smoothing the entry process, both for current and 
future investors. In other words, it would allow to set out domestic interests in a clearer way 
to foreign investors, while bringing forward the opportunities for discussions on the 
requirements of the latter with the government. 
The issues to be covered in such investment policy statements could include: 
- statement of government objectives; 
- fiscal arrangements, including special features, if any, applicable to the sector; 
- foreign exchange arrangements, including special features, if any, applicable to the sector; 
- the regulatory framework for the industry; 
- investment terms applicable to foreign investors, including: 
• particular rights and protections available with reference to the sector; 
• management control and shareholder relationships in joint ventures; 
• exit provisions; 
• the mechanisms for achieving government objectives (forbid unacceptable terms or 
encourage desirable outcomes); 
- operating terms, including: 
• rights to export and import; 
• access terms for key inputs, including land and utilities, and freedom to buy outside 
the state sector; 
• employment and social obligations. 
Yet, comprehensive investment promotion campaign will not achieve its goals, if it is 
insulated from more urgent steps to resolve some general problems encountered by 
established and prospective foreign investors (see Box 5.1). 
 211
 
 
5.2.7. Promotion Campaign, or Information Component in National Investment Strategy 
More active efforts on liberalization of FDI regulation in the world have granted transnational 
corporations with the diversified set of locations to move their funds. As a result, they become 
even more exacting to evaluate investment climate in the host countries. As competition 
intensifies, it is already insufficient to focus on liberal foreign policies making the use of 
various additional privileges only. The picture may become more complete, when the role of 
information is cordially reviewed nowadays. 
According to the established international views, in order to attract FDI many countries need 
to create good image of a favorable place for the realisation of investment projects. It would 
Box 5.1. What is the investors' feeling on domestic policy? 
 
In December 1997, the Trade and Investment Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Uzbekistan undertook a survey amongst its members, aimed at documenting the daily operating 
problems faced by foreign firms currently operating in Uzbekistan, so as to be in a better position to 
apprise the Government of Uzbekistan of the concerns raised by the foreign business community. 
The survey, published in February 1998, identified several areas of immediate concern: 
 
1. Currency convertibility and exchange regulations 
2. Import contract registration 
3. Restrictions on the use of funds in local bank accounts 
4. Business registration and licensing 
5. Bureaucratic culture and reprisals 
6. Customs delays; and 
7. Currency surrender requirements. 
 
In addition, the survey highlighted some industry-specific concerns related to insurance laws, rules 
and restrictions; taxes; and barriers to investment in the natural resources sector.  
 
Source: Investment Policy Review of Uzbekistan. UNCTAD, 1999 
 
Letting aside the debates on the extent of the latest steps in Uzbekistan to address each particular 
problem, the two implications for national policy can be drawn from this research. The first one 
concerns investors: despite of the prolifiration of the fiscal and other types of the privileges provided 
by the legislation in order to cushion shortages in domestic policies, investors would rather prefer to 
operate in generally improved conditions, with less uncertainty and restrictions of any kind. The 
second one touches upon the government. The past development resulted in some controvercies of 
using such restrictions in order to prioritize both the coming investments and the development of the 
specific domestic areas. It seems to be an excessive burden not only for investors, but for the 
government itself to follow such a strategy in view of complicated and ever-changing legislation, 
lingering decision-making, administrative and technical impediments. This inevitably makes difficult 
and slows down investment process, and may quite easily lead to inconsistent treatment among 
investors, as well as to a perceived lack of transparency while setting investment terms. Moreover, 
the record of benefits and costs of this strategy would depend not only on the contributions of already 
established investors in response to legislative and fiscal incentives, but also would comprise those 
deterred from investing into the economy of the republic in the past years. Although it is an uneasy 
task to make acute estimates now, one may suggest that Uzbekistan has been underperforming in the 
area of FDI so far comparatively to its investment potential. In such case, further liberalization and 
institutional reforms could be very helpful and necessary.
 212
be similar to specifying its place on the map available to foreign investors.390 As a young 
country, Uzbekistan is also in need for a broad and in-depth PR campaign to make the world 
community familiar with both domestic and regional developments. In the last decade, 
sustainable work has been already done to give general information about socio-political and 
economic events in the republic, either particular and detailed picture of the changes in 
spheres of social and political life (legislation, administrative reforms, foreign policies, etc.); 
areas of national economy (mineral base, the structure of the economy, infrastructure, 
denationalization and privatization, etc.). Besides, a lot of information has been dealing with 
rich cultural heritage, spiritual life, cultural events of international significance which has 
allowed to understand local standard of life, domestic traditions, social relations and their 
integrity with socio-economic developments in the republic.391 
Generally, however, investment promotion efforts were sometimes offset by poor support 
with the presentation of highly focused and tightly structured investment opportunities. 
Investment promotion became reactive once initial positive contact had been made. The 
Foreign Investment Agency, for instance, was dedicated to facilitating foreign direct 
investment but its actual contribution remained insignificant in supporting foreign investors to 
overcome the daunting policy weaknesses to be in place in the local investment climate. 
The investment promotion literature is still to be improved, especially taking into account 
latest changes in general regime and specific areas. A number of published investment guides 
by government agencies should be in principle helpful but must be regularly updated and 
improved, both in conceptual and language perspective, to meet international standards. 
Major internationally recognized consulting companies are also little involved in publishing 
business guides for Uzbekistan without which the country’s chances are slim to be regarded 
as an equal partner in joint projects. 
Simultaneously, to establish a good view on a country is not appereantly to be monotonic. It is 
influenced by exogenous factors too. In particular, investors may have information prepared 
by internationally recognized consulting agencies, international financial institutions, NGO, 
which are used to look into domestic trends, conduct analyses resulting in a wide range of 
                                                 
390 World Investment Report 1999, UN, p.182 
391 Nowadays investment campaign continues to be widespread at a high level within the government. The 
President and top economic officials, both from the government and from the line ministries, travel overseas 
regularly to meet investor groups and make themselves available to meet business delegations visiting 
Uzbekistan. The investor conferences held abroad and the organized visits to Uzbekistan by business delegations 
are well attended and well received due to the high level support they receive within the government. These 
events are used to expose prospective investors to broad opportunities and those investors which show interest in 
major or innovative projects receive ongoing encouragement from senior government figures. 
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reports. These reports, as a rule, are exacting and relatively tough, especially when the issue 
of international investments is under consideration. Moreover, they comprise almost all the 
spheres, including political, economic, social which expands the set of factors to influence 
investment criteria.392 Complex relations with multilateral donors and financial institutions in 
the past have likely formed above all a discrepant view on the happening in the country. 
On the other hand, it is an accomplished fact that the military operation in Afghanistan in 
2001 has forced to reconsider the role of the region in contemporary international relations 
and therefore, the reinforced formation of new dimensions of global security and common 
efforts against the global threats. Since then, information on Central Asia in Western mass 
media has been mainly dominated by analyses and reports on the fight against terrorism and 
drug trafficking as well as national and regional political developments, including the issues 
of regional security. "It is well-known that foreign investments are not used to confine 
themselves to the needs for (proper) legislative basis only. They come to those countries 
where there are real conditions to run business; where social and political stability is 
provided; where political threats are minimal; where there are no national and civil friction. 
One may set up exclusively favorable legislative base, pass through the most advanced laws 
in order to reform economy and to draw attention of foreign investors. However, without 
social stability, without guarantees against political shocks, civil wars and regional conflicts, 
it would make no sense to talk about the efficiency of the laws in force, about foreign 
investments inflows to be so much-needed to pursue structural changes in the domestic 
economy", noted the President of Uzbekistan I.Karimov.393 
In this context, without political stability it looks hard to achieve sustainable socio-economic 
prosperity, conduct ambitious market reforms, make the efficient use of natural resources, 
improve infrastructure, etc. It is also true, however, that with the acute economic challenges 
on the agenda, political development, as well as stability and security in each of these 
countries are a tough task. On the way towards regional stability via the expansion of contacts 
within and beyond the region at all levels, it becomes high time to use the opportunity for the 
closer contacts between potential investors and domestic economic units in the light of 
numerous foreign visits to the region since September 11. It is efficient in that when investors 
                                                 
392 Relatively poor investment ratings concern both general conditions and situation in separate fields. Thus, for 
instance, as of June 2002, Business Environment Risk Index (BERI) ranked Uzbekistan as the 39 riskiest place 
in the world. The country was considered to be 114, according to country bonus ratings in 2002. In view of the 
underdevelopment of domestic financial markets and their poor linkages to the global financial system, almost 
all countries of Central Asia are either in the group of heightened risk or are not comprised by the analyses at all. 
More details see in Laenderanalyse Kasachstan/Usbekistan, FAZ, Instituet fuer Management, Markt- und 
Medieninformationen Gmbh., 2002, juni. 
393 Translated by the author from Karimov I. O'zbekiston Buyuk Kelajak Sari. Tashkent, 1998. p.651. 
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come in Uzbekistan, they are able to witness local conditions by themselves, so that to 
subsequently set up preliminary business linkages.  
Uzbekistan has its own views on domestic socio-political and economic transformation 
processes. In the country the government is commissioned to decide on the main priorities and 
scale of reforms in all spheres of life. International practice shows a variety of approaches in 
this regard too. Economic policies of the South-East Asian countries, for example, followed 
the path of national sovereignty in policy-making, with the preferences of unilateral over 
multilateral liberalization in order to maintain scope for policy manoeuvring. The Central and 
Eastern Europe, on the contrary, accepted international commitments by virtue of acceding to 
supranational bodies and multilateral treaties. 
But, what is crucial is that the world is changing towards strengthened globalization on the 
one hand, and intensified competition on the other hand. That signifies for Uzbekistan to 
reinforce cooperation with the world community through the exchange of useful information 
on the country in both directions. Such a collaborative approach, in particular in the 
information field, can be realized through the efficient linkages with foreign and international 
analytical agencies which may share methodological and technical experience in turning over 
the generally accepted methods and tools of analyses. Other important steps may include 
obtaining sufficient statistical information from relevant state bodies; activization of mass 
media, encouragement of NGO, etc. In other words, all the aforementioned might be very 
helpful to bring fresh and updated information into international credit ratings, and, eliminate 
existing divergensies in evaluations.394 Eventually, it would also assist in persuading investors 
of the untapped domestic economic potential.  
Additional crucial steps to facilitate a trust-building process as to the reforms undertaken may 
be related to the more openness and transparency of the government bodies. This would 
imply, as we believe, not only broader access to statistical data, but also more active efforts on 
arranging official briefings and meetings with the representatives of foreign companies, 
diplomatic corps, international financial institutions, and mass media as well. The latter, as an 
integral attribute of modern democratic society, is regarded as an efficient source to propagate 
relevant information throughout the wide range of circles in space and time.  
In the given context, it is also important to increase the role played by high- and middle-rank 
government officials to take more active and immediate part in explaining publicly the 
                                                 
394 Nadyrkhanov U. Privlecheniye Inostrannyh Unvestitsiy i Integratsionnye Aspekty „Public Relations“. 
Uzbekistanskiy Gumanitarniy Jurnal magazine, 2003, No 1. 
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government position on various measures concerning investors; in taking questions and giving 
personal assessments and comments; as well as in the scrutiny of the proposals and 
recommendations from foreign participants. By holding such meetings on the regular basis the 
mutually advantageous exchange of views and information between the state and foreign and 
domestic business may be achieved. This in turn could contribute to the definition and timely 
elimination of the state policy gaps as well as prevent such deficiencies in the future.  
Besides, consistent and closer inter-committee collaboration between the key government 
agencies will be required. It is also possible, for example, to stimulate set-ups of public 
coordination councils which might include famed politicians, leading economists, 
representatives of political parties, as well as regional governors (khokims), mass media, 
foreign diplomats and international experts. Such structures could hold discussion clubs and 
round-tables on the challenges of domestic and foreign business whose final decisions and 
recommendations to improve investment climate in Uzbekistan could make up the foundation 
for corresponding government decisions. Such experience was widespread in the outward-
oriented economies of Japan and Malaysia, and contributed to the development of mutually 
beneficial links between both domestic private sector and foreign investors and government 
authorities as well as subsequently ensured successful realization of many government 
decisions concerning vital long-run economic and political issues.395 
In other words, it may allow to improve coordination between the state and private sectors on 
mutual confidence-building which seems to be an essential element during the transition 
period to raise the efficiency of a state machine and its policies. In addition, foreign investors 
are more experienced in using their own capital resources than domestic producers. The latter 
have had limited capacities for the access to the world markets for decades of historical 
development and, therefore, unable to adequately behave in market conditions so far. For that 
reason, there is a strong need for adequate domestic environment for foreign companies which 
are very sensitive to any steps of the government and thus, able to compare business climate 
in different countries, so that to choose between the most promising ones. Besides, due to 
their worldwide network and contacts, successful foreign investors may serve as 
intermediaries to enhance extra financial inflows in Uzbekistan too. 
In sum, favorable investment climate for FDI is critical in which some role is assigned to 
information campaign too to reach this goal. Relatively tough assessments in international 
reports, as a rule, look both fair and exacting at the same time. Yet, they need not to be seen 
                                                 
395 Alimov A., Muminov R. Liberalizatsiya Vneshneekonomichskoy Deyatelnosti (Mirovoy Opyt i Problemy 
Uzbekistana). Magazine Rynok, Dengi, Kredit, 2000, No 11. 
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as final, but as attributable to the specific stage of development only. The foreign policy 
priority of Uzbekistan places a clear emphasis on the moves towards more sustainable 
integration with the world community, with domestic progress to have been already made and 
further plans on the irreversible market reforms. Hence, the role of information is augmented 
through openness, availability and transparency to highlight domestic achievements. In 
practice, the main among these steps would signify the following: collaboration of state 
agencies with corresponding international analytical institutions on the methodological and 
technical basis; the reforms in the national accounts system; administrative reform, which 
above all, will imply the new role of state agencies and public officials in arranging efficiently 
various meetings, round tables, etc. in order to exchange views with private sector (investors, 
international experts, mass media, NGO); more consistency and coordination between the 
state bodies in decision-making and elaboration of the common strategy as to investors. In 
many respects, the expertise of foreign investors could become useful, and contribute to the 
reinforcement of positive investment image of Uzbekistan on the international arena.  
The task of the government policy is not only to eliminate technical, bureaucratic and other 
administrative barriers on the way of foreign investments, but also to conceive and expand the 
role of information through conducting and using consequent information strategy with the 
help of its own institutions, both domestically and abroad. The capacities of mass media, 
foreign investors, international organizations could be also quite helpful. It is equally useful to 
follow and monitor the domestic situation in other countries, not only in those which are the 
main sources of foreign investments, but also in those which are the largest recipients of such 
resources. Hence, the republic has to sustain severe competition with these countries to attract 
international investments. 
5.3. Free Economic Zones 
Another important element is to set up free economic areas which could complement overall 
foreign economic strategy of the republic in the forthcoming years too.  
Free economic areas could be defined as the specific economic territories with particularly 
favorable investment climate to pursue efficient and targeted individual and production 
activities. In addition, it is the place, where the interests of both private sector and the 
government go together in order to reach common goals and advantages. 
The given direction is essential in terms of Uzbekistan for the following primary reasons. 
Such specific areas, as a rule, are established with the purposes to attract more investment, 
mainly foreign, which especially need friendly treatment to be convinced of the attractiveness 
 217
of Uzbekistan as the right place to do business. In the past, foreign capital was usually 
attracted into the republic mainly by using government guarantees and establishing joint 
ventures. Yet, in the light of liberalized foreign economic relations, it is crucial to accelerate 
this process through the broader use of the available tools and opportunities.  
On the other hand, free economic zones need to be seen as a complementary instrument to 
develop and bring into action the national strategy of export promotion. The fundamental 
objective of export promotion is to prevent a policy-induced bias against exportable products. 
The ideal way to achieve a balanced incentive system would be to eliminate tariffs as well as 
quantitative restrictions on all imports and exports and to keep the exchange rate at the 
purchasing power parity of the national currency. This can hardly happen in view of the 
government priorities to protect domestic industries and markets for strategic and priority 
reasons or even on healthy and environmental grounds. In this case, pushing forward and 
maintaining free economic areas and export zones could be one of the measures to cushion 
general setbacks in the national strategy.  
Moreover, under particular conditions, they also allow the country to benefit from scientific 
and technological achievements in forms of modern equipment, ways and the methods of 
production. Finally, as many countries, Uzbekistan embraces the administrative and territorial 
territories which differ from each other by the level of socio-economic development. In such 
conditions, it requires from the government to balance national development, i.e. the regions 
with objectively less favorable local economic and social conditions need some support to 
keep the pace of general development. In this context, the task of the government is seen in 
designing a specific atmosphere in order to promote efficient involvement and put into action 
all the opportunities the given regions.  It finally could ensure the improvement not only in the 
economic structure of domestic economy, but also may be instrumental in addressing a wider 
number of social tasks too (higher employment, raises in income, infrastructure development, 
etc.). This, in turn, is about to encourage consolidating the economic roots of secure and 
sustainable development of the society. 
It needs to be mentioned that free economic zones are to some degree, a generalized 
definition. In more concrete cases, it may foresee export processing zones, bonded 
warehouses, the zones of free entrepreneurship, technological parks and some others. 
According to international experience, they may include also its own administration, customs 
agency, post office, telegraph, employment agency, banking services, necessary infrastructure 
(water, energy, fire), residential areas and districts for investors and workers, as well as other 
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necessary services. In other words, it may look like “a town of free entrepreneurship and 
production activities”.396 
The Uzbek parliament adopted the national law “On Free Economic Zones” pretty long time 
ago, in 1996. But actually, no significant progress has been marked, as well as the concrete 
mechanisms to bring it into action in the given period.397 On the one hand, the work at best 
stalled most likely because of introduction of foreign exchange restrictions in the late 1996; 
and on the other hand, the government expected first the sufficient foreign inflows, and only 
then, to continue works on such projects. 
In this regard, general success in Uzbekistan in pursuing export promotion strategy and 
attracting foreign capital will apparently depend on how the country succeeds in arranging the 
work of such local economic areas. This success will be also related to the encouragement of 
efficient management which may reduce transaction costs of production activities 
(registration, licensing, rapid and transparent local decision-making process), i.e. the functions 
which could be fulfilled by the administrative bodies of such economic territories. These on-
site administrative bodies would be more capable to monitor local business and foreign 
investors and its activities and, therefore, be better informed of their problems. However, 
regional and central authorities would coordinate their efforts in improving local 
infrastructure (transport, communications, energy system, etc.), which are hardly covered 
either by local authorities or new-coming investors. These investments would be apparently 
provided by state budget. However, foreign involvement could be also possible as a result of 
concrete negotiations and mechanisms with foreign partners. 
For Uzbekistan, the choice of possible places with the specifically favorable privileges may 
not be simple as it may look like. Since some free economic areas would be supposed to be 
                                                 
396 Economic zones could also be efficient as technopoles and scientific parks which may also contribute to 
industrialization and export expansion. The experience of South Korea is a representative example in this regard. 
The role of the Korean government was in establishing the Korea Institute of Electronics Technology, the 
Electronic Technology Research Institute, and the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, to bring 
about technological advances in the electronics, in particular in semi-conductor industry. The role of 
technological and scientific institutions located in such technopoles or around main industrial cities made their 
contribution on each stage of a product’s development, starting with the research and touching upon production 
processes. Moreover, according to the incentive scheme, foreign affiliates carrying advanced technology were 
subject to a complete exemption of corporate income tax for the first seven years and a 50% reduction for the 
next three years. These firms are also eligible to locate their facilities in industrial complexes reserved 
exclusively for foreign affiliates. By pursuing such policy, the investment climate in the Republic of Korea 
seems to be more favourable for FDI with high technology. See also: Hong S., Gray S.J. Attracting of FDI to the 
Republic of Korea: Foreign Affiliates Satisfaction with Government Policies. Magazine Transnational 
Corporations, Vol.12, No 1. 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=4268&intItemID=2926&lang=1 
397 There has been no established and functioned zone in the country from that time onwards, at least to meet the 
required characteristics. 
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created in the rural areas too, it might make this process especially difficult. Very often, rural 
areas are the most densely populated territories with relatively poor developed production and 
social infrastructure without which such zones are unable to do well. On the other hand, 
successful experience of the South East Asia, for example, is mainly explained by the fact that 
many export processing zones were set up close to large industrial cities and seaports, such as 
Seoul, Taipei, Bangkok, Shanghai.398 Therefore, it becomes reasonable to establish such 
zones in the areas which are not so far away from the local regional centres and their 
infrastructure facilities. In addition, these zones could be also effective in the border areas, 
since in such a way, one may reduce transport costs for exports, equipment and raw materials 
imports as well as benefiting from the large undeveloped potential of cross-border trade links. 
In the recent past, the government abided by the strategy of seeking 50/50 joint ventures 
between foreign investors and national partners. The rationale of this approach viewed the 
significant equity stake for the national partner as ensuring full participation and acquisition 
of skills for the national partner. “FDI as not just to create jobs; Uzbeks want to learn and be 
able to compete”, was emphasized in an interview by one of the top local officials.399 
Through the improvements in infrastructure facilities and ensuring targeted tax and fiscal 
privileges to the investors, the host country may then put into the agenda its own suggestions 
too. In the given context, such economic zones may also envisage commitments of the foreign 
investors to use the minimum local content of domestic factors of production, such as labor 
and raw materials.400 Yet, one of the crucial elements in designing free economic zones is that 
potential foreign investors will be seeking for the contacts with domestic suppliers of 
resources and enterprises too. This may be explained not only by the intentions of investors to 
reduce their operational costs, but also with the purposes of expanding volumes of sales, 
including those in the domestic and adjacent regional markets. Unfortunately this aspect of 
the relations still remains controversial. In a row with the investors who have a half mind to 
                                                 
398 Mirzalieva S. Analiz Sozdaniya i Razvitiya Svobodnyh Ekonomicheskih Zon v Yujnoy Koree. Magazine 
Ekonomicheskiy Vestnik Uzbekistana, 2000, No 6. 
399 An interview with M.Askarov, former First Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and currently the 
Chairman of State Committee for State Property and Development of Entrepreneurship (Goskomimushestvo) 
during a meeting with a mission of UNCTAD in Tashkent in December 1997. Quoted from UNCTAD 
Investment Policy Review of Uzbekistan. UNCTAD, 1999. http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//poiteiipm13.en.pdf 
400 For instance, Taiwan set up the requirement of minimal 25% of total export value added. In Malaysia, the 
government required from the foreign companies to provide certain managerial positions for the Malaisians in 
exchange of the given privileges, while income tax did not discriminate against residents and non-residents. See: 
Bektemirov I. Malaysiya: Ekonomicheskiy Rost i Ustoichivoye Razvitiye. Magazine Ekonomicheskiy Vestnik 
Uzbekistana, 2000, No 7. These actions, however, were well-grounded and balanced and did not engender 
discontent among investors. The requirements were not brought forward all at once, but came after the 
consequent improvements in general conditions, which had been in principle stable for years to earn more 
credibility among investors. In turn, local labor force was also already proficient enough to claim for them better 
jobs and better salaries.  
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encourage their foreign suppliers to relocate to Uzbekistan and so introduce backward 
linkages, there is a concern and dissatisfaction with the cost and quality of local supplies and 
services.401 
In such cases, the restrictions on competitive import may discriminate export-oriented 
industries due to their dependency on the imports of intermediate goods and raw materials, as 
well as making the import substitution sector more attractive for investments. In terms of 
retained import restrictions in Uzbekistan, the costs of local content may then bring to the low 
export competitiveness of the products and reorientation of the activities towards domestic 
markets.402 Most probably, the solution to this problem would be found in time of the 
negotiation process with each particular investors and after consideration of mutual 
capabilities and conditions to take proactive measures to bring about necessary improvements. 
One equally needs not to forget that the role of such special zones which they played in export 
promotion, differed considerably across countries and over time. In Taiwan, they accounted 
for three quarters of the trade surplus during 1971-1980. Parallel to trade liberalization, their 
role declined substantially. The same is true for Korea, where free trade zones accounted for 
less than 3% of exports and imports in 1990. This share has remained below 10% in the 
Philippines, although free trade zones were preferred export promotion schemes.403 In China, 
in the middle of the 1980s the establishment of free juridical space with the slogan “hands 
off” was much more influential factor for FDI inflows, than the setting up of free economic 
zones with specific privileges.404 At the same time, other researches show that that the Special 
Economic Zones designated by government turned out to be important factors affecting the 
location of inward FDI in China and subsequently attracting significantly more foreign 
manufacturing affiliates.405 
Thus, the development of free economic areas in Uzbekistan could serve as another tool to 
back up the outward-oriented policy through foreign capital inflows. This policy may bring 
many advantages, if it is organized and pursued properly. International experience in South 
East Asia points to the necessity of good governance, proper infrastructure facilities, essential 
                                                 
401 Investment Policy Review of Uzbekistan. UNCTAD, 
1999.http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//poiteiipm13.en.pdf 
402 Such a situation was observed in the Phillipines, for instance, where export promotion remained isolated and 
was not supplied by effects of import liberalization. See: Agarwal J., Laughannen R., Luecke M., Mannerkamp 
P. Export Expansion and Diversification in Central and Eastern Europe: What can be learnt from East and South 
East Asia? Institut fuer Weltwistschaft, Kiel, November, 1995. p.11 
403 The same. p.15 
404 See also Pomfret R. Foreign Trade Policy For Economies in Transition. Magazine Ekonomichskoye 
Obozreniye, 1998, august, p.41 
405 Cheng, Leonard K. and Yum K. Kwan (2000). “What are the determinants of the location of foreign direct 
investment? The Chinese experience”, Magazine of International Economics, 51 (2), pp. 379-400. 
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services, macroeconomic environment. However, the efficiency of such zones will not be 
significant, if they do not exert competitive pressure on the rest of the economy via input and 
output linkages. In terms of Uzbekistan, it requires some balanced policies to diminish the 
risks of excessive import substitution with the detriment to much-desired export expansion. 
The question remains open, which territories of the country could be endued with better 
conditions to make such zones operating efficiently. The specifics of geographical location, 
demographic conditions, and domestic mineral base, may require from Uzbekistan much more 
active efforts in the given direction than other countries did in their time. 
5.4. Summary 
The economic developments in Uzbekistan in the second half of the 1990s were dominated by 
foreign exchange and trade restrictions. As a result, it was hardly able to maximize the 
positive, if any, effect in the developments in the foreign economic sector. Although the 
government still has a clear view about the economic development model which it follows, 
the philosophy of selective favouritism of private investments was insufficient, due to its 
limitations, to benefit from broad investment inflows.  
Yet, in new terms of the needed reforms, especially if it relies seriously on the foreign sources 
of economic growth, a number of both domestic and external factors should be taken into 
consideration. In other words, where can Uzbekistan, within the ambit of the current 
economic models in Central Asia, clearly adopt better policies and procedures? But there are 
still some areas where Uzbekistan is far from being the successful, despite its rich potential. 
Therefore, there is a strong need and opportunity to improve. 
 International experience witnesses that the reform in the foreign economic field, if 
pursued on a long-run basis, is conducive to sustainable development. In case of 
Uzbekistan, which has spent many decades in the isolation from the world community, 
these reforms are of both economic and political significance. On the one hand, this is an 
area which ensures much-needed export earnings and foreign investments that in turn are 
crucial to pursue domestic reforms, raise production efficiency, create new jobs, fight with 
poverty and raise income. On the other hand, the reforms in this area are important in 
terms of further comprehensive integration of the country with the world community. The 
given sphere is a primary intermediary which conveys substantial amounts of social, 
political and economic information and other intangible resources to and from the republic 
without which no sustainable progress in all areas is possible nowadays.  
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 Liberalization and optimisation in the foreign sector are two parallel processes within the 
general strategy. If liberalization concerns more freedom and sovereignty to economic 
units, optimization will deal with the improvements in government policies through less 
centralization and direct government interference in foreign economic relations. 
Moreover, sustainable economic growth is most probably related to further structural 
changes in domestic economy, adequate import and export policies. 
 In this regard, export promotion is expected to play a cordial role. With its traditional 
industries, including the light and textile ones, it looks equally important to support the 
diversified export structure and, therefore develop and strengthen new industries too, such 
as electronics and home appliances, for example. Some lessons from Asia suggest that 
targeted measures of the government with the use of trade, fiscal, tax, administrative tools 
are essential, but not the only steps on the way to a final goal. They should be consistent 
with government credibility through improvements in the tools and methods of domestic 
policies, as well as by ensuring sound macroeconomic environment with real export-
induced bias. Long-term success of export promotion strategy will be also crucially 
attributable to the fact, how efficiently the process of technological transfer will be taking 
place and how properly these technologies are going to be adapted to local conditions and 
subsequently treated by local labor force. Finally, institutional and technical support for 
export promotion is expected to contribute to local exporters in expanding their 
opportunities, knowledge and skills to behave in foreign markets. 
 It is crucial to proceed with the work on the reinforcement of domestic legal base, 
especially towards FDI. This will require not only the adoption some new national laws, 
in order to fully use comparative advantages of the republics in international division of 
labor, but also improvements in the existing ones on the way to simplification, 
transparency and consistence. The development of legislative power and the judiciary 
system is going to be an integral part of the given process. 
 Further work needs to be done in order to strengthen the institutional base of government 
regulation. It does not necessarily imply the expansion of the staff of state apparatus to 
control over the foreign sector. On the contrary, in the light of the administrative reform, 
existing state bodies are required to be more flexible and optimal, as government 
interference is substituted more by market-regulated mechanisms. 
 For Uzbekistan, like for many countries, FDI seem to be the much-needed source of long-
run sustainable development. FDI is undeniably a more stable source of finance than 
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portfolio investments, but should be seen as a complement, rather than a substitute to 
public finance. International experience shows that FDI flows are moderate, if the host 
country has poor legislation, inconsistent court system, burdensome state machine and 
bureaucracy, lots of foreign restrictions, highly regulated and dependent banking system, 
etc. Foreign investors have broad sources of information to compare and analyse before 
going to a final conclusion. They may include not only officially accepted international 
reports (and not only purely economic), independent surveys of NGOs, conferences, 
expos, etc., but equally be based on rumours and personal experiences. Political factors 
may influence the acceptability of policy measures. The responsiveness of investors to 
policy changes and, thus, the adjustment flexibility of the economy is likely to be higher if 
the government’s credibility is beyond serious doubt. Consequently, all the factors are 
strongly correlated which requires a more thorough and multi-dimensional approach to 
touch upon the whole specter of issues and not foreign economic development only. 
 At the same time, as international experience reveals, it is sometimes a complex task to 
define which of the factors may have optimum and direct effect on the developments with 
export promotion and FDI. But as the appropriate package of export promotion measures 
is devised, it should be kept in mind that specific export incentives in terms of tax or tariff 
exempts and drawbacks, financial support through credits and subsidies can only be 
complementary and cannot substitute for sound macroeconomic policies, the main 
indicators of which are low inflation, adequate foreign exchange and trade policies, etc. 
For FDI, however, it becomes clear that stable macroeconomic environment is an 
important, but not a sufficient condition today. The world trends show a lot of additional 
targeted efforts pursued by the governments to attract FDI or encourage sustainable export 
promotion. Moreover, some new criteria, such as the credibility of recipient governments, 
the state of democratic development, human rights, etc. are also taken into consideration.  
 Economic transformation in Uzbekistan involves quite diversified policy tasks. In 
particular, the country is due to continue in dealing with the institution building, 
macroeconomic stabilization, structural reforms, privatization, as well as with irreversibly 
committed political and democratic reforms. As reforms in these areas are firmly rooted 
and strongly pledged, the uncertainty as to general investment conditions may be avoided. 
 The foreign economic sector is going to develop well, if the appropriate system of the 
various forms of insurance from the risks of doing business or exportation, both for 
domestic and foreign investors is in place, in addition to drastic industrial restructuring 
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and appropriate development of financial and capital markets. All of them should reflect 
government priorities for the republic in the middle- and long-run. 
 Analysis shows that one of the greatest challenges in the foreign sector is a chronic 
shortage of both general and commercial information. According to international 
experience, one of the possible solutions is to develop the public system of information for 
foreign economic activity. The system may collect and analize necessary information, in 
order to subsequently provide it to the parties concerned. The system may have many 
branches and be widespread across the country. In addition, there is a strong need for 
another publicly managed set-up in order to fill in the institutional and marketing gap in 
foreign trade. Its strategic task should be broader assistance to economic units in market 
research, product development, advertising Uzbek products abroad, attendance in 
international fairs, etc.  
 Openness and transparency in foreign affairs is much dependent on the measures to 
communicate with the outside world. The task of the government policy in this particular 
case is not only to eliminate technical, bureaucratic and other administrative barriers on 
the way of foreign and domestic investors, but also to perceive and expand the role of 
information by conducting and using its consequent information strategy with the help of 
its own institutions, both domestically and abroad, and as well as capacities and 
opportunities of mass media, foreign investors, international organizations.  
 If the barriers in Uzbekistan’s foreign trade are to hold in the foreseeable future, mainly 
because of the current priorities in the industrial sector, the possible drawbacks could be to 
some extent eased through the establishment of free economic areas. The latter will be 
also crucial in complementing outward-oriented, export promotion strategy. This policy 
may bring a plenty of advantages, if it is organized and pursued properly. International 
experience in South East Asia points at the necessity of good governance, proper 
infrastructure facilities, essential services, macroeconomic environment. The peculiarities 
of geographical location, demographic conditions, and domestic mineral base, however, 
may require from Uzbekistan much more active efforts in this direction, than other 
countries did decades ago. But, with the steps towards further trade liberalization the 
needs for such zones and their subsequent role is going to be diminished. 
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Chapter VI. THE PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL (CENTRAL ASIAN) COOPERATION 
6.1. Theoretical Aspects of Regionalism 
6.1.1. Definition and Theories of Regionalism 
A great deal of debates are currently devoted to the issues related to socio-economic and 
political events in the entire CIS space. On the one hand, it could be seen as another reflection 
of the trends explained by causes and consequences of the emergence of various regional 
unions and blocs, as well as their role in the deepening interdependence between countries 
and regions. Not at least, it could also be related to the general geopolitical situation in the 
world as a result of the demise of the Cold war political order and subsequent shifts in foreign 
policy doctrines of major powers which are actually determining the situation in the priority 
geographical, economic and political areas. The new emerging territories, regardless of their 
natural or cultural distance, could equally become the place of both shared interests and 
conflicts due to their rich and untapped potential. 
One of such places in international relations after the 1990s has been Central Asia, the five 
countries of the former USSR that were little known internationally during the Soviet 
period.406 The established contention that regional cooperation in Central Asia has already 
proved to be a very specific, controversial and long-lasting process rather than successful 
regional integration efforts assumes the solid, sometimes even finalized shape. The regional 
initiatives are regarded as an allegedly completed process featured with the dismal history 
record and even more vague outlook. Whereby, however, the fact is underestimated that these 
countries with relatively young history of independent development are still to confront with 
parallel challenges on national building, institutional and structural reforms, security and 
political dilemmas. In the given light, study of regional processes requires conducting a more 
in-depth analysis with a particular emphasis on the factors and reasons allowing to better 
understand Central Asia's regional history and to devise its own formula for future 
development.407  
First and foremost, the analysis of regional trends requires giving a definition of 
“regionalism”. It needs to be emphasized that many of the debates on the given issues are 
based on a few principal notions - “integration” on the one hand, and “regionalisation”, 
                                                 
406 That is Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
407 Some scholarship are used to look at the region as a part of the Caspian basin in the light of energy resources 
and their role in contemporary international politics. Others refer to a wider territory called a Central Eurasia, 
embracing in addition to the aforementioned five republics, also Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and even the 
northwestern part of China. Our focus has been basically made on the regionalization efforts between the former 
Soviet Central Asian states in the past, the role of Uzbekistan, and the specific impact of bi-and multilateral 
involvement on its future potential. 
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“regionalism” and “regional cooperation” on the other.408 While the former was actively used 
in political and scientific circles in the Central Asia region itself, the others were the 
definitions given by western researchers to highlight regional tendencies in post-Soviet 
Central Asia. In view of a strong interrelationship between these terms, they most probably 
were treated as synonyms. However, we need to specify clearly some particular differences. 
In more general sense, “regional cooperation” could be defined as a process of joining forces 
by countries or groups of countries on the bi- and multilateral basis, who have and perceive 
common interests in various fields. This action is needed to maximize favorable effects from 
such common efforts on each single country which is unable to achieve these effects if it 
would act unilaterally. In order to enable these processes to develop in some organized and 
proper manner, countries may coordinate their moves in particular areas by steadily increasing 
the extent of such coordination. The latter may be obtained further through the establishment 
of certain intergovernmental and non-governmental structures and bodies in each area of a 
mutual concern. These structures could be agreed from the outset of regional cooperation, as 
it was in the EU, to monitor, analyze and take the decisions and rules which are usually 
mandatory for all country members and their national set-ups. Equally, however, they may 
come into life after concrete cooperate links and projects on the economic and social levels 
have been implemented successfully. Then, institutionalization takes place on the basis and as 
an outcome of positive practical experience in the past, as it mainly happened in East and 
South-East Asia.409  
As for “integration”, the term may be used to express different processes. Equally, however, 
one needs to differentiate between the types and the stages of integration.410 Although the 
types may differ from its relatively simple one (free trade area) towards more complex and 
ultimate one (economic and political union), some elements may exist simultaneously in a 
few types. For example, free capital and labor mobility which is normally pertains to common 
                                                 
408 Although these terms are used interchangeably, one needs to be stressed that regionalisation represents the 
process of a growing importance of regional arrangements, while regionalism implies these regional trading 
arrangements themselves. In turn, integration of states is seen as the higher level of regional cooperation and 
coordination between the states as to various methods, common norms and rules in political and economic 
spheres in which both state-led and market forces-led initiatives may be equally important. Hence, the term 
“regional cooperation” could be more relevant as to Central Asia, since its seems to be neutral to reflect the 
extent of both former and current relations between the states. 
409 Agarwal J., Laughannen R., Luecke M., Mannerkamp P. Export Expansion and Diversification in Central and 
Eastern Europe: What can be learnt from East and South East Asia? Institut fuer Weltwistschaft, Kiel, 
November, 1995. 
410 The literature refers to the five main types of integration. They are: free trade area (with no tariffs on goods 
and services, but autonomous tariff policy as to third countries), customs union (free trade area plus common 
tariffs as to third countries), common market (customs union plus free movement of all factors of production), 
economic union (plus coordination of economic policies), and political union (plus supranational structures 
coordinating non-economic issues too). See more on this in Micic M. International Trade, St.Martin's Press, New 
York, pp.441-465. 
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market or economic union may be found in free trade area too. It could certainly be easier for 
some countries to follow the order by starting with the more simple removal of borders and 
other impediments towards the free movement of products and services. Under appropriate 
conditions, they can thus initiate the integrative process by coordinating and harmonising 
economic, financial and customs policies not only to promote future development, but to 
overcome the existing bottlenecks too in all the countries-members of the union. Yet for some 
others, the elimination of the obstacles in intra-regional trade will remain the ultimate goal 
rather than the establishment of a more complex political and economic union. 
Due to the objective limitations, the given research is certainly unable to comprise all the 
possible theories on this issues, but some of them which could be useful to analyze the trends 
in Central Asia, will be briefly set out. 
In the 1940s it was a functionalist theory that was considered as sufficient to meet the 
requirements of social and economic developments between states. Since these states were 
requiring close technocratic cooperation in each single economic area, the postulate of 
functionalism declared that successful cooperation in a concrete field or project might 
stimulate further, even stronger integration processes.411 
A conception of federalism was born in the late 1940s. In comparison with the former views, 
the given theory argued that hopes for integration through technocratic collaboration would 
fail unless a strong and constitutional structure on the regional or international level was 
established. This theory succeeds further by forbearance from the strategies of short-run gain 
by the potential cooperators in favor of greater long-term benefits to be drawn out from 
collaboration.412 
A neo-functionalist approach, especially developed in the mid-1980s, emphasizes the role of 
a political aspect and initiative functions of supranational structures on the one hand, and the 
reinforcement of the “spill-over” effects from cooperation in particular fields on the other. 
This was particularly attributable to the cyclical developments within the Western European 
integration which strengthened its positions in the mid-1980s after facing some stagnation in 
the 1970s-early 1980s.413 
                                                 
411 Talipov F. Teoriya i Praktika Regionalnoy Integratsii v Tsentralnoy Azii. Quoted from Mitrany D. The 
Functional Theory of Politics. London School of Economics and Political Science. M.Robertson and Co., 1975. 
412 Gleason G. Interstate Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum. Europe-Asia Studies, 
Vol.53, No 7, 2001, pp.1007-1095.  
413 Jakobeit K. Teoriya Regionalnoy Integratsii. In Diter H. Regionalnaya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii. 
Zentralstelle fuer Wirtschafts- und Socialentwicklung, Berlin, 1995. 
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A relatively new conception of transactionism makes the use of quantitative methods to 
define the scale of integration processes. In terms of the growing exchange of products and 
emerging communications, as well as the new shifts in approaches from armed to other forms 
of conflict solutions, some kind of “security communities” has begun emerging which 
eventually may bring the countries under the umbrella of common political unions.414 
In a pragmatic way, the aforementioned approaches could stipulate the following reasons for 
the establishment of regional unions.415 They are:  
1) general interests of the states for regional cooperation to be formed by the existence of 
concrete economic and political interests; social, historical and ethnical similarities; 
geographical proximity, etc.; 
2) ideological considerations and motivations which may ensure a fruitful ground for the 
future union; 
3) “rational choice”, i.e. the quantitative and detailed measurement of benefits and losses 
coming out from direct participation in regional unions. 
History of regionalism in the world contains both theoretical and empirical evidence. While 
the theory’s evolution eventually led to the depiction of bounds between costs and benefits 
from regionalism, empirical data proved to be less assertive. The latter’s contribution has 
come in defining the differences in motivations and in outcome of these efforts across the 
space and time. But the magnitude and direction of real benefits for the countries which took 
part in common regional initiatives was often open to debate. The main question in both 
political and academic circles since the end of World War II, has been whether an array of the 
established regional blocs does benefit a handful number of countries, i.e. those which take 
part in these blocs, through the mutual preferences in free trade and the protection of regional 
market from external competition. And if yes, then it may probably occur at the costs of the 
others left outside such unions which should thus lead to the diminished world welfare, when 
these costs for both the members and non-members of the regional unions will exceed their 
potential benefits. Consequently, the debates still remain on whether such trends are in 
compliance with the establishment of a universal multilateral system of relations in which all 
                                                 
414 Association for South and East Asian Cooperation (ASEAN set up in 1967) could serve a representative 
example in this regard. Although its member countries announced a wide range of issues to keep up interstate 
collaboration, including economic, social, cultural, educational and other spheres, regional approach to address 
outside and domestic threats under the mottos of common security and stability remains the strategic task of such 
cooperation nowadays too. 
415 Jakobeit K. Teoriya Regionalnoy Integratsii. In Diter H. Regionalnaya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii. 
Zentralstelle fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialentwicklung, Berlin, 1995. p.5 
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the countries could benefit and not only those immediately involved in a particular regional 
bloc. In other words, the question is whether regionalism should be regarded as a stage 
towards the creation of a more global system or it is an attempt to resist this kind of 
universalized intentions.  
In the given context, some questions may also arise when considering the true rationales 
behind the intentions to “regionalise” in Central Asia. All the regional states are seeking to 
integrate into the world community and favor, to a different degree, multilateralism in foreign 
policies. Equally, however, they are all members of many regional unions, though the fate of 
such unions remains indefinite. Hence, how the region is going to act in these conditions and 
what the impact, both political and economic, of these steps will be are the two among a 
number of issues on regional cooperation to be considered by these countries. Yet, in the 
search of some answers to these sort of questions, at first it is necessary to remind the general 
features of the creation and emergence of such blocs across the world in the past. 
 
6.1.2. Some Lessons From the International Past 
It is a recognized view that a significant impetus to the trends of the first regionalist wave 
across the developing world was given by the process of Western European integration. The 
initial wave of the regional unions was widespread during the entire 1960s-1970s. In Latin 
America, it was the Latin America Free Trade Area (LAFTA) and the Central American 
Common Market both established in 1960. Later, disagreements in LAFTA led to the 
emergence of the Andean Pact in 1969. In 1980, LAFTA itself was replaced by more flexible 
and less binding Latin American Integration Association.416  
Although far-reaching trade and political goals had been declared, it became soon clear, 
however, that the prospects of these regional efforts remained vague. The countries were able 
neither to increase their share in the world trade which, on the contrary, had diminished; nor 
to cope with the declining volumes of intra-regional trade too. The idea of regional success 
had reportedly failed. In the Latin American case, the source of these developments was the 
wide range of size and the level of development among its members, with small Bolivia and 
                                                 
416 A number of regional aggrements appeared in the African continent too, including the East African 
Community, the Western Africa’s Economic Community, the Economic Union of Central Africa, and the South 
African Customs Union. Yet all these initiatives failed, since the African countries were all small with the low 
level of economic development and primary trade with non-members of the established unions. Moreover, 
regular inter-state political conflicts impeded seriously common regional efforts. As for Asia, it was relatively 
devoid of active regional economic arrangements. The focus was made on the encouragement of political 
collaboration and confidence-building measures. For all these see: Pomfret R. The Economics of Regional 
Trading Arrangements, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.98-104. 
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Paraguay and larger Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. The process of industrialization caused by 
the regional emphasis on the import-substitution manufacturing sector development, led to the 
further expansion of the gap between small and larger economies. In addition, some 
disagreements over the redistribution of benefits from highly protected regional industries, 
and over the costs of the higher prices on domestic markets were the frequent case.417  
Another reason of the differences between the European integration and a poor performance 
of regionalism in the third world, particularly in Africa, was seen in the local conditions 
which had existed in the less developed economies. Natural resource endowment, retention of 
a common colonial legacy, in addition to high political orientation towards former metropoly 
states long after independence resulted in emerging non-diversified commodities-based local 
economies and slow or the absence of any economic progress.418 In many respects, as a result 
of such orientation in foreign trade, the structure of merchandise exports among these 
countries made no significant differences and subsequently gave a little impetus to the 
development of intra-regional relations.  
It needs to be underlined that the level of industrialization, as a mirror reflection of the 
commodity orientation in foreign trade, serves as an important pre-condition for the 
intensification of foreign trade. This was certainly absent or lacked in the developing 
countries at the time when they had decided to set up regional unions. Therefore, for such 
countries regionalisation in forms of various unions ended with no tangible benefits than 
expected at the outset of such a process. On the other hand, the goals of those countries 
looked more ambitious compared to true domestic and external environment. Emboldened 
with the elusive political dreams about regionalism, the countries seemed to set a too high 
tempo of integration which was later perceived to be unattainable in view of the inadequate 
and so far not formed political and economic potential. At last, the vulnerability of the young 
states due to the high dependence on the world commodity markets made them the first 
targets of instability in the world economy. It was especially seen during the oil and energy 
                                                 
417 One of the points here is that in terms when intra-industry relationships are poorly developed, when foreign 
trade mainly hinges upon one or a few staples, then, one may reach little by joining efforts within regional 
structures. In other words, the benefits of the regional bloc may not be palpable until the material conditions for a 
deepening division of labor are secured, i.e. some minimal level of intra-industry specialization has been 
achieved. See: Altvater E. Regionalizatsiya Mirovogo Rynka In Diter H. Regionalnaya Integratsiya v 
Tsentralnoy Azii. Zentralstelle fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialentwicklung, Berlin, 1995. p.77. Yet it is still open to 
debate whether a more liberal strategy towards foreign trade and market mechanisms could have resulted in 
better achivements for these countries. Extremely politicization of the economic issues, and conflicts between 
the countries had also singnificantly damaged the progress towards the declared goals. 
418 Anglo- and francophone countries in Africa continued to draw up their foreign policy, especially foreign 
economic policy, in conformity with the agenda of their recent parent states. See more: Jakobeit K. Teoriya 
Regionalnoy Integratsii. In Diter H. Regionalnaya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii. Zentralstelle fuer Wirtschafts- 
und Sozialentwicklung, Berlin, 1995. 
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shocks in the 1970s. Although these were resource-rich countries, who suffered more, the 
subsequent slow-down in global economic growth resulted in tumbling demand for 
commodities and the lower prices on the main exports from these countries to the developed 
economies. It happened at the moment, when developing countries, especially relatively 
poorly endowed with natural resources, had to confront with the de facto high and 
unsustainable amounts of foreign debt. This eventually undermined all the efforts on 
sustainable regional development.419 
Later on, the next wave of regionalism started spreading across the world during the 1980s-
1990s. As so called “new regionalism”, it could be characterized as “an attempt to find 
answers to the challenges coming out from global structural crisis and strengthened 
international competition exacerbated by financial instability in the world”.420 NAFTA (North 
American Free Trade Association) and Mercosur (South American Common Market) are the 
cases of regional unions during the second wave of regionalism in the world. The peculiarity 
of these unions is that their birth was connected not only to purely economic reasons.421 
Mercosur was the most important of the Latin American initiatives in terms of the size of the 
economies involved (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and called for a common 
market from January 1995 with free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital.422 
At this moment, some differences were in place between the first and second waves of 
regionalism. The approach of bringing forward common interests as a group was believed to 
be a more or less efficient way to defend national interests in negotiations with the rest of the 
world, especially on multilateral agreements. The policy orthodoxy itself was shifting during 
the 1980s from import-substituting industrialization towards more outward-oriented and 
                                                 
419 For debt crisis in the 1980s see in Micic M. International Trade, St.Martin's Press, New York, pp.261-267. 
420 Altvater E. Regionalizatsiya Mirovogo Rynka In Diter H. Regionalnaya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii. Zentralstelle fuer 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialentwicklung, Berlin, 1995. p.83 
421 Some analysts believe that the US policies towards integration with the economically much weaker Mexico could above 
all witness about a combination of both the tactical steps to open up the Mexican borders for American capital, and the US 
strategic interests in response to intensified competition from the European continent and South-East Asia given the 
geographical location of the USA between these two continents. See for instance: Altvater E. Regionalizatsiya Mirovogo 
Rynka In Diter H. Regionalnaya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii. Zentralstelle fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialentwicklung, 
Berlin, 1995. p.99. Equally, however, this process did not go smoothly. Especially in the case of Mexico, this initiative faced 
significant resistance in the US Congress. Although the idea of equal partnership between the strong and the weak was 
undermined, the US Administration had to make a few serious revisions of the operating procedures to the signed Agreement 
before it was put into action. On the other hand, the North American integrative initiatives, both pre-NAFTA (which is 
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, signed in January 1988) and NAFTA itself reflected the interests of the smaller countries 
too. Canada and Mexico were the initiators of these initiatives: both wanted to safeguard its position from the American 
unilateralism launched in the mid-1980s by Congress and the R.Reagan administration against unfair trade practices in trade 
partners. But the latter also wanted to use a trade agreement to promote foreign investment and support for its neo-liberal 
reforms. Morever, president of Mexico was reportedly influenced by a trip to Europe in which he observed the EU countries 
looking only east towards Central Europe.Find out more on North American regional initiatives in Pomfret R. The 
Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.135-143.    
422 Similar patterns were observable in Africa, the Carribean, West, and South Asia, but with less practical results. The only 
exceptions were East and Southeast Asia which remained catious with regional trading arrangements untill the mid-1990s. 
See more on that in Pomfret R. The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.143-
148. 
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market-friendly development strategies. Developing countries became increasingly willing to 
accept the obligations of GATT members (as to more liberal trade policies) and 
simultaneously seek the rights of such membership (in the form of legal guarantees to market 
access). Given the greater importance of US, EU, and Japan’s domestic trade policies for 
developing countries, GATT became the principal multilaterally negotiating forum in which 
developing countries began to play an active role for the first time ever.423 
Conclusion of the most long-lasting Uruguay Round multilateral trade talks was to some 
extent successful in assuaging the regionalism-versus-multilateralism issue by favoring free 
trade globally.424 The reform of dispute settlement procedures and the establishment of 
discussion panels in the newly organized system of multilateral trade within WTO on the 
basis of the former GATT limited the potential for unilateralism from developed countries, 
and helped thus the developing economies to negotiate trade on more equal footing.425 The 
WTO relieved some restrictions on the establishment of regional blocs in the world under 
particular conditions, as well as introduced a special clause on regional unions between 
developing countries.426 With these opportunities, developing countries were keen to set up 
various regional unions with and without supranational structures. The latter were regarded as 
a tool to contribute to both a policy-making process in response to global trends and 
international trade on the one hand, and to the simultaneous protection of national interests 
through the step-by-step promotion and reinforcement of regional competitiveness on the the 
world markets dominated by industrially developed countries.427  
                                                 
423 Find out more on these specific issues in Pomfret R. The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, pp.128-156. 
424 Some authors note, however, that it was just the loss of momentum in the multilateral trade negotiations during the GATT 
Uruguay Round which caused the rising interest to regionalism in the 1990s. See: Micic M. International Trade, St.Martin's 
Press, New York, pp.523-528. For the overview of the GATT Rounds see in Hockman B., Kostecki M. The Political 
Economy of the World Trading System. The WTO and Beyond, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.100-108. 
425 For the mechanism of dispute settlement procedures see in Hockman B., Kostecki M. The Political Economy of the World 
Trading System. The WTO and Beyond, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.74-99. 
426 Article XXIV of GATT foresees the following three conditions to form customs unons and free trade areas: trade barriers 
facing non-members must not “on the whole” be higher than those previously in effect; trade barriers must be eliminated on 
“substantially all” trade among members; interim arrangements to permit scheduling these unions must be completed over a 
reasobale period of time. See: Hockman B., Kostecki M. The Political Economy of the World Trading System. The WTO and 
Beyond, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.352-255. But experts agree on the internal controvercies and poor practical 
efficiency of this article in terms of other obligation within the non-discrimination principle of the GATT. See more on these 
critics in Micic M. International Trade, St.Martin's Press, New York, pp.519-522; Pomfret R. The Economics of Regional 
Trading Arrangements, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.74-76. 
427 These processes seem to continue nowadays too. In South America also one may observe regional and national desire to 
acquire additional political weight in order to operate as a common trade grouping during the negotiations in multilateral 
trade. The latter most probably implies to increase region’s clout in trade talks with South America’s main trading partners 
(EU, Japan, USA), which still continue to be the outside economies. Despite a number of outstanding difficulties, the 
countries are moving purposefully towards the creation of stronger regional identity. At first the Andean Community of 
Nations (CAN) and Mercosur signed a trade deal in July 2004 to open up trade across the continent. The CAN includes 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, while Mercosur’s members are Brazil, Argentine, Paraguay and Uruguay and 
Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela as associate members. On December 9 2004, representatives from 12 South 
American countries went even further, when after the meeting in Peru they signed another agreement to set up a political and 
economic bloc modeled on the European Union. While skepticism is present over the successful future of the new Union, 
 233
In addition, contemporary trends in regionalism are supported by the mutual reinforcement of 
economic and political rationales. In terms of the established economic and trade relations 
among countries, total volumes of regional trade occurs at the rates higher than those with the 
rest of the world. Economic linkages tend to reinforce which in turn secures more active 
collaboration in political dimensions. Such patterns pertain to the Asian regionalism (ASEAN, 
APEC) under the slogans of regional cooperation and integration in a pragmatic and gradual 
way. Its main feature is that these processes may happen before institutionalization and the 
strong adherence to the binding obligations which is not regarded as an indispensable 
condition. Moreover, modern regionalism is driven more by the ideas to strengthen key 
positions in international relations through the mergers with the previously formed regional 
unions (Latin America), the expansion of membership by admitting new members or directly 
through bilateral negotiations to comprise new aspects of regionalism (Asia),428 or the 
emergence of biregionalism.429 The following table summarizes the importance of regional 
bloc trade in different parts of the world. 
 
Table 6.1. Share of Intra-regional Trade in Total Trade, various regions, 1928-2003 
 
 1928 1948 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 
Western Europe 50.7 41.8 61.1 67.7 64.7 69.9 67.4 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
19 46.4 71.3 58.8 57.3 19.7 25.9 
North America* 25 27.1 30.5 35.1 31.7 33 32.3 
Latin America 11.1 20 16.3 27.9 17.7 19.4 16.9 
Asia 45.5 38.9 47 41.6 43 49.7 53.5 
Africa 10.3 8.4 7.8 7.6 4.4 8.4 10.6 
Middle East 5 20.3 8.7 6.1 7.9 9.4 8.8 
World 38.7 32.9 44.1 49.3 44.2 50.4 50.5 
 
* Mexico is included in Latin America 
Source: Updated from Micic M. International Trade, p.444; WTO International Trade Statistics 2004. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
both in regional and bilateral relations across the region, the initiators believe that it could one day “have a common currency, 
parliament and passport”, help better “confront the challenges of globalization and of new political and economic order”. It 
represents 45% of the total American continent, with GDP of about $973 mln., export of $181 mln. of goods and services and 
361 mln. of population. Sources: South America Trade Bloc Expands,  BBC News, 08 July 2004; South America Blocs in 
Trade Deal. BBC News, 19 October 2004; South America Launches Trading Bloc, BBC News, 09 December 2004. 
428 ASEAN – Association of South East Nations, APEC - Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation could be taken as examples. 
The most recent event is the ASEAN-China trade accord, which unites 10 South East Asian economies and China in a single 
market worth $2 trln. and a quarter of the world’s population. The countries committed to lower tariffs by 2010 and create 
free trade area in the region. Moreover, wider ambitions are behind plans for East Asian Summit, including “ASEAN plus 3”, 
i.e. China, Japan and Korea as a means to create a trade bloc to rival the EU and the USA. Especially after the 1997 financial 
crisis, in Asia Pacific bilateral negotiations on capital movements and financial services were also mushrooming, which 
marked a new aspect of regional trends. For more information see: China in Landmark Pact: a Landmark Trade Agreement 
between 10 South East Countries and China Has Been Signed at a Summit in Laos.  BBC News, 29 November 2004. 
429 A case of biregionalism gathers its force in the relations between the EU and Latin America as a response to the recent 
trends in a globalised world system. Referred on the part as a “defence strategy” to strengthen bargaining positions against 
the two economic giants, such as the USA and the EU, it comprises a multilevel mechanisms on political dialogue and 
economic diplomacy to serve Latin America’s foreign policy goals on diversification and growing multilateralism in new 
terms. See more on that: Grabendorff W., Seidelmann R. (eds.) (2005) Relations Between the European Union and Latin 
America: Biregionalism in a Changing Global System. Nomos Verlagsgeselschaft, Baden-Baden. 
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To sum up, the efforts and willingness to set up regional blocs in the various parts of the 
world in the past was influenced by a number of specific economic and political factors. In the 
developing world, the given process seems to require another, most probably longer 
timeframe for objective reasons, such as lack of sufficient funds, dependence on foreign 
capital and international donors, absence of transnational corporations capable to implement 
such investments (Annex 6.1). The regionalism in the world in the past took various forms 
which differed by their nature. But there should be links between the waves of 1950s-60s and 
1980s-1990s which reflect in that this regionalism was substantially provoked by national 
trade policies of the USA, Europe, and Japan towards each other and towards the third parties. 
For the latter, it is thus believed to be “difficult in terms of being secluded from the gravity of 
industrial countries. The terms of both national and regional policies are drawn up in the 
world of industrial countries; the IMF-led international financial system, World Bank, WTO. 
Neither regional blocs, no single countries are able to get isolated from the world markets. It 
thus leaves only some medium way between a defenseless openness, and a voluntary or 
forced seclusion… When moving forward this way, the regional spaces (blocs) may be useful, 
but only on the provision that political value added could be turned into an extra economic 
potential through sound economic policies”.430 
 
6.2. Central Asia: Vision, Reality, Challenges Ahead 
6.2.1. History of Institutionalization 
This chapter is going to cover a process of institutionalization of cooperation efforts in 
Central Asia in the sphere of economics. Then, it deals with a comparative analysis of the 
declared goals with the evidence of real progress made in the past. The reasons of failure in 
regional cooperation will be put under special scrutiny, while some debates on the specific 
conditions for regional initiatives in Central Asia will finalize the chapter. 
Regional groupings and subgroupings which involved the Central Asian states, could be seen 
as a part of the general resurgence of regionalism in the post-Soviet international order since 
the early 1990s.431 The idea of the subregional structure within the region goes back into the 
                                                 
430 Translated by the author from Altvater E. Regionalizatsiya Mirovogo Rynka, in Diter H. Regionalnaya 
Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii. Zentralstelle fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialentwicklung, Berlin, 1995. p.108 
431 The list of groupings and characteristics to their activities in the CIS space are analysed in detail by List D. 
within the given project. See her work “Regionale Kooperation in Zentralasien: Hindernisse und 
Moeglichkeiten”, pp.131-190. For their role in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, see Inomjonov Kh. “Aussen und 
Sicherheitspolitik der Republik Usbekistan in den ersten Jahren der staatlichen Unabhaengigkeit“ within the 
Central Asian project. 
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Soviet time. In 1990, the republics of Middle Asia and Kazakhstan, as the region was 
officially called under the Soviet ruling, undertook the first attempt to join forces in pursuing 
structural changes to improve domestic situation. For this purpose, a corresponding 
Agreement on economic, scientific and technical, and cultural cooperation was signed 
between the states.432 This initiatives was necessiated by much-needed strategic changes in 
the established resource and commodity-based orientation of local economies and 
deteriorating environmental conditions, but also to prevent social catastrophe caused by 
worsening in public health, growing child mortality rates, as well as by the unsatisfactory 
foodstuffs supplies to local people.433 On the other hand, it corresponded to the reform-
oriented changes in the Soviet policy aimed at the partial transfer of the Union’s functions to 
the republics at the time of perestroika to address certain issues of economic policy.434 As a 
result, by the end of the 1990s, all the Central Asian republics, along with the other republics 
of the USSR, had adopted the Declarations of “National Sovereignty”. The definition of 
“socialist national sovereignty” at this point was a peculiar one, since it meant sovereignty 
within the confines of the USSR.435 
With the declaration of independence, in part to address their common problems and prevent 
their further marginalisation in the new post-Soviet era, but also to ensure smooth integration 
into the world community, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed a Compact on 
Creation of Common Economic Space on April 30 1994, which gave birth to first regional 
institution called the Central Asian Union. Its main purpose was defined as implementation of 
joint programs on deepening economic integration, and the establishment of conditions for 
free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital; concerted steps in pursuing credit and 
accounting, fiscal, tax, price, customs and foreign exchange policies.436 The document 
became a legal basis for cooperation between the four states, after Tajikistan was also a 
signatory since 28 March 1998. 
                                                 
432 See Zayavleniye Rukovoditeley Rukovpditeley Uzbekskoy SSR, Kazahskoy SSr, Kyrgyzskoy SSR, 
Tadjikskoy SSR, Turkmenskoy SSR. Na Puti Sotrudnichestva i Progressa. Tashkent, 1990. 
433 The same, pp.7-8. 
434 However, the given factor seemed to exert a moderate influence on the region. Some other authors are 
convinced that these shifts in the Soviet policy had barely or no impact on the peripheral parts of the USSR, such 
as Central Asia. Therefore, the regional republics benefited little from pro-reformist novelties of the Centre and 
still kept on highly dependent on the financial injections from Moscow up to their full independence. See 
Pomfret R. Development Strategies and Prospects for the Future. Materials of International Conference “Central 
Asia 2010”, UNDP, 2001, pp.58-65. 
435 Gleason G. Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum. Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol.53, 2001, No 7, p.1080. 
436 See Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on 
Common Economic Space. Sbornik normativnyh dokumentov, Ispolnitelniy Komitet Tsentralnoaziatskogo 
Sodrujestva. Alma-Ata, 1995 
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Three months later, the organization was given a new name, Central Asian Economic Union 
which particularly emphasized the role of economic criteria. It needs to be seen as a main 
force in bringing countries’ economies closer to each other through elimination of borders, 
harmonization of rules and norms for local economic entities and for physical persons. It is 
worth noting that the emergence of the given organization was not regarded as a counterpoise 
to integration initiatives within the entire CIS space, as the leaders of the local republics 
repeatedly pointed it out.437 In general, the Central Asian Economic Union was an institution 
open to any other new members. In this regard, for example, first, Russia in 1996, then 
Georgia, Ukraine and Turkey in 1999 were granted an observer status.438 But it came out 
primarily as a result of common regional interests to look for the ways for a more rational use 
of regional resources in the worsening economic situation, partly caused by the collapse of 
trade relations with the other parts of the former Soviet Union. As the President of Kyrgyzstan 
pointed out on this occasion in the early 1990s: “We should meet each other from time to time 
in order to discuss our work, the measures taken in our republics. Our main task is to set up a 
common infrastructure for the republics of Central Asia to move towards a market 
economy”.439 
In this sense, the signed Agreement on Common Economic Space counted on the availability 
of conditions in the region which could make the regional cooperation an expedient and 
purposeful process underpinned by regional logic: geographical proximity; language and 
socio-cultural mentality; intentions and willingness of the elites to reinforce friendly relations; 
necessity for common resource and infrastructure development. The latter implied common 
transport and energy infrastructure built in the Soviet period. Due to local geographical 
conditions, the use of water and energy resources, was regarded among the mains conditions 
to secure sustainable economic development. Besides, it was in line with other priorities, such 
as environmental protection and national security concerns to meet regional demand and look 
at the prospective export routes to reach the world markets. It was also at this stage of 
development when the appropriate resolution on the establishment of international 
                                                 
437 The CIS, in turn, was seen as a vehicle to retain traditional, especially economic linkages capable to prevent 
from negative impacts of the post-Soviet turmoil and to consolidate their ways to national independence. 
Nevertheless, the spirit of dissatisfaction by the activities in the frame of CIS, appeared to exist locally, 
sometimes even being made publicly known. The President of Kazakhstan, for instance, noticed after the 
meeting of the Central Asian leaders in Astana in 12 December 1997 that if the CIS did not show real equality 
among its members, then it would turn into something that would rather not have been at all. See: Sakwa R., 
Webber M. The Commonwealth of Independent States: Stagnation and Survival. Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 3, 
1999, p.379,  Talipov F. Teoriya i Praktika Regionalnoy Integratsii v Tsentralnoy Azii, Magazine Central Asia 
and Caucasus, 2002, No 2, p.94. 
438 Ushakova N. Tsentralno-Aziatskoye Sodrujestvo – Napravleniya Transformatsii, Magazine Central Asia and 
Caucasus, 2003, No 3, p.143. 
439 Newspaper «Narodnoye Slovo»,  3 November 1998. 
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consortiums, initially only the three ones (in water and energy, food, and in mineral resources) 
was taken. At that period Turkmenistan, being absolutely skeptical on any regional and CIS 
developments, also expressed its concerns in common efforts. In particular on 5-6 1998, the 
regional meeting of the heads of states was held in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, at 
which the matters on the development in the oil and gas potential, and cooperation in possible 
regional pipelines projects, along with other political issues were thoroughly discussed.440 
Equally there was cooperation in the financial sphere too, after the Central Asian Bank on 
Cooperation and Development was set up in 1994, with the headquarters in Almaty 
(Kazakhstan). Its capital was formed by equal injections from each member states441, and its 
main activities were due to ensure inter-state settlements, assist the development of regional 
trade, finance various projects of both regional and national significance in each state. In 
general, the bank financed some moderate projects (from $500 thousand to $5 mln. USD) in 
each country. It also helped economic entities from the member states prepare business plans 
preparatory to loans. Besides, it received grants from some foreign governments and 
multinational banks for its work and correspondent relations with several important overseas 
and regional banks.  
According to the program of economic integration until 2000, a particular attention was given 
to creation of joint ventures in production, particularly in industrial field, given the existing 
potential. In machine-building complex, for instance, it was agreed upon the joint production 
of cable and related products, mobile compressor stations, excavators, machine and 
equipment for agriculture, including for melioration purposes. The Uzbek-Korean auto plant 
“UzDaewooauto”, with its partners from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, were reportedly to have 
made arrangements on intra-industry regional cooperation to produce and supply various 
spare parts for the given plant from economic units located in their territories. Uzbekistan 
expressed its willingness to take part in the completion of the factory in Ust-Kamenogorsk 
(Kazakhstan) was going to produce zirconium concentrate, in order to use it as a raw material 
in its domestic china and ceramic industry.442 
One of the reasons to coordinate the moves towards a market economy between the states was 
explained by the difficulties of introduction of new currency units in each state. None of the 
states was in position at independence to rapidly introduce its own currency, yet a few wanted 
to be dependent upon monetary decisions taken by Russia. At the CIS summit in Bishkek in 
                                                 
440 The same. 
441 The four countries provided $3 mln.USD each. 
442 Ziyamov N. Nekotorye Aspekty Ekonomicheskogo Sotrudnichestva Tsentralno-Aziatskih Gosudarstv. 
Magazine Obshestvennye Nauki Uzbekistan, 1999, No 3-4, p.51. 
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October 1992 the states agreed to maintain the Russian ruble zone.443 After the ruble was 
allowed to float and price liberalization was launched in Russia, its value immediately 
plunged against the dollar, while domestic prices moved up substantially. In the situation, 
when the republican borders were actually porous, Central Asian states had little tools to 
prevent significant cash movements across the whole CIS space. On the other hand, they 
themselves were unable to prevent extra credit domestic emissions, which formed additional 
inflationary pressure on domestic goods and commodities markets, still in shortage in the 
region.  
In such conditions, Kyrgyzstan, first among the region’s countries, introduced its national 
currency, the som, in 1993. His unilateral actions, however, were not welcomed by its 
neighbors, who rushed into closing up national borders to eliminate an inflow of huge 
amounts of cash money. Uzbekistan, for example, acted quickly to establish border and 
customs inspection posts along the many thoroughfares where it was possible. But it brought 
little efficiency and was only a temporary step before all the countries introduced their own 
national currencies very soon.444 
In the subsequent years (1998-1999) relatively slow progress in intra-regional relations had 
been made. There are probably two main explanations for that: economic and political. The 
former was related to the fact that all the countries managed to reach some degree of domestic 
macroeconomic stabilization with the first signs of economic growth. It enforced some states 
to put through with further reforms. Yet the situation remained relatively fragile, as August 
1998 financial crisis in Russia had a strong effect on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, to a lesser 
degree on Uzbekistan. The first two states kept up very close relations with the Russian 
economy, which finally ensured a spillover effect of the Russian crisis. Kyrgyzstan was 
already saddled with its rising external debts problems, when the crisis raised substantially the 
doubts on the returns from the reforms, leading the country to halt or even reverse its 
economic plans.445 Kazakhstan was even stronger shaken by the crisis which fuelled domestic 
inflationary trends. Being more concerned in macroeconomic stabilization, it was hard for 
Kazakhstan to ensure the committed terms on sustainable and consequent customs and transit 
policies with respect to its neighbors, which finally resulted in transit fees going up. Although 
Uzbekistan was insulated from direct impact of the Russian crisis, higher prices in 
                                                 
443 Gleason G. Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum. Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol.53, 2001, No 7.  
444 Uzbekistan implemented it in two stages: in Nov.1993-Juni 1994 temporary currency unit sum-coupon, then 
since 1 July 1994 – the Uzbek sum was introduced. Kazakhstan introduced its tenge in November 1993. 
445 Pomfret R. Central Asia since 1991; the Experience of the NIS. OECD Development Centre Technical Paper 
212, Paris, July 2003, p.36. 
 239
Kazakhstan and Russia had its negative influence on its import and export opportunities. As 
was known from history, if the Central Asian countries had had to face with direct economic 
problems, they would have preferred to act more unilaterally by favoring national interests, 
rather than following any common regional approach to address these problems through 
appropriate coordination. In addition to these economic factors, the political side of the issue 
is seen by some experts in that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, for fear of Uzbekistan’s military 
preponderance and strong-arm strategies in security-related issues, held back from direct 
cooperation within the Central Asian Economic Community and tried to search for closer 
cooperation with other states in the frame of other regional groupings, such the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, or the Eurasian Economic Community, for instance, though it is 
rather difficult to assess the real impact of the given factor on their decisions.446 
In 2000-2001, the region had to confront mainly with geopolitical issues both within and 
around the region.447 One of the basic trends during this period was a threat of destabilization 
of socio-political situation in the region after a number of the undertaken incursions of 
militant Islamic groups from the neighbor countries into Uzbekistan.448 It put the governments 
of the republics before a real threat which in turned necessiated to introduce some cordial and 
immediate changes both in institutional structure of regionalism, and the substance and focus 
of their further actions. Despite its new name in January 2001,449 the decisions was taken in 
December of the same year in Tashkent, and subsequently the respective Agreement was 
signed at the meeting of the heads of state in Almaty in 28 February 2002, to transform the 
economic community into the more generalized Organization of Central Asian Cooperation. It 
was a time when economic aspects were officially ceased to be the only issues of regional 
consultations and negotiations by the shifted focus on more security-related components, 
although political and security matters had already been on the regional agenda very often at 
the previous meetings too. The former “cumbersome and inefficient” institutional structure 
based on the regional Councils of the Heads of State, Foreign and Defense Ministers, and the 
Executive Committee of the Central Asian Economic Community was replaced with a new 
system of national coordinators from each country who are subject directly to the Presidents 
                                                 
446 See Pomfret R. Central Asia since 1991; the Experience of the NIS. OECD Development Centre Technical 
Paper 212, Paris, July 2003; Bohr A. Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order. 
International Relations Magazine, Vol.80, issue 3, pp.485-502. 
447 Talipov F. Teoriya i Praktika Regionalnoy Integratsii v Tsentralnoy Azii, Magazine Central Asia and 
Caucasus, 2002, No 2, p.94. 
448 See more in List D. Regionale Kooperation in Zentralasien: Hindernisse und Moeglichkeiten. Research work 
within the Central Asian project, pp.235-243. 
449 The Central Asian Economic Union was renamed into the Central Asian Economic Community in January 
2001, yet no substantial differences could be seen in its goals and activities comparing to its predecessor. 
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and should work more closely with the Ministries for Foreign Affairs of their own countries. 
Some experts characterized the given changes by that the ambitious economic projects of the 
past had given the way to the tasks and issues defined not by the countries themselves, but by 
the true life reality.450 
Since 2002, the regional processes have been influenced by the incremental and broad 
contacts with the non-regional partners. Since then, the region was visited by so many top 
level delegations, especially from the USA, EU, and other bi- and multilateral organizations, 
which had been never ever seen during the entire period of Central Asia’s independent 
development.451 All the countries tended to pursue multi-vector foreign policies by expressing 
their willingness to cooperate with the USA and West in general in the military field. Equally 
all of them had already been the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, while 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were also the members of the Russia’s led Collective 
Security Treaty Organization.452 
Besides, the most recent warming on the front of the Russian-Uzbek bi- and multilateral 
relations could be also seen as an important feature of the given period. But its impact is still 
due to be assessed in terms of the entire regional trends.453 By setting about refurbishing its 
positions in the region, Russia is expectedly to rely upon the tools of both geopolitical, 
economic and military cooperation. The fact that Russia has already been granted full 
membership in the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) may serve as an 
evidence of the expected changes in the regional tendencies in the years to come.454 Yet 
before the prospects will be debated, the challenges of the past regional development need to 
be analyzed. 
6.2.2. Confronting Reality 
6.2.2.1 Economic Constraints on Regional Efforts 
The regional states had to encounter with a number of controversial processes. By retaining 
deformed elements of the common economic space in the first years after the demise of the 
USSR; having recognized and strongly believed in the possibilities to speed up local 
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economic processes through the organizational and political methods; having plunged into the 
euphoria at the initial years after independence, the states appeared to overestimate the real 
factors of economic integration. These factors might have been essential the long-run, but 
turned out to be inadequately poor at the early stages so far. According to the analysts, most 
probably, the lath of integration came to be set up initially at the higher level.455 
Therefore, the states had to face fierce, but probably some objective reality in the combination 
of socio-political, economic and natural factors in the new development terms. The main 
socio-economic factors, which subsequently exerted influence on inter-state cooperation in 
the past, were the following:  
- national strategy of economic reforms and future prospects for development; 
- national trade policies; 
- difficulties in the financial field, as well as related problems with inter-state payments 
and non-payments; 
- external shocks. 
One of the main factors which influenced the lay-out in Central Asian, could be found in  the 
differences in the approaches to both the development and implementation of domestic socio-
economic reforms through the prism of future development. Despite all the states committed 
themselves to one common strategic goal, i.e. to build up an open market economic system 
with a particular emphasis on its social component, the paths the national governments chose 
to move towards the final goal, came to be different. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan embarked 
on the path of radical reforms. It resulted in that very soon all domestic prices had been 
liberalized drastically; most part of local state enterprises had been privatized by the middle of 
the 1990s; and foreign trade operations had been liberalized with free account convertibility 
of national currencies in place. This in turn eventually allowed the two countries to open up 
the economies to the inflows of foreign capital and foreign assistance from bi- and 
multilateral resources.456 
Since the key issues of the Uzbekistan’s national development strategy have been already 
covered by the previous chapters, the emphasis will be placed on the single features to explain 
the differences through the prism of regional events. Thus, the Uzbek path emphasized the 
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maintenance of local industrial capacities, full employment, rural development and 
diversification of the economy, which implied relatively restricted and step-by-step 
liberalization. While foreign direct investments were prioritized too, the strong reliance on 
multinational foreign aid was practically ignored. To achieve these goals, the five principles 
of domestic reforms, known as “the Uzbek model” was developed.457 
Tajikistan up to 1997 was fully unable to make any reforms, being engaged in lasting and 
severe civil war. As a result, the country was turned into the poorest nation in the whole CIS 
space. 
These general divergences laid the ground for mutual discontent very soon, since national 
actions to carry out reforms were understandably implemented unilaterally, very often driven 
by some steps to protect national interests too. For example, when Uzbekistan’s government 
maintained subsidies on its basic consumer goods, price for the flour in the country was used 
to lower than its domestic production costs. It meant that in new market terms and almost 
transparent national borders in the region, this flour was naturally finding its way into 
neighbor countries (Kazakhstan) where it could have been sold at higher prices. For this 
reason, Uzbekistan was to certain degree concerned in slowing the process of price 
liberalization in Kazakhstan down, while Russia, as a leader and initiator of price 
liberalization, - in urging the latter to go faster. And when Kazakhstan was unwilling to 
slacken the tempo of its movement towards liberalization, it provoked adequate responsive 
measures from its regional neighbors.458 
In the frame of strategic national priorities, each country also implemented its own trade 
policy, which has not always dovetailed with regional interests. After the independence, 
practically all the countries had to deal with substantial deficits in trade balance related above 
all to the close integration into the former Soviet economic complex. According to some data, 
the former system resulted in the exceptionally high level of intra-Union trade for the region: 
89% - for Kazakhstan’s trade turnover (import plus export), 86% - for Kyrgyzstan, and 89% 
for Uzbekistan.459 On the other hand, at the outset of 1990s, the share of net material product 
supplied by the other Soviet republics to Kazakhstan was equal to 39,9%, Tajikistan – 41,8%, 
                                                 
457 For more details see the previous chapters on economic development of Uzbekistan in the years of 
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458 For instance, it was probably the main reason, when Uzbekistan was forced to impose export tariffs, establish 
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 243
Uzbekistan – 43,2%, Kyrgyzstan – 50,2%, Turkmenistan – 50,7%.460 It meant that all the 
states remained significantly dependent on external supplies, especially on strategic raw 
materials (oil, energy products, metal) and food products. Hence, it induced to look for the 
stable sources of foreign exchange to keep up current domestic social and physical needs on 
the one hand, and to realize reforms on the other.  
For this reason, all the countries reoriented their trade towards the far distant foreign markets 
where natural resources could have always been easily sold, i.e. Uzbek cotton and gold; 
Kyrgyz gold; Turkmen gas; Kazakh oil; Tajik aluminum. Therefore, in all the countries of the 
region the share of non-CIS countries exceeded over the half of total trade after the middle of 
1990s: from 37,$5 in 1994 to 60,3% in 2001 for the whole region.461 In these terms, the 
national trade priorities, both as to the structure and geography of exports and imports were 
different in several aspects, which subsequently had an impact on the vectors of the 
geoeconomic and geopolitical interests in each state. Moreover, the economies of the region 
seemed to vie in investments to be attracted from industrially developed countries.462 
On the other hand, infrastructure shortages could be of a particular concern too. Poor land, rail 
and air connection within the Central Asian region due to economic and historical 
development within the former system proved to be another major constraint on intra-regional 
trade. Although the railway system was a priority for development on the Soviet policy 
agenda in comparison with other forms of transport, the majority of such connections were 
developed vertically which prioritized the relations with Russia and other European republics. 
On the contrary, little attention was given to intra-regional linkages. Besides, the main 
regional roads were not only accustomed to ensure cargo traffic, but also got out of the order 
very soon in view of lack of an appropriate maintenance. In the new terms of post-
independent development, it implied that regardless geographic proximity, the countries of 
Central Asia de facto remained economically secluded from each other.  
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The consequences were deleterious for intra-regional trade. Its volumes dropped by 1,4 times, 
from $2133,4 mln. USD in 1994 to $1579,4 mln. USD in 2000 (Annex 6.2). During the 
period 1994-2001, the volume of trade between the four countries as share of their exports 
and imports, as well as in trade with the CIS, reduced too from 15,6% to 7,2%, and from 
25,6% to 18,1%, respectively. Thus, the indicator of intra-regional trade came to be much less 
than the same figure in other regional groupings in the world (See Table 6.1, p.233). 
This situation was exacerbated by the mutual protectionist policies in each country. Non-tariff 
barriers emerged on the basis of imperfect national legislation and eventually resulted in 
cumbersome customs procedures, low regulatory transparency, the operation of transport 
services and corruption practices.463 As a result, the conflicting trade policies and non-tariff 
barriers inhibited the interaction of private business groups and individual traders, including 
those in transboundary areas, stifling their potential contribution to the creation of the 
autonomous interstate linkages necessary for the evolvement of informal regionalism.464  
The main feature of the past efforts was the domination of state-to-state relations which are 
certainly important, especially in the creation of common rules and conditions and 
coordination of the regional initiatives. Although non-centralized contacts between the states 
could serve as the main force to produce substantial amounts of immediate social and 
economic benefits, they remained definitely underdeveloped. Direct contacts between the 
administrative territories and various economic units were poorly developed not only due to 
inadequate regional rules and legislative conditions, but also because of the differences in 
each country’s environment. Consequently, economic units were acting in more liberalized 
conditions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while state dominance and restricted opportunities 
for free market behavior were more pertinent to Uzbekistan. The President of Kyrgyzstan 
Askar Akaev once noted as to the facing challenges over the establishment of joint 
international consortiums in energy and water management by saying that "the process of the 
establishment of such structures proved to be a complicated process due to a different level of 
reformation of the economies in Central Asian member-countries".465 This generally held for 
other economic units too which were devoided to behave in the equal environment, and to be 
therefore, similarly sovereign partners in passing mutually propituous decisions. 
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Another important issue of the complex inter-state relations was caused by buoyant debts and 
non-payments for the commodities supplied. The situation was especially intrinsic to the 
energy sector, when countries-consumers (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) had difficulties to pay for 
the energy resources supplied from Uzbekistan due to poor capabilities to collect payments 
from both domestic industrial units and population. For this reason, the regional meetings of 
the heads of state and respective institutions included the topic of the delayed payments.466 
Although inter-state debts were subsequently restructured, as well as plans were devised to 
coordinate the foreign economic investment and future swaps between countries, obstacles to 
the Central Asian cooperation still remained throughout the entire subsequent period.467 
The step backward was also made, after the decision to shut down the Central Asian Bank on 
Cooperation and Development (CABCD) had been taken in 2002. The regional initiatives in 
the financial sphere were unable to set up a common system of inter-state settlements which 
was of particular significance to implement foreign trade operations. But the reasons for this 
were hidden not only in the national policy actions, though this also was the case.468 The 
given process was also substantially undermined by inefficient activities of the CABCD itself. 
Being a relatively small financial institution, some bank’s modest success at a particular stage 
was eventually replaced by the pursuance of poor credit and investment strategy. It led in turn 
to low returns on allocated resources exacerbated by the emergence of increasing cases of 
non-returned credits and bad debts in its investment portfolio, as well as to a number of cases 
of malpractice.469  
                                                 
466 In 1996, for instance even the presidential summit was unable to relieve relations between Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan that had become strained due to accumulated late payments and non-delivery of gas 
and electricity. See: Olcott M. Central Asia: Confronting Independence. The James Baker III Institute, the Rise 
University, April 1998, p 20.  
467 There were several reports with coverage on regular disputes on non-payments. Being exclusively economic 
dispute by substance, these tensions could be easily transformed into a political plane in Central Asia dominated 
by a number of other unresolved challenges, such as border or water management matters, for example. As a 
rule, the cut-off of energy supplies for non-payments was followed by the immediate professions and steps to 
take restrictive adequate measures by consumer countries, producing the main setback to sustainability of 
intraregional relations among the aforementioned countries. See: Alimov R. and others (eds). Tsentralnaya 
Aziya: Geoekonomika, Geopolitika, Bezopasnost. Tashkent, 2002.p.64-67. In addition, heavily indebted small 
countries, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan not only failed to pay for energy products, but also for a range of 
other products and services therefore proposing other countries to use barter transactions. But as history of using 
barter in foreign trade shows, it beares the risks of inadequate trade operation under such conditions, since 
suppliers will tend to abuse and overestimate the price of their products to withdraw more benefits. Being thus a 
suboptimal tool of payments in foreign trade, it may further fuel mutual mistrust and undermine the whole trade 
practice.  
468 For example, difficulties due to limited current account convertibility and tough trade policies in Uzbekistan 
had its impact on the process of creation of the mechanism of intra-regional settlements in the past. 
469 In 2002 the National Bank of Kazakhstan called off the license of the head office of CABCD in Kazakhstan 
due to a systematic breaches of national bank legislation and norms. This decision was soon followed by the 
subsequent step of the Central Bank of Uzbekistan to seize activities of its branch in Uzbekistan too in 
connection with elimination of the main office. Being mainly economic by substance, these reasons, however, 
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Such controversial developments in the field of economic, trade and financial cooperation 
barely ensured sustainability of foreign economic relations among the Central Asian 
countries. As a result, volumes of trade turnover between the largest economies Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan fell from $422 mln.USD in 1995 to $316,4 mln.USD in 2000, while equalled 
to about $175 mln. in the first 8 months of 2003. The Uzbek exports to Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan in 2001 was equal 84% and 60,7%, respectively, while imports from Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan - 97% and 85,8%, respectively, of the 1996 level.470 The level of production 
and investment cooperation was also affected with many foreseen projects left unfulfilled.471 
The last, but not least, the external shocks seems to have influenced regional events in the past 
too. Even the largest economies of the region Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are relatively small 
in global terms. With share of foreign trade in GDP 85% and 60%, respectively, they 
remained significantly susceptible to various external shocks. Following the traditional 
pattern, each country reacted unilaterally to ease up these negative impacts. In particular, as it 
has been stressed earlier, Kazakhstan responded quickly to the Russian crisis by increasing 
customs duties and transit fees over its territory. Uzbekistan introduced severe foreign 
exchange and trade restrictions, after the world prices on its cotton and gold had dropped. 
These steps taken by the two potential locomotives of the regional initiatives had evidently 
affected the smaller economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which depended substantially on 
domestic markets and infrastructure of the neighbor countries. 
 
6.2.2.2. Non-Economic Determinants 
In addition to the economic factors, poor regional developments have to be seen in relation to 
socio-political progress of each country; the existence of a number of the unresolved issues in 
                                                                                                                                                        
implicitly witnessed about the failure in attempt to compromise far-reaching political goals for which it was 
established. Lack of efficient and objective system on decision-making finally led to adverse selection and one-
sided nationalization of some projects at the expense of other country-participants. For instance, out of 5 
members of the Board of Directors, 3 represented Kyrgyzstan, which allowed them to favor the projects with 
participation of companies from their own country first. See: “Otozvana Litsenziya u Tsentralnoaziatskogo 
banka”, www.gazeta.kz, 26 July 2003; “Tsentrobank Uzbekistana Otozval Litsenzii Dvuh Bankov”, 
www.uza.uz, 28 April 2003; “Predsedatel Natsbanka RK Glavnoy Problemoy Bankovskoy Sistemy Kyrgyzstana 
Schitaet Otsutstvie Realnoy Nezavisimosti u Natsionalnogo Banka”,  Panorama, 2003 №30, August. On-line version : 
http://www.panorama.kz/info/index.asp?yearfolder=2003&num=30&NumArticle=21 
470 Kuzmin N. Regionalnoye Sotrudnichestvo Stran Tsentralnoy Azii. Materials of the Conference “Stability in 
Central Asia in Post-Conflict Period”, Tashkent, 2002, p.75; Kayumov A. Prioritetnye Napravleniya 
Ekonomicheskoy Integratsii v Regione Tsentralnoy Azii, the same source, p.82. In 2003 (8 months) 
Uzbekistan’s trade with Kyrgyzstan amounted to $53,6 mln.USD (exports – $36,8 mln., imports – $16,9 mln.). 
The same figures with Tadjikistan were $103,9 mln., $85,9 mln. and  17,9 mln.USD, respectively. The figures 
are taken from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan at www.mfa.uz 
471 In particular, despite the corresponding Program of economic integration was reconsidered and endorsed for a 
few times, 27 projects of the total 53, as well as 7 out of 10 primary investment projects passed through at the 
meetings of the heads of states eventually lost their importance. 
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border and water management; and differences in common approaches to the vision of 
regional cooperation.  
At a specific development stage, history of regional organizations in Central Asia was driven 
more by political considerations, with economic matters as a second background.472 In 
addition, some of the researchers see nation-building policies and process of "nationalizing" 
regimes working towards the elimination of subnational identities "as a counterpoise to the 
geographical imperatives and practical considerations that argue in favor of regional 
cooperation, while "have also geared their efforts towards realizing national histories, 
upgrading national languages and creating new iconographies rather than directing them 
towards the reabsorption of their polities into regional organizations requiring policy of 
sovereignty and the formation of supranational structures".473 
As it has been mentioned before, the Central Asian common society has been made up of the 
communities close to each other by their cultural and historical heritage, traditions and values. 
For this particular reason, both the efforts to underline regional and pursuance of national 
ideological conceptions were very often in place in the early years of independence. On the 
one hand, the idea “Turkestan is our common home” was developed by Uzbek sociologists, 
political scientists and historians, and actively put forward by the Uzbekistan’s President to 
ensure an ideological basis for Central Asian unification.474 On the other hand, each of the 
states worked out its own ideological vision to consolidate national independence and national 
identity.475 Yet, all leaders “were smart enough to realize that their states were still too weak 
and too interdependent to allow their personal and national rivalries to undermine the 
overarching need for regional cooperation”.476 Moreover, Uzbekistan, for example, was 
especially loath to politicization of the regional unions by passing over any part of their recent 
national independence to supranational structures. On the other hand, the development 
process itself through signing and the endorsement of an array of regional documents on the 
highest level, the expression and support for the idea on creation of free trade area or free 
economic space in the region could be regarded as the existence and integrity of a sustainable 
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political component with the economic principles of regionalisation. Hence, these measures 
would eventually turn out to some extent in less control over national autonomy.477 
Once in an interview, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev emphasized a democratic 
nature of Central Asian integration by saying that “it rests with the peoples of Central Asia to 
decide on the federalization of the region”.478 Yet it is difficult to conclude, whether these 
views might have been unambiguously backed up by Central Asian nations in terms of certain 
degree of ethnocentrism observed in the early 1990s.479  
Some similar trends were reportedly to obstruct sustainable economic relations in business 
sector too. Among the exclusively economic explanations of such poor interrelations (lack of 
funds, slow growth of indigenous business due to structural and institutional adjustment in 
new conditions), regional cooperation in the production sector between countries 
underperformed because of a subjective unwillingness of businessmen to invest money in the 
development of the other country.480 
In sum, the outcome of regional initiatives turned out to be well below than expected, while 
substantial part of prospective integration projects was not realized. It could be equally 
explained by a growing range of differences in economic interests of each state; the tempo 
and substance of their socio-economic reforms; lack of the agreed positions in specific policy 
areas (trade, finance, tariffs, price); the level of domestic economic and political 
liberalization; the level of integration into the world economy; as well as by the differences in 
political, ideological and economic preferences in the post-Soviet period. Some experts 
believe that these divergences have come as a result of a complex and controversial process to 
form domestic socio-political and state systems which has not been finished yet. Hence, until 
the subject of integration, i.e. state itself is in process of establishment, integration process is 
allegedly far from its completion.481 Certainly policy measures are crucial to speed up 
regional initiatives. Yet it is equally true that they may evolve without state-led integration 
                                                 
477 Jakobeit K. Teoriya Regionalnoy Integratsii. In Diter H. Regionalnaya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii. 
Zentralstelle fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialentwicklung, Berlin, 1995. pp.9-10. 
478 Quoted from Talipov F. Teoriya i Praktika Regionalnoy Integratsii v Tsentralnoy Azii, Magazine Central 
Asia and Caucasus, 2002, No 2, p.94. 
479 Although the scale of a 1991 survey was small, nevertheless, it revealed that only one out of ten in 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan felt their countries should rely on other Central Asian countries. Roughly half 
preferred to “go it alone”. Quite a few others preferred to turn to Western Europe, Japan, the USA or even Russia 
in preference to fellow Muslim or Central Asian countries. Only ten percent said nationality would make no 
difference in working with a colleague. From Spechler M. Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Promises and 
More Promises, praxis the Fletcher Magazine of Development Studies, Vol.XVI, 2000, p.9. 
480 Komissina I. Uzbekistan i Politika Regionalnoy Integratsii v Tsentralnoy Azii, in « Uzbekistan : Obreteniye 
Novogo Oblika », Volume II, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow, 1998, p.198. 
481 Esenov M. Problemy Mejgosudarstvennoy Integratsii v Tsentralnoy Azii (k postanovke problemy). Rossiya I 
Musulmanskiy Mir, 1998, No 12, p.62. 
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too, and probably, on a more sustainable basis. Eventually they may also accelerate the much-
desired market reforms in each country. 
 
6.2.3. Shaping the Premises of Central Asian Cooperation 
After almost one and a half decade of independent development, the countries of Central Asia 
are still to put through with the reforms towards democratic society and an open market 
economy. Although they are much different from what is known as Soviet type economies 
due to the domestic policy measures in the past, many tasks still remain ahead.  
 
Table 6.2. Central Asian Economies, Basic Characteristics, 2002 
 
 Popul. 
(mln.) 
GDP 
($bln) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
($USD) 
Structure of GDP (%) FDI 
stock ($) 
Trade in 
GDP (%) 
External 
Debt/GDP 
(%) 
    ind-ry agr-
re 
servi
ces 
  
Kazakhstan 14,5 24,4 1668 25,2 10,1 64,7 15,354 72,6 74 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 4,8 1,6 334 19,1 35,6 45,3 415 65,5 135 
 
Tajikistan 6,4 1,1 187 19,3 21,1 57 162 126,6 82 
 
Turkmenistan 5,8 na 648 50 21 29 1,163 132,7 68 
 
Uzbekistan 25,6 9,7 308 14,1 30,6 55,3 1,332 59,6 60 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2003 
 
The factual situation is that the states of Central Asia have formed an open type of national 
economies, with high share of foreign trade in their domestic product. But agriculture, 
extracting and manufacturing industries are similarly important in all the states by adding 
together from one third in Kazakhstan to almost three fourth in Turkmenistan’s GDP. Among 
others, the light and textile industries, agricultural machine building, and the construction 
complex in Uzbekistan, the oil and petrochemical industry in Kazakhstan, and food and home 
appliances in Kyrgyzstan; aluminum extraction in Tadjikistan, played an important role in the 
past. Against the background of some basic economic similarities, however, the intra-regional 
discrepancies could be also observed. These differences came out especially explicitly in the 
post-Soviet years not only as a result of the mixed influence of specific domestic factors, such 
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as uneven macroeconomic development, divergences in the national reform strategies, or 
domestic political unrest, but also as a consequence of external shocks.482 
Since the early 1990s the countries of the region have been confronting with the transition 
challenges stipulated by the necessity of market reforms, political transformation, and the 
needs for nation-building. Along these pivotal elements, it was even before the proclamation 
of independence that the republics had contemplated the idea of closer coordination of the 
efforts within the region to improve the deteriorating socio-economic situation in each 
country.483 Being embraced into the turmoil of the event across the whole Soviet space in the 
beginning of the 1990s, it might be expected that these processes would not be going easily 
and evenly in the frame of the concerted activities. Let us consider at the issue through the 
prism of the objective pre-conditions for regionalism in the region.  
In the early 1990s, the countries’ development was pre-determined by the legacy of the recent 
Soviet past. In particular, the structure of merchandise exports remained dependent on a few 
crucial commodities even almost decade later (Annex 6.3). With the cease of the subsidies 
from Russia in the early 1990s, all the states pushed forward national priorities to strive for 
the markets of non-CIS countries due to a desperate need for foreign exchange. Intra-regional 
trade became of less significance in these terms. Similar export structure was thus objectively 
more conducive to competitiveness rather than complementarity of the countries, with almost 
little incentive to trade with each other on the goods they could produce at home.484  
These developments gave rise to some views to conclude that structural context in which 
subregional initiatives were taking place, were therefore, more akin to the African economies 
with the staple-based foreign trade, rather than to those of Europe, North America or South-
East Asia, in which intra-industry trade was substantial.485 Others who interpreted 
regionalisation as a response to the polarizing and peripherizing pressures of economic 
                                                 
482 For example, Kyrgyzstan placed an emphasis on donor-financed domestic reforms that resulted not only in 
relatively quick domestic macroeconomic stabilization, but also in piling up outstanding foreign debts in terms 
of inadequate economic growth and weak economic potential. Tajikistan’s poor economic indicators came 
mainly as a result of internal political unrest and civil war, which actually destroyed the economic system in the 
country for the most part of independent development. Kazakhstan looked better in attracting higher volumes of 
FDI, mainly because of rich injections in oil industry, while Uzbekistan preferred to move gradually in the 
implementation of its policy goals. 
483 See: Zayavleniye Rukovoditeley Rukovoditeley Uzbekskoy SSR, Kazahskoy SSR, Kyrgyzskoy SSR, 
Tadjikskoy SSR, Turkmenskoy SSR. Na Puti Sotrudnichestva i Progressa. Tashkent, 1990. 
484 Koshanov A. Khusainov B. Integration Problems in Central Asia. Magazine Central Asia and Caucasus, 
2001, No 1, p.78. 
485 As in Africa, “intraregional trade intensity in Central Asia was relatively low and external trade dependence 
was high; trade consists of mainly agricultural and mineral products, informal trade is of great significance and 
there are large distortions in the market system”. See: Robson P. The New Regionalism and Developing 
Countries, Magazine of Common Market Studies 31 ; 3 September 1993, p.334. 
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globalization have argued that Central Asia was one of a number of regions lying in a 
peripheral zone in the world system. Such zones are therefore beset by political turbulence 
and economic stagnation, and are caught in a vicious circle of conflict, domestic unrest and 
underdevelopment. According this argument, while there is an incentive for such a region to 
organize to avert the threat of marginalisation, the regional arrangements that develop are 
fragile and ineffective.486 
Against such the dismal background, there are also the views to find more similarities among 
countries which would be crucial in tackling economic, social and political challenges in the 
region. After the Tsarist and subsequent Soviet ruling in Central Asia, electrification, 
industrialization and irrigation systems were formed here on the assumption that the Central 
Asian states would never be independent states. Therefore, in 1991 the Central Asian 
countries were confronted with the task of building sovereign entities, while being integrally 
linked into a common economic and geopolitical space. Nowhere were the states of the 
former Soviet Union more closely bound with one another than in Central Asia, not only 
because of the strong sense of common ancestry and shared cultural and religious heritage, 
but also simply because of region’s geography. Precise boundaries were never drawn and 
highway and railway systems paid little attention to national borders.487 Besides, during the 
common past Central Asia acquired an interconnected power grid that was used to pool 
energy resources between each other.488 
As the part of retained traditional energy linkages, Uzbekistan also supplied Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Southern Kazakhstan with natural gas, while Kazakhstan was a traditional 
supplier of coal to Kyrgyz power plants. Moreover, small economies of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan are significantly dependent on markets of larger countries, while Uzbekistan - on 
                                                 
486 Hettne B. Regionalism, Security and Development : a Comparative Perspective, in Hettne B., Inotai A., 
Sunkel O. Comparing Regionalism for Global Development. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, pp.3-5, 8-9. 
487 For example, the main route between the Uzbek cities of Tashkent and Samarkand and that between Tashkent 
and Andijan went through Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, respectively. The Kyrgyz also must pass through customs 
points on the main routes between Bishkek and Osh, as well as between Bishkek and Talas (all the Kyrgyz 
cities), crossing briefly into Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, respectively. Moreover, according to some Western 
analysts, for example, the southern part of Kazakhstan was informally closer to Tashkent, which was about 2 
hours away than the Kazakh capital Alma-Ata (now Almaty), which was a 10-hour drive. Olcott M. Central 
Asia: Confronting Independence. The James Baker III Institute, the Rise University, April 1998, pp.17-18. In 
addition, it might be explained by both transparency of borders between the republics, and the fact that Tashkent 
was chosen as the epicentre of the Soviet policies in the entire region during the Soviet ruling, not to mention 
many ethnic Uzbeks who settled and lived mainly in this part of Kazakhstan.  
488 In particular, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and the southern parts of Kazakhstan were supplied by power energy 
from Uzbekistan, while Kyrgyzstan in its turn also supplied power to Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley. Being in 
partial use, the grid is currently in poor state and needs upgrading to eliminate huge physical losses during 
energy transmission. 
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transit routes going through Kazakhstan.489 On the other hand, all the countries are locked 
with no direct access to seas, while Uzbekistan is one of the two double land-locked countries 
in the world which makes it extremely keen in keeping up sustainable regional linkages. 
On the other hand, the necessity for macroeconomic stabilization in the countries might have 
provoked the latter to reorient trade towards the markets in which they could obtain foreign 
exchange and then cushion the balance of payments problems. Although intra-regional trade 
does place a small emphasis on industrial goods, the region has continued to expand its 
industrial potential in the post-Soviet development which included the aforementioned 
energy, petro-chemical, machine-building, radio-electronics, home appliances, food and 
textile, aviation, automobile, etc. In terms of the regional shortages in light industry products 
(food, textile, shoes, etc.) as well as unsustainable energy supplies, there could be still 
untapped opportunities in inter- and intra-industry exchange of goods and services. Therefore, 
these industries may have probably underperformed in the past not only due to the regional 
non-complementarity and lack of appropriate mutual interests. It might be equally true that 
they did so because of the poor institutional base, inadequate policy procedures, lack of 
common rules and norms, the shortage of domestic investments, and the ongoing period of 
complex structural adjustment during transition to a market economy.  
Moreover, strong cultural and social identity of the regional communities should not be 
underestimated too. In this regard, some researchers from the region fairly argue that 
“supporters of economic determinism refer to the lack of economic complementarity, they 
certainly pay little attention to a fundamental fact. It means that their economic rationalism 
relatively to integration is more attributable to the formed polities of the industrial and post-
industrial epoch. Yet, in our case, under the general trends of regionalisation of international 
relations, the question is not only to draw up the Central Asian political map which has not 
been completed yet, so have the issues not been resolved to impinge on the completion of this 
process. Being historically established, a transboundary way of life of the local communities 
is hardly confined within the frames set up by national boundaries. Yet speaking generally, it 
is still far from the final understanding that delimitation is the economically inefficient 
                                                 
489 In 2001, for instance, Uzbekistan was the second largest user of transit railway cargo system of Kazakhstan 
with more than 23% of its export and about 28% for its import. For Russia, these figures were 31% and 19%, 
Tajikistan - 9% and 13%, Kyrgyzstan - 5% and 7%, respectively. See: Rakhimov K. Kuda Povernyotsya 
Transportniy Vektor Kyrgyzstana? At: http://profi.gateway.kg/rakhimov3 
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situation if the costs of drawing up the true national bounds with all their attributes are going 
to be taken into account”.490 
By taking a look at the issue through the prism of common threats which nowadays all the 
countries have to confront with, such as drug trafficking, the spawning of religious extremism 
and fundamentalism, etc.491, the opinion is dominated by security-related regionalism which is 
equally going to be the main driving force of regional cooperation in Central Asia in the 
future.492 The President of Uzbekistan I.Karimov suggested on this occasion a new formula 
which defined regional efforts in the way that “the threat to security is inversely proportional 
to the level of integration of the states”. It may indirectly witness about the country’s concerns 
and readiness to seek for the common way to resist potential threats, as well as to set out a 
new platform for the joint efforts.493 
At the same time the heads of all the Central Asian states recognize unanimously the necessity 
and benefits of economic collaboration which is integral part of the scientific security-related 
debates and a pre-condition for long-lasting and sustainable security. In particular, the 
President of Kazakhstan N.Nazarbaev has emphasized the rationale of such cooperation: “If 
we set up single economic space, it will embrace 55 million people. If we remove the frontiers 
between our states and open trade routes, we shall acquire a market that will enable Central 
Asia to become self-sufficient, so that all the states can enjoy normal lives. Indeed, Central 
Asia can meet its needs in energy, fuels and foodstuffs. We will not ask anybody to buy our 
commodities – we shall sell them here. Can you imagine how much we shall gain?”.494 
Uzbekistan’s President, added some philosophical and historical notes to these discourses. But 
he similarly pointed to the economic dimensions as something which had traditionally existed 
in Central Asia for centuries of its development: “This integration by its substance was and 
remains popular… Let us stress that integration of the peoples of Central Asia is not a dream 
or project for the future, it is something which exists, it is reality which requires 
organizational and political forms only”.495 
                                                 
490 Talipov F. Teoriya i Praktika Regionalnoy Integratsii v Tsentralnoy Azii, Magazine Central Asia and 
Caucasus, 2002, No 2, p.90. 
491 For more details on these issues see List D. Regionale Kooperation in Zentralasien: Hindernisse und 
Moeglichkeiten. Research work within the Central Asian project, pp.. 
492 See the International Conference “Stabilnost v Tsentralnoy Azii v Post-Kofliktniy Period”. 14-15 July 2002, 
Tashkent. Materials of the Conference “Stability in Central Asia in Post-Conflict Period”, Tashkent, 2002. 
493 Karimov I. Uzbekistan is on the Threshold of XXI Centrury: Threats to Security, Conditions of Stability, 
Guarantees for Progress”, Tashkent, 1997. 
494 Quoted from Talipov F. Theoretical Aspects of Central Asian Geopolitics. Magazine Central Asia and 
Caucasus, 2001, No 6, p.133. 
495 Karimov I. Uzbekistan is on the Threshold of XXI Centrury: Threats to Security, Conditions of Stability, 
Guarantees for Progress”, Tashkent, 1997. 
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In the confirmation of his words, many regional scholars are also close to the view that that 
the unity among the nations in Central Asia is believed to be a key task with the solid 
prerequisites based on common culture, traditions, way of life, social values, and similar 
languages. Thus, it might serve as a strong psychological aspect in bringing the regional 
nations much closer to each other even without the costly policy-led projects to encourage 
desired regional linkages.496 
On the other hand, in the last decade the region was warped by internal regional conflicts 
whose roots had been mainly entrenched in the Soviet time. Along the tasks to build up and 
consolidate the acquired independence, it was then sometimes the case that each state had 
formed a set of more or less efficient means to exert an influence on interstate relations across 
the region too in order to protect its national interests.497 This certainly did not contributed to 
the parallel efforts towards regionalism. Yet, in new terms these conflict areas could be 
equally treated as a ground for the hidden and unrealized potential for regional cooperation, 
since it may help to reach the double effect: firstly, promote conflict prevention and peace in 
the region; secondly, economic benefits and sustainable development. Thus, it is one problem 
with two alternative choices of its solution: to conduct the concerted movements to a common 
solution, or keep on acting unilaterally. If the benefits and costs of political and economic 
cooperation are set out correctly to turn negative factors into mutually acceptable rational 
ideas, then desired progress could be most probably made. But key question is how to specify 
the share of each possible factor to have impact on Central Asian regional trends in the past 
and in the future. 
In seeking for different pre-requisites for the desired unity in the region, scholarship and 
officials usually attempt to bring the states under the common denominator of cooperation. As 
scrutinized below, first efforts on comprehensive economic integration in the region failed to 
reach their goals due to both the intra-regional problems and external factors which threatened 
national security. It may partly explain, why security-related agenda had been brought to the 
forefront of regional collaboration. However, one needs to be emphasized that economic 
dimensions may play an equally important role to consolidate Central Asian unity and 
cooperation. It certainly needs to well devised and implemented, since traditional economic 
links across the regions suffered significantly in the last decade. Yet if they are revived and 
                                                 
496 Kasenov U. Post-Soviet Modernization in Central Asia : Realities and Prospects, in Rumer B., Zhukov S. 
(eds) Central Asia: The Challenges of Independence. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1998, p.51; see also Talipov F. 
Theoretical Aspects of Central Asian Geopolitics. Magazine Central Asia and Caucasus, 2001, No 6 
497 See, for example, Giese E. and oth. Zwischenstaatliche Wassernutzungskonflikte in Zentralasien, Zentrum 
fuer Internationale Entwicklungs- und Umweltforschung, Discussion Paper No 18, Giessen, Mai 2004. 
 255
fostered by appropriate policies and regional initiatives, the fruits of cooperation may be 
substantial. It is uncertain, how much time it may take to make all these arrangements for 
appropriate policy conditions to be set up. But there is a little doubt that if common and 
harmonized regional policies would be followed, the region’s priorities might be addressed in 
a better way. 
For these reasons, it seems to be relatively early to be conclusive over the poor impulses for 
economic collaboration due to the insufficiency of objective economic determinants of 
regionalisation, such as the similar level of economic development, complementarity, intra-
industry trade, etc. Economic complementarity is not a static situation which means that it 
may change if the regional union expands due to new members, including those more 
complementary to old members. In addition, it could be equally argued that success or failure 
of regionalism may depend on not purely economic issues too, such as administrative barriers, 
inter-state conflicts, political will, vested interests in each country, ongoing reforms, social 
and cultural values, etc. The question remains open, however, what might be more important 
to regional trends: economic incentives, or adequate socio-political environment.498 Central 
Asia is obviously a region with so far the stifled intra-regional potential for joint projects 
which could be still realized. This is also strengthened by the necessity to gear efforts on 
resolution and cooperation in pursuing conflict prevention and security potential strategy. The 
key issue on the agenda may be not just about the expediency and objective conditions for 
cooperation, but to search for the areas, methods and ways of its implementation. In defining 
them more specifically, several possible scenarios of the future development might be helpful.  
 
6.3. The Scenarios of Prospective Regional Trends in Central Asia:  
Priorities, Forms, Nature 
6.3.1. Determinants of the Scenarios 
The regional resurgence of 1990s in Central Asia has presented the states and their 
governments with an ongoing dilemma interesting to scholarship: how do they reconcile the 
need, on one hand, to liberalize and coordinate their economies and political systems to 
prevent greater marginalisation, with the perceived exigency, on the other hand, of 
                                                 
498 International experience also gives no explicit evidence of such interrelationship. The EC was founded for political 
reasons, but economic integration was given the key functional role, although a number of issues (CAP, monetary union) 
were pressed by virtue of active political tools. In North America, both economic and political factors prompted controversies 
in bilateral economic relations since XIX century. But on some stages (since 1965), bilateral trade was ever increasing 
regardless of deteriorating political relations between two countries over some decades. See more in:  Pomfret R. The 
Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.347-253 and pp.390-402. 
 256
consolidating and maintaining their power bases?499 In such conditions the security and 
economic challenges facing the Central Asian states are expected to reinforce each other with 
a particular impact on further regional cooperation. It is this dilemma that at least may 
partially explain why regional structures have survived for years in Central Asia while barely 
functioning, yielding only meager results and limited achievements. At the same time the 
level of their interdependence and mutual influence is going to determine a character, form 
and priorities of the future developments within the region.  
In this regard, it is an attempt to devise some conditional scenarios for regional economic 
trends in the future, yet the timeframe of their realization is open to debate. Moreover, based 
on the outcome of the previous regional efforts, the given scenarios are expected to depend on 
peculiar socio-economic processes in each single country; economic characteristics of the 
countries given their potential similarities and differences; regional interdependence; as well 
as by the extent of involvement of regional and non-regional powers in the events to take 
place in Central Asia. The scenarios do not seem to follow a quite different pathes. Much will 
depend on what kind of priorities, either economic or political, the countries would prefer to 
bolster up. Thus, possibilities for the various theories applicable to both sovereign and 
common regional development also need to be discussed. 
 
6.3.2. Features of the Scenarios 
6.3.2.1. Economic Bilateralism vs. Multilateral Cooperation 
The first scenario is based on the assumption that the Central Asian states would continue to 
develop in terms of poor economic complementarities and similarities in economic and export 
structures. Therefore, despite of the signed inter-state agreements in the past, they would 
provide no or little impetus to speed up regionalisation due to little interests in a single market 
as in the EU, nor capabilities to secure large investment resources from one of the member 
states, as in NAFTA. 
Given relatively poor signals proceeding from economic factors across the region, further 
development of the economic union here is expected to stumble. Consequently, one may also 
expect that the countries may keep on economic cooperation with each other on a bilateral 
basis, while no particular partner in the region is given preference. Rather, the countries will 
try to seek most-favored-nation treatment and membership in multilateral organizations, such 
                                                 
499 Bohr A. Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order, International Relations 
Magazine, Vol.80, issue 3, p.494. 
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as the WTO, along with loans, technical aid, and investments from national and multinational 
sources. The so-called “export globalism” may continue which implies that the countries 
would go on with the orientation towards markets beyond the region.500 In other words, the 
countries will remain main exporters of raw materials and commodities, and dependent on the 
imports of capital and consumer products at least in the foreseeable future. 
The realization and further fate of the given scenario will be basically determined by the 
decisions taken by the two largest economies of the region, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, while 
the small countries, like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will probably either follow this strategy or 
seek the more palpable support in other regional groupings, such the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) or the Eurasian Economic Community. 
Despite the much shared background with common initial conditions, all the countries, 
especially the two larger economies, are expected to move further along different trajectories 
in view of even stronger sovereign positions on national socio-economic and political 
reforms. While smaller economies of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan in perspective 
will remain minor players in the global economy, both of the larger countries could become 
significant middle-size economies, but rather in their own right rather than as part of Central 
Asia. In terms of further divergent economic characteristics, it is reasonable to expect that it 
will become an even more elusive idea to implement regional integration in the future given 
only moderate success made nowadays with much more contributing similarities. 
With little incentives for common economic projects in the region, the Central Asian regional 
structures may nevertheless survive to enhance more political and security-based cooperation 
in collaboration with other similar regional set-ups, such as the SCO, for example. 
Paradoxically, but in order to pursue sovereign national development and consolidate their 
independence, it will require from the states multilateral collaboration to address the issues 
related to border disputes, intra-regional migration, religious fundamentalism, drug 
trafficking. It means that the theory of neo-realism may be more applicable to the region to 
maintain regional cooperation as a common response to external threats to national and 
regional security, rather than through an inadequate economic rationale with independent 
                                                 
500 Spechler M. Regional Cooperation in Central Asia : the Middle Road. Analysis of Current Events, 9,12 
December 1997 in 1-4 ADB Regional Cooperation in Central Asia, DAI, 1998. Reference in Spechler M. 
Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Promises and More Promises, praxis the Fletcher Magazine of 
Development Studies, Vol.XVI, 2000. 
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social and business networks.501 This sort of cooperation could eventually circumscribe each 
country’s autonomous development.  
Among negative consequences of the scenario for the region in general and for each country 
in particular are the risks to remain mainly as the suppliers of commodities to the world 
markets with accordingly low efficiency and/or inability to improve their economic and 
export structure by producing more valuable finished goods. Hence, long-run sustainability 
and  economic progress remain hardly attainable. This in turn will not only reduce economic 
and social benefits from foreign trade provisioned that it keeps on playing crucial role for 
each country in the future. This will also reinforce the states’ vulnerability to cyclical global 
shocks, with subsequent pressure on local socio-political and economic patterns. 
Besides the given strategy could promote little in both the efficient use of natural resource 
base of the region, and the enhancement of potential investment inflows. Most probably, the 
latter will be attracted primarily to finance the projects on self-sufficiency, economic viability 
of which could be in turn questioned. The region itself could therefore remain significantly 
dependent on the non-regional imports, which would further exert its pressure on the national 
balances of payments in terms of the limited foreign exchange earnings. Yet, the major 
constraint reflects in that it would be barely possible to find optimum solutions to regional 
infrastructure projects, since the required multi-national cooperation will be replaced by the 
emphasis on those projects which may be primarily beneficial to national interests rather than 
those of the region.502 As evident from the past, this approach could be more resourceful in 
terms of both time and funds needed for the implementation of the foreseen multi-billion 
projects. 
 
6.3.2.2. Common Interests and Common Projects: Huge, but Untapped Potential 
Another scenario, more beneficial to our mind, is based on the postulates of the functionalist 
theory of regionalism which supposes to look for common points of interaction to bring 
together inter-state interests in particular projects or fields of economy. It is believed that this 
is an important step confined  not only to a narrow success within the implementation of such 
projects, but on further moves towards much wider cooperation in other areas too. Such areas 
                                                 
501 Bohr A. Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order, International Relations 
Magazine, Vol.80, issue 3, p.499-500. 
502 Alimov R. and others (eds). Tsentralnaya Aziya: Geoekonomika, Geopolitika, Bezopasnost. Tashkent, 2002, 
p.64. 
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of the economy where the Central Asian countries share common national interests, could be 
the fuel and energy complex, transport infrastructure, and trade. 
Unlike the former scenario, the given variant proceeds from the assertion of close economic 
interdependence of the countries in each of the aforementioned spheres. It is especially true 
for energy and transport infrastructure. Since the Soviet times all the countries are members of 
the Central Asian Interconnected Power Grid  through which substantial exchange of energy 
between countries may be carried out. The centre of the grid is located in Tashkent and  is 
responsible for coordination and monitoring of sustainable energy transmission across the 
region. During the last decade, however, the system has deteriorated; electricity lines are 
barely meeting growing consumption needs of the regional economies, while regular losses of 
power during its transmission has acquired a normal practice in recent time. As a result, some 
countries currently face not only a deficit of energy resources for domestic needs, but also 
suffer from its underdeveloped export potential in the given field. For this reason, the regional 
energy infrastructure may benefit substantially from up-grading and renovation which could 
for sure be able to increase efficiency of production in the energy complex of both the region 
and its countries. 
After the 1990s Central Asia became known in the world mainly as another promising region 
with abundant hydrocarbon reserves. Similarly, however, only  a handful of pipeline projects 
have been realized to bring these resources to the world markets. The region remains 
significantly remote and dependent on poor transport and pipeline infrastructure, while the 
factor of distance is one of the major impediments to Central Asian competitiveness on global 
markets (Annex 6.4). The main routes still basically go towards the northern direction, as in 
the former Soviet Union, although possibly huge benefits are untapped so far from 
diversification of the routes toward East, South and West. Unfortunately private investments 
usually come in the region in order to maximize their profits and short-term benefits, while 
the Central Asian states are more concerned in addressing strategic tasks to pursue domestic 
reforms and ensure the development of diversified foreign economic relations.  
In such terms, the states could be interested in pushing forward and defending their interests 
together. Besides, in favor of  this scenario could also speak the fact that the economies are 
differently endowed with natural resources: Uzbekistan has huge gas reserves; Kazakhstan – 
oil and coal; while Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan have a great potential for production of 
hydroelectricity (Table 6.3).  
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Table 6.3. Projected Energy Surpluses and Deficits, by Country, for 2005 
 
Energy Form Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic 
 
Tadjikistan Uzbekistan 
Oil Surplus Deficit Deficit Surplus 
Gas Surplus Deficit Deficit Surplus 
Electricity Deficit Surplus Surplus Surplus 
Coal Surplus Deficit Deficit Deficit 
 Source: ADB 
 
Through the reinforcement and extension of these linkages by regional forces, one may not 
only satisfy domestic needs, while effectively using regional mineral base. It would also allow 
Central Asia to become another stable source of energy located in the epicentre of the 
growing industrial needs of China and South-East Asia to the East; the extended EU to the 
West, and vast energy consumers, such as India and Pakistan, to the South. 
In terms of importance of trade in intermediate and finished goods for the viability of a 
regional bloc, Central Asian economies have already formed some domestic industrial 
potential too. Automobile industry, radio and electronics, home appliances, light and textile 
industries in Uzbekistan; oil and chemical, electro-technical and machine-building industries 
in Kazakhstan; foodstuffs, device, and home appliances in Kyrgyzstan may jointly provide a 
fertile ground for inter- and intra-industrial collaboration. The large-scale industries, like the 
automobile one in Uzbekistan, are currently operating explicitly below its total production 
capacities, with little benefits from the economies of scale. Cooperation in the given sphere 
could thus imply the establishment of joint ventures with Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tadjik 
enterprises which might specialize in spare parts, such as tyres, seats, car glasses, etc. for the 
head plant in Uzbekistan. In doing so, given inter-industry trade is the fastest growing type of 
trade among advanced economies around the world, it will allow for consequent improvement 
and diversification in export structure of the whole region. It will also promote  innovation, 
cost-reduction and management efficiency in many industries, so that they further  sustain 
efficiently in the global and regional markets as well. 
In May 2004, the Presidents of the two largest regional countries, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, 
met in Astana to discuss the current setbacks in the relationship of  their countries. After that 
meeting, the Presidents agreed to set their governments to make out the measures on 
“significant increases in the mutual trade turnover and the elimination of impediments on the 
way to its expansion”.503 The question remains, however, whether this meeting could virtually 
become that much-needed momentum in pushing regional initiatives. Nevertheless, concerted 
                                                 
503 The National Information Agency of Uzbekistan, www.uza.uz, 28 May 2004 
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efforts to pursue common tariff and custom policies which may eventually result in 
deprivation of tariffs, unification of trade regimes, and dismantling other trade barriers will 
unconditionally serve to foster intra-regional trade. It is important that by opening up national 
borders and eliminating cumbersome customs rules, bribes and bureaucratic procedures, the 
countries could reduce currently relatively high transactions costs, especially significant for 
the private sector which then acquires an excellent opportunity to contribute substantially to 
the development and expansion of intra-regional trade. Enhancement of trade in the border 
areas, for example in the Ferghana Valley, where most of the countries have common borders, 
is able to produce spill over effects for higher trade in other regions, too. The lessons from 
international experience show that “bottom-up” and private investment-driven regionalism 
may have much more substantial positive effect on the extension of regional relations than 
“top-down” and policy-led initiatives. It is also applicable to Central Asia where historically 
there had been no borders among the countries for the most part of its past development. In 
addition, since the regional governments have been declaring to stand by their  further 
economic and political liberalization, “from below”, efforts could acquire their particular 
meaning. 
To ensure realisation of the aforementioned measures, an appropriate transport infrastructure 
also needs to be built up. The specific geographical location and historical development made 
the region relatively distant from major world markets. All the countries are land-locked, 
while Uzbekistan is double-landlocked which means that the countries may be desperately 
interested in searching the most optimal ways to relieve and improve their situation (See Box 
6.1).  
Uzbekistan and the other regional countries participate already in existing and planned 
regional transport projects, such as in TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) 
financed by the EU Commission504; Serakhs-Tedjen-Mashad operating railway line which 
brings the region to the Iranian seaports to the South; the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan 
road project to the Pakistani seaports Quetta and Karachi; the Andijan-Osh-Kashgar railway 
and road project505 which starts in Uzbekistan and then goes through Kyrgyzstan, further to 
                                                 
504 The TRACECA Program, initiated by the EU, takes its origin from the Conference of Trade and Transport 
Ministers of Central Asia and Caucasus, which was held Brussels in 1993. The Summit of Europe, South 
Caucasus and Central Asia was held in Baku in 1998. The Principal Multilateral Agreement on a Europe-
Caucasus-Asia transport corridor was signed at this summit. Cargo transport in Central Asia and Trans-Caucasus 
made up 128.5 million tons in 2003. Annual growth of cargo transport by railway accounts for 9-10%, and by 
road, 18-20%. Interview with R.Yunusov, Deputy Prime Minister of Uzbekistan, 
http://www.internationalreports.net/asiapacific/uzbekistan/2004/deputy.htm 
505 With the opening of tunnels in 2000, and 100 kilometers of road crossing the passes of Kamchik and Rezak in 
Ferghana Valley (Uzbekistan), which were the most difficult part of the Eurasian transcontinental highway, 
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China and across its territory to the Chinese ports in the Pacific region. These  are only a few 
of the dozen alternatives which may unite the  national interests of each country and 
encourage them to move towards further coordination of their efforts in this field. For this 
reason, all the countries may stand together to support each other with being interested in a 
quick realization of similar projects which benefit all  parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The general rationality of this scenario is in that all the countries perceive the necessity and 
possibility of benefits which they can draw out from the realization of concrete investment 
projects in particular areas. The regional market of Central Asia may experience slow, but 
sustainable progress. As a result of joint measures, prospective economic union of the states 
                                                                                                                                                        
Uzbekistan has got an access to the Pacific Ocean. Now, the largest strategic international highway in Asia, 
passing through Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and China to Chinese seaports, has begun to operate. 
 
Box 6.1. National Transport Priorities of Uzbekistan 
 
In an interview, Vice-Prime-Minister responsible for the Transport-related issues in the Government of 
Uzbekistan, pointed out  a great significance of regional and international transport projects for the country. In 
particular, he emphasized that  “the need to cross a number of borders, the remoteness of seaports, high 
transport rates, the existence of physical and nonphysical barriers that isolate Uzbekistan and other Central 
Asian countries from world markets, constrain the growth of exports and aggravate the problems of 
development. At the same time, Uzbekistan has a significant geopolitical importance. Uzbekistan is located at 
the center of the Great Silk Road that has connected the East with the West for many millenniums.
The country is located in the center of regional and inter-regional corridors that have been formed during the 
last 13 years. President Karimov proposed in 1989 that overcoming transport isolation and development of 
international transport communications become national priorities“. 
 
The following tasks were prioritized under the national priorities in the transport sphere:
• integration of national transport corridors into the ITC system, first of all, into the pan-European transport 
networks; 
• use of the convenient geopolitical location of the country for attraction of transit on Asia- Europe and North-
South itineraries; 
• ensuring national interests in the regional transport and in the framework of globalization, including transport 
services; 
• attracting large foreign investments; 
• applying advanced world experience in the field of transportation systems, transport infrastructure, and ITC 
in Uzbekistan; 
• sustainable growth of transit flows and currency inflow from transit by the foreign policy; 
• working out maximal diversity of export and import directions of cargo transports by means of foreign 
policy; 
• foreign policy assistance to achieve preferences in the field of tariffs and transit duties; 
• search for alternative routes in order to assist cargo delivery in the shortest distances with minimum transport 
costs; 
• ensuring interests of national forwarding agencies and transport companies in the international market of 
transport services, and assisting the growth of personnel and intellectual resources in the field of transport and 
communications by means of foreign policy;  
• developing a transport system in harmony with the environment, and reducing the negative influences of 
transport on environment and public health. 
 
Source: «International transport has top priority for doubly landlocked country». Interview with R.Yunusov, Deputy Prime Minister of 
Uzbekistan 
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will probably reach the level of certain harmonization of economic, financial, trade and social 
policies after success has been gained in specific areas. In this regard, the role of Uzbekistan 
is of particular significance in ensuring this success owing to its position linking the countries 
of the region as well as its desperate interests to have access to the world markets which in 
turn is substantially pre-determined by success of the regional initiatives. Against the 
background of the reinvigorated and reinforced economic projects political and security 
dimensions might also be further strengthened.  
Equally, however, there are a number of constraints in the given model. The experience of 
these states with little more than a dozen years of independence is too brief to foretell 
confidently their real potential for regionalism in ten or even five years’ time. In other regions 
of the world, functional cooperation in one field has often preceded and helped to prompt 
functional cooperation in another; security policy ties may follow the coordination of 
economic and trade issues, for example, or vice versa. Soft regionalism has also developed as 
societies and political systems have evolved and transnational networks have increased.506 
Moreover, this scenario is hardly realizable by the  efforts of the Central Asian states only. On 
the contrary, it may require both, financial support and reasonable mediation from the outside. 
It is unlikely, that even when joining forces within a common regional union, the region will 
turn itself into a key player on international arena. Rather, what may be anticipated is that this 
union is needed to a greater extent for the development of common strategy and position on a 
various range of international issues, including bi- and multilateral negotiations with foreign 
investors and donors who prefer to see the region as a whole in the course of active regional 
interaction, rather than single progresses in each economy.507  
In other words, the single states of Central Asia are unable to espouse real hopes for economic 
and political achievements, notwithstanding this contention finds little countenance among the 
regional scientific sets. Even the economies of the largest regional countries, like Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan, are rather small in global dimensions. The single regional economy is still 
unlikely to represent a large economic bloc.508 There are only two alternatives ahead for the 
small economies of Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan and probably Turkmenistan in the prospect, 
either to be confronted with sustainable growth of poverty, or with regional integration. It is 
obvious that the region should not choose between regional cooperation and integration into 
the world community. Successful regional cooperation could be seen as a minimal condition 
                                                 
506 Allison R. International Affairs Magazine, 2004, Vol.80., issue 3, p.426. 
507 Alimov R. and others (eds). Tsentralnaya Aziya: Geoekonomika, Geopolitika, Bezopasnost. Tashkent, 2002, 
p.67. 
508 It is comparable with the economy of neighboring Iran. 
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for any efforts to integrate in the world economy for at least a number of reasons, including 
that no country has a direct access to the sea. Consequently, further enhancement of regional 
trade in goods and services will be apparently dependent on the realization of concrete 
investment projects in particular areas, including infrastructure, trade, and energy at the outset 
of such steps. 
 
6.3.2.3. New Constitutionalism in Central Asia? 
The Russia’s full membership in the Central Asia Cooperation Organization after the October 
2004 summit of regional states has marked a new stage in the regional events. Hence, it has 
opened another potential scenario for Central Asia’s regional prospects. Some time earlier, the 
President of Russia called upon the Russian diplomatic missions on more active and 
consequent efforts to reinforce Russian policies in the CIS space by giving an appropriate 
support to interregional integration trends there. Russian diplomats have got an explicit signal 
and responsibility to look at efficient leadership in the region through the prism of permanent 
adequate and effective policy actions. On the contrary, the former misguided view on a 
Russia’s allegedly exclusive right on regional engagement in the past was severely 
criticized.509  
Nevertheless, there is some doubt that Russia has ever completely pulled out of the region. At 
least, both, economic and political factors might hardly allow doing in such a way. 
Economically, it proceeds from infrastructure interdependence between Russia and Central 
Asia. The highways, for instance, have  never been especially good in Central Asia, while 
geographically they were not connected to main world roads, or to the main regional 
waterways, but only to European Russia. The principal highway and rail links to Europe from 
Central Asia still go through Russia, although improved transport links from Europe to Asia 
through the region to China and other East Asian nations could be of great interest to many 
parties. First improvements to the road and rail links in different connections were started, 
towards west, south and east, and, will still be a long-lasting process. Therefore traditional 
routes will probably keep on playing the main role in the nearest future. 
On the other hand, Russia remains a primary trading partner for all the Central Asian 
countries, as well as their important market for many their commodities. Geographically, 
Russia is too large and the Russian minorities are all spread across the whole region 
                                                 
509 Address of President of Russia V.Putin at the Plenary Session of the Russian Federation Ambassadors and 
Permanent Representatives Meeting, Moscow, Foreign Ministry, 12 July 2004, 
http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/07/12/1323_74425.shtml 
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protection of whose interests is among the main Russian policy priorities. Russian domestic 
social, political and economic changes are well perceived in the Central Asian elites and 
societies whereby the Strategic Partnership Agreement of Uzbekistan with Russia has brought 
forth particularly warm welcome in Uzbek society which may provide necessary public 
support for coming closer at all levels. Thus, the strategic interests of Russia’s involvement in 
the regional processes have dovetailed with the strong economic and socio-political roots 
going mainly into the common development in the past. 
The given scenario is not going to be much different from the previous one in terms of 
regional priorities: the necessity of regional initiatives in energy, trade, and transport and 
communications system.510 The question only is if their implementation is expected to come 
under big influence and even direct participation of Russia. Whereas almost all the Central 
Asian states have confirmed their strategic partnership with the northern neighbor511, they 
may anticipate the latter to play a role of a regional locomotive to bring all the countries 
together by the improvements in regional network.512  
Along with security and political issues, Russia has already demonstrated that it is going to be 
fairly active in the economic arena too, especially in the energy and trade areas.513 For 
example because there is a lack of sufficient export pipelines out of Central Asia so far, due to 
either long-lasting negotiation processes, or differences in costs and forms of investments 
with foreign partners, or other geopolitical trends, the Russian energy pipeline system still 
feeds significant amounts of Central Asian oil and gas to the world markets, mainly from the 
most abundant countries of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Russia, in its turn, is also 
concerned in ensuring competitiveness of its pipeline system and not allowing other 
alternative projects to undermine its work through functioning below its throughput 
capacities. Russia benefits from transport fees and will further secure the interests of its 
companies working in any part of the world, including Central Asia. In particular, the Russian 
                                                 
510 At the same time, this scenario has much to do with the enlargement of the purely economic bloc, both 
current and prospective. At the moment, the events will be analysed through the prism of the Russia’s 
membership, but further expansion, collaboration or even possible mergers with similar regional groupings in the 
longer run may equally occur. Since these unions are all in process of formation, it is difficult to predict such 
developments at the contemporary stage.  
511 In its August 2004 session, Parliament of Uzbekistan ratified the Agreement with Russia on Strategic 
Partnership signed on October 21, 2001 in Moscow. See: Parlament Uzbekistana Ratifitsiroval Dogovor o 
Strategicheskom Partnerstve s Rossiey. Information  agency “Kabar”, 28 August 2004. 
512 According to the signed Agreement between the Government of Kyrgyzstan and Russian Energy Company 
RAO “EES” in August 2004, Russia pledged to invest about $2 bln. USD in completion of construction of 
Kambarata’s two big hydropower stations in Kyrgyzstan. Being the largest company’s investment project 
abroad, the given deal may give the Russian company not only purely economic benefits from regional export of 
energy, but also have a substantial impact on regional water resources management and distribution issue in 
Central Asia. See Siluyanova P. “Chubays Prishyol v Kyrgyziyu”, www.gzt.ru. 23 August 2004. 
513 See Chapter IV for more details. 
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companies Lukoil and Gazprom have committed to invest up to $1 bln.USD each within the 
next 35 years in the development of oil and gas fields in Uzbekistan, as well as into the 
improvement of domestic infrastructure. Considering them as a first large project in the 
energy area, Uzbekistan is plotting to boost domestic gas and oil production, while Russia has 
pledged to upgrade the existing regional gas pipeline “Central Asia-Centre” which eventually 
brings Turkmen and Uzbek gas to the Russian refineries. Kazakhstan is also expected to 
benefit from these plans, since a branch of the given pipeline starts in the Bukhara-Khiva gas 
region in Uzbekistan and leads also to Kazakhstan’s southern territories through the Kyrgyz 
capital Bishkek. Renovation of the existing pipeline may provide sustainable gas supplies 
within the region and prevent the shortage of energy which is currently observed in some 
parts of the region due to a poor physical state of the regional energy system. 
Russia may also contribute to restoration and improvement of the road, rail and other 
transportation and communication links, in addition to more concessive and concerted 
custom, tariff and transit policies which will reflect broad interests of the land-locked regional 
countries into the CIS and other regional markets. In particular, Russia is a part of the Soviet-
era international North-South freight transportation corridor from Europe to Iran and India 
through Central Asia (Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan). Another effective continuation 
of the transport corridor to the West, the direction China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-
Russia-Ukraine and further through Poland to Germany by an European transport corridor is 
considered.514 Being among the Uzbekistan and Russian regional strategies in the 21 century, 
it may facilitate regional efforts of the regional countries to gain additional access to the 
seaports of Iran and India in the Indian ocean as well as to European markets in the West. 
In general, Russia and Central Asia may share common interests in permanent improvement 
of the technical state of their air and rail park; agricultural machine-building; textile and food 
industries, while harmonization of economic policies will promote further benefits from 
expected freight volumes in both directions to Europe and South Asia. 
Along with economic priorities, Central Asian economies will apply a common strategy to 
oppose the regional threats to regional and national security. With such collaboration under a 
security umbrella embracing existing initiatives within the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, 
Collective Security Treaty, one may thus reach a multi-level interaction on security issues 
complementing each other in a much wider geopolitical area. 
                                                 
514  «International transport has top priority for doubly landlocked country». Interview with R.Yunusov, Deputy 
Prime Minister of Uzbekistan, http://www.internationalreports.net/asiapacific/uzbekistan/2004/deputy.htm 
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In a row with the aforementioned benefits, the realization of the given scenario may also hold 
a number of specific costs of a largely long-term character. By recalling similar models in the 
other world regional development, it may be revealed that in order to have economic 
cooperation be a success, national interests of the countries should be accompanied by a 
concurrent or at least cohesive vision of strategic relations in the political area too. In our 
case, by playing a substantial role in the development of the energy and transport projects, 
including the small Central Asian economies, Russia will understandably proceed from its 
own strategic national priorities. Through a number of the concluded agreements on strategic 
partnership with the Central Asian states, Russia has taken a steady stand to be engaged in any 
large energy and transport projects of the region with the third countries. In other words, the 
regional countries are expected to stand on preliminary coordination of their diversification 
strategies with their northern neighbor which will barely allow to put into life the ideas at the 
expense of its own. On the contrary, Russia may be the least concerned party in any strong 
diversification of the regional network, capable to dwindle the use of its own routes. Moscow 
has pledged to promote the much-needed improvement in regional energy pipelines, but only 
those traditionally ensuring northern connections. That implies that horizontal economic 
relations in the foreseeable future and later on remain mainly unchanged; while northern links 
are intended to be further reinforced to keep up strong vertical interdependence. 
It bears the two principal implications for Central Asia. On the one hand, the region stays 
close to the realization of a number of projects in particular economic areas. It is going to be 
easier and more cost-effective for the countries to restore and upgrade the existing 
infrastructure, especially if it is congruous with the Russian interests to render all necessary 
support for such projects. Then, it seems to make economic sense, primarily for the region. 
For a large country, like Russia, entering into cooperation agreements with small countries, 
the economic costs are likely to be minimal in terms of GDP, but for smaller economies of the 
region the economic benefits may be unambiguous and possibly large with respect to GDP. 
Although there might be no economic benefits or they are relatively small to the large 
country, this type of arrangement offers a low-cost method of achieving political goals.515  
                                                 
515 In this regard, political economy helps some authors point at the variance in political objectives for large 
countries with subsequent conclusions that these objectives most commonly involve spheres of influence. 
International experience refers to the EU’s preferential arrangements with African and Mediterranean countries 
(the 1975 Lome Convention) to strengthen those countries’ traditional political links with Western Europe, and 
the similar 1982 US initiative towards Caribbean countries. In this cases, foreign economic policy in general and 
trade policy in particular was foreign policy, because suggested trade preferences and favorable environment to a 
small trading partner assist in strengthening its economic and trade links to the large country, for which they may 
be a low-cost influence-strengthening tool, albeit this is going to depend on the efficasy of this and other tools in 
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On the other hand, in compliance with the theory of constitutionalism which among other 
things also supposes that smaller states are forced to follow the rules and standards of larger 
economies,516 the regional economies will be expected to bring their standards in concert with 
those of Russia. It may leave little room to look for and put into life other possible justified 
economic and political alternatives.  
Besides, implementation of new projects is much more a long-lasting process which starts 
with looking for potential investors and leads to the beginning of the operation. Although it is 
likely to be of higher priority, such projects may sustain only long after their realization under 
a few exogenous conditions. However, more sustainability and national security development 
in the long-run may speak in favor of this time span. 
Therefore, it is most likely that the regional states should compromise the particular aspects of 
this model by taking into account possible economic and political consequences. For this a 
balanced and multifaceted analysis in drawing up their actions within this variant would be 
advisable. Yet it is often difficult to make these appropriate estimates as to various policy 
areas, as well as to define, whether they might serve the true interests of the countries’ long-
run development.  
 
6.3.3. General and Specific Constraints 
Central Asia as a whole is confronted with controversial processes comprising both domestic 
and global trends. It makes it reasonable to be very cautious not only about current 
developments, but also in assessing the possible scenarios and future prospects of 
regionalisation. On the one hand, the major subjects of regional processes in Central Asia 
today, i.e. the states, experience a process of formation, attempting to integrate with each 
other at the same time: the trends which are supposed to complement rather than contradict 
each other. But, national interests of the states so far could be more intrinsic to a particular 
stage of development rather than to long-run periods in view of complete domestic socio-
                                                                                                                                                        
foreign policy. See more in: Pomfret R. The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements, Oxford University 
Press, 2001, pp.338-340. 
516 The case of Mexico could be an especially vivid example here. After the NAFTA Agreement was signed in 
1993, Mexico had to comply with many additional conditions and waivers to the Agreement at the operation 
level which mainly came as a result of lobby activities in the USA, such as sweet corn lobbies, for example. It 
engendered many problems for the Mexican government, both economic and political. See more detailes: 
Altvater E. Regionalizatsiya Mirovogo Rynka In Diter H. Regionalnaya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii. 
Zentralstelle fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialentwicklung, Berlin, 1995. Other views, however, proceed from the 
idea that NAFTA was initiated by the smallest country, i.e. Mexico which then confirmed its commitment to 
trade and investment reforms. See North American Free Trade Agreement, in Micic M. International Trade, 
St.Martin's Press, New York, pp.494-496. 
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political and economic reforms.517 Besides, the national interests are determined by the level 
of integration into the world community and according to the main provisions of international 
law; both  processes are still  underway, too.518  
On the other hand, the future of the scenarios in many respects will depend on the further 
development of a geopolitical situation in the region and around it, as well as on positions of 
the countries engaged into these trends. The cases of Afghanistan and Turkmenistan could 
serve as a vivid example in this regard. Regional processes in general and the regional policy 
of Uzbekistan in particular seems to benefit these two countries’ participation in regional 
cooperation. For Uzbekistan, security and stability in Afghanistan is undoubtedly top priority 
in its regional policies. But in the long-run, Afghan involvement in regional processes will 
determine not the less important issues such as water and energy and transport projects, since 
Uzbekistan is keen in realizing a number of Trans-Afghan energy and transport projects 
giving access to Iranian, Indian and Pakistani seaports and markets.  
The same is true concerning  Turkmenistan. As it was vowed by Uzbek Foreign Ministry's top 
official, “existing security threats have a negative impact on prospects of the strengthening of 
regional cooperation. Besides…terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, transnational 
organized crime, one can add the problems with water supply and energy resources, 
boundary delimitation and demarcations, absence of a common regional transport 
infrastructure and power systems, environment problems, etc. I can not ignore, that the 
certain difficulties on a way of regional integration are caused by so called ”special 
position” of Turkmenistan to the given questions”.519 So far Turkmenistan has ignored almost 
all main initiatives of regional cooperation. Yet, in the long run if Turkmenistan decides to be 
a full member of the regional transport and energy projects, it may have a considerable impact 
on  national priorities of Uzbekistan and those of the whole region.  
It means that on the one hand, sustainability of the region and attractiveness of regional 
economic projects in the scenarios are going to increase. But, former interstate cooperation 
has interconnected security and economic dimensions. Both are definitely necessary. Failure 
                                                 
517 For example, the difficulties are partly related to a complex definition of real national interests based on the 
conception of foreign economic policies if reformation of the polities and structure of power in the countries is 
actively underway. Kyrgyzstan, for instance, returned to a one-chamber parliament in 2000, like in the beginning 
of independence, after a two-chamber parliament system had been first set up in 1997 and operated only a few 
years. In Uzbekistan, on the contrary, a new two-chamber system was introduced in 2003 for the first time after 
12 years development with a one-chamber parliament. 
518 Talipov F. Teoriya i Praktika Regionalnoy Integratsii v Tsentralnoy Azii, Magazine Central Asia and 
Caucasus, 2002, No 2, p.99. 
519 Speech of First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan Mr. V. Norov at the Briefing “Uzbekistan’s 
Role in Regional Integration and Ensuring Regional Security ”, 8 October 2003. 
http://www.eias.org/luncheons/uzbekperspective/norov.pdf  
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in one dimension is sure to defeat progress in the other. Developments in the past has revealed 
that a certain dominance of the former over the latter was observed. If this continues, one may 
not be easy to depend exclusively upon the benefits of economic viability supported by 
regional initiatives within each scenarios. They are expected to remain in a significant 
relationship with national and regional security concerns. 
 
6.4. Contribution of Foreign Partners 
6.4.1. Mutually Beneficial Relations With “Good Neighborhood” 
Although the Central Asian market is not itself large enough to support a significant degree of 
intra-regional trade specialization at the current stage of regionalisation, the picture changes 
substantially when the definition of the region is widened to include Russia, China, Iran, as 
well as other non-CIS countries. There is a conviction among some groups of non-regional 
researchers that “it is the liberalization of trade relations in this wider region that should lie at 
the heart of a strategy of increased integration into the world economy for the countries of 
Central Asia”.520 
Even if the Central Asian states could benefit relatively much from close cooperation with 
Russia within the third scenario through “better” access to its pipeline and transport 
infrastructure, it is in the strategic long-run interests of the region to think about the 
development of other possible alternatives too. In this regard, the agenda of neighboring 
powers should be also taken into account.521 
China, for instance, sees much in the crucial and geopolitical significance of Central Asia.522 
Therefore, it is interested in enhancing steady economic cooperation with the whole region on 
bi- and multilateral basis. Among other priorities, China is contemplating Central Asia as a 
market for its products and investments which have consequently grown comparing to the 
beginning of the 1990s. In addition, some domestic factors in China have also influenced its 
goals. Growing needs of the economy for energy products, and political debates to set up 
national oil reserves have made the region of particular interest in comprehensive Chinese 
efforts across the globe in search of all possible and diversified energy alternatives for its 
import. In 2003, China imported 91 mln.tons of crude oil which amounted to almost 40% of 
                                                 
520 Grafe et Al. The Importance of Good Neighbors: Regional Trade in Central Asia, p.117. 
521 The geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations are more closely analysed in Chapter IV. 
522 Bin X. China and Central Asia : A New Dimension of Partnership, in Seidelman R., Giese E. (eds.) 
Cooperation and Conflict Management in Central Asia, Zentrum fuer Internationale and 
Umweltforschungspolitik. Justug Liebig Universitaet, Frankfurt-am-Main, Peter Lang Verlag, Band 10, 2004. 
pp.177-187. 
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its total oil consumption. 523 Moreover, this figure is expected to rise further. Besides, China 
and Central Asia are both concerned parties to collaborate in the development of mutually 
beneficial transport corridors. In 1992 they started to operate  a route which is known as the 
Second Eurasian Continental Bridge, linking the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Starting in 
Lianyungang, a port in East China’s Jiangsan province, it embraces the Central Asian 
railways system and ends up in the seaport of Rotterdam in the Netherlands After a 302 km 
Tedjen-Serakhs-Meshad (Central Asia-Iran) railway project was completed in 1996, the new 
length amounted 9,500 km in comparison with the old Trans-Siberian railway route of 14,000 
km long. China’s railway system was enabled to gain an access to Iranian ports in the Persian 
Gulf and  then, further to the Turkish ones in the Mediterranean.524. But being also of 
particular importance for Uzbekistan, its operation is complicated by virtue of the political 
and organizational reasons, as well as by imperfection of available legal base. At the same 
time, the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China rail corridor with 985 km in length is on pre-design 
stage covering the railroad Andizhan - Osh – Kashgar and expected to be completed in 2009. 
Economic rationale is fortified by political and security dimensions, on which China and 
Central Asia are actively collaborating within the Shanghai Forum Organization. 
By enhancing regional partnership in infrastructure projects, Iran may also be of a particular 
interest for Central Asia in bringing its oil and gas to the world markets. A few years ago, for 
example, Iran initiated an oil swap programme which permits Kazakhstan to ship oil to points 
on the South Caspian, and then sell oil of Iranian origin from points on the Persian Gulf. 
Turkmenistan and Iran make similar swap deals for Turkmen gas, too, which allows to 
transport it from Turkmen gas fields to European (through Turkey) and Asian (India, 
Pakistan) markets.525  
Since insignificant volumes of oil are comprised by current swap deals so far, Iran is 
ambitiously contemplating the possibility to increase swap oil supplies from the Caspian 
region through implementation of a number of purposeful projects. In addition, Iran itself is 
going to benefit by building up additional domestic pipelines for its refinery facilities to meet 
domestic needs and export to regional neighbors. 526  
                                                 
523 „China sucht Erdölversorgungs-Sicherheit/Aufbau einer strategischen Reserve“, "Neue Zuercher Zeitung", 16 
August 2004 
524 Azovskiy I. V Poiskah Putey Rasshireniya Tranzitnyh Svyzey, Vostok Magazine. 1997, No 2, pp.108-120. 
525 For more details see Chapter IV on energy issue in Central Asia. 
526 In particular, such  plans foresee a gradual increase of volumes from current 170 barels to 500 barels per day 
by the year 2010. Source: Voropayeva L. Nichego Svoyego. Gazeta SNG, 02 June 2004. See also Chapter IV. 
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The projects with Iran are the most economically viable and profitable, since it represents the 
shortest way to its seaports in the Persian Gulf from where one may arrange shipments to any 
parts of the world. On this occasion, the President of Kazakhstan confirmed the interests of 
his country by saying that the Iranian route was a better oil export alternative than eastern and 
western directions.527 The same is true for Uzbekistan whose benefits from sustainable 
transport projects in the long run will be stipulated by the use of the shortest way to the 
Southern seaports.528 During the official visit of the President of Uzbekistan to Iran, a 
Trilateral Agreement between Iran, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan on Transafghan transport 
corridor and on international transport routes was signed, creating  a legal base for a long-
existed idea to expand and use the potential of southern direction in foreign relations.529 
Thus, taking into account domestic economic potential of such neighbors, as well as particular 
economic benefits which cooperation with them may bring to the efficiency, and 
implementation of many regional projects, foreign policies on a friendly footing and the 
principles of “good neighborhood” are going to be crucial. 
 
6.4.2. Importance of the Coordination Among Foreign Partners 
It would certainly be a mistake to assume that Central Asia’s foreign economic strategy has 
been exclusively fastened on their large neighbour states. In fact, each of the countries has 
been anxious to secure close ties with the broader international community, including the 
USA, EU, East and South-East Asian nations. Since this kind of foreign policy in the past 
decade was driven by the desire to consolidate independence on the one hand and to ensure 
smooth integration into the world economic system on the other, appropriate international 
recognition and backing of this path was regarded as an integral part of this process. Given the 
additional emphasis placed on the region  after the events of September 11  and extension of 
foreign involvement in regional processes, coordinate efforts among multilateral and bilateral 
assistance programmes will be required. In its turn, there is also a conviction among the 
governments of the necessity in further increase of such programmes in Central Asia. In 
                                                 
527 Eastern direction suggests an oil pipeline from the Kashagan oil field in Western part of Kazakhstan to 
Western province of China. The western route implies the participation in Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil project 
intending to bring Central Asian oil to the European markets through Caucasus. See more in Chapter IV. 
528 If distance is taken into account, the western and southern directions are in clear advantage in Eurasian 
Transport Corridors: Northern corridor  Tashkent-Riga – 4008 km; Northwest corridor Tashkent-Brest – 
4249 km; Central corridor “Europe-Caucasus-Asia” Tashkent-Aktau-Poti – 2309 km and Tashkent-Farab-
Poti – 2733km; Southern corridor – Tashkent-Bandar-Abbas – 3617 km; Eastern corridors  Tashkent – 
Lianyungang 4550 km and Tashkent-Nahodka – 8701 km. Source: 
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/010125trans.htm 
529 Visit of President of Uzbekistan I.Karimov to Iran, www.uza.uz, 17-18 June 2003 
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particular, delivering a speech at the briefing, the first deputy minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Uzbekistan emphasized the following: „We think it is expedient to consider the following 
issues with corresponding UN institutes, other international economic, financial 
organizations and donor-countries: substantial increase of aid allocated to the Central Asian 
states and Afghanistan for development of trade, transport and infrastructure; rendering 
practical support to the regional and inter-regional projects on transport and communication 
systems“.530 
Strategically, international assistance could be mainly instrumental in ensuring realization of 
the two intertwined national and regional priorities of the states mentioned above under the 
auspices of general sustainable development. The given goal could be achieved through 
implementation of concrete programmes in different socio-economic areas, such as, for 
example, improvement of general investment climate; micro-finance and small business 
development projects; debt and poverty reduction initiatives; capacity-building for 
government institutions; public investment support and social service improvement.  
For these purposes, technical and financial assistance from multilateral donors, such as the 
World Bank, UNDP, IMF, ADB, EBRD and others may play a great role. For example, since 
1997, ADB has launched a special project Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation 
embracing the Central Asian states, Azerbaidjan, Mongolia and the Chinese Xinjiang 
province, as well as nowadays Afghanistan. The project comprises trade, energy and transport 
as  priority areas for cooperation to facilitate growth and prosperity in Central Asia through a 
gradual elimination of natural and economic constraints (remoteness, seclusion, inefficiency 
of using natural resources, etc.) and building trust and consensus among countries to set up a 
ground for dialogue and much-needed coordination.531 
On a regional level, donors could thus assist in devising a formula for coordination on water 
resources management; trade and transportation; energy development; rural areas 
development; health and disease, as well as combating drug trafficking. It is strengthened by 
the fact that these priorities remain equally strategic areas for development for both regional 
states and international organizations that may enhance mutually advantageous interaction 
between the two sides. The World Bank, whose activities have resulted in total $3 bln.USD 
assistance since Independence, has opened its regional office in Almaty (Kazakhstan). This 
                                                 
530 Speech of First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan Mr. V. Norov at the Briefing “Uzbekistan’s 
Role in Regional Integration and Ensuring Regional Security ”, 8 October 2003. 
http://www.eias.org/luncheons/uzbekperspective/norov.pdf  
531 Blue A. Central Asia: Development Bank Views Economic Cooperation With Optimism, RFE/RL, 
www.unece.org/operact/opera/sppled/admin.doc. 
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institution, like all others, has also pledged to continue its support for national and regional 
social projects focusing on transport and trade; water and energy; as well as programmes 
against contagious diseases.532 
The IMF has committed itself to remain fully engaged in providing assistance to Central Asia 
in its quest for faster sustained growth and rising living standards for all.533 It was pointed out 
that the IMF would support the ultimate integration of the region into the world community 
and therefore, was prepared to keep on rendering necessary technical and financial 
arrangements for greater regional cooperation as an interim stage promoting to reach the final 
goals. 
Along with multilateral donors, further bilateral assistance is going to be equally beneficial 
and necessary (Table 6.4).  
Table 6.4 Official Development Aid to Central Asia in 2002 
 
 Net ODA  
(US $million) 
Bilateral  
(percent) 
Major Donors (US 
$million) 
Population 
(million) 
Kazakhstan 188 90 USA (65), Japan 
(38), Spain (12) 
14.8 
Kyrgyz Republic 186 51 AsDF (43), USA 
(40), IDA (30) 
5.0 
Tadjikistan 168 68 USA (59), IDA (22), 
EU (21) 
6.3 
Turkmenistan 41 86 Arab countries (18), 
Japan (14), USA 
(13) 
5.5 
Uzbekistan 189 89 USA (63), Japan 
(36), Germany (18) 
25.4 
Afghanistan 1,285 78 USA (188), EU (95), 
Germany (86) 
28.0 
Source: OECD website 
The Trade and Investment Framework agreement signed between the Central Asian countries 
and the USA in 2003 is intended to assist Central Asia through a plan of actions in solving 
practical issues on investment and trade across the region; lifting trade impediments; 
improvement in tariff and intellectual property rights policies.534 The Partnership and 
Cooperation national agreements with the EU and the project of TACIS launched on its basis 
in 2002 to promote the implementation of the provisions of the given agreement could be 
another vivid example of tangible interaction which can ensure the region fully to address 
                                                 
532 “World Bank Open Its Office in Central Asia”, Times of Central Asia Neswpaper, 02 July 2002. II 
Ministerial Conference on Central Asian Economic Cooperation, Tashkent, November 2003. 
533 Kohler H. Opportunities and Challenges for Central Asia. Speech at the Conference for the Tenth 
Anniversary of the Introduction of the Kazakh monetary unit tenge, Almaty, 13 November 2003. 
534 «V Vashingtone Podpisano Soglasheniye o Torgovle i Investitsiyah Mejdu Stranami Tsentralnoy Azii i 
SshA». Kazakhstan Today, 02 June 2004. 
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current challenges and put its foot down through gradual improvements in domestic socio-
economic policies and fostering closer regional cooperation535.  
Yet, some limitations should be emphasized in providing efficient international support for 
Central Asia. On the one hand, all the states have a low absorptive capacity for assistance. 
Partners and donors have to deal with mainly government agencies or their subordinates with 
less opportunities to act directly with the private sector. Local governments, as a rule, still 
lack the skills and budget revenues for self-governance. On the other hand, the development 
of the private sector is going on slowly due to the controversial process of transition to a 
market economy. Therefore, business community is sometimes unable to act as a partner for 
donors, though having a vested interest in attracting additional resources in the short-term to 
organize and enhance its capacity. 
In addition, notwithstanding increased attention to the region after the terrorist acts in the 
USA in 2001, international assistance and real involvement in the regional trends is still 
limited.536 This support is unlikely to be sufficient to cover all pressing needs for sustainable 
development. Multinational donors, such as the World bank and UNDP will not  provide huge 
infusions of cash either. World Bank loans for projects eventually have to be repaid, and 
regional governments are normally cash-starved, while some of them are even heavily saddled 
with the debt’s burden.537 Besides, the credit allocation process seems to be basically a 
complex process with particular scrutiny of donors who want to make sure that the resources 
provided have been effectively used under each programme they have designed which does 
not always find support among recipients.  
                                                 
535 PCA Support for Implementation project of the TACIS in Uzbekistan comprises a few concrete areas of 
assistance. They are: economic development support, assistance in transition to a market economy, and an 
improvement in trade and investment policies, as well as administrative reform, civil society, mass media and 
NGOs. The work is based on the analyses of domestic legislation in respective fields and development 
recommendations to bring domestic practices closer to the international standards and those of the EU. The 
activities are carried out with active engagement of government agencies to promote capacity building and 
liberalization of economic and political life in the country. Find out more on Information Portal of PCA 
Secretariat, http://cfp.pca.uz/. 
536 For example, ADB’s total loans in the region from 1997 to 2001 amounted to some $1,2 bln.USD which was 
only 3,7% of ADB’s total loans, and this process of funding is likely to remain constant further on. Blue A. 
Central Asia : Development Bank Views Economic Cooperation With Optimism, RFE/RL, 
www.unece.org/operact/opera/sppled/admin.doc. 
537 The IMF CIS 7 initiatives comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tadjikistan, 
Uzbekistan to address debt problems which the countries of the CIS are facing with. Tadjikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
were affected especially badly at the end of 2001 with external debt/GDP ratio 107,6 and 118,5%, respectively, 
which was higher the average in other CIS (62,3) and transition countries (43,7%). Since in 2002 debt burden 
increased for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the former was seeking the ways of partial restructuring of total debt 
amount in the recent past, while the latter remained assidous with all payments of its extrenal financial 
obligations. Helbling T., Mody A., Sahay R.  “Debt Accumulation in the CIS countries: Bad Luck, Bad Policies, 
or Bad Advice”  IMF Working Paper 04/93, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0493.pdf. See also 
“A New Initiative for the CIS 7”. 02 February 2002. 
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/EU2/2002/edebt/eng/040202b.pdf.  
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Consequently, even if substantial assistance is crucial, its amounts and effects may be 
moderate, until common structural changes within the states themselves through gradual, 
incremental and result-oriented steps between the regional countries to facilitate regional 
process will take place. The business community determines the degree of their involvement 
in joint projects within the context of integration processes taking place in Central Asia.538 
Only in this case, one may pin one's  hope for intensification of international assistance to the 
region over the long-term. 
 
6.4.3. Methods to Promote Regional Cooperation 
Multilateral and bi-lateral activities in Central Asia would be then even more efficient if 
donors would not only coordinate their efforts in general and particular projects, but would 
exchange and share common views on persistent methods and approaches applicable to local 
conditions of regionalization, too. Donors will probably have to continue to put forward 
initiatives promoting a mutual dialogue within and among the countries of the region which 
may be produced by the assistance to address critical issues related to national reforms and 
sub-regional cooperation; higher popular participation in economic and political decision-
making; and by exploring new approaches to development, such as tapping more into local 
resources for increasing economic activity.539  
Since for the most part of past development, international assistance was dominated by aid 
projects with primarily the government sector, diversification of this approach will require 
creation of conditions in which the private sector could also benefit from such initiatives in 
the region. The projects of direct economic impact, such as small and medium-sized business 
and micro-finance or credit unions development, for example, could be a starting point, since 
their benefits are palpable and could bear both, national and regional positive effects for the 
societies striving for the establishment and enhancement of a strong and sound private sector. 
It is of particular significance that such suggested purposeful confidence-building measures 
would encourage the states to bring actors outside the central governments into the economic 
process which may facilitate horizontal linkages across the region between different levels of 
the society. It is an important factor which may have a very strong and positive social regional 
impact arisen from the initiatives embracing NGOs, associations, unions, etc. and their 
                                                 
538 Alimov R. and others (eds). Tsentralnaya Aziya: Geoekonomika, Geopolitika, Bezopasnost. Tashkent, 2002, 
p.67. 
539 Hill F. Areas for Future Cooperation or Conflict in Central Asia and Caucasus, Yale University Conference 
“The Silk Road in the 21 Century”, 19 September, 2002. www.brook.edu/views/speeches/hillf/20020919.htm. 
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potential contribution to regional trends. This contribution may come from regional meetings, 
conferences, workshops, round tables and other possible events on different topic organized 
by such non-governmental set-ups in which private entrepreneurs, businessmen, scientists, 
politicians, mass media and many others have good opportunities to meet directly to exchange 
views on top challenges of regionalism and cooperation; and subsequently develop 
recommendations on how to address them in a most appropriate way. They can also assist in 
the establishment of direct and sustainable links between administrative and economic 
territories, especially in border areas where presumably a significant suppressed signal for 
such cooperation could come from. Through the support of regional associations and unions, 
international assistance is expected to reinforce regional structure activities for the  creation 
and sustainability of regional markets for goods and services; as well as to broader and direct 
contacts between territories, regions and cities in Central Asia. 
In the financial area, for example, assistance could be essential in the development of the 
banking and non-banking sector. The establishment and support for credit unions, insurance 
and investment companies, for example, is currently at its embryonic stage and thus needs 
further financial and technical arrangements to open itself to a larger extent. If they develop 
properly, their activities may contribute substantially to the expansion of the private sector by 
providing much-needed services in the elaboration of business plans, investment projects, as 
well as bolstering up trade initiatives, all of which are supposed to be equally significant 
development goals for all the states. 
However, foreign involvement in fostering regional projects must not be considered in the 
narrow frame of confidence-building measures only. Its impact could be much broader if 
high-level dialogue will assist the governments to improve and coordinate their national 
policies on common use of natural resources, environmental protection and water 
management. The latter is especially essential given repeated droughts, the catastrophic 
depletion of the Aral sea, widespread pollution and degradation of water resources in addition 
to their immediate economic and social effects for each country. Therefore, in the nearest 
future, it is more likely that pragmatic support might focus on bi- and multilateral cooperation 
among selected Central Asian countries, and on country-specific reform and investments for 
improved water management in the region. 
Broader engagement of bi- and multilateral donors in the post-conflict reconstruction and 
development of Afghanistan with the direct participation of the other countries of Central 
Asia in this process is also expected to make up a solid basis for closer interaction on a wide 
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range of common issues between donors and Central Asia. Stability in Afghanistan and 
reintegration of the given state into the world community is going to exert a positive influence 
upon many regional processes in the long-run. The role of Central Asia in renovation 
processes in  Afghanistan should not be underplayed. On the contrary, the states of the region 
are able to join their resources and experience to render an effective and viable strategy not 
only to bring Afghanistan back in the world community, but also to assist it in becoming 
again a part of the secular, multinational and culturally diversified Central Asian region.540  
“Uzbekistan thinks that the reconstruction of life support systems as well as rehabilitation of 
Afghan economy are the necessary and basic conditions for settling peace and socio-political 
stability in the country and, as a consequence, for strengthening regional and international 
security. Furthermore, from the earliest times, Afghanistan was one of the important transit 
networks and, hence, its transport and communication capabilities provide great perspectives 
for the regional and international cooperation”.541 
From this viewpoint, Uzbekistan has currently renewed supplies of about 2,5 mln.kWh of 
electricity annually to the northern parts of Afghanistan, mainly free of charge. Uzbekistan 
has expressed its willingness to take part in reconstruction and upgrading of various objects of 
hydropower infrastructure, the irrigation system, the oil and gas sector, as well as to supply 
goods of domestic textile, construction and chemical industries for the neighbor country. 
Particularly, Uzbekistan participates in reconstruction and rebuilding of 10 bridges on Termez 
- Mazari-Sharif –Kabul route, 5 of which have already been put into operation. The 
government of Uzbekistan has expressed its preparedness to build the Khayraton-Mazari-
Sharif railroad and the Khayraton-Puli Khumri power line, to take part in the tender on 
building of an electric power station, to reconstruct waterworks facilities in Jalalabad, Sarda, 
Kokcha and to construct power facilities in the Northern and Central regions of 
Afghanistan.542  
                                                 
540 Alimov R., Antonenko O. Rol Progressa po Vosstanovleniyu Stabilizatsii Afganistana v Ukreplenii 
Stabilnosti i Bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii. Materials of the Conference “Stability in Central Asia in Post-
Conflict Period”, Tashkent, 2002, p.7. 
541 Speech of the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan Mr. V. Norov at the Briefing 
“Uzbekistan’s Role in Regional Integration and Ensuring Regional Security ”, 8 October 2003. 
http://www.eias.org/luncheons/uzbekperspective/norov.pdf 
542 In December 2003, a preliminary feasibility study of the first railway Khairaton-Mazari-Sharif, with a budget 
of more than $100 million has been prepared jointly with American companies. The U.S. government is 
considering the possibility of funding this project. See «International transport has top priority for doubly 
landlocked country». Interview with Rustam R. Yunusov, Deputy Prime Minister of Uzbekistan, 
http://www.internationalreports.net/asiapacific/uzbekistan/2004/deputy.htm 
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In addition, the current role of Uzbekistan is to serve as a transit territory for  international 
and regional humanitarian aid.543 Since the beginning of reconstruction work, two million 
tons of cargo were transported through Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. 
In June 2003, the Agreement between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan was signed on the corridor 
to connect Central Asia with Iran through Afghanistan, while an extra project enables to reach 
the Pakistani ports, too.544 If they are realized, these Trans-Afghan corridors may be mutually 
beneficial, since it may also assist the rehabilitation of the Afghan economy through  
improvement of the infrastructure, creation of jobs, and transit fees from intensified cargo 
traffic in both directions, to and from Central Asia. Generally speaking, in doing so, the 
region may do even better in addressing its own regional infrastructure bottlenecks, but also 
promote the efficient solution of the issues of international significance. 
Thus, in order to realize cooperation initiatives in the region, in addition to the enhanced self-
endeavors of each country here it will be necessary for international society (donors) as well: 
(a) to continue to expand trade relations with the regional states; (b) to continue with the 
provision of official development assistance; (c) to promote private direct investment inflows; 
(d) to assist in fostering various technical programs for local officials,  to help them 
administer their economic management. Equally however, international community will have 
to show the relatively young states of the region a certain degree of indulgence and tolerance 
for the speed of domestic reforms, addressing various problems of their transition to a market 
economy and achieving their sustainable development. Surely it will take time for them to 
acquire new techniques and skills of acting in newly globalised terms. 
6.5. Summary 
The newly independent states of Central Asia had to implement strategies for economic 
development since becoming independent of the Soviet Union in 1991. Simultaneously, in 
keeping with the general resurgence of regionalism in the modern international order there has 
been a proliferation of regional and subregional groupings involving four Central Asian states 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, and Uzbekistan. However, whereas the limited 
opportunities to comprise all these set-ups within the given work, an emphasis was put on the 
scrutiny of the progress made, as well as future perspectives within the Central Asian 
Cooperation Organization only, as a pivotal structure of regional efforts touching upon 
                                                 
543 Safaev S. Regionalnoe Razvitie i Postkonfliktnoe Vosstanovlenie Afghanistana. Materials of the Conference 
“Stability in Central Asia in Post-Conflict Period”, Tashkent, 2002, p.30. 
544  Termez-Herat-Kandagar-Kveta-Karachi and Termez-Mazari Sharif-Kabul-Kandagar-Chaman-Kveta-Karachi 
routes are discussed as possible road projects in the interests of Uzbekistan. Alimov R. and others (eds). 
Tsentralnaya Aziya: Geoekonomika, Geopolitika, Bezopasnost. Tashkent, 2002, p.26-41.  
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exclusively the countries of Central Asia, set aside Turkmenistan which has currently ignored 
membership in any of the  dozens of regional initiatives, but whose participation in the 
regional projects remains perhaps a matter of time. 
Regionalisation, understood as an active process of changes toward increased cooperation, 
convergence, coherence and identity, was not an obvious feature of policy interactions in 
Central Asia in the past decade. At the same time, a number of common elements, such as 
historical and ethnic preconditions, confessional community, geographical proximity, and 
largely similar socio-economic challenges, gave birth to the perceived exigency of regional 
cooperation even before Independence. The idea suggested by the President of Uzbekistan in 
the early 1990s was named “Turkestan is our common home” was reflect an attempt to 
combine the region’s past with well-developed ideological conception in order to reinforce 
common regional identity. Bringing forward the need for cooperation, the idea was expected 
to unite all forces concerned in this process, and make every citizen aware of the aims and 
tasks of such efforts. 
Yet, many of the newly regional states have discovered that cooperation with their neighbors, 
even those having similar interests and goals, was not always easily attainable. As a result, 
many regional efforts today have proved to be more declarative rather than reflecting any 
significant step forward toward the goals designed. Neither any customs area, nor free trade 
area, nor any single economic space ensuring free movement of goods and services and 
factors of production have been created. It affected the intra-regional trade which dropped 
from more than 15% to 7% as share to total trade turnover of the whole region. Common 
market, thus, has been now considered to be a more distant goal towards which the countries 
have agreed to move gradually as necessary conditions for further steps are in place. The main 
reasons of such a faint pattern were not only objective difficulties of transition to a market 
economy expressed in substantial drop in regional countries’ GDP and output (20-60%); 
inadequate institutional base to pursue financial, tariff, trade, tax and other policies in new 
conditions; external shocks, such as negative trends in world markets, Russian financial crisis, 
etc. Most probably, enhancement of national priorities, and subsequent differences in strategic 
realization of these tasks, nation-building and political liberalization were the forces inversely 
proportional to centrifugal regional processes. Facing current economic and socio-political 
problems of global and regional trends, the states have probably recognized that it was easier 
for them to protect independence and the interests of their own in the short run rather than to 
join forces for common regional policies and reap the benefits in the longer perspective. In 
other words, national priorities have not always dovetailed with regional ones, while the states 
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were loath to make concessions in the regional decision-making which might pose a threat to 
their relatively young sovereignty.545 
Under such circumstances, nevertheless, the experience of the states with still brief 
independent development confronting with socio-political and economic challenges appears 
to be short to draw final conclusions in forecasting the true potential for regionalism in 
Central Asia in the even foreseeable future. The suggested models for prospects of regional 
developments are very general with a number of assumptions and constraints: political and 
economic stability, structural and institutional reforms, role of foreign investments and 
donors, further liberalization of social and political life. The first scenario is based on the 
assumption that the economies of the region are insufficiently complementary which gives no 
strong economic incentives for the expansion of regional trade and economic linkages. The 
countries may continue regional cooperation primarily on the bilateral basis which is going to 
be sufficient to address regional problems. On the contrary, countries will keep on 
independent economic integration into the multilateral economic community through the 
strategy of export globalism by virtue of abundant resource base. While small economies of 
Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, and Turkmenistan in perspective will remain minor players in the 
global economy, both of the larger countries - Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan could become 
significant middle-size economies, but rather in their own right rather than as part of Central 
Asia. In terms of further divergent economic characteristics, it is reasonable to expect that it 
will become an even more elusive idea to implement regional integration in the future. The 
region may remain a big exporter of raw materials and commodities, but substantially 
dependent on imports of capital and consumer products further in the future. 
The second scenario takes into account the postulates of the functionalist theory which allows 
the countries of Central Asia to depend upon better regional perspectives to the extent, to 
which progress in particular areas of cooperation (energy, transport, trade) has been made. It 
may result not only in better economic outcome from joint activities, but more importantly, in 
the establishment of solid long-term benefits on the basis of confidence-building measures on 
different levels of regional economic relations. Concerted efforts to upgrade the regional 
energy system to meet regional needs and make sustainable export; construction of intra- and 
interregional pipelines and transport corridors to reach the world markets at the least costs; 
and common tariff and custom policies which may eventually result in deprivation of tariffs, 
unification of trade regimes, and dismantling other trade barriers, will unconditionally serve 
                                                 
545 Komissina I. Uzbekistan i Politika Regionalnoy Integratsii v Tsentralnoy Azii, in « Uzbekistan : Obreteniye 
Novogo Oblika », Volume II, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow, 1998, p.221. 
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to foster close regional interaction. The regional market of Central Asia may experience slow, 
but sustainable progress. There is also a political rationale implying reinvigoration and 
reinforcement of confidence-building measures in economic projects, with their positive 
impact on political and security dimensions. In this regard, the role of Uzbekistan could be of 
particular significance to promote this success due to its linking position between the regional 
states as well as its desperate interests in having access to the world markets which in turn is 
substantially pre-determined by the success of  regional initiatives. The main constraint is that 
this scenario is hardly realizable by the efforts of the Central Asian states only. Both, financial 
support and reasonable technical mediation from the outside may be required.  
The last scenario takes into account the developments arisen from successful economic and 
security cooperation with Russia which has been recently invited to become an equal member 
of the CACO. Dependency upon traditional economic linkages with the northern neighbor 
makes Central Asia and Russia economically more interdependent and complementary which 
allows the regional countries to hope for tangible economic benefits from Russian 
investments into regional economies and assistance in the upgrading and expansion of the 
existing infrastructure facilities. The question is open to debate whether short-run benefits are 
going to serve  regional interests in the long-run, too. For this, a balanced and multifaceted 
analysis is necessary in order to define potential economic and political benefits and the costs 
of these developments in the future. 
Finally, international experience suggests that regionalism among developing countries is not 
similar to that in the developed parts of the world. Hence, it should not be expected to flourish 
quickly on the basis of the political blueprints of regional governments or even external 
contributors. Concrete challenges have still to be addressed and overcome to reach the more 
mature expression in even comparatively more advanced regionalism in Asia Pacific or 
ASEAN, for instance. With respect to Central Asia, the following words could be quite 
pertinent to define a specific role of time to challenge the current reality and hope for better 
regional perspectives: “In some restaurants, you will find a small note in the menu 
recommending you to be ready for waiting if a delicious meal is wanted, since good food 
requires some time to be cooked. In other words, in terms of Central Asia, time is necessary to 
develop and carry out reforms. Equally time is essential to learn working together. Regional 
integration is not going to be so merely attainable”.546 
 
                                                 
546 Akiner Sh. Mejregionalnaya Strategiya Ekonomicheskogo Razvitiya i Integratsii. Materials of the Conference “Stability in 
Central Asia in Post-Conflict Period”, Tashkent, 2002, p.64. 
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VII. Conclusion 
For several decades, Uzbekistan has been largely secluded from the trends in the external 
world. All foreign relations were handled through Moscow. Consequently, with the exception 
of a handful of senior officials from the local elite, very few individuals representing the 
republic had any firsthand knowledge of and access to life beyond the Soviet borders. That is 
why, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 due to long-lasting and acute challenges in 
domestic political and economic life, the governments of all Central Asian republics, 
including Uzbekistan, became actively involved on a much wider scope in a new field of 
foreign affairs that was relatively new to them.  
Foreign policy planners in Uzbekistan were confronted with several simultaneous tasks: 
finding the niche in the international arena; defining their national interests; identifying 
friends and partners; and prioritizing objectives. However, the realization of these tasks has 
had an exploratory character and policies have been tentative not only due to a significant lack 
of experience, but also because of a number of domestic economic challenges. Generally 
speaking, Uzbekistan declared to build up a socially-oriented market economy with parallel 
domestic reforms related to the creation of a new political system based on purely democratic 
principles. However, the republic had to face some serious macroeconomic problems, 
especially in the first years after the collapse of the USSR. These problems were mainly 
reflected by macroeconomic destabilization. The fall of the GDP (19% in 1991-1995) and the 
decline of industrial production were observed, although the GDP decline was smaller than 
the average decline in the CIS countries (30-70%); inflation reached its highest annual level 
ever culminating in four-digit figures (almost 1600% in 1994).547 The situation was caused by 
a sudden collapse of economic ties with the other republics, interrupted supplies of goods and 
services within the already non-existing Soviet division of labor and poor efforts to keep up 
common economic space in the framework of the CIS initiatives. It might be also connected 
to the inability of domestic economic units to behave in new conditions of sweeping market 
relations, lack of funds and galloping inflation, losses of investment resources, as well as by 
steady deterioration of the local industrial base. In addition, the general socio-economic 
situation remained complex. According to some data, almost half of the local population had 
already lived below the poverty line, even prior to the collapse of the Soviet system. The 
specific demographic situation with one of the highest population growth rates in the entire 
USSR was continually getting worse after independence in terms of shrinking domestic 
                                                 
547 According to EBRD. See: Transition Report 2002. 
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production.548 The fact that almost 60% of its population was under age 25 exerted a pressure 
on the social situation. Besides, this was exacerbated by an ideological vacuum emerging after 
the collapse of the old Soviet communist dogma. This vacuum, which was particularly strong 
in conservative and highly populated rural areas where most of the poverty risk groups used to 
be concentrated, was being immediately filled with several ideas of a radical character.  These 
ideas initially appeared in the 1980s and were disseminated especially widely on the eve of 
independence. In the predominantly Islamic society of Uzbekistan with a strong traditional 
and conservative outlook, these ideas were seen as a real threat to a government striving for a 
more secular way of life. 
In this regard, domestic stability and the avoidance of potential social conflicts qualified as an 
important criterion in defining pace and the essence of domestic reforms. A bing bang 
strategy with drastic price liberalization, massive privatization of state enterprises, and the 
liberalization of the foreign economic sector was thus defied. The government allowed some 
old institutions to adjust to new conditions as well as enforced new market set-ups which did 
not exist in the republic in the Soviet era. The following “five” principles announced by  
President I.Karimov, i.e. de-ideologization of economic processes; the superiority of law; 
government as the main reformer; social security policy; and gradualism in pursuing the 
reforms, gave birth to the so called “Uzbek model of economic reforms”, favoring national 
policy over other possible choices. 
Although the economic performance of the republic was marked as rather moderate in 
comparison with sweeping reformers from Central and Eastern Europe, it is still open to 
debate, whether policy recommendations according to the principle one-size-fits all might 
have brought equal results in Uzbekistan or anywhere else in the region. For instance, the 
given principle seems to be only loosely connected to the fact that Kyrgyzstan, which had 
most faithfully followed the advise for reform, did not perform better in terms of economic 
growth in the past decade than Uzbekistan549, though there might have been other factors 
involved, such as endowment with natural resources, skilled bureaucrats, socio-cultural 
factors, etc. 
Uzbekistan will thus need to find the mechanism which could be capable not only to deal with 
the issues of purely economic character, but is also looking at the issues in the context of 
                                                 
548 Total fertility rate was between four and six birth per woman in Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Kyrgyzstan in th early 1980s, 
reflecting the highest growth indicators in the entire CIS. Although Uzbekistan has been experiencing almost 50% decline in 
population growth after the Independence, its population has increased by about 56% for the last two decades. See: Mueller 
K. Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries, GDI, Bonn, April 2003, p.25. 
549 Tanaka T. Stability in Central Asia in the 21 Century: an Economic Approach, in “Central Asia in 21 Century: 
Cooperation, Partnership and Dialogue. Materials of the International conference. Tashkent, 2004, p.135. 
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broader, political transformation and its perspectives in XXI century. Nowadays, we may 
speak about three main aspects of development which require a close scrutiny through the 
prism of local conditions in Uzbekistan. These areas may be represented in the form of a 
triangle with national and regional policy objectives at the two lowest corners and global 
goals at the top. Each of the models suggests both specific benefits and losses within a 
definite demographic, technological, financial, foreign economic, and ecological framework 
which may vary correspondingly in space and time.  
As history shows, despite the declared objectives in the early 1990s to link national, regional 
and global goals, the main emphasis in Uzbekistan had been placed on a national development 
model which implied uncontestable sovereignty over all policy issues and a decision-making 
process. Partly as a result of this approach, the policy prioritized import-substitution industrial 
development by making the use of domestic potential through strong government intervention 
and resource redistribution. In line with the envisaged priorities, this model’s achievements, 
however, are limited due to the difficulties associated with its implementation. This mainly 
bears high risks of resource misallocation among different sectors compared to more 
liberalized market relations; high costs to realize the strategy which may require foreign 
injections increasing country’s long-term external debt problems; high dependency of national 
policies on external factors, such as world prices, economic and political situation in the main 
trading partners, the state of regional infrastructure, etc.; low efficiency of domestic sectors 
due to the absence of competitive pressure and incentives towards more effective production 
which may subsequently lead to monopolisation and higher prices in domestic markets; 
limited absorptive capacity of domestic market which reduces the scope for benefits from 
economies of scale in some large-scale production (auto industry, aviation industry, etc.); 
comparatively insignificant volumes of FDI; proliferation of lobby interests whose narrow 
interests may favor particular groups, ministries or producers rather than society in general 
which is suboptimum for common public welfare.  
Hence, where national policy lacks the tools to achieve its goals, a regional model might be 
quite helpful. For instance, it suggests more chances to benefit from economies of scale; self-
sufficiency in a number of products whose import is complicated due to lack of foreign 
exchange, high transport and shipment costs, etc.; lower transaction costs for private sector 
development in terms of free mobility of capital, labor, goods and services; enhancement of 
competition facilitating domestic structural changes, better performance and employment in 
real sector; higher efficacy of actions against the potential negative consequences of 
globalisation processes due to more coordinated policies with other similar neighbor 
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countries; assistance in finding more viable solutions to both national and regional problems 
(political, economic, security, ecological, social, etc.). In sum, the country may face 
opportunities for more sustainable development, long-term growth and social welfare. At the 
same time, the main challenge in implementation of an effective regional model, as 
international history shows, lies in reaching inter-state agreements over the distribution of 
costs and benefits of regional initiatives among member-countries. Since it can be expected 
that the scope of costs and benefits will not be equal for all parties concerned, it might require 
strong political decisions from the governments to give regional projects a desperate push. In 
other words, in terms of Central Asia, the fate of regional cooperation will seemingly depend 
on economically stronger states, such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, both with respect to 
their bilateral relations and the relations towards other states in the region, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tadjikistan. 
Within a global development model, Uzbekistan, like all the other Central Asian states, sees 
globalisation as an inevitable process. The country has joined many key international 
organizations, while negotiations for membership in the others, such the WTO in which 
Uzbekistan was granted observer status, has already been kickstarted, too. By taking a more 
active part in the global environment, the country is believed to safeguard its legal position in 
fair global trade, reducing barriers to its main exports, benefiting from transborder investment 
flows, innovations, know-how and equipment as well as from development assistance. 
Simultaneously, however, it still needs to be defined what the real impact of globalisation on 
the domestic situation could be in terms of gains received and costs which might arise in 
accordance with international obligations to liberalise domestic conditions (current account 
problems, budget deficit, employment, etc.). Uzbekistan is a small country, which implies its 
limited influence in global terms, while its own vulnerability to global processes remains 
high. For instance, although the importance of FDI for the country’s development is widely 
acknowledged, no definitive conclusions could be made with respect to its monotonic positive 
impact on the domestic situation to resolve national issues, such as needs for new 
technologies, export promotion or strengthening competition. As expected, it may particularly 
exert competitive pressure on local firms urging them to move towards more efficiency; but it 
may equally deteriorate competitive environment via monopolisation of local markets, 
especially small ones, by persuading the government of a recipient country to follow 
protectionist policies against imports, seeking for less competition from other foreign firms. 
In other words, investment come to make profits, while the government’s national policy tools 
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prove to be limited in global terms with its long-term development goals being of less direct 
significance to investors.  
Are the aforementioned models complementary, or do they conflict with each other in terms 
of implementation? No clear answer to this question is available so far. There might be two 
alternatives in implementing these models: 1) by following a step-by-step strategy; 2) 
simultaneous moves in different areas. The first variant is more easily realizable in view of 
prioritising specific goals and the areas of actions with the subsequent concentration on 
implementation of the measures envisaged. However, it is apparently a more time-consuming 
process in which some interests may be favored at the cost of the others. In addition, it does 
not look that any of them at its own will be able to resolve existing problems. All the 
countries of the region favored national policies in the past, making efforts to consolidate 
acquired independence and strengthen their positions globally through diversification of 
foreign partners with less attention being paid to regional issues for various political and 
economic reasons. Nevertheless, although with many things having been already done, the 
reforms in the regional states are still far from finished which very often due to the fact that 
the efficacy of national projects may go far beyond just national borders. In this regard, the 
second way which regards coordinated steps in each area as an important element, is more 
desirable, since it attempts to tackle the issues in a three-edge way by taking a broader view at 
the role of each area. For example, currently Uzbekistan’s industries are almost 
noncompetitive in global terms, but they could be demanded in the regional markets of the 
CIS and Central Asia. In the latter case, it is economically more viable to position in regional 
markets due to lower shipment costs. Moreover, there are some areas in which the region still 
faces insufficiencies, but which could be eliminated if proper policy actions at the regional 
level were made. This would not only promote the solution of regional problems, such as 
energy and food deficiencies, transport infrastructure, security dimensions, and so forth, but 
also improve the region’s position globally because of higher investment flows and fair trade 
as well as nationally through facilitating domestic reforms. Global markets remain 
nevertheless critical for the country in terms of needed technology and investment to 
modernize domestic industries. The main difficulty with this approach is that it is easier to 
design, but problematic to realize. In practice, this looks like a complex task due to the lack of 
effective policy tools, so far unfinished reforms, potential lobby resistance, and therefore, its 
implementation becomes dependent on a strong political will to carry through any projects.  
Thus, what would policy actions specifically mean for Uzbekistan in the years to come in the 
context of such a multi-pronged approach if it were favored? As mentioned earlier, the issues 
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are expected to be national, regional and global in nature. A national element of the strategy 
may embrace several key reform areas, including agriculture, the energy sector, small- and 
medium-sized businesses as well as structural and institutional measures. 
Agriculture remains a priority target of the reforms in Uzbekistan in the years to come, since 
it makes the largest contribution to the GDP and still involves more than half of the total 
domestic labor force. It is necessary to continue with the measures which will allow the 
increase of efficiency in the sector and also lead to a higher income, as for example: 
appropriate property rights protection; enhancement of market relations by minimizing the 
ground for bad practices of inefficient distribution of production factors for farmers (land, 
material and technical and financial resources), as well as bureaucracy and protraction in 
decision-making on pressing agricultural issues; improvement of social and production 
facilities in rural areas, including a better water management and its use in agriculture; 
encourage and assist in benefiting from new technologies in the production process; regular 
training and upbringing of specialists and entrepreneurs on all regional and national levels, 
involved directly in production or decision-making processes.  
The main goal of market reforms in agriculture is to set up an environment in which a 
producer would be a core figure fully responsible for the decisions on output, its volume and 
prices. The question concerns a complexity of measures which could increase and help 
maintain financial sustainability of agrarians. In other words, it is important that agricultural 
policy should centre on higher efficiency in the sector through an adequate management of 
price mechanisms which in turn would secure both better returns from investments into the 
sector and sustainable agricultural production, too. 
Sustainable economic growth is also related to the encouragement of small- and medium-
sized business whose success is in turn highly dependent on the improvements in the domestic 
climate. The rule of law is critical to ensure legal protection of the private sector, the rights 
and interests of entrepreneurs. The work should be continued to provide wider access of SMB 
to local and foreign financial, consultative and other technical support which would 
strengthen their position on domestic as well as on foreign markets. The expansion of 
activities through direct cooperation links with foreign partners and better access to the 
markets beyond national borders would intensify the flexibility of SMB and increase its 
contribution to the strengthening of competition, creation of jobs, inflow of foreign capital, all 
of which are critical for economic growth.  
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The reforms in the energy sector seem to occupy another important place among necessary 
steps to secure a stable economic development. So far, these reforms have been induced 
mainly by a relatively low efficiency in the sector affecting competitiveness of the whole 
economy in the global arena. Energy intensity of the GDP in Uzbekistan remains 3-4 times 
higher than in the developed part of the world and 1,5-2 times higher than in South-East Asia 
and Central Europe, which results from the inefficient use of resources in the domestic 
economy. Hence, the following tasks acquire primary meaning in the forthcoming future: to 
maintain the modernization and innovation process; to improve the organization structure and 
the decision-making process by a gradual demonopolization and decentralization; to take 
steps towards the coordination of efforts with other regional countries dealing with the 
development, modernization and expansion of production and transportation facilities, in 
order to create a common regional energy market in Central Asia. 
In dealing with foreign investments, several significant measures have been already taken, 
especially since Uzbekistan became a signatory to the Article VIII of the IMF Agreements on 
Liberalization of Current Account Transactions in the fall of 2003. Yet, further work should 
be done to improve national legislation as well as fiscal and custom policies. Specifically, 
some legal steps should be taken to expand opportunities for the use of a rich mineral base, 
encouraging foreign capital to take part in geological and exploration activities as well as in 
the privatization of large-scale industrial enterprises which are involved in the given field. 
Besides, the textile and food and tourism industries still contain high investment potential 
which could be strengthened through adequate fiscal and customs policies. In this regard, the 
role of information is not to be underestimated. This requires an effective information strategy 
realized through a network of government and non-government institutions. The experience 
of successful Asian economies (Japan, Malaysia, Chinese Taipei, Korea) was that they 
succeeded in attracting substantial amounts of foreign capital due to a mixture of active trade 
and information support. Thus, these policy measures may include: better involvement in 
international expositions and fairs; organization of conferences, workshops, round tables on 
the mutual and multilateral level; the cooperation with credible consulting and financial 
groups in the preparation and edition of investment guides and business publications; the 
expansion of activities through a network of diplomatic and trade representations of the 
country abroad; and the continuing training of local experts in the foreign economic field. 
As far as regional actions are concerned, the Central Asian direction becomes critical for 
Uzbekistan. In the early 1990s, it was mainly economic imperatives to preserve common 
economic space in order to alleviate or at least beset the consequences of the collapse of the 
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USSR. Later, these imperatives have been much diversified and subsequently included socio-
political, demographic and cultural dimensions as well. Independence has brought not only 
freedom to express one’s own ideas, develop the principles of domestic and foreign policies, 
and the right to determine the future of people’s living in the country. With independence, as 
mentioned above, the whole region had to face inter-state border, territorial and social 
conflicts, under the pressure of poverty and unemployment, as well as national security threats 
in face of international extremism, religious fundamentalism and drug traffic.  
Although former regional efforts have been mainly marked by security concerns, nevertheless 
the economic aspect remains on the agenda, since its potential is still unrealized. Some 
researchers believe that Central Asian countries lack economic pre-requisites for fruitful 
cooperation in view of similar export structure, shortage of investment resources, low 
concerns in intra-regional trade, existing distortions in the contemporary market relations, as 
well as some variance in the level of economic development. Given these arguments, the 
process of close multilateral regional cooperation could start with a few core areas of mutual 
interest which include trade, energy and transport.  
All the countries are land-locked, while Uzbekistan is double land-locked. It means that all 
the countries have clear difficulties to reach world markets for their imports as well as their 
exports. In Uzbekistan, for instance, import and export operations play an important role with 
each of them making up slightly less than one third of its total GDP. Central Asia is able to be 
self-sufficient in merchandise products, especially in food and minerals. With the appropriate 
mixture of trade, customs, tax, fiscal, legal policies, there might be much more focus on intra-
regional trade, while costs of shipment from other regions would also be diminished. 
The growth of the export from the region is substantially dependent on the transport corridors 
and infrastructure facilities to be built and commonly used by the regional states. Among a 
number of routes, the southern one is the shortest and therefore important to all the states, 
since it may give final access to the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan and Pakistan and to 
the Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf. However, the main routes in the given direction are still 
to be constructed given the socio-political stabilization in neighboring Afghanistan. In 
addition, Central Asia may benefit from inter-regional cargo traffic, since Russia, China, Iran, 
India also wish to expand trade activities with other regions. But for the region itself it is 
crucial that the reliance on transit economic development alone is not providing sustainability 
in growth. It means that the regional states should first and foremost develop their own trade 
potential and then strengthen intra-regional trade, too.  
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In the energy field, cooperation on the regional level acquires a particular significance with 
two strategic goals on the agenda: self-sufficiency of the region in energy resources; and 
development and diversification of a pipeline network system inside and outside the region. 
Central Asia in general has a vast energy base which, however, is unevenly distributed 
throughout the region. The regionalisation of Central Asia’s energy markets has a bright 
future, if pursued properly, because the regional states are closely connected through an 
existing regional energy network and through trade of energy resources. Besides, there is still 
a shortage of energy in some countries. Therefore, cooperation between Central Asian 
countries in the sphere of energy will imply establishment of the regional energy market, 
coordination in pursuing intra-regional and interregional energy policy, in order  to maintain 
intra-regional energy security and efficiency of regional energy exports. It would be unwise 
and wasteful to restrict trade in energy resources to Central Asia simply because it has already 
a power production potential and the vast resources exceed the existing regional needs.  
The main obstacle preventing a further increase in exports of fuel and energy from the region 
is the insufficient and non-diversified network of pipelines that bring oil, gas and electric 
power from Central Asia to world and regional energy markets. A number of energy projects 
with foreign assistance are at different stages of development. Thus, foreign investment in the 
Central Asian energy industries can only be further welcomed. Yet, the future of regional 
projects seems to be exacerbated by the necessity to balance geopolitical and national interests 
of the USA, Russia, EC, Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkey. If rivalry between the main players 
continues, it may be of little use for Central Asia’s efforts to solve its desperate energy 
infrastructure problems, to efficiently use resources and to secure sustainable foreign 
exchange and investments into the regional economies. On the contrary, if the main potential 
competitors work together to share a common strategy regarding the costs and technologies, 
which are desperately needed in Central Asia, it may create some pre-conditions for the 
prosperous and sustainable development of the region.  
Hence, if regional projects are to make good headway on a large-scale and long term basis, 
they will require the backing of bi- and multilateral donors which highlights the importance of 
global policy actions. Based on a systematic, coordinated, and persistent approach, donors 
might continue to assist in the realization of concrete projects in energy, water management, 
trade and infrastructure development; they should facilitate engagement in dialogue on 
national and regional reform strategies; foster technical assistance in the expansion of 
horizontal linkages between the private sector, local authorities and administrative and 
territorial units which all together may result in better coordination and cooperation across the 
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region. Major powers should be no longer regarded as competitors, but they should be 
considered equal. The USA and Russia could represent a vivid example in this respect: Russia 
may be interested in a stable and dynamically developing Central Asia, whereas the USA may 
be concerned in domestic stability in Russia itself which in turn is going to be significantly 
dependent on secure southern borders. Definitely, the EU, China, Japan, Iran may also share 
an interest in a new order of bi- and multilateral relations both with Central Asia and with 
each other. This approach would perfectly fit the declarations of local governments, although 
it is difficult to predict which of the parties concerned could make the first step.550 
Once again, regional policies should not be perceived as a single area only, but need to be 
seen in both the national and global context. Speaking broadly, it may provide a solid ground 
for the realization of long-term national priorities, such as a sustainable market economy and 
an open democratic society. In addition, it may give another good opportunity to cope more 
consequently and effectively with the constraints of the region, such as remoteness and 
insulation from mutual collaboration with the world community with which the region has 
been confronted for decades of former historical development. In general, the policies on the 
national, regional and global levels are intertwined with each other, but not sufficiently 
integrated to suggest a universal recipe for development. It reminds us of the sides of a 
triangle, in which each side complements the other two, but if one is absent, the other two are 
unable to close the gap, since their geometric features prevent them from doing so. In the 
given sense, it cannot be denied that national priorities are likely to be more attainable with a 
proper policy on the regional level. Meanwhile, the regional events themselves are becoming 
more determined by the process of globalization, since even as a region, the countries of 
Central Asia will still remain small from a global perspective. In this case, it becomes the 
primary task of national and regional policies to mitigate the appeals of globalisation, while 
also moving smoothly towards the international community. This, however, will require a 
balanced approach with additional studies of the possible impact of globalisation on 
Uzbekistan’s general development. 
 
                                                 
550 The official view in Uzbekistan was outlined by a high-ranked government official who specifically noted the 
following: “Certainly, we perfectly realize that Central Asia is among the vital interests of the world’s most 
powerful countries which, to some extent, show their interest in regional integration and cooperation. Moreover, 
these countries possess necessary resources and abilities to act as guarantors of stability and steady 
development of the entire region. However, Uzbekistan acts strongly against the so called «a new round» of 
geopolitical competition in the Central Asian region. We are for an open, mutually beneficial cooperation 
among all respective parties concerned”. From the speech of the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Uzbekistan Mr. V. Norov at the Briefing “Uzbekistan’s Role in Regional Integration and Ensuring Regional 
Security ”, 8 October 2003. http://www.eias.org/luncheons/uzbekperspective/norov.pdf 
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Annex 2.1 
 
(a) Central Asian Selected Industries in Total Soviet Output and Trade, 1990 
 
 USSR, total  Uzbekistan, 
% 
Kazakhstan, 
% 
Kyrgyzstan, 
% 
Tadjikistan, 
% 
Turkmenistan, 
% 
Electricity, 
bln.kWh 
1726 3.3 5.1 0.8 1.1 0.8 
Oil, 
mln.tons 
571 0.5 4.5 0 0 1 
Natural 
gas, bln.m3 
815 5 0.9 0 0 10.8 
Coal, mln.t 703 0.9 18.7 0.5 0.1 - 
Steel, mln.t 154436 0.7 4.4 0 0 0 
Import 
(export) of 
buses  
86322 
(86322) 
2.7  
(0) 
4.5 
(0) 
1.4 
(1) 
1 
(0) 
0.7 
(0) 
Import 
(export) of 
trucks 
773881 
(773881) 
2 
- 
4.8 
- 
0.8 
(3.1) 
0.5 
(0) 
0.4 
- 
Import 
(export), 
mln.USD, 
1991 
 600  
(1300) 
800  
(1600) 
50 
(600) 
300  
(500) 
100  
(400) 
 
 
(b) Central Asian Republics in the Soviet Trade System, 1990 
 
 USSR, total 
in 
mln.roubles 
Uzbekistan, 
% 
Kazakhstan, 
% 
Kyrgyzstan, 
% 
Tadjikistan, 
% 
Turkmenistan, 
% 
Total 
export: 
234179,7 4 4 1.1 1.1 1.1 
-out the 
USSR 
45632,8 2.6 2 0.1 0.7 0.4 
-inter-
republican 
188546,9 4.3 4.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Total 
import: 
302644,1 4.8 5.9 1,4 1.4 1.2 
-out the 
USSR 
114097,2 2.5 3.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 
-inter-
republican 
188546,9 6.3 7.6 1.7 1.8 1.6 
Trade 
balance: 
-68464,4 - - - - - 
with world -68464,4 - - - - - 
with 
Union’s 
republics 
 
0 
- - - - - 
 
Source: Mangott G. (Hrsg.) Buerden Auferlegter Unabhaengigkeit. Neue-Staaten im post-sowjetischen Zentralasien. Based on Tables on pp.151-158. 
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Annex 2.2 
 
Socio-Economic Potential of Uzbekistan in the First Years of Independence: 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
 Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
Population High ratio of young motivated 
people to support 
transformation process. There 
was no problem of “aging 
population”.  
High population growth rates 
which exerted pressure on the 
existing economic difficulties 
(socially vulnerable long 
families, unemployment). 
Industry The republic did not suffer 
huge losses related to high 
integrity with the former 
Soviet economy. 
The share of industry in the 
economy was lower than in 
other republics, with low level 
of diversification and high 
ratio of obsolete equipment 
which in turn needed both 
modernization and 
replacement. 
Trade There were a few 
commodities (gold, cotton) 
which could be easily sold on 
world markets. 
Industrial sector activities and 
domestic consumption in 
general were highly 
dependent on imports. 
Agriculture The sector had a strong 
potential to meet the 
requirements of both domestic 
and external markets as well 
as to raise standard of living 
in the future.  
Simultaneously, it was very 
large and therefore, 
functioned inefficiently. 
Reforms in the sector were 
much needed even in the 
Soviet time. 
Macroeconomy Moderate external debt∗ Underdevelopment of 
financial markets and absence 
of convertibility of national 
currency. 
Human capital High life expectancy and 
literacy indicators comparing 
to other countries with the 
similar income level. 
Abrupt decline in public 
financing for healthcare and 
education.  
 Source: UNDP (1999). Uzbekistan. Human Development Report. p.13, adapted version. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ In 1992 Russia took on the entire debt of the former USSR on the condition that it also assumed the whole USSR’s 
external assets. 
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Annex 2.3 
 
(a) Selected Macroeconomic and Social Indicators in Various Years 
 
 Growth in Real 
GDP 
Inflation HDI Population under 
poverty line, % 
 1992 1993 1994 1992 1993 1994 1992 1993 1994 1987-
88 
1993-
1994 
Uzbekistan -11 -2 -4 645 534 1568 na 0.676 0.675 24 29 
Kazakhstan -3 -9 -13 1381 1662 1892 0.788 0.752 0.697 5 50 
Kyrgyzstan -19 -16 -20 855 772 229 0.689 0.664 na 12 76 
Tadjikistan -29 -11 -19 1157 2195 350 na na na na na 
Turkmenistan -5 -10 -17 493 3102 1748 0.873 0.746 0.697 12 48 
Source: EBRD Transition Update, April 2001; National Human Development Reports for 1995-99. 
 
 
 
 
(b) Progress in Institutional Reform 
  
Country Aggr. 
EBRD 
index 
EU index of 
instititional 
development 
EU index of 
political 
development 
World Bank 
classification 
Private 
sector share 
in GDP 
(%), 1995 
Change 
in private 
sector 
share of 
GDP (% 
points) 
1969-95 
Estonia 2.9 3 2.9 3 65 55 
Belorus 1.8 1.4 1.3 1 15 10 
Turkmenistan 0.8 1.4 1.3 1 15 10 
Russia 2.3 2.3 2.1 2 55 50 
Latvia 2.4 2.6 2.5 3 60 50 
Kyrgyzstan 2.5 1.8 1.7 2 40 35 
Lithuania 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 55 45 
Kazakhstan 1.8 1.9 1.6 2 25 10 
Ukraine 1.9 1.8 1.9 1 35 30 
Azerbaijan 1.3 1.6 1.5 0 25 20 
Moldova 2.3 2.1 2.1 2 30 25 
Armenia 1.8 1.8 1.9 0 45 37 
Tadjikistan 1.3 1.3 1.2 0 15 10 
Georgia 1.7 1.8 1.8 0 30 12 
Uzbekistan 2 1.5 1.3 1 30 25 
 
Note: EBRD classification (on a scale of 1-4.5) and the World bank’s classification (on a scale of 0-4) with higher figures reflecting better reforms. 
 
Source: Transition, 7, July-August 1996. 
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Organizational Structure of Decision-Making in Oil and Gas Industry, 20041 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Policy-making level 
 
 
 
 
 
Functional split of implementation  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Institutional support 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional split of construction services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* with 51% of government stake, at least 39% - for private investment, and rest – employees stake, as for 2002 
** 100% state owned, as for 2002 
*** a) 100% owned by UNG or other JSC; or b) with 51% of the higher-level JSC stake, at least 39% - for private investment, and rest – employees 
stake; or c) 25% - for JSC at former levels, 26% for employees, 25% - for foreign investors, 24%-for free sale; or d) joint ventures, as for 2002. 
 
 
 
Other institutions 
(State Committees 
on Geology, on 
Environment 
Protection, etc.) in 
less direct way 
Cabinet of Ministers  
(Vice Prime Minister on 
Fuel and Energy Issues)  
Spec. Commission 
on Demonopoli-
zation of Energy 
Enterprises     
(instit. component) 
JS National Holding Company 
UZBEKNEFTEGAZ, i.e. UNG 
(51% of gov.stake, 49% is due to be sold 
to strategic investor) 
Ministry of Finance  
(price policy) 
energy 
prices in 
industry 
Retail prices 
for coal and 
petroleum 
products 
 
Shurtan Gas 
and Chemical 
Complex** 
JSC 
„Uzgeoburneftega
sdobycha“* 
(exploration, 
production, 
processing, drilling) 
JSC 
Uznefteprodukt* 
(sales and distribution) 
JSC 
Uztransgas* 
(natural gas 
pipeline system) 
JSC 
Uzneftegasmash* 
(fuel and energy 
equipment supplier) 
Uzneftegassvyaz* 
(communications supervision) 
UzVch** 
(safety and 
security 
company) 
Open JS 
UzLITIneft
egas, 25% 
UNG stake 
Open JS 
UzVneshne
ftegas** 
(foreign 
activities)
Bukhara 
College of 
Oil and Gas 
Industry** 
Ferghana 
Oil 
College** 
Editorial 
Board of Oil 
and Gas 
Magazine** 
Open JS 
Mubareknefte
gasmontaj***  
Open JS  
Bukhara 
gaspromstroy***  
Open JS 
Kashkadaryan
eftegaspromstr
oy*** 
Open JS 
Yuggasstroy  
*** 
Open JS 
Tashneftegasst
roy*** 
Open JS 
Neftegasstroy
komplekt*** 
Committee on 
State Property 
(denationalisation/ 
incorporatisation 
issues) 
Regional 
subsidiaries*** 
Regional 
subsidiaries*** 
JSC UzLITIneftegas, 
“Neftegaskonstriktsiya
”, “IGIRNIGM”, 
Institute of Oil and 
Gas*** 
(R&D activities)
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Scheme of Power Supply and Decision-Making in Energy and Coal Mining Industry, 20031 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
1 public utilities is not a part of this system, but among the biggest consumers. They are governed separately through another Vice-Prime Minister 
administration for public utilities, transport and construction industry, and by an ad hoc state agency UzKomunxizmat (public utilities). 
Civil works, 
design, 
maintenance 
companies***
Cabinet of Ministers  
(Vice Prime Minister on 
Oil and Energy Issues)  
Uzgosenergonadzor 
(inter-ministerial body with 
supervisory function) 
Spec. Commission 
on Demonopoli-
zation of Energy 
Enterprises     
(instit. component) 
State Joint Stock Company 
UZBEKENERGO 
Joint Stock Company 
UZBEKUGOL**  
(coal mining 
company) 
UZELECTROSET* 
(electricity grid 
subsidiary ) 
UZENERGOSBYT* 
(buyer and seller 
of bulk power) 
Subsidiaries 
15 Regional 
Heat 
Distribution 
Units** 
Ministry of Finance  
(price policy) 
Open Stock 
Company 
Svyazugol  
(communications) 
Open Stock 
Company 
Ugolstroy  
(construction) 
Open Stock 
Company 
Infougol  
(information) 
Others (social 
infrastructure, 
etc.) 
Power Consumers 
* fully state owned 
** 51% gov.stake and up to 49% for sale to foreign investor 
*** mimimum 75% is due to be sold to private investor 
**** transfer of authority to regional municipalities 
- as for 2002 
7 
Thermal 
Plants** 
3 Heat 
Plants**** 
6 Hydropower 
Plants* 
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The Energy Deficiencies of the Soviet system 
 
It is well-known fact that the world oil crisis of 1973 and 1979 played a key role in the 
development of new trends in the energy sphere worldwide. If between 1960 and 1973 OECD countries 
total energy consumption grew at a brisk of 4,8% per year (just slightly slower than GDP which was 
growing at an average 5% per year), during the 1973-1990 period the growth rate dropped to 0,7%, while 
GDP slowed to only 2,6%. It meant that traditional point of view on economic growth on the basis of 
extensive resource consumption was undermined. The industrialized countries, the largest consumers of 
energy at that time, significantly redeveloped their energy strategy under the circumstances of the world 
trends. 
Compared to them, for the Soviet Union, even though the growth rate of aggregate energy 
consumption began to drop only with about a half-decade lag after reorientation of western economies, 
the drop in the growth rates was substantially less. Even before the first oil shock, the soviet energy 
system was substantially overwasted. The most adherent characteristic of the planned system was its 
considerable energy-intensity. In 1970, despite its much lower level of economic development, the Soviet 
Union was consuming 30% more energy per dollar of GDP than the average of OECD countries, and 70% 
more than Japan. The only exclusion was the USA, which consumed 10% more energy than the Soviet 
Union. In 1980, the planned system consumed already 2 times more energy per unit of GDP than the 
OECD countries on average, and 3 times more than Japan. In 1988, Soviet industry, for example, 
consumed 37% more energy than US industry, even though the final output of goods produced by Soviet 
industry was only about one third of that of the USA. Therefore, according to some estimates, with 1980 
the rate of consumption of energy resources, the Soviet economy overconsumed 60% of energy resources 
in the beginning of 1990s. In other words, these figures could be interpreted as 520 mln.tonnes of oil 
equivalent or 6,5% of the world consumption of primary energy, or half of total oil production by OPEC, 
or 25% higher than total energy consumption of Japan in 1990s. 
The analysis showed that the Soviet energy sector was highly inefficient. The following, both 
economic and political, reasons are summarized to explain the main sources of the critical events in the 
energy sector: 
¾ Extensive methods of encouragement of economic growth. Energy abundancy of the economy in 
international perpective made the planners to be wasteful rather than being efficient. The overall 
principle of “primacy of quantity over quality” exacerbated inefficency and stagnation of the Soviet 
economy since 1970s and till the mids of 1980s; 
¾ Low energy prices of energy resources which did not reflect direct costs (resource and capital rent), 
let alone other costs (environmental, for instance). The average cost for the specific industry plus 
arbitrary profit margin extremely undermined sound athmosphere in the energy sector; 
¾ All prices were strongly regulated by the government, because energy sector was the state monopoly. 
The domestic prices did not reflect world energy tendencies, since they were isolated from the world 
prices. The government determined domestic production and consumption substantially proceeding 
from its internal and external political interests (energy and resource intensive military complex 
needed relatively cheap resources to keep pace within arm race during the Cold War; Soviet Union 
was a large supplier of energy resources both to socialist camp and to the third world countries); 
¾ Systemic shortcomings. That implied traditional preoccupation with gross output; the relatively weak 
managerial incentive to minimize costs in the absence of genuine profit motives and competitive 
performance pressures; the anti-innovative bias with a profoundly non-competitive and permissive 
economic development; soft budget constraints and distorted prices; 
¾ Deceleration of technological progress and the exhaustion of overall production capacities in the 
entire sector. 
 
Source: Dobozi I. (1992) Soviet Energy Policy and Consumption in the 1990s: the Need for New Thinking and Price Reform.  
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(a) Comparative Data on Energy Potential of Central Asian Republics 
 
 Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan  Central Asian 
region  
Energy 
resources  
2000 2020 2000 2020 2000 2020 2000 2020 2000 2020 2000 2020 
Coal*, bln 
tons 
34,1 34,1 1,34 1,27 0,67 1,0 Insig. Insig 2 2 38,11 38,37 
Oil*, mln 
tons 
2760 2760 11,5 10,2 5,4 10 75 75 350 350 3261,9 3205,2 
Gas*, bln 
cu.m  
1841 1841 6,54 6,2 9,2 10 2860 2860 2000 2000 6716,74 6717,2 
Uranium**
, ths tons  
601 601 Insig.  Insig.  Insig. Insig Insig. Insig 83,7 83,7 684,7 684,7 
Hydropow
er***, bln 
kWh/year 
27 27 52 99 317 317 2 2 15 15 413 460 
RES, incl. 
small 
hydro, bln 
kWh/year 
66 66 Insig.  Insig.  18,4 18,4 n/a  n/a n/a  84,4 84,4 
* Figures for coal, oil and natural gas refer to proven recoverable resources. 
** Uranium resources estimated by the World Energy Council with mining costs at below US$ 130/kg 
*** Economically viable potential (for Uzbekistan – technological hydroelectric capacity) 
Source: Diagnostic Report on Energy Resources in Central Asia 
 
 
(b) Distribution of Proven Recoverable Energy Reserves and Hydroelectric Potential in 
Central Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Diagnostic Report on Energy Resources in Central Asia 
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Energy Production and Consumption in Selected Years 
 
Years Production Consumption 
 1992 1997 2002 1992 1997 2002 
  
Total primary energy, million tce* 
Kazakhstan 127.0 92.7 143.7 102.9 60.5 38 
Kyrgyzstan 2.8 0.8 1.8 4.3 3.2 2.9 
Tajikistan 2.2 1.8 2 6.5 5.3 4.3 
Turkmenistan 76.0 22.5 80.5 24.5 16.2 15.6 
Uzbekistan 57.2 72.2 83.68 61.3 62.6 57.7 
Total 265.2 191.0 311.68 199.5 147.8 118.5 
  
Coal, million tce 
Kazakhstan 127 72.6 86**  86.00 56.00 58** 
Kyrgyzstan 2.2 0.5 0.5 4.00 0.72 0.89 
Tajikistan 0.2 0.02 0.036 1.00 0.08 0.13 
Turkmenistan 0 0 - 0.70 0.00 - 
Uzbekistan 4.7 2.9 2.74 6.00 3.00 2.7 
Total 134.1 76.02 89.28 97.7 59.8 61.72 
  
Oil and Gas Condensate, million t 
Kazakhstan 25.8 25.8 51.5** 17.37 9 8.03** 
Kyrgyzstan 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.73 1.12 0.12 
Tajikistan 0.06 0.03 0.016 1.17 0.70 0.98  
Turkmenistan 5.2 4.8 8.2 6.84 4.70 2.6 
Uzbekistan 3.3 7.9 7.1** 9.22 7.50 7.5 
Total 34.46 38.63 67.32 36.33 22.02 19.2 
  
Natural Gas, billion cubic meters 
Kazakhstan 8.1 8.1 14** 17.3 6.6 16** 
Kyrgyzstan 0.1 0.2 0.016 1.9 0.99 2.02 
Tajikistan 0.01 0.04 0.033 1.8 1.7 1.3 
Turkmenistan 60.1 13.7 53.4 10.8 7.4 7.5 
Uzbekistan 42.8 51.2 57,5** 41.3 45.1 55.4 
Total 111.2 73.06 124.95 73.1 61.792 82.22 
  
Electricity (Hydro-energy), billion kWh 
Kazakhstan 86 (6.86) 52 (6.5) 63.7** 96.9 57.1 62** 
Kyrgyzstan 11.9 (9.3) 12.64 (10.9) 11.9 9.80 6.6 10.5 
Tajikistan 16.8 (15.9) 14 (13.7) 15.2 18.00 16.2 16.03 
Turkmenistan 13.2 (0.4) 9.5 (0.49) 10.7 8.10 7.9 10.1 
Uzbekistan 50.9 (6.3) 46.1 (5.8) 49.3** 49.00 48 48 
Total 178.8 (38.72) 134.24 (37.39) 150.8 181.8 135.8 146.63 
 
* data on a net calorific value basis;  ** 2003 
 Sources: Diagnostic Report on Energy Resources in Central Asia; ADB Key Indicators 2003; Energy Information Administration; CIA World Fact 
Book 2003; IEA Statistical data base. 
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Oil and Natural Gas Infrastructure in Central Asia: Existing and Envisaged 
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Main Energy Pipelines With Central Asian Involvement 
 
Name Route Annual 
Capacity 
Length Estimated 
costs and 
investment 
Status Main parties 
concerned 
Oil projects 
Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium 
(CPC) 
Tengiz oil field 
(Kz) to Black sea 
terminal in 
Novorossiysk 
(Ru) 
Currently: 
28 mln.t  
 
Plans: up to 
67 mln.t 
Almost 
1760 km
More than 
US $4 bln. 
Kz exported 15 
mln.in 2003, plans 
for 20 mln.in 
2004 
Russia, 
Kazakhstan 
Atyrau-Samara 
pipeline 
Atyrau (the only 
seaport in Kz) to 
Samara (Ru) 
linking the 
Russian pipeline 
system 
Currently: 
15 mln.t 
 
Plans: 25-
30 mln.t by 
2006 
765 km About US 
$37.5 mln. 
In 2002 an 
agreement was 
signed to export 
current amounts 
in the next 15 
years 
Russia, 
Kazakhstan 
Kenkiyak-Orsk  Aktobe fields 
(Kz) to the Orsk 
refinery (Ru) 
6.5 mln.t   Kz agreed to swap 
2,5 mln.t of its oil 
annually to 
Russian oil from 
Omsk (Rs) for its 
Pavlodar refinery 
Russia, 
Kazakhstan 
Aqtau-
Novorossiysk  
Western Kz via 
Aqtau seaport 
(Kz) to 
Makhachkala 
(Caspian port in 
Russia), linking 
to Makhachkala-
Tikhoretsk- 
Novorossisysk 
pipeline to 
Russian Black 
sea oil terminal 
Aqtau 
freight 
facilities 
allow to 
handle 
more than 8 
mln.t after 
upgrade in 
2002 
  Currently used for 
the shipments of 
about 2.5 mln.t of 
Kazakh oil 
Russia, 
Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan-Iran 
oil swap scheme 
Oil from Aqtau 
(Kz) to the 
Iranian ports in 
the Caspian sea, 
while Iran 
commits to 
export the same 
amount from its 
ports in Persian 
Gulf. 
Currently 
more than 1 
mln.t 
  Plans to increase 
exports by another 
1.5 mln.t if two 
oil reloading 
terminals in Iran 
with a volume 
totaling 150,000 
tons are built 
Kazakhstan, Iran 
Baku-Ceyhan 
(“main export 
pipeline”) 
Baku (Az) via 
Tbilisi (Ge) to 
Ceyhan (Tr), 
terminating at the 
Ceyhan 
Mediterranean 
sea port 
1 stage: 25 
mln.t 
 
2008-up to 
50 mln.t 
1740 km Min.US $3 
bln. 
Construction is 
underway to be 
completed in 
2005; Kz is 
contemplationg to 
supply 20 mln.t 
from its Kashagan 
oil field via 
Caspian to Baku 
Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, 
Turkey, the 
USA, the EU 
(contesting 
project to CPC) 
Central Asia Oil 
pipeline 
Kz via Tu and 
Afghanistan to 
Pakistan 
Plans: up to 
50 mln.t 
1800 km US $2.5 bln. Memorandum of 
understanding 
signed by the 
countries; project 
stalled by regional 
instability and 
lack of financing 
Four Signatories 
plus the USA 
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Kazakhstan-
Turkmenistan-
Iran pipeline ( 
economically the 
most viable) 
Kz via Tu to 
Kharg Island 
(Iran) on Persian 
Gulf 
Plans: up to 
50 mln.t 
1600 km US $ 1.2 bln. Under feasibility 
study by 
TotalFinaElf; 
process stalled for 
political reasons  
Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Iran 
Trans-Caspian 
oil pipeline 
Aqtau (western 
Kz) to Baku 
(Az), could 
extend to Ceyhan 
na 650 km US $ 2-4 bln. 
(if to 
Ceyhan) 
currently used by 
both parties (Kz 
and Az) 
Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, 
Turkey, the USA 
(contesting 
project to CPC) 
Kazakhstan-
China oil 
pipeline: 
 
 
1.phase is 
Kenkyiak-Atyrau 
pipeline 
 
 
 
 
2.phase is Atasu-
Alashankou 
pipeline (first 
export route not 
crossing Russia) 
Aktyubinsk (Kz) 
to Xinjang (Ch) 
 
 
 
Fields in Western 
Kz are linked to 
CPC and Atyrau-
Samara pipelines 
 
 
 
From a railroad 
loading rack in 
Atasu (Kz) to the 
Chinese border at 
the Druzhba-
Alashankou (Ch) 
railroad terminal 
20-50 mln.t 
 
 
 
 
In 2003- 6 
mln.t; 
In 2004-10 
mln.t; 
2006 - 14 
mln.t 
 
2006 – 10 
mln.t; 
 
2011 – 20 
mln.t 
3000 km 
 
 
 
 
450 km 
 
 
 
 
 
 
988 km 
 
 
 
US $3 bln. 
 
 
 
 
US $160 mln.
Agreement 
concluded in 1997 
between Ch and 
Kz. 
 
Opened in spring 
2003 and 
currently oil 
exports in 
Western direction 
 
 
Construction 
works began in 28 
Sept 2004 
 
Kazakhstan, 
China 
Gas projects 
Central Asia-
Center pipeline 
Tu and Uz via Kz 
to Saratov (Ru) 
linking to the 
Russian natural 
gas pipeline 
system 
Currently 
up to 50 
bln.m3 
 
Plans for 90 
bln.m3 
during the 
next decade 
 About US 
$1,5 bln. 
Upgrading has 
been made in the 
Kazakh part; 
commitments by 
Ru to upgrade 
other parts too 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Ukraine, 
possibly the EU 
Bukhara-Ural 
pipeline 
From Bukhara 
gas region (Uz) 
to Yekaterinburg 
(Ru) 
7 bln.m3 588 km  In 2003 
Kaztransgas 
signed an 
agreement with 
Russian company 
Mezhregiongaz to 
supply 50 bln.m3 
from Uz and Tu 
via Kz to Russia 
within the next 5 
years 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, 
Russia 
Gazli-Tashkent-
Bishkek-Almaty 
pipeline 
From Bukhara 
region (Uz) to 
Northern Kg and 
further to 
Southern Kz 
21,6 bln.m3   Currently used Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan 
Korpezhe-Kurt-
kui 
Korpezhe (Tu) to 
Kurt-kui 
(Northern Iran), 
possible to 
Armenia 
5 bln.m3; 
 
plans to 
increase up 
to 12 bln.m3 
210 km US $190 
mln.; 
expansion 
costs US 
$300-400 
mln. 
An agreement was 
signed in 1997 for 
the deal to be 
valid within the 
next 25 years. 
35% of gas 
supplied goes as a 
payment to Iran  
for construction 
works. 
Turkmenistan, 
Iran, Armenia 
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Trans-Caspian 
Gas Pipeline 
Turkmenbashy 
(Tu) via Baku 
(Az) and Tbilisi 
(Ge) to Erzurum 
(Tr) 
Up to 30 
bln.m3 
1650 km US $2-3 bln. At the early stage  Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Turkey, 
the USA, the EU 
Transafghan gas 
corridor 
Dauletabad (Tu) 
via Herat 
(Afghanistan) to 
Multan 
(Pakistan). Could 
extend to India 
19 bln.m3 1600 km US $ 2.5 bln. Several high level 
meetings were 
held. Feasibility 
study is financed 
by ADB. 
Negotiations 
stalled after 
Pakistan had 
required reserves 
assessments in Tu 
in November 
2004 
Turkmenistan, 
Afganistan, 
Pakistan, 
possibly India 
Central Asia-
China gas project 
From Turkmen 
gas fields via Uz 
and Kz to 
Western China, 
possibly further 
to Japan and 
Korea 
na More 
than 7000 
km, 
another 
1500 km 
if to 
Japan and 
Korea 
US $ 10-12 
bln., more if 
to Japan and 
Korea 
No visible 
progress due to 
lack of finance 
and political 
agreements 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, 
China 
Electricity  
Central Asia 
Interconnected 
Power System 
National Energy 
systems of all the 
Central Asian 
states make up 
the common 
system, also 
linked to Russian 
power grid 
through Kz 
over 20000 
MWt, 
almost half 
of which 
could come 
from 
hydropower 
energy in 
Ta and Kg 
na na Several meetings 
on the expert level 
were held to 
discuss the future 
of the system. 
Russia signed an 
agreements on 
imports of 
electricity from 
Ta (1,4 bln.kWh) 
and Kg (more 
than 1 bln.Kwh in 
summer) in 2004. 
Tadjikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, 
Russia 
Batken-
Kanibadom 
electricity line  
Lines connect Kg 
and Ta, also 
allow to export to 
other CIS 
countries 
na na na Construction is 
due to be 
completed in 
March 2005 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tadjikistan, 
CIS 
Central Asia-
Afghanistan 
Uz, Kg and Ta 
are main 
potential 
suppliers 
Uz alone 
may 
potentially 
sell up to 
300 GWh 
per year via 
link with 
northern Af 
na na Since 2002 Uz 
has supplied about 
2.5 mln.kWh 
annually in the 
frame of 
humanitarian aid. 
Yet power infr. in 
Af needs 
upgrading. 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tadjikistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Note: Af - Afghanistan, Az – Azerbaijan, Ch – China, Ge – Georgia, Kz – Kazakhstan, Kg – Kyrgyzstan, Ru – Russia, Ta – Tadjikistan, Tr – Turkey, 
Tu – Turkmenistan, Uz – Uzbekistan. 
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Table (a). Uzbekistan’s Foreign Trade Turnover, Export and Import Data 
 
 1992 1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 
 
2003 
Foreign trade turnover, 
mln.$USD 
    CIS (%) 
    rest of the world (%) 
3083 
 
na 
na 
5662.2
 
61.2 
38.8 
6612.6
 
38.4 
61.6 
9311.3
 
27.6 
73.4 
6816.9
 
26.9 
73.1 
6212.1 
 
37 
63 
5.830 
 
32.4 
67.6 
Export, mln.$USD 
 
   CIS (%) 
   rest of the world (%) 
1424 
 
82 
18 
3087.4
 
52.6 
47.4 
3719.9
 
34.5 
65.5 
4590.2
 
22.9 
77.1 
3528,2
 
26 
74 
3264.7 
 
35.9 
64,1 
3.260 
 
26.5 
73.5 
Import, mln.$USD 
 
   CIS (%) 
   rest of the world (%) 
1659 
 
43.7 
56.3 
2556.1
 
53.3 
46.7 
2892.7
 
43.5 
56.5 
4721.1
 
32.1 
67.9 
3288.7
 
27.8 
72.2 
2947.4 
 
38.2 
61.8 
2.570 
 
38.2 
61.8 
Balance, mln.$USD 
 
   with CIS  
   with rest of the world 
-235 
 
na 
na 
550 
 
736.6 
-186.6 
827.2 
 
13.9 
803.3 
-130.9 
 
467.1 
336.2 
239.5 
 
1.6 
237.9 
317.3 
 
46.6 
270.7 
690 
 
-117.84 
572.16 
 
 
Table (b). Structure of Merchandise Export and Import in Uzbekistan, % of total 
 
 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 2000 
 
2002 2003
Export 
    cotton fibre 
    chemicals and plastic 
    ferrous and non-ferrous metals 
    machine and equipment 
    foodstuff 
    energy products 
    services 
    others 
 
62.8 
6.07 
9.22 
7 
2.54 
6.72 
na 
5.65 
 
50 
2.4 
2.7 
3.4 
3.4 
14.6 
4.5 
18.7 
 
57.9 
2.9 
5.6 
2.5 
2.5 
14 
9.3 
25.5 
 
38.1 
2.4 
3.5 
2.8 
2.8 
6 
8.3 
34.4 
 
36 
1.7 
4.6 
6.3 
6.3 
12 
8.2 
27.4 
 
27.5 
2.9 
6.6 
3.4 
3.4 
10.3 
13.8 
30.2 
 
 
22.4 
3 
na 
3.9 
3.5 
8.1 
15.9 
36.8 
 
19.8 
3.1 
na 
5.9 
2.7 
9.8 
14.4 
37.9 
Import 
    foodstuffs 
    chemicals and plastic 
    ferrous and non-ferrous metals 
    machine and equipment 
    energy products 
    services 
    others 
 
46.4 
5.65 
8.78 
5.2 
13.29
na 
20.68
 
31.5 
6.2 
8.5 
16.2 
13.5 
0.3 
22 
 
18.2 
9.3 
5.7 
47.9 
1.9 
5 
12 
 
29.5 
12.5 
6.7 
35.8 
1.1 
na 
14.3 
 
19.3 
12.5 
7.5 
45.9 
0.6 
7.5 
6.7 
 
12.3 
13.6 
8.6 
35.4 
3.8 
8.5 
17.8 
 
12.5 
15.1 
8 
41.4 
1.3 
10.6 
11.1 
 
9.9 
12.8 
7.9 
44.4 
2.7 
10.2 
12.1 
 
Source: Sirajiddinov N. Uzbekistan. Put k Eksportoorientirovannomu Razvitiyu. Magazine Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mejdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 
2002, No 7; Shadiyev R. Vneshneekonomicheskaya Deyatelnost Uzbekistana: Retrospektiva i Perspektivy Razvitiya. Magazine Halqaro 
Munosabatlar, 2001, No 3; WTO International Trade Stastistics 2004; Uzbekistan’s Foreign Trade Reaches $6.68 bln. in 2003, www.uzreport.com. 
22 March 2004. 
 
 
 306
Annex 5.2 
 
Domestic Prices on Selected Consumer Imports under Protectionist Policy in Uzbekistan,  
late 1990s∗ 
 
 
 
Pd - domestic prices, Pw - world prices 
 
Source: Sirajiddinov N., Gulyamov R. Reforma Vneshnetorgovoy Politiki v Protsesse Liberalizatsii Valyutnogo Rynka 
Uzbekistana. Magazine Halqaro Munosabatlar, 2001, No 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ These differences are estimates and to show price divergencies, as a result of restrictive foreign exchange and trade 
policies in the country in the recent past. On the other hand, it also justifies the necessity of appropriate adjustment in 
trade policy after the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions on 15 October, 2003. 
Merchandise Group Index of Actual 
Difference,  
Pd/Pw (%) 
Customs Rates 
  Excise on 
Imports (%) 
 
Customs Duty 
(%) 
VAT on 
Imports (%) 
Video- and audio 
appliances 
210 45 30 20 
Grain products 156 10 20 20 
Macarones 168 20 20 20 
Fruit juices 198 35 30 20 
Soft drinks 198 35 30 20 
Bier 210 45 30 20 
Perfumes 174 15 30 20 
Detergent and cleaning 
means 
180 20 30 20 
Leather products 168 20 20 20 
Up-wear and hat from 
natural fur 
174 25 20 20 
Carpet and carpet 
products 
264 90 30 24 
Cloth and related knitted 
wear (except children’s 
wear) 
174 15 30 20 
Bedding 180 20 30 20 
Ceramic wares 180 20 30 20 
Jewelry from precious 
stones and metals 
264 90 30 20 
Furniture 174 15 30 20 
Chandelier and light 
equipment 
168 10 30 20 
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Annex 5.3 
 
 
The Key Factors of International Investments and Credits to Uzbekistan∗ 
 
Macroeconomic Factors Microeconomic Factors 
 
Socio-Political and Cultural Factors 
I. Government Policies 
     
a) Fiscal and Tax 
b) Monetary 
c) Financial 
d) Foreign Economic 
e) Social 
f) Infrastructure 
 
I. Specific Factors Which 
Provide a Firm With 
Exclusively Advantageous 
Position on the Market 
 
a) Differentiation in Supply 
of Goods 
b) Market Proficiency and 
Management 
c) Technological 
Advancement 
d) Property Rights 
 
I. General 
 
a) Political Stability and Security 
b) Political Behaviour in the Society 
c) Democratic Values 
II. Factors of Business Cycle 
      
a) Growth of Exports 
b) Growth of GDP 
c) Absorptive Capacities 
of Host Countries 
 
II. Low Production Costs 
 
a) Economies of Scale  
b) Standartization of Goods 
 
II. Credibility of State Machine 
 
a) Confidence in government actions 
b) Well-educated, reform-oriented 
government bureaucracy 
c) Good governance (exclusion of red 
tape, bribery) 
d) Transparent and consistent 
decision-making process 
 
III. Exogenous Factors 
  
a) Economic Growth in 
Main and Non-Main 
Trade Partners 
b) Stability on World 
Markets/World 
Economy 
c) Interest Rates 
III. Comparative Advantages 
 
a) Cheap and Qualified 
Labor Force 
b) Relatively High MPC 
c) Sustainable and Solvent 
Consumer Demand 
d) Proximity to Domestic 
Consumers and Suppliers 
 
III. Efficient Judicial System 
 
a) Rule of Law 
b) Sustainable Legislation  
c) Democratization of Courts 
System 
       
 IV. Lower Operational Costs 
   
a) Taxation 
b) Licensing 
c) Infrastructure 
 
IV. Environmental Issues 
 
 V. Evaluation Indicators 
 
a) Differences in Returns 
b) Differences in Risks 
 
V. Socio-Cultural Factors 
 
a) Nationality of  Investors 
b) Cultural Menthality of 
Recipient Countries 
 VI. Marketing  
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ In the given case, international investments include capital movements through private, bi- and multilateral channels. 
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Annex 6.1 
 
Regionalism in Developing World 
 
Reasons of Failure 
 
Lessons 
Insufficient interests of the leadership Reinforcement of political value added from 
regionalism 
 
Unpreparedness of the members to repudiate 
unilateral national policy measures 
 
Prove the advantages of joint steps  
Introduction of unilateral trade restrictions to 
behave in new liberalized conditions 
 
Principle of reciprocity and coordination 
Unfair distribution of costs and benefits More equal allocation of costs and benefits of 
integration 
 
Traditional orientation of trade toward former 
parent state* 
Regional integration coordinates with 
multilateral trade system 
 
Cultural and ideological divergences Stronger reciprocal exchange may relieve 
natural estrangement 
 
Poor tax system enforce the governments to 
rely upon customs receipts 
Better governance and optimization of policies 
in the public finance area 
 
Differences in basic socio-economic indicators 
(per capita income, productivity, structure of 
economy, etc.) 
 
Assistance to regional development through 
specific programs and projects 
Prevalence of import-substitution over outward 
development strategy 
 
Enhancement of open door policy 
Setbacks to movement of production factors Necessity of measures to encourage factor 
mobility 
 
Macroeconomic impediments (inflation, 
negative balance of payments, budget deficit, 
etc.) 
 
Measures to keep up macroeconomic stability 
Low level of integration at the outset of the 
integration process 
Structural flexibility through higher trade 
specialization; improvement of the structure of 
trade and integration agreements 
* - in former colonies 
 
Source: Altvater E. Regionalizatsiya Mirovogo Rynka In Diter H. Regionalnaya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii. 
Zentralstelle fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialentwicklung, Berlin, 1995. p.109 
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Annex 6.2 
 
Intraregional Trade Operations in Central Asia (%) 
 
 1994 
 
2001 
Indicators share in total 
trade 
share in trade 
with CIS 
share in total 
trade 
share in trade 
with CIS 
 
Kazakhstan 
export 5,8 10 3,4 11,3 
import 10,6 15,3 1,8 3,5 
trade turnover 8,6 13,3 2,7 6,9 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
export 41,7 63,6 19,7 55,7 
import 37,7 53,4 32,1 58,4 
trade turnover 39,6 58,1 25,8 57,3 
 
Tadjikistan 
export 9 40,2 14,2 43,6 
import 47,1 72,8 35,7 45,7 
trade turnover 35,1 68,3 25,2 45,1 
 
Uzbekistan 
export 28,2 41,3 9,3 27,2 
import 7,4 13,8 12,8 34,5 
trade turnover 18,7 30,5 11 30,9 
 
Central Asia 
export 15 28,7 6 19,6 
import 16,2 23,1 8,6 17,3 
trade turnover 15,6 25,6 7,2 18,1 
 
Source: Ushakova N. Tsentralno-Aziatskoye Sotrudjestvo – Napravleniya Transformatsii, Magazine Central Asia and 
Caucasus, 2003, No 3, p.146. 
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Annex 6.3 
 
 
Major Trade Exports in Central Asia 
Exports 
From: Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Tajikistan Uzbekistan Xinjiang PRC
Kazakhstan   Petroleum, coal, wheat, 
nonferrous metals, 
chemicals and plastics, 
machinery 
Wheat, flour, 
petroleum 
products, tractors
Gasoline, wheat, 
clothing, chemicals, 
rubber, copper, wool, 
meat 
Steel, ores, 
fertilizer, 
textiles, hides, 
cotton 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Electricity, antimony, 
sulfur, tobacco, ores 
and scrap, textiles 
  Asbestos and 
cement, flour, 
natural gas 
Electricity, meat and 
milk, coal, ores and 
scrap, wool, cloth, sugar, 
medicines 
Hides, wool, 
cotton, metal 
Tajikistan Aluminum, ore, 
ethanol, fruits 
Electricity, ethanol, ore   Electricity, aluminum, rail 
services 
Cotton 
Uzbekistan Natural gas, 
electricity, cotton, 
consumer goods 
Natural gas, fertilizer, 
fuel oil, gasoline 
Petroleum 
products, 
fertilizer, cement, 
fabric 
  Cotton, 
fertilizer, wool 
Xinjiang, 
PRC 
Clothing, food, sugar, 
electronic goods 
Clothing, shoes, 
construction materials 
Cars Clothing, shoes, 
electronics 
  
 
Source: Asian Development Bank, Regional Economic Cooperation in Central Asia, July 1998.  
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Annex 6.4 
 
 
Factor of Distance for Central Asian Exports 
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